In Re: Adoption of P.J., minor, Appeal of: D.A. ( 2015 )

J-S17045-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF P.J., MINOR CHILD : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: D.A., FATHER : No. 1949 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Order October 29, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County
Orphans’ Court at No(s): 63-14-226
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P. J., SHOGAN, J., AND FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED APRIL 1, 2015
Appellant, D.A. (“Father”), appeals from the order entered in the
Washington County Court of Common Pleas, which involuntarily terminated
his parental rights to his minor child, P.J. (“Child”). We affirm.
In its opinion, the trial court fully set forth the relevant facts of this
case. Therefore, we have no reason to restate them. Procedurally, Child
was adjudicated dependent on June 19, 2012. On February 21, 2014,
Washington County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) filed a petition for
involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights to Child.1 The court held
a hearing on the petition on September 5, 2014. On October 29, 2014, the
court entered an order involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights to
Child. Father filed a timely notice of appeal on November 26, 2014, along
1
The petition also sought to terminate the parental rights of M.R.
(“Mother”), who is not a party to this appeal. Following a hearing, the court
terminated Mother’s parental rights by a separate order filed on July 22,
2014.
___________________________
*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i).
Father raises the following issues for our review:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TERMINATING
[FATHER’S] PARENTAL RIGHTS PURSUANT TO SECTIONS
2511(a)(1) and (2) OF THE ADOPTION ACT.
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE TERMINATION OF [FATHER’S] PARENTAL RIGHTS
SERVED THE CHILD’S NEEDS AND WELFARE UNDER
SECTION 2511(b) OF THE ADOPTION ACT.
(Father’s Brief at 5).
The standard and scope of review applicable in termination of parental
rights cases are as follows:
When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating
parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the
decision of the trial court is supported by competent
evidence. Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law,
or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s
decision, the decree must stand. Where a trial court has
granted a petition to involuntarily terminate parental
rights, this Court must accord the hearing judge’s decision
the same deference that it would give to a jury verdict.
We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the
record in order to determine whether the trial court’s
decision is supported by competent evidence.
Furthermore, we note that the trial court, as the finder of
fact, is the sole determiner of the credibility of witnesses
and all conflicts in testimony are to be resolved by [the]
finder of fact. The burden of proof is on the party seeking
termination to establish by clear and convincing evidence
the existence of grounds for doing so.
The standard of clear and convincing evidence means
testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing
as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,
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without hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.
We may uphold a termination decision if any proper basis
exists for the result reached. If the trial court’s findings
are supported by competent evidence, we must affirm the
court’s decision, even though the record could support an
opposite result.
In re Adoption of K.J., 936 A.2d 1128, 1131-32 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal
denied, 597 Pa. 718, 951 A.2d 1165 (2008) (internal citations omitted).
CYS sought the involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights on
the following grounds:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in
regard to a child may be terminated after a petition
filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a
period of at least six months immediately
preceding the filing of the petition either has
evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing
parental claim to a child or has refused or
failed to perform parental duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has
caused the child to be without essential
parental care, control or subsistence necessary
for his physical or mental well-being and the
conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
* * *
(b) Other considerations.—The court in
terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary
consideration to the developmental, physical and
emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the
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basis of environmental factors such as inadequate
housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical
care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
With respect to any petition filed pursuant to
subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the
conditions described therein which are first initiated
subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the
petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)-(2), (b). “Parental rights may be involuntarily
terminated where any one subsection of Section 2511(a) is satisfied, along
with consideration of the subsection 2511(b) provisions.” In re Z.P., 994
A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa.Super. 2010).
Under Section 2511(b), the court must consider whether termination
will best serve the child’s needs and welfare. In re C.P., 901 A.2d 516
(Pa.Super. 2006). “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability
are involved when inquiring about the needs and welfare of the child.” Id.
at 520. “In this context, the court must take into account whether a bond
exists between child and parent, and whether termination would destroy an
existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.” In re Z.P., supra at 1121.
When conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not
required to use expert testimony. Social workers and
caseworkers can offer evaluations as well. Additionally,
Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
“The statute permitting the termination of parental rights outlines
certain irreducible minimum requirements of care that parents must provide
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for their children, and a parent who cannot or will not meet the requirements
within a reasonable time following intervention by the state, may properly be
considered unfit and may properly have his…rights terminated.” In re
B.L.L., 787 A.2d 1007, 1013 (Pa.Super. 2001).
There is no simple or easy definition of parental
duties. Parental duty is best understood in relation
to the needs of a child. A child needs love,
protection, guidance, and support. These needs,
physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely
passive interest in the development of the child.
Thus, this court has held that the parental obligation
is a positive duty which requires affirmative
performance.
This affirmative duty encompasses more than a
financial obligation; it requires continuing interest in
the child and a genuine effort to maintain
communication and association with the child.
Because a child needs more than a benefactor,
parental duty requires that a parent exert himself to
take and maintain a place of importance in the
child’s life.
Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively
with good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every
problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship
to the best of his…ability, even in difficult circumstances.
A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve
the parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable
firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of
maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental rights
are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or
convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities
while others provide the child with [the child’s] physical
and emotional needs.
Where a parent is incarcerated, the fact of incarceration
does not, in itself, provide grounds for the termination of
parental rights. However, a parent’s responsibilities are
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not tolled during incarceration. The focus is on whether
the parent utilized resources available while in prison to
maintain a relationship with his…child. An incarcerated
parent is expected to utilize all available resources to
foster a continuing close relationship with his…children.
In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 582 Pa.
718, 872 A.2d 1200 (2005) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
“[A] parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of
his…child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his…parental duties, to the
child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of his…potential in a
permanent, healthy, safe environment.” Id. at 856.
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Katherine B.
Emery, we conclude Father’s issues merit no relief. The trial court opinion
comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions
presented. (See Trial Court Opinion, filed 12/17/14, at 5-8) (finding: Father
never provided primary or even occasional parental care to Child; Father has
been incarcerated for most of Child’s life; Father was briefly out of jail in
August 2013, and visit was arranged, but Father did not appear; Father
sporadically participated in juvenile dependency hearings via telephone or
video conferencing; Father routinely violated his parole, resulting in
numerous penalties; Father failed to make significant efforts to treat his
drug and alcohol addictions; Father completed one parenting course and
several drug treatment programs but did not complete mental health
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treatment and evaluation or anger management programs; while
incarcerated, Father saw Child only once, after petition for termination of
parental rights had already been filed; Father was released from jail in
August 2014; Father testified he is not ready to assume custody of Child but
instead would like Child to live with Father’s parents for initial period of six
months; Child’s foster family is attentive to needs of Child, and Child has
progressed significantly in foster home; Child is very close with sister, who
also resides in foster home; Child demonstrates no particular attachment to
Father outside of their visits; Child would experience little to no negative
effect from severance of parental relationship; since his release from prison,
Father has had no steady source of legitimate income; Father failed to make
significant efforts to achieve financial and personal stability; CYS proved by
clear and convincing evidence that Father’s instability and continued
involvement in use and/or sale of illegal drugs has caused Child to be
without essential parental care, control, and subsistence necessary for
Child’s physical or mental well-being; evidence is clear and convincing that
Father cannot or will not remedy conditions that led to termination of his
parental rights, and termination will best serve Child’s needs and welfare).
Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court opinion.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/1/2015
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Copies: Joyce Hatfield-Wise, Esq.; Tamora Reese, Esq.; MariAnn Hathaway, Esq.
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Emery, J. December 17, 2014
OPINION PURSUANT TO PA. R.A.P. 1925 (a}
This case came before the Court on a Petition for the Involuntary Termination of Parental
Rights filed by Washington County Children and Youth Social Services Agency (CYS). The
petition, filed on February 21, 2014, sought to terminate the parental rights of D. It. (~f~th,e,;··),
natural father to the child, P.J. After several continuances, the hearing was held on September 5,
2014. The Father was present and represented by counsel. The child was represented by a
Guardian ad Litem appointed by the Court. Suggested Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
were submitted to the Court on behalf of CYS and the Father; the Guardian ad Litem submitted a
written position statement. The Court granted the Petition on October 29, 2014 and terminated
the Father's rights to P.J. This timely appeal ensued.
I. FACTS
Feith.ft' is the biological father of P.J., who was born on January 11, 2006, age 8.
The biological mother is · M. J2.. , whose parental rights were terminated on July 22,
2014. The child was first adjudicated dependent on November 13, 2007; she was placed in foster
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care from September 9, 2007 until March 3, 2009, when she was returned to the home of her
mother. (Exhibit 1 Orders of November 13, 2007 and March 3, 2009; T.T. p. 7) The Father was
incarcerated during the eighteen month period of placement. (Exhibit 1; Order of March 3, 2009;
T.T. p. 8) The case was subsequently closed. CYS again became involved with the family in
2012. The child was placed in emergency shelter care on May 7, 2012 when the Pennsylvania
State of Police took protective custody of the child after the police arrested the Mother and her
husband for domestic violence and Mother tested positive for cocaine. (Exhibit 1 - Court Order
May 7, 2012). The child was adjudicated dependent on June 19, 2012 and has remained in foster
care since. At the time of the shelter hearing, the Father was incarcerated. (Exhibit 1 - Court
Order May 7, 2012). Since the child's placement in May of 2012, Father has been out of jail
only for a few months.
Father's criminal history centers on drugs; the Father has multiple convictions for
misdemeanor drug charges and one felony for the sale of cocaine and a felony escape conviction
for failure to returnto a halfway house. (T.T. pp. 32-41; Exhibit 3) Father has lacked
compliance with his parole, resulting in numerous parole violation penalties. Father did not visit
with the child from the date of placement in May of2012 until July 27, 2014, when a visit
occurred at the Allegheny County Jail. (T.T. p. 27) He was briefly out of jail in August of 2013
and a visit was arranged but he did not appear. (T.T. pp. 9, 49) The Father sporadically
participated in the juvenile dependency hearings via telephone or video conferencing. (Exhibit 1)
The Father was ordered by Juvenile Court, upon his release, to complete a drug and alcohol
evaluation and follow through with treatment, to begin visits with his daughter and to obtain
appropriate housing. (Exhibit 1; Court Orders June 19, 2012; October 15, 2013). Father was
also ordered to complete parenting classes and anger management. The Father did complete a
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parenting program entitled Inside Out Dad Parenting Program while in the Allegheny County
Jail. (Exhibit A; T.T. p. 58) Father has participated in numerous drug treatment programs; he has
not completed mental health treatment and evaluation and anger management. (T.T. pp. 15, 58)
The Father was released from jail in August of 2014. He has had supervised visitation with the
child since then.
The child is in the third grade. She has exhibited significant behavioral problems and
mental health issues in the past. She currently is receiving mental health treatment including
mobile therapy, case management and counseling and school support, including wrap around
services of a TSS Worker. (T.T. pp. 14, 110) She was placed in her current home in February
2014; it was the sixth placement since she was removed from her mother's care in May of 2012.
(T.T. p. 96) Her behaviors have improved while in this home. Her sister A.K., age seven, is also
placed in this home. P.J. and her sister have a positive and close relationship. (T.T. p. 13) The
foster parents desire to adopt both P.J. and A.K. (T.T. p. 14)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In order to grant the Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, the Court
must find that the moving party provides a clear and convincing evidence of one of the grounds
enumerated in the petition. In re: J.D.W.M., 810 A.2d 688 (Pa. Super. 2002). The clear and
convincing evidence standard means testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as
to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitation, of the truth of the
precise facts in issue. Id.; In Re: Julissa 0., 746 A.2d 1137 (Pa. Super. 2002). The petition
alleged that the Father's rights should be terminated pursuant to sections 1 and 2 of §2511 of the
Adoption Act enumerated as follows:
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(1) A parent, by conduct continued for a period of at least six months immediately
preceding the filing of the petition, either has evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental
duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has
caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well being, and the conditions and causes of
the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the
parent.
23 Pa. C.S.A. 2511 (a) (1) and (2)
The Court's examination is a two part test. The Court must determine if CYS has
established by clear and convincing evidence if the Father's conduct satisfies any of the grounds
delineated in §2511 (a) (1) and (2). If so, then the Court must determine, pursuant to §2511 (b)
that the termination of the parental rights will best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
III. ISSUES ON APPEAL
The Appellant asserts in his Statements of Matters Complained of on Appeal that "the
trial court committed an error of law and/or abuse of discretion ... in terminating Natural
Father's rights to his minor child pursuant to Section 251 l(a)(l)(2)(5) and (8) of the Adoption
and in finding the termination of the Natural Father's parental rights to his minor child best
served the child's needs and welfare under Section 251 l(b) of the Adoption Act." (Record
No. ) The Court will first note that the Petition seeks to terminate Appellant's rights pursuant
to Section (1) and (2) and NOT (5) and (8) as claimed in the Concise Statement. As the issues
on appeal asserted by the Appellant are general in nature, the Court sets forth its Rationale for
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the decision as a full and complete response to the Appellant's Statement of Matters Complained
of on Appeal.
IV. RATIONALE
The Father has been incarcerated throughout most of the child's life. It is well settled
that incarceration, in of itself, is not grounds for termination; however, the duties and
responsibilities of a parent are not tolled during incarceration. In re: J.I.R, 808 A.2d 934 (Pa.
Super. 2002). An incarcerated father is expected to utilize all resources available to him to
maintain a relationship with his child. In re: C.S., 761 A.2d 1197 (Pa. Super. 2000). Pursuant to
§2511 (a) (2), the question before the Court is whether CYS has established by clear and
convincing evidence that the repeated and continued incapacity, neglect or refusal of the Father
has caused the child to be without essential parental care necessary for her well-being, and the
conditions and causes of the neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the Father. The
Father has never provided primary parental care to this child, nor has he provided even
occasional parental care. The Father has been incarcerated for most of the child's life. Although
he was out of prison at the time of the hearing, the Father stated that he is still not ready to
assume custody of his daughter but rather wants her to be placed with his mother and he could
have regular contact with her. (T.T. p. S 1) The Father is not currently in a drug and alcohol
treatment program. He has been in both in-patient, out-patient and prison-based treatment
programs in the past but is not in a program at this time. Father was previously receiving Social
Security Disability and is seeking to have it reinstated since his release from prison. The
Father's instability, not having a residence and employment, throughout the child's life and the
Father's continued involvement in the use and/or sale of illegal drugs has caused this child to be
without her Father's care. Those conditions and causes have not yet been remedied and they are
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not likely to be remedied in a reasonable period of time. The child has been in foster care for
two and one-half years. As expressed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, there is no simple
definition of parental duties. They have defined parental duty as follows: "Parenting duty is best
understood in relation to the needs of a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance and
support. These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be met by merely passive interest in the
development of the child ... parental obligation is a positive duty which requires affirmative
performance; ... parental duty requires that a parent "exert himself to take and maintain a place
of importance in the child's life." In Re: Bums, 474 Pa. 615, 624, 379 A.2d 535, 540 (1977); In
Re: B .•N.M., supra. The Father has simply not performed any parental duty except that he loves
the child. But she needs and deserves more. CYS has met its burden of proof in proving §2511
(a) (2).
Pursuant to §2511 (a) (1), the question before the Court is whether CVS presented clear
and convincing evidence that the Father, during the six month period prior to the filing of the
petition on February 21, 2014, has failed to perform his parental duty or evidenced a settled
purpose of relinquishing his parental rights. The Agency does not have to prove that Father has
evidenced both failure to perform parental duties and evidence a settled purpose of relinquishing
his rights; one of these grounds is sufficient. In Re: C.M.S., (1), 832 A.2d 457 (Pa. Super. 2003).
Similar to the analysis set forth above, the Court finds that the Father has failed to perform his
parental duties. During the six months prior to filing of the TPR Petition on February 21, 2014,
the Father was incarcerated but did not request any visits at the jail. The Father did not request
visitation until after the filing of the petition. While the Father attempted to send cards to the
child, the letters were not received. The Father never petitioned the dependency court to insure
that he could maintain contact. Father's explanation for his lack of involvement was that he
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believed his mother was in contact with both CYS and the child's Mother and he was of the
understanding that the child was going to be returned to her mother and that he did not need to
do anything. In fact, his Mother was not visiting with the child. (T.T. p. 112) Being a parent
requires affirmative action. "Parents are required to make diligent efforts toward the reasonably
prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities." In the Interest of A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326 (Pa.
Super. 2002). The Father has not made diligent efforts. The Court finds that CYS has met its
burden and established §2511 (a) (1) that the Father's actions has caused the child to be without
parental care and the conditions and causes will not be remedied.
In addition to establishing the grounds for termination in§ (1) or (2) of §2511 (a), CYS
must also establish that the child's needs and interests will be best served by termination of the
Father's parental rights. In re: LG., 939 A.2d 950, 2007 Pa. Super. 394. The Court must "give
primary consideration to the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the
child." 23 Pa. C.S.A. §2511 (b). The Court must consider the intangibles oflove, comfort,
security and stability and must probe the nature of the parent-child bond and the effects of the
severance of that bond. In re: C.M.S .• II, 84 A.2d 1284, 2005 Pa. Super. 340. The child resides
with her sister A.K. in a pre-adoptive home. While A.K. is not Father's biological child, he
considers her to be his child as well and recognizes that the two girls should remain together. (T.
T. pp. 43,56) The Mother's rights have already been terminated. (T.T. p. 6) The child desires to
remain in her current placement. (T.T. p. 98) The child enjoys seeing her Father but that alone is
not evidence of a bond. The child has referred to at least three people as Daddy; those persons
are her Father and two other men who had relationships with the Mother. (T.T. pp. 17, 100) The
child doesn't ask about her Father nor has she expressed, outside of the visits, any interest in
him. The Pennsylvania Superior Court has held "the mere existence of an emotional bond does
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not preclude the termination of parental rights." In the Interest ofK.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa.
Super. 2012). The Court Appointed Special Advocate (GASA), Marilyn Montecalvo, opined
that a bond exists between the Father and child but it is not a significant one. (T.T. p. 100) The
CASA supported the termination of parental rights petition. (Exhibit 4) The child recognizes her
Father and recognizes others as a Father, or as a father figure. She has had very limited contact
with him throughout her life. The caseworker opined that there was no bond in existence
between Father and child; the child merely enjoys a friendly relationship with him. (T.T. p. 17-
18) Lastly and importantly, the Guardian Ad Litem supported the termination, informing the
Court that the child has expressed a desire to remain in the current placement and that remaining
there and being adopted is in her best interest. (Position of Guardian Ad Litem filed October 29,
2014) The Court found that the bond between Father and child is not a strong or meaningful
one for the child and she will experience little or no negative or detrimental effects by severing
the parental relationship.
In conclusion, the evidence established, by a clear and convincing standard, that the
Father failed to perform parental duties for at least six months (§1), that the Father showed a
repeated and continued incapacity or refusal which has caused the child to be without essential
parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for her physical and mental well-being, and that
those conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the Father (§2). The evidence also established by a clear and convincing standard
that the best interests of the child would be served by this termination. Therefore, the Court
granted the Petition for the Involuntary Termination of the Parental Rights of the Father, D.A.
, to the child, P .J.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Court's Opinion and Final Decree of October 29, 2014 should be affirmed.
BY THE COURT:
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