JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Mewha, E. ( 2015 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
ASSOCIATION PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
ERIC MEWHA
No. 1415 EDA 2014
APPEAL OF: INTERVENORS, MELISSA
AND DARRIN DOUGHERTY
Appeal from the Order April 30, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Civil Division at No(s): 2013-11685
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., and OTT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED MARCH 30, 2015
Appellants, Melissa and Darrin Dougherty appeal from the order
entered April 30, 2014, denying their Emergency Motion to Intervene in JP
Morgan Chase Bank, National Association’s mortgage foreclosure action.
After review, we affirm.
The undisputed facts of this case are as follows. On November 25,
2013, Appellee JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association filed a complaint
in mortgage foreclosure against Eric Mewha, who was in default of monthly
payments due under a mortgage recorded on property located at 4205
Springhouse Lane, Aston, Pennsylvania. The trial court entered default
judgment against Mewha on February 14, 2014. Thereafter, on April 13,
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2014, the court amended the judgment to include additional sums sought by
JP Morgan Chase Bank.
On April 13, 2014, after the entry of the amended default judgment,
Melissa and Darren Dougherty filed an Emergency Motion to Intervene in
Relation to an Upcoming Sheriff’s Sale and or Eviction. Appellants alleged in
the petition that on April 9, 2012, they entered a “lease to own agreement”
with Mewha with respect to the mortgaged property, which was set to
mature in 2015. They requested to join the dispute as a party to have their
alleged interest in the property protected. Following a hearing, the trial
court denied Appellants’ petition, on the basis that no pending matter
existed in which petitioners could intervene. See Order, 4/29/14. This
timely appeal followed.
Appellants raise the following issues on appeal:
1. Whether the [c]ourt-below [sic] committed reversible error or
abused its discretion by denying the equity based petition to
intervene and the motion to strike given that fatal defects
existed in the foreclosure action rendering the Prothonotary
without jurisdiction to docket the default judgments against
defendant Mewha; thus, the [c]ourt-below [sic] cannot
preclude the Dougherty’s petition to intervene on the sole
basis that it was untimely-filed for having been docketed after
those judgments.
2. Whether the [c]ourt-below [sic] committed reversible error or
abused its discretion by denying the petition to intervene
given that:
a. The petition was indeed filed during the pendency of the
action;
b. The requisites of rule 2327 were satisfied;
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c. Equitable owners are indispensable parties, the absence of
whom divests the [c]ourt of subject matter jurisdiction;
and,
d. It would be inequitable to deny intervention.
3. Whether the [c]ourt-below [sic] committed reversible error or
abused its discretion by deny[ing] the motion to strike given
that:
a. The motion to strike was never addressed by the [c]ourt-
below [sic];
b. The motion to strike was timely filed;
c. Fatal defects are apparent in the record of the foreclosure
action;
d. The Dougherty’s have a meritorious claim in the dispute[.]
Appellants’ Brief at 4.
As a general rule, an appeal will not lie from an order
denying intervention, because such an order is not a final
determination of the claim made by the would-be intervenor.
However, in some cases, the order denying intervention has the
practical effect of denying relief to which the intervenor is
entitled and which he can obtain in no other way. Such an order
will be deemed final, and an appeal therefrom will be allowed. In
order to determine the appealability of an order denying
intervention, therefore, one must examine the ramifications of
the order to determine whether it constitutes a practical denial of
relief to which the petitioner for intervention is entitled and
which he can obtain in no other way.
Often, it is necessary to examine the merits of an
appellant’s petition in order to determine whether the court’s
order results in a practical denial of relief to which the appellant
is entitled but which can be secured in no other way.
First Commonwealth Bank v. Heller, 863 A.2d 1153, 1155 (Pa. Super.
2004) (citation omitted). See also Pa.R.A.P. 341, note (recognizing an
order denying a party the right to intervene is no longer appealable as a final
order).
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Before we address the merits of Appellants’ motion to intervene, we
must first address the timeliness of the motion. Pursuant to Pennsylvania
Rule of Civil Procedure 2327, a petition for leave to intervene must be filed
during the pendency of the action. “After final adjudication, a petition to
intervene is too late.” Newberg by Newberg v. Board of Public Educ.,
478 A.2d 1352, 1354-1355 (Pa. Super. 1984) (citations omitted). A motion
to intervene filed after final adjudication should be denied except in
“extraordinary circumstances.” Jackson v. Hendrick, 446 A.2d 226, 278
(Pa. 1982) (citations omitted).
Here, the trial court entered default judgment against Eric Mewha on
February 14, 2014, and amended the judgment on April 3, 2014. Appellants
did not file their motion to intervene until after the court amended the final
judgment, and several weeks after the court initially entered default
judgment in this matter. It is undisputed that Appellants were aware of the
foreclosure action as early as December 18, 2013, but waited until after the
entry of final judgment to file their motion to intervene. See Appellants’
Reproduced Record at 63a (email dated 12/18/13 from Appellants’ attorney
indicating notice received regarding foreclosure action).
Appellants delayed intervention in this matter at their peril.
Accordingly, we find no extraordinary circumstances such that would excuse
their untimely attempt at intervention. We therefore find no error in the trial
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court’s order denying Appellants’ untimely motion to intervene.1, 2
See
Financial Freedom, SFC v. Cooper, 21 A.3d 1229 (Pa. Super. 2011)
(affirming order denying untimely motion to intervene filed after entry of
default judgment in mortgage foreclosure case).
Appellants alternatively argue that they are indispensable parties to
the underlying mortgage foreclosure action. See Appellants’ Brief at 21-22.
Pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 2227, a “[p]erson[ ] having only a joint interest in the
subject matter of an action must be joined on the same side as plaintiffs or
defendants.”
As a general rule, an indispensable party is one whose rights are
so connected with the claims of the litigants that no decree can
be made without impairing its rights. Appellate courts have
consistently held that property owners are indispensable parties
in lawsuits concerning the owners' property rights.
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1
Appellants additionally argue that the entry of default judgment was void
because the prothonotary allegedly failed to send Mewha appropriate notice
of judgment pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 236. See Appellants’ Brief at 15.
Appellants raise this issue for the first time on appeal, and, therefore, it is
waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Nonetheless, we note that we find no
evidence that the prothonotary failed to comply with the dictates of Rule
236.
2
To the extent that Appellants sought in their petition to stay the
proceedings or strike the entry of default judgment, our determination that
the trial court correctly denied Appellants’ petition to intervene renders a
discussion of these issues moot. See In re Barnes Foundation, 871 A.2d
792, 794-795 (Pa. 2005) (petitioner’s failure to attain intervenor status
foreclosed his ability to file a cognizable appeal relative to the court’s final
decree).
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The absence of an indispensable party goes absolutely to the
court’s jurisdiction. If an indispensable party is not joined, a
court is without jurisdiction to decide the matter. The absence of
an indispensable party renders any order or decree of the court
null and void. The issue of “the failure to join an indispensable
party” cannot be waived.
Sabella v. Appalachian Development Corp., 103 A.3d 83, 90 (Pa. Super.
2014) (citation omitted).3
Appellants argue that they maintain a possessory interest in the
mortgaged property by virtue of the “lease to own” addendum to the lease
with Mewha. Thus, they contend that “no decree could be made [in this
matter] without impairing their rights[.]” Appellants’ Brief at 22, citing
Commercial Banking Corp. v. Culp, 443 A.2d 1154, 1156 (Pa. Super.
1982). We note at the outset that this Court’s decision in Commercial
Banking Corp. is inapposite to this case. Therein, this Court determined
that the mortgagee, as the “real owner of the property” was an
indispensable party to a mortgage foreclosure action. Commercial
Banking Corp., 443 A.2d at 1156. Herein, it is uncontested that Eric
Mewha – not Appellants – is the real owner of the property subject to the
mortgage foreclosure action.
Although Appellants maintain that they are the equitable owners, if not
the real owners, of the foreclosed property, they provide no case law to
support their claim. Moreover, a close examination of the lease in question
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3
As this issue cannot be waived, we will proceed to examine Appellants’
claim despite their failure to raise it in the court below.
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reveals that, at the time the Appellants sought to intervene in the mortgage
foreclosure action, they had not yet acquired a possessory interest in the
property. On page four of the “Agreement To Rent or Lease” there appears
a handwritten addendum which states that, “after 4/9/13 all additional
money will go into escro[w] toward purchase of house in 2015 or sooner.”
Emergency Petition to Intervene, Exhibit B. This single clause serves as the
basis for Appellants’ contention that they maintained a possessory interest in
the property. However, the clause clearly states that the money will be
maintained in an escrow account for the purchase of the home “in 2015 or
sooner.” Appellants do not contend that they purchased the home prior to
the mortgage foreclosure action or the filing of the motion to intervene.
Therefore, as Appellants had not yet acquired a possessory interest in the
property at the time the mortgage foreclosure action had commenced, JP
Morgan Chase Bank was not required to join them as an indispensable party.
See Financial Freedom, SFC, supra, at 1232 (“[O]nce a foreclosure has
been commenced, any person or entity acquiring an interest in the property
will be bound by decree and need not be joined.”) (citation omitted). As
such, we disagree that Appellants qualify as indispensable parties to the
underlying action.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/30/2015
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