Com. v. Stewart, S. ( 2019 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
SHAWN A. STEWART :
:
Appellant : No. 1376 MDA 2018
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 27, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-22-CR-0005521-2014
BEFORE: OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED JUNE 11, 2019
Appellant, Shawn A. Stewart, appeals from the order entered on July
27, 2018, dismissing his first petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction
Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Although we leave Appellant’s
convictions undisturbed, we vacate the punishments imposed as part of
Appellant’s judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing consistent with
this memorandum.
On direct appeal, we briefly summarized the facts of this case as follows:
[I]n the two years leading up to early January 2014, Appellant and
[S.M.1] were engaged in a “friends with benefits” relationship. As
of January 2014, [S.M] lived in a Middletown, Pennsylvania
townhome with her 13-year old twin sons. In the two months
leading up to January 6, 2014, [S.M.’s] father [(“Father”)] lived
with [S.M.] and her sons after moving to Middletown from Puerto
Rico.
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1 We use the victim’s initials to protect her identity.
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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On the morning of Monday, January 6, 2014, [S.M.] was at work
and her sons were at school when [Father] heard a knock on the
front door of the townhome. He opened the door to find two males
and one female who asked for [S.M.]. When [Father] explained
she was not there, the three entered the home uninvited. One
intruder put a gun to [Father’s] chest, ordered him to the floor,
zip-tied his wrists behind him, and placed an item over his head.
The other two intruders went upstairs and ransacked [S.M.’s]
bedroom and [Father’s] bedroom before leaving the home with a
small blue suitcase belonging to [Father].
[Father] was able to leave the home and summon assistance from
a neighbor who called the police. The police, in turn, called [S.M.]
who returned to the home. In the course of discussions with the
police, [S.M.] explained that she had fabricated a story—playing
to Appellant's perpetual interest in money—telling Appellant she
was traveling to Puerto Rico over the January 3-5 weekend to
conduct business for her father and she was returning to
Middletown with $87,000 in a locked bag.
Following a police investigation, Appellant was arrested and
charged with burglary, robbery, conspiracy and other crimes.
Following trial, a jury found Appellant guilty of all ten counts
against him.[2] On August 3, 2015, the trial court sentenced
Appellant to consecutive terms of imprisonment totaling not less
than 28 years nor more than 56 years in a state correctional
institution, plus fines totaling $4,000.[00.] Each of the sentences
fell within the standard range for the crime committed.
Commonwealth v. Stewart, 2016 WL 5266553, at *1 (Pa. Super. 2016)
(unpublished memorandum). This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of
sentence in an unpublished memorandum on July 25, 2016. Appellant did not
file a petition for allowance of appeal with our Supreme Court.
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2Appellant was convicted of robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, burglary,
conspiracy to commit burglary, conspiracy to commit unlawful restraint,
conspiracy to commit false imprisonment, recklessly endangering another
person, simple assault, theft by unlawful taking, and criminal use of
communication facility.
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On August 22, 2017, Appellant filed a timely, counseled PCRA petition.
On September 5, 2017, at the PCRA court’s direction, counsel for Appellant
filed an amended PCRA petition. On June 29, 2018, the PCRA court issued
notice pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 of its intent to dismiss the PCRA petition,
along with a memorandum opinion setting forth its reasons for denying
Appellant relief. On July 27, 2018, the PCRA court filed an order dismissing
Appellant’s PCRA petition. This appeal resulted.3
On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
I. Whether the PCRA court committed reversible error by
dismissing [Appellant’s] PCRA claim that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to and/or request any
remedial measures following the prejudicial closing
argument by the Commonwealth, which included
misrepresentation of testimony, misleading inferences[,]
and arguing facts not in evidence?
II. Whether the PCRA court committed reversible error by
dismissing [Appellant’s] PCRA claim that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to and/or request an
appropriate cautionary instruction when Detective [Robert]
Appleby improperly offered his personal opinion as to the
guilt of [Appellant] and that he was observed in one of the
vehicles?
III. Whether the PCRA court committed reversible error by
dismissing [Appellant’s] PCRA claim that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to investigate and call defense
witnesses Maritza Melendez and Rickie Hairston at trial?
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3 Appellant filed a notice of appeal on August 16, 2018. The PCRA court
directed Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant complied timely. On September 14,
2018, the PCRA court filed an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) relying
upon its earlier June 29, 2018 decision for its rationale in denying Appellant
relief.
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IV. Whether the PCRA court committed reversible error by
dismissing [Appellant’s] PCRA claim that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to request a [jury] instruction that the
identification testimony of the complainant must be received
with caution where he was unable to identify and/or observe
his assailant[?]
V. Whether the PCRA court committed reversible error by
dismissing [Appellant’s] PCRA claim that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to use available impeachment evidence
derived from the police interrogation of [S.M.]?
VI. Whether the PCRA court committed reversible error by
dismissing [Appellant’s] PCRA claim that trial counsel and/or
post-sentence counsel were ineffective for failing to object
to the [trial] court’s application of erroneous sentencing
guidelines?
VII. Whether the PCRA court committed reversible error by
dismissing [Appellant’s] PCRA claim that trial counsel and/or
post-sentence motion counsel were ineffective for failing to
object to the [trial] court’s sentencing of multiple inchoate
crimes of conspiracy, where the evidence revealed that
those conspiracies were part of the same agreement or
continuous conspiratorial relationship?
VIII. Whether the PCRA court committed reversible error by
dismissing [Appellant’s] PCRA claim that trial counsel and/or
post-sentence motion counsel were ineffective for failing to
object to improper sentencing factors, namely [Appellant]
maintaining his innocence as a lack of acceptance of
responsibility and lack of remorse?
IX. Whether the PCRA court committed reversible error by
dismissing [Appellant’s] PCRA claim that trial counsel was
ineffective for standing silent and failing to advocate
whatsoever on behalf of [Appellant] at sentencing,
amounting to a complete abandonment of counsel?
X. Whether the PCRA court abused its discretion by denying an
evidentiary hearing where [Appellant] raised substantive
and material issues of fact regarding trial counsel’s
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ineffectiveness that required the need to determine the
basis for trial counsel’s actions?4
Appellant’s Brief at 4-6 (complete capitalization omitted).
Appellant’s first nine issues challenge trial counsel’s effectiveness. Our
standard of review is as follows:
We must determine whether the PCRA court's ruling is supported
by the record and free of legal error. In examining [] claim[s] of
counsel ineffectiveness, we apply the following principles:
It is well-established that counsel is presumed
effective, and to rebut that presumption, the PCRA
petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's
performance was deficient and that such deficiency
prejudiced him. To prevail on an ineffectiveness claim,
the petitioner has the burden to prove that (1) the
underlying substantive claim has arguable merit; (2)
counsel whose effectiveness is being challenged did
not have a reasonable basis for his or her actions or
failure to act; and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice
as a result of counsel's deficient performance. The
failure to satisfy any one of the prongs will cause the
entire claim to fail.
Commonwealth v. Pou, 201 A.3d 735, 738–739 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation
omitted).
On the first issue we examine, Appellant claims that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to the Commonwealth’s closing argument or to
request appropriate curative jury instructions. Appellant’s Brief at 17-22.
Appellant complains that the Commonwealth’s “closing argument was riddled
with falsities.” Id. at 20. Appellant contends that the Commonwealth, in
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4For ease of discussion and disposition, we have reordered Appellant’s issues
as presented.
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closing, suggested that Appellant was the individual who held Father at
gunpoint, despite the Father’s testimony that he did not see who was holding
the gun. Id. Appellant further maintains that “the prosecutor also argued
facts not in evidence such as that [Appellant] was the ‘ringleader,’ ‘this was
his idea,’ and that historical cell[ular] [tele]phone data placed [Appellant’s]
cell[ular] [tele]phone at the address at the approximate time of the home
invasion.” Id.
This Court has held:
It is axiomatic that during closing arguments the prosecution is
limited to making comments based upon the evidence and fair
deductions and inferences therefrom. Indeed, given the critical
role that the Commonwealth plays in the administration of justice,
a prosecutor has been historically prohibited from expressing a
personal belief regarding a defendant's guilt or innocence or the
veracity of the defendant or the credibility of his witnesses.
However, because trials are necessarily adversarial proceedings,
prosecutors are entitled to present their arguments with
reasonable latitude. Moreover, it is well settled that defendants
are entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one. Thus, a prosecutor's
remarks do not constitute reversible error unless their
unavoidable effect was to prejudice the jury, forming in their
minds fixed bias and hostility toward the defendant so that they
could not weigh the evidence objectively and render a true verdict.
Commonwealth v. Ligon, 2019 WL 1109515, at *3 (Pa. Super. 2019)
(internal citations, quotations, and brackets omitted).
Here, the PCRA court determined that there was no merit to Appellant’s
prosecutorial misconduct claim regarding the Commonwealth’s closing
arguments, opining that “[t]he jury heard ample evidence which supported
the Commonwealth’s [closing] arguments[.]” PCRA Court Opinion,
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6/29/2018, at 8. The PCRA court noted that the jury heard evidence that S.M.
told Appellant about a fictitious money stash held inside the residence at issue.
Id. The Commonwealth presented evidence that Appellant questioned S.M.
about who would be at the house at the time of the crimes and said that he
was “going to get this money.” Id. As such, the trial court determined that
the evidence showed that the home invasion was Appellant’s idea. Id.Further, Father testified that one of the men involved held him at gunpoint.
Id. The Commonwealth also presented Appellant’s cellular telephone data
indicating he was in close proximity to the crimes. Id. Upon our review of
the certified record, we agree with the PCRA court that the Commonwealth’s
closing argument was fairly based upon the evidence presented at trial.
Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury that “[t]he speeches of counsel
are not part of the evidence, and [the jury] should not consider them as such.”
N.T., 6/10/2015, at 192. “It is well settled that the jury is presumed to follow
the trial court's instructions.” Commonwealth v. Vucich, 194 A.3d 1103,
1113 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). For all of the foregoing reasons,
the first issue lacks merit.
Next, Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
object or request a cautionary jury instruction when Detective Robert Appleby
offered his personal opinion as to Appellant’s guilt. Appellant’s Brief at 22-24.
Appellant points to an exchange at trial wherein Detective Appleby testified
about surveillance video showing three vehicles circling the residence at issue
prior to the crimes. Detective Appleby testified that he believed that
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Appellant was in one of those vehicles. Id. at 23-24. Appellant argues that
“[t]here was no evidence elicited at trial, from any source that [Appellant] was
one of the individuals in the aforementioned vehicles[”] and that Detective
Appleby’s “opinion was tantamount to a declaration of his professional opinion
that [Appellant] was guilty as charged.” Id. at 24.
On this claim, the PCRA court opined that this Court “concluded in a
nearly identical claim on direct appeal, Detective Appleby properly testified to
the information gathered during his investigation and presented his conclusion
based upon his experience as a police officer, which testimony the jury was
free to accept or reject.” PCRA Court Opinion, 6/29/2018, at 10. As such,
the PCRA court determined that the issue was previously litigated on direct
appeal and that Appellant was merely re-labeling it and presenting it as a
revised theory of relief in the PCRA setting. Id. at 9.
As a general rule, in order to be eligible for relief under the PCRA, the
petitioner must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
allegation of error has not been previously litigated. 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9543(a)(3). An issue has been previously litigated if “the highest appellate
court in which the petitioner could have had review as a matter of right has
ruled on the merits of the issue[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(a)(2). However, our
Supreme Court has also determined:
Collateral claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness deriving from an
underlying claim of error that was litigated on direct appeal cannot
automatically be dismissed as “previously litigated.” Rather, Sixth
Amendment claims challenging counsel's conduct at trial are
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analytically distinct from the foregone claim of trial court error
from which they often derive, and must be analyzed as such.
Commonwealth v. Puksar, 951 A.2d 267, 274 (Pa. 2008) (citations
omitted).
On direct appeal, the trial court determined that the detective’s belief
that Appellant was in one of the three vehicles was a credibility determination
for the jury to decide. We agreed, opining:
The detective testified to his belief based on his experience. In
fact, he used the word “believe” three times in the course of the
exchange. As the trial court determined, the detective's belief that
Appellant was in one of the three vehicles constituted a credibility
determination within the province of the jury. The jury was free
to accept or reject any and all facts and conclusions to which the
detective testified in deciding whether Appellant occupied one of
the vehicles in the vicinity at the time surrounding the robbery.
Stewart, 2016 WL 5266553, at *7. Thus, the issue was previously litigated
on direct appeal.
However, we are mindful that we must analyze Appellant’s claim under
the ineffective assistance of counsel rubric. We similarly conclude that
Appellant’s current collateral claim lacks merit. Because Detective Appleby
testified regarding his beliefs, the jury was permitted to accept or reject all,
part, or none of his testimony. See Commonwealth v. Diggs, 949 A.2d
873, 879 (Pa. 2008) (“The factfinder is free to believe all, part, or none of the
evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses.”). As such, we
conclude that there is no merit to Appellant’s claim that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to Detective Appleby’s testimony.
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Regarding the third issue we examine, Appellant claims that trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to investigate and call Maritza Melendez and Rickie
Hairston as defense witnesses. Appellant’s Brief at 25-30. Initially, Appellant
posits that the PCRA court erred in denying relief because he “purportedly did
not attach a signed certification from these witnesses” to his PCRA petition.
Id. at 26. He claims that PCRA counsel satisfied the witness certification
requirement under the PCRA by personally certifying the substance of each
witness’ testimony. Id. at 27. Appellant next contends that Melendez, his
girlfriend at the time of the crimes, “would have provided an alibi for
[Appellant] and testified that she was working with [Appellant] at another
location at the time of the home invasion” and would have “contradict[ed] the
Commonwealth’s evidence that she drove the same type of vehicle used in
the home invasion.” Id. at 28. With regard to Rickie Hairston, Appellant
avers:
[]Rickie Hairston, an individual identified as the possible other
male involved in the robbery, was never called as a witness. The
Commonwealth’s theory throughout the case was that two males
and one female were the suspects in this case. Detective Appleby
testified that [Father] identified Rickie Hairston in a photo lineup
as the suspect he believed was pointing the gun. He further
testified that Rickie Hairston was one of the males on video coming
out of the subject vehicle.
Mr. Hairston lives in LaFayette, Louisiana and has lived there since
approximately 2012. If called as a witness at trial, Mr. Hairston
would have testified that he was in Louisiana at the time of the
incident on January 6, 2014 and was not in the Harrisburg area.
This testimony would have cast further doubt on the
Commonwealth’s entire theory of [Appellant’s] guilt[.]
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Id. at 28-29 (record citations omitted).
To prove that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to
call a witness, Appellant must demonstrate:
(1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available to testify
for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, or should have known of,
the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was willing to testify
for the defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony of the
witness was so prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a fair
trial.
Commonwealth v. Brown, 196 A.3d 130, 167 (Pa. 2018) (citation omitted).
Moreover, we have previously determined that a PCRA petitioner who
seeks an evidentiary hearing on a claim that counsel was ineffective for failing
to call alleged alibi witnesses is not required to attach sworn affidavits of
proposed witnesses to his PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Pander,
100 A.3d 626, 641 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 109 A.3d 679 (Pa.
2015). However, the PCRA petition must include “a signed certification as to
each intended witness,” setting forth the “witness's name, address, date of
birth and the substance of the proposed testimony.” Commonwealth v.
Brown, 767 A.2d 576, 582 (Pa. Super. 2001); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A.
9545(d)(1)(ii) (“If a petitioner is unable to obtain the signature of a witness
[], the petitioner shall include a certification, signed by the petitioner or
counsel, stating the witness's name, address, date of birth and substance of
testimony.”) (emphasis added). Here, Appellant’s counsel attached a
certification, which he signed, to the PCRA petition setting forth the personal
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information of Maritza Melendez and Rickie Hairston, as required above, as
well as the substance of their testimony. As such, we agree with Appellant
that the PCRA court erred by determining that the signed certification as
presented was deficient.
However, the PCRA court alternatively examined the merits of
Appellant’s witness claim and determined that Appellant could not prove he
was prejudiced by failing to call Melendez or Hairston. With regard to
Melendez, the PCRA court determined that trial counsel’s decision not to call
Melendez was “a reasonable strategic decision” because her testimony “would
have solidified identification of [Appellant] as the perpetrator.” PCRA Court
Opinion, 6/29/2018, at 11. Upon review of the certified record, we agree. At
trial, counsel argued there was no physical evidence linking Appellant to the
crimes and that the sole eyewitness, Father, did not identify Appellant as a
perpetrator. The Commonwealth argued that Melendez and Appellant worked
together to complete the crimes. As the trial court astutely noted, calling
Melendez as an alibi witness would have only highlighted the fact that the two
were together at the time of the crime, undermining counsel’s strategy to
distance Appellant from Melendez. Aside from Melendez’s proffered
testimony, Appellant does not identify additional evidence to support the bald
assertion that he and Melendez were in another location at the time of the
crimes. For all of the foregoing reasons, we agree with the PCRA court’s
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assessment that trial counsel had a reasonable strategy in not calling
Melendez at trial.
With regard to Hairston, the PCRA court also concluded that counsel had
a reasonable strategy in not calling Hairston as a witness at trial. PCRA Court
Opinion, 6/29/2018, at 12. As the PCRA court notes, calling Hairston would
have “hampered the entire defense theory” that Father identified Hairston as
a perpetrator and “vehemently” denied that Appellant was responsible. Id.
at 13. We agree. Father identified Hairston “as the man he believed may
have been holding the gun.” N.T., 6/9/2015, at 150. Detective Appleby
testified that while watching surveillance videos of the three cars circling the
subject residence, he “saw a male he believed to be Rick Hairston get out of
one of those vehicles” at a nearby McDonald’s. Id. at 151. Detective Appleby
also testified that Hairston “went to Louisiana a few days after the robbery.”
Id. at 153. If Hairston testified that he was in Louisiana at the time of the
crime, it would have cast doubt on Father’s identification of Hairston and
weakened Appellant’s claim that Hairston was the actual perpetrator. As such,
we do not deem trial counsel ineffective for failing to call Melendez and
Hairston as witnesses.
Next, Appellant maintains that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
request a jury instruction pursuant to Commonwealth v. Kloiber, 106 A.2d
820 (Pa. 1954), because Father did not have an opportunity to clearly view or
identify the perpetrator. Appellant’s Brief at 30-33. He contends that “[t]he
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trial court’s final charge regarding witness testimony and credibility was
woefully inadequate for the Kloiber instruction.” Id. at 32.
Our Supreme Court has determined:
Our case law makes clear that the need for a Kloiber instruction
focuses on the ability of a witness to identify the defendant. See
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 813 A.2d 761, 770–771 (Pa. 2002)
(opinion announcing the judgment of the court) (providing no
relief to PCRA petitioner based [on] Kloiber [] where witness, who
knew defendant prior to shooting, failed to identify defendant at
pre-trial line-up due to fear that identifying him would endanger
her and her family); Commonwealth v. Lee, 585 A.2d 1084,
1087 (Pa. 1991) (finding Kloiber instruction inappropriate where
fear of identifying defendant cannot be equated to failure to make
identification); [Commonwealth v.] Ali, 10 A.3d [282,] 304
[(Pa. 2010)](“Any perceived weaknesses in N.M's testimony
attributable to her tender years, the circumstances of the horrific
experience, the subject matter, and her ability to recall details
were matters of credibility for the jury as factfinder to decide; but
those issues did not undermine N.M.'s actual physical ability to
identify appellant at the time and place of the murder, so as to
trigger the special identification testimony concerns underlying
the Kloiber line of decisions.”).
Commonwealth v. Reid, 99 A.3d 470, 490–491 (Pa. 2014). In such
instances, where a witness’ equivocal identification is based upon fear of
reprisal, our Supreme Court has concluded that a Kloiber instruction is
inappropriate and that a general jury charge on witness credibility is proper.
Id.In this case, Detective Appleby testified that Father acted strangely
when asked to identify Appellant from a photo array. N.T., 6/9/2015, at
127-130. Detective Appleby testified that Father was “scared to death” when
he pointed to a photograph of Appellant and said, “Definitely not him.” Id. at
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128-129. Detective Appleby stated that it was the only time in 17 years of
law enforcement that he had seen such behavior. Id. at 128. In essence,
Detective Appleby’s testimony suggested that Father’s behavior when viewing
the photographic array indicated that he recognized Appellant, but stopped
short of positively identify him due to fear. As our Supreme Court has made
clear, a Kloiber instruction is not warranted where the fear of identifying a
defendant cannot be equated to the failure to make an identification. Here,
there is no dispute that the trial court gave the jury a general charge on
credibility and we presume that the jury followed the trial court’s instructions.
See Vucich. As such, Appellant’s Kloiber challenge fails.
Appellant also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to use
impeachment evidence derived from the police interrogation of S.M.
Appellant’s Brief at 33. In sum, Appellant posits:
Here, [S.M.], the daughter of the victim [(Father)], had a prior
relationship with [Appellant]. She was a key Commonwealth
witness who provided a purported motive for the offense. She
provided a recorded interrogation with Detective Appleby. During
that interrogation, she had an attorney present. During that
interview, she provided a number of inconsistent statements, as
well as recanting exculpatory statements she made to police about
[Appellant’s] alleged involvement in the offense. Nevertheless, at
no point in time was that recorded interrogation ever played or
utilized, nor was she impeached with her own prior statements.
Given the lack of direct evidence in the case, the failure to do so
constituted ineffective assistance [of counsel].
Id. at 34 (citation omitted).
The PCRA court determined that “the record reflects that [] trial counsel
properly focused on questioning [] inconsistencies in [S.M.’s] testimony.”
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PCRA Court Opinion, 6/29/2018, at 16. Upon review of the trial transcripts,
we agree. Here, defense counsel cross-examined S.M. upon perceived
inconsistences between her trial testimony and statements made to police.
S.M. testified that she hesitated in telling the police that Appellant was the
perpetrator because she “was scared for her life.” N.T., 6/9/2015, at 60. S.M.
also stated that she believed certain statements attributed to her were not
accurately reflected in the police report. Id. at 64-65. As such, trial counsel
adequately cross-examined S.M. at trial, in an attempt to impeach her.
Finally, we note that trial counsel also questioned Detective Appleby
extensively about his interactions and interviews with S.M., which showed that
S.M. was reluctant and slow to reveal information to police. Id. at 120-129.
He testified that she was extremely fearful “and it was difficult for her to tell
[police] things about [Appellant.]” Id. at 129. Thus, while trial counsel
impeached S.M. with her inconsistent statements, the Commonwealth
provided evidence to explain them. As such, Appellant has failed to show he
was prejudiced. Accordingly, there is no merit to Appellant’s claim that trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach S.M. with her prior recorded
conversation with police.
We turn now to address three claims that trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to raise issues pertaining to sentencing. First, Appellant contends
that he was improperly sentenced for multiple conspiracies – conspiracy to
commit robbery, conspiracy to commit burglary, and conspiracy to commit
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unlawful restraint.5 Appellant’s Brief at 40-41. Citing 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 903
and 906, Appellant argues that all of the crimes arose out of the same
agreement or continuous relationship, namely “to obtain money inside a
residence that was allegedly being held in a suitcase.” Id. at 41. As such,
Appellant argues that he could only be convicted of one inchoate crime for his
conduct. Id. at 40. Therefore, Appellant argues that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to sentencing on multiple inchoate counts as
set forth above. Id. at 41.
This issue implicates the legality of Appellant’s sentence.6 See
Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 39 A.3d 977, 982 (Pa. 2012) (opinion
announcing the judgment of the court) (“[S]eparate sentences […] barred by
Section 906's prohibition of multiple sentences for inchoate crimes […] relates
to the legality of sentence[].”). An issue relating to legality of sentence
presents a question of law for our review. Id. (citation omitted). “When
addressing such questions of law, we employ a plenary scope of review, and
our standard of review is de novo.” Id.We begin with the definition of conspiracy, which is as follows:
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5 Appellant fails to mention that he was convicted of a fourth inchoate crime,
conspiracy to commit false imprisonment.
6Appellant raised the issue in his PCRA petition and, thus, it is properly before
us. See Commonwealth v. Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238 (Pa. Super. 2011)
(Although legality of sentence is subject to review within the PCRA, the claim
must be raised in a PCRA petition and cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal).
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(a) Definition of conspiracy.--A person is guilty of conspiracy
with another person or persons to commit a crime if with
the intent of promoting or facilitating its commission he:
(1) agrees with such other person or persons that they or
one or more of them will engage in conduct which
constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to
commit such crime; or
(2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the
planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt
or solicitation to commit such crime.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a). “If a person conspires to commit a number of crimes,
he is guilty of only one conspiracy so long as such multiple crimes are the
object of the same agreement or continuous conspiratorial relationship.” 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 903(c). “A person may not be convicted of more than one of the
inchoate crimes of criminal attempt, criminal solicitation or criminal conspiracy
for conduct designed to commit or to culminate in the commission of the same
crime.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 906.
In Jacobs, our Supreme Court examined the application of Section 906
in circumstances relevant to those currently before us:
The full text of Section 906 of the Crimes Code, entitled “Multiple
convictions of inchoate crimes barred,” provides as follows: “A
person may not be convicted of more than one of the inchoate
crimes of criminal attempt, criminal solicitation or criminal
conspiracy for conduct designed to commit or to culminate in the
commission of the same crime.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 906. […T]he
Superior Court has interpreted “convicted” in Section 906 to mean
the entry of a judgment of sentence, rather than a finding of guilt
by the jury. See Commonwealth v. Grekis, 601 A.2d 1284,
1295 (Pa. Super. 1992) (“Section 906 is designed to eliminate
multiple convictions, i.e., judgments of sentence, for conduct
which constitutes preparation for a single criminal objective.”);
Commonwealth v. Maguire, 452 A.2d 1047, 1049 (Pa. Super.
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1982) (rejecting the defendant's argument that “convicted” in
Section 906 is equivalent to the jury's verdict: “When the law
speaks of a ‘conviction,’ it means a judgment, and not merely a
verdict, which in common parlance is called a ‘conviction.’”).
[Accordingly,] it is not a violation of Section 906 for the jury to
find a defendant guilty of multiple inchoate crimes designed to
culminate in the same crime; a problem arises only when the trial
court imposes multiple sentences for those inchoate crimes that
are designed to culminate in the same crime.
* * *
Applying Section 906, [our Supreme Court has] held that
“inchoate crimes merge only when directed to the commission of
the same crime, not merely because they arise out of the same
incident.” Commonwealth v. Graves, 508 A.2d 1198, 1198 (Pa.
1986) (per curiam). In determining whether inchoate crimes are
directed to the commission of the same crime, [our Supreme
Court has] taken a narrow view of the object crime. In Graves,
for example, the defendant was convicted and sentenced for
criminal conspiracy and criminal solicitation for his part in an
incident in which he conspired with fellow gang members to
assault three police officers, and individually solicited one gang
member to murder one police officer. Id. at 1199 (Zappala, J.,
dissenting). Consecutive sentences were imposed for the
conspiracy and solicitation. On appeal, [our Supreme] Court
approved of the two sentences. [Graves] held that [] review of
the record revealed that even though the two inchoate crimes
arose out of the “same incident,” they were directed at different
ends, and therefore did not merge at sentencing: the defendant
conspired to assault three police officers and discreetly solicited
the murder of one of the officers. [Id.] at 1198. Thus, a person
may be convicted and sentenced for two inchoate crimes that arise
out of the same incident which were not designed to culminate in
the commission of the same crime.
Jacobs, 39 A.3d 977, 982–983 (original brackets omitted; new brackets
added).
Moreover, this Court has determined:
A single, continuing conspiracy is demonstrated where the
evidence proves that the essential feature of the existing
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conspiracy was a common plan or scheme to achieve a common,
single, comprehensive goal.... A single, continuing conspiracy may
contemplate a series of offenses, or be comprised of a series of
steps in the formation of a larger, general conspiracy....
Therefore, where the evidence at trial is sufficient for the jury to
infer that the essential features of the existing conspiracy were a
common plan or scheme to achieve a common, single,
comprehensive goal or end, then the conclusion that the
conspiracy was a single, continuing conspiracy is justified.
Commonwealth v. Troop, 571 A.2d 1084, 1089–1090 (Pa. Super. 1990);
see also Commonwealth v. Henkel, 487 A.2d 1010, 1013 (Pa. Super.
1985) (“[C]onspiracy is not severable as to diverse crimes contemplated by a
single agreement[.]”).
In determining whether a single or multiple conspiracy has been
established, we consider several relevant factors:
The factors most commonly considered in a totality of the
circumstances analysis of the single vs. multiple conspiracies issue
are: the number of overt acts in common; the overlap of
personnel; the time period during which the alleged acts took
place; the similarity in methods of operation; the locations in
which the alleged acts took place; the extent to which the
purported conspiracies share a common objective; and, the
degree to which interdependence is needed for the overall
operation to succeed.
Commonwealth v. Davis, 704 A.2d 650, 654 (Pa. Super. 1997) (ellipsis
omitted).
In this case, the entire sum of the PCRA court’s analysis on this issue is
as follows:
[Appellant] argues that it was improper for the trial court to
sentence [him] for multiple inchoate offenses, despite the fact
that no evidence was presented establishing the natural
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progression of events that took place on January 6, 2014, resulted
from one common agreement.
In the absence of evidence establishing that multiple crimes
resulted from one common agreement, an individual may be
convicted and sentenced for multiple inchoate offenses. The
[Pennsylvania] Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Savage,
established “just as a single entrepreneur may enter into several
separate yet similar joint business ventures with the same or
different partners or investors at the same time, criminals in
general and drug traffickers in particular may enter into more than
one criminal conspiracy involving similar crimes at the same time,
even in the same area.” Commonwealth v. Savage, 566 A.2d
272, 277 (Pa. Super. 1989).
Evidence was never presented during the trial to establish that the
progression of events directly emanated from one common
agreement before the individuals entered the home. Accordingly,
[the trial court] was proper to sentence [Appellant] for multiple
inchoate offenses and [] reject [Appellant’s] contention as
meritless.
PCRA Court Opinion, 6/29/2018, at 19.
For the reasons that follow, we disagree. Here, when viewing the
totality of the circumstances in this case, it is clear that there was a common
plan or scheme to achieve a common, single, comprehensive goal – the theft
of money thought to be stored inside the subject residence. Considering the
factors in Davis, all of the crimes took place at the same time in the same
location and were committed by the same cohorts acting in concert with one
another. More specifically, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of
S.M. and the investigating police officer showing that Appellant was led to
believe that there was a large sum of money in a suitcase inside S.M.’s home.
Approximately an hour before the crimes, Appellant asked S.M. if anyone was
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home at the residence in question. While such facts may have suggested that
Appellant and his confederates intended to burgle the residence while it was
unoccupied, such a conclusion is a red herring, as other important evidence
suggests otherwise. Father testified that the three conspirators knocked on
the door and came directly into the residence without invitation and a gun
drawn, demanded Father get on the floor, and then immediately tied his hands
behind his back with zip-ties. N.T., 6/9/2015, at 19-22. Here, the
Commonwealth presented evidence that Appellant and his cohorts arrived at
the home with a firearm and zip-ties, which demonstrated their intent to
procure the purported cash by any means, including the use of a firearm,
physical force (or threat of force), and forcible restraint if someone was
present. Thus, we disagree with the PCRA court’s determination that there
was no evidence suggesting that there was a progression of events from a
common agreement or understanding.
Moreover, there was no evidence to suggest a freestanding criminal plot
to rob Father, separate from the general plan to steal money purportedly
stored at S.M.’s residence and use force against anyone present at the time.
See Graves, supra. In fact, none of the conspirators took anything from
Father’s person. The only item stolen from the home was a blue suitcase,
which the Commonwealth established through S.M.’s testimony was the object
of the conspiracy. Thus, we conclude that Appellant’s conduct was designed
to culminate in the commission of only one general crime, namely, the theft
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of money thought to be stored in a suitcase in the victims’ home. See
Commonwealth v. Crocker, 389 A.2d 601 (Pa. Super. 1978) (“18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 906 explicitly bars appellant’s conviction and sentencing for both criminal
attempt and possession of an instrument of crime[; a]ppellant’s conduct [of]
nighttime entry into an enclosed Bell Telephone storage lot while in possession
of cable-cutting tools was designed to culminate in the commission of only
one crime: theft of Bell Telephone’s cable.”; compare Commonwealth v.
Welch, 912 A.2d 857 (Pa. Super. 2006) (conspiracy to commit robbery and
attempted homicide were independent where conspirators were interrupted
stealing an all-terrain vehicle, which led Welch to chase an eyewitness and
shoot at him). In this case, there is no evidence to suggest that Appellant
agreed only to a burglary, but later agreed to a robbery based upon
unanticipated, intervening factors. Instead, the converse is true. From the
start, the conspirators were ready to commit a robbery, as evidenced by the
materials they brought to the scene.
Furthermore, we reject the PCRA court’s reliance on Savage. In that
case, this Court was tasked with determining whether state charges for
conspiracy to deliver narcotics should be dismissed as barred under 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 111 (when prosecution barred by former prosecution in another
jurisdiction), because the defendant had been charged already with the same
crime in federal court. The scope and nature of that case, however, was
focused on a double jeopardy claim, wherein “the principle issue [was]
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whether one or two groups of conspirators were involved; and, if two separate
groups were involved, whether the separate group of conspirators nonetheless
furthered a single broader conspiracy.” Savage, 566 A.2d at 277-278. The
Commonwealth argued that there were two separate cocaine distribution
conspiracies involved, but we disagreed and discharged the state conspiracy
charge. That case focused solely on double jeopardy and examined the
overlap of different groups of alleged coconspirators in a larger narcotics
distribution scheme. Here, as set forth in detail above, there was only one
group of conspirators and the central inquiry was on sentencing for multiple
inchoate crimes arising out of one single, general crime under Section 906.
Thus, the trial court’s reliance on Savage is misplaced and simply not
applicable herein. Accordingly, for all the reasons set forth above, we discern
that the PCRA court erred as a matter of law in concluding that Appellant was
not entitled to relief on his illegal sentencing claim.
Accordingly, we turn now to discuss Appellant’s remedy. Generally,
when there is an error in sentencing a defendant to multiple inchoate crimes,
we have the option to either remand for resentencing or to amend the
sentence directly. Commonwealth v. Ford, 461 A.2d 1281, 1289 (Pa.
Super. 1983). Normally, when sentences are imposed concurrently, we can
amend where we will not upset the overall sentencing scheme. See
Commonwealth v. Martinez, 153 A.3d 1025, 1033 (Pa. Super. 2016). In
such instances, we vacate the concurrent sentence for the lesser offense and
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let stand the sentence for the greater offense. Ford, 461 A.2d at 1298.
However, in instances where consecutive sentences are imposed for inchoate
offenses of equal grading, we have determined it “prudent to vacate and
remand, leaving it to the sentencing court to decide which one of the []
inchoate convictions to let stand and the sentence to be entered in accordance
thereto.” Id. at 1289–1290. Finally, it is well-settled that:
[I]f a trial court errs in its sentence on one count in a multi-count
case, then all sentences for all counts will be vacated so that the
court can restructure its entire sentencing scheme.
Commonwealth v. Baney, 187 A.3d 1020, 1023 (Pa. Super. 2018), citing
Commonwealth v. Bartrug, 732 A.2d 1287, 1289 (Pa. Super. 1999), appeal
denied, 747 A.2d 896 (Pa. 1999) (citations omitted) (holding that the PCRA
court did not abuse its discretion in vacating entire sentence before
resentencing, rather than addressing only illegal part of sentence); see also
Commonwealth v. Veon, 150 A.3d 435, 456 (Pa. 2016) (remanding for
resentencing where vacating sentence of imprisonment and restitution left the
“comprehensive sentencing scheme unmoored from its foundation.”).
Here, Appellant was convicted of conspiracy to commit burglary,
conspiracy to commit robbery, conspiracy to commit false imprisonment, and
conspiracy to commit unlawful restraint. The trial court imposed consecutive
sentences for conspiracy to commit burglary, conspiracy to commit robbery,
and conspiracy to commit unlawful restraint; no further penalty was imposed
for conspiracy to commit false imprisonment. Burglary and robbery were
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graded as first-degree felonies, unlawful restraint was graded as a first-degree
misdemeanor, and false imprisonment was graded as a second-degree
misdemeanor. Because of the consecutive nature of the sentences and
differences in the grading of the offenses, we vacate the judgment of sentence
for conspiracy to commit burglary, conspiracy to commit robbery, conspiracy
to commit false imprisonment, and conspiracy to commit unlawful restraint
and remand for the trial court to determine which of the highest-graded
felonies (either burglary or robbery) to let stand and the sentence to be
entered in accordance thereto. Moreover, having upset the entire sentencing
scheme, we vacate all of the sentences imposed on all the remaining
convictions and remand for resentencing consistent with this memorandum.
Appellant’s next two issues challenge the ineffective assistance of
counsel regarding the discretionary aspects of sentencing. Appellant contends
that trial counsel and post-sentence counsel rendered ineffective assistance
of counsel for failing to object to erroneous sentencing guidelines. Appellant’s
Brief at 35-38. Appellant claims that the trial court erroneously relied upon
a sentencing guideline form that indicated that he was a repeat felony offender
(“RFEL”) when his prior record score indicated that it was actually “5.” Id. at
35. Despite the Commonwealth’s concession at sentencing that Appellant’s
prior record score was a “5” instead of RFEL for guideline purposes, Appellant
contends that he was still sentenced in the aggravated range of sentences for
those defendants with a prior record score of 5, as well as in the top of the
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standard range of sentences for RFELs. Id. at 36-37. As such, Appellant
claims that trial and post-sentence counsel were ineffective for failing to object
to the trial court’s use of erroneous sentencing guidelines. Finally, Appellant
maintains that the trial court relied upon improper sentencing factors in
fashioning his sentence and that trial and post-trial counsel were ineffective
for failing to object. Appellant’s Brief at 38-40. He claims that the trial court
relied upon his “silence, protestation of innocence[,] and purported lack of
remorse” at sentencing which resulted in an aggravated sentence. Id. at
39-40. However, given our disposition that resentencing is warranted, we
need not address these issues. Appellant can raise any issues pertaining to
the sentencing guidelines employed and the reasons the trial court relies upon
in fashioning a new sentence at resentencing or in post-sentence motions.
Finally, Appellant contends that he was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing under the PCRA. Appellant’s Brief at 16-17. When reviewing the
denial of a PCRA petition without an evidentiary hearing, we determine:
whether the PCRA court erred in concluding that there were no
genuine issues of material fact and in denying relief without an
evidentiary hearing. When there are no disputed factual issues,
an evidentiary hearing is not required.
Commonwealth v. Hart, 199 A.3d 475, 481 (Pa. Super. 2018) (internal
citations and quotations omitted). Here, as set forth above, there were no
issues of material fact requiring an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly,
Appellant’s final issue is without merit.
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Convictions affirmed. Case remanded for resentencing in accordance
with this memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 06/11/2019
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