Com. v. Hansley, S. ( 2016 )

J-A31038-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
SHAWN D. HANSLEY,
Appellant No. 1019 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered June 4, 2015
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-36-CR-0003030-2011
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED JANUARY 21, 2016
Appellant, Shawn D. Hansley, appeals from the order denying his
counseled first petition for relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
(PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546, after a hearing. Appellant claims that
his trial counsel was ineffective and that his guilty plea was a product of this
ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm on the basis of the PCRA court
opinion.
In its opinion, the court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant facts
and procedural history of this case. (See PCRA Court Opinion, 6/04/15, at
2-7). Therefore, we have no reason to restate them at length here.
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A31038-15
For context and convenience of reference, we note briefly that on
November 8, 2012, Appellant pleaded guilty, pursuant to a negotiated plea
agreement, to aggravated assault1 and simple assault,2 and was sentenced
to an agreed-on aggregate sentence of not less than two nor more than six
years of incarceration. In exchange for his guilty plea, the Commonwealth
nolle prossed the count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon
enhancement.3 Appellant’s conviction arose out of a workplace altercation
between Appellant and the victims, Mark and Tim Miranda, wherein
Appellant “used a box cutter to cut the left eye and eyebrow and left nose of
Tim Miranda.” (N.T. Guilty Plea and Sentencing Hearing, 11/08/2012, at 8).
Appellant also cut the left eye and left side of the mouth of Mark Miranda.
(See id. at 9).
The trial court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion and granted
trial counsel’s request to withdraw on November 29, 2012. On December
19, 2012, petitioner pro se filed a timely first PCRA petition. After the PCRA
court appointed counsel to represent Appellant, he submitted an amended
motion for post-conviction collateral relief. The PCRA court held a hearing
____________________________________________
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1).
2
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(2).
3
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(4).
-2-
J-A31038-15
on December 15, 2014, during which Appellant sought relief on four
grounds:
(1) [Trial counsel] failed to provide [Appellant] with any written
discovery materials before [Appellant’s] guilty plea despite
[Appellant’s] request to review them; (2) [trial counsel] met
[Appellant] only four times between [Appellant’s] request and
guilty plea; (3) [trial counsel] refused to interview any potential
witnesses in a timely manner; and (4) [trial counsel] told
[Appellant] that a Lancaster County jury would not acquit
[Appellant] because of [Appellant’s] race, notwithstanding the
potential merits of any defense. ([See] Pet. Am. Mot. For Post-
Conviction Collateral Relief ¶ 9(A)-(D)).
(PCRA Ct. Op., at 8). During the PCRA hearing, the court heard testimony
from Appellant’s trial counsel, one of his co-workers, and Appellant. The
court found counsel’s testimony credible and Appellant’s not credible. (See
id. at 7). After the hearing, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s amended
petition. (See PCRA Ct. Op. and Order, 6/04/15). This timely appeal
followed.4
Appellant raises one question on appeal:
[I.] Whether the [PCRA] court erred in denying [Appellant’s]
amended motion for post-conviction collateral relief when his
guilty plea was a product of the ineffective assistance of counsel?
(Appellant’s Brief, at 4) (most capitalization omitted).
Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition
is limited to examining whether the court’s determination
____________________________________________
4
The PCRA court filed an order on June 12, 2015, referencing its opinion
filed June 4, 2015. (See Order, 6/12/15); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). The
court did not order a statement of errors. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
-3-
J-A31038-15
is supported by the evidence of record and free of legal
error. This Court grants great deference to the findings of
the PCRA court if the record contains any support for those
findings. Further, the PCRA court’s credibility
determinations are binding on this Court, where there is
record support for those determinations.
Commonwealth v. Anderson, 995 A.2d 1184, 1189 (Pa.
Super. 2010)[, appeal denied, 9 A.3d 626 (Pa. 2010)] (citations
omitted).
To prevail on a claim alleging counsel’s ineffectiveness
under the PCRA, Appellant must demonstrate (1) that the
underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel’s
course of conduct was without a reasonable basis designed
to effectuate [her] client’s interest; and (3) that he was
prejudiced by counsel’s ineffectiveness, i.e. there is a
reasonable probability that but for the act or omission in
question the outcome of the proceedings would have been
different.
It is clear that a criminal defendant’s right to effective
counsel extends to the plea process, as well as during trial.
However, [a]llegations of ineffectiveness in connection
with the entry of a guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief
only if the ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter
an involuntary or unknowing plea. Where the defendant
enters his plea on the advice of counsel, the voluntariness
of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice was
within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases.
Commonwealth v. Wah, 42 A.3d 335, 338 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(citations, quotation, and quotation marks omitted). “[T]he law
does not require that [the defendant] be pleased with the
outcome of his decision to enter a plea of guilty: All that is
required is that [his] decision to plead guilty be knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently made.” Anderson, [supra] at
1192 (citations, quotation, and quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, with regard to the prejudice prong, where an
appellant has entered a guilty plea, the appellant must
demonstrate “it is reasonably probable that, but for counsel’s
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have gone to
trial.” Commonwealth v. Rathfon, 899 A.2d 365, 370 (Pa.
Super. 2006) (quotation and quotation marks omitted).
-4-
J-A31038-15
Commonwealth v. Timchak, 69 A.3d 765, 769-70 (Pa. Super. 2013).
Here, after a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties,
the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the PCRA court we
conclude that there is no merit to the issue Appellant has raised on appeal.
The PCRA court opinion properly disposes of the question presented. (See
PCRA Ct. Op., at 7-25) (concluding that: (1) trial counsel met with Appellant
on numerous occasions, maintained written communication with him, and
had investigators meet with him, and Appellant suffered no prejudice based
on the number of meetings; (2) trial counsel had reasonable basis for not
obtaining video of altercation or giving Appellant copy of discovery packet
and Appellant suffered no prejudice based on not having copy of packet; (3)
trial counsel’s lack of effort to contact witness did not constitute ineffective
assistance because witness’s testimony would have been useless to any
defense and absence of her testimony did not prejudice Appellant; (4) trial
counsel had reasonable basis for not asserting self-defense or “castle
doctrine” defense; and (5) Appellant entered knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent guilty plea as demonstrated by extensive on-the-record colloquy).
Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the PCRA court’s opinion.
-5-
J-A31038-15
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/21/2016
-6-
Circulated 12/28/2015 10:38 AM
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OPINION
BY: WRIGHT, J. June~. 2015
Before the Court are Petitioner Shawn D. Hansley's prose "Motion for Post
Conviction Collateral Relier [sic]," "Motion for Ineffective Counseln [sic]" deemed a
"Petition for Post-Conviction Collateral Relief" by this Court's January 7, 2013 Order,
Petitioner's "Amended Motion for Post-Conviction Collateral Relief" accompanied by a
Brief in Support, as well as the Commonwealth's Reply Brief. Petitioner claims that the
following aspects of his guilty plea counsel's assistance were ineffective such that he
should be entitled to relief under the Post-Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 9541-461: (1) Petitioner's guilty plea counsel failed to provide Petitioner with any
written discovery materials before Petitioner's guilty plea despite Petitioner's request to
review them; (2) Petitioner's guilty plea counsel met Petitioner only four times between
Petitioner's arrest and guilty plea; (3) Petitioner's guilty plea counsel refused to interview
any potential witnesses in a timely manner; and (4) Petitioner's guilty plea counsel told
1 At the PCRA hearing, I asked Petitioner's attorney to specify the exact grounds for relief. (N.T. PCRA
Hr'g. at 3:8-9.) Attorney Quinn limited the grounds for relief to those provided in Paragraph 9 (A)-(0) of
Petitioner's Amended Motion for Post-Conviction Collateral Relief.(~ at 3:14-17.)
To the extent that paragraphs 8 and 10-12 of Petitioner's Amended Motion for Post-Conviction Relief
state alternate grounds for relief, those grounds are waived due to Attorney Quinn's limiting statement at
the PCRA hearing.
cr1 J ·.
Petitioner that a Lancaster County jury would not acquit Petitioner because of
Petitioner's race, notwithstanding the potential merits of any defense. As a result of this
allegedly ineffective assistance, Petitioner claims that his guilty plea was not knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary.2 For the reasons that follow, Defendant's PCRA Petition is
denied.
BACKGROUND
On Criminal lnformation 3030-2011, Petitioner was charged with one count of
Aggravated Assault (F-1),3 another count of Aggravated Assault (F-2),4 and Simple
Assault (M-2).5 The charges stem from a June 24, 2011 workplace altercation that
occurred at approximately 10: 15 A.M. at the Newgistics building located at 3750
Hempland Road, West Hempfield Township. (Aff. Prob. Cause, ,I 1; N.T. PCRA Hr'g. at
34:1-2.)6 The altercation was preceded by a "verbal argument" about a damaged
motorcycle that escalated into a physical confrontation. (See Aff. Prob. Cause ,I 1.) It
directly involved Petitioner and two of his co-workers, brothers Tim and Mark Miranda.
(N.T. Guilty Plea & Sentencing Hr'g. at 2:23-3:2.) During the altercation, Petitioner used
a box cutter to slash the left eye, left eyebrow, and left side of Tim Miranda's nose as
well as Mark Miranda's forehead above the left eye and the left side of his mouth. (Aff.
Prob. Cause ,I 1; Campi. 2.) Petitioner admitted slashing the Miranda brothers with the
2
3
Def's Am.Mot. For Post-Conviction Relief,,m 8-12.
18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1)
4 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2702(a~(4)
5 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2701 (a)(2)
6 N.T. PCRA Hr'g. at 34:1-2. The reference to Defendant's working at Logistics was either a misstatement
by Attorney Spotts or a typo. (N.T. Guilty Plea & Sentencing at 13:8.)
2
box cutter during the fight. (See Aff. Prob. Cause ,I 3.) Between his arrest and Guilty
Plea/Sentencing hearing, Petitioner submitted two prose filings.7
Guilty Plea & Sentencing
A Guilty-Plea/Sentencing hearing was held on November 8, 2012. Patricia K.
Spotts, Esquire, of the Lancaster County Office of the Public Defender represented
Petitioner. (N.T. Guilty Plea & Sentencing Hr'g. at 1.) A guilty plea was negotiated
between the Commonwealth and Petitioner in which Count 1-Aggravated Assault (F-1)
would be no/le prossed with costs on Petitioner, but Petitioner would plead guilty to
Count 2-Aggravated Assault (F-2) and Count 3-Simple Assault (M-2) for agreed-upon
concurrent sentences of 2-6 years of incarceration in a State Correctional Institution
plus a $300 fine on the Aggravated Assault Count, and time served to twenty-three
months on the Simple Assault Count. (See~ at 21 :3-6 (establishing concurrent
sentences); Plea Agreement).) Petitioner would have to pay all costs, including a
mandatory $250 DNA sampling fee and the sum of $5701.00 in restitution. (See Plea
Agreement.) Defend~nt was also made Boot Camp eligible.8 (See N.T. Guilty Plea &
Sentencing Hr'g. at 21:10-12.)
7
The first was titled "Informal Request for Transcripts," requested "[a]ny information that would be helpful
in my [d]efense," and was filed on November 21, 2011. The Filing is dated November 21, 2011. It was
time-stamped by the Clerk of Courts on November 23, 2011. Although this discrepancy does not affect
any disposition in these proceedings, this Request will be deemed to have been filed on November 21,
2011, pursuant to the "prisoner mailbox rule." See Commonwealth v. Crawford, 17 A.3d 1279, 1281 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2011) ("Under the prisoner mailbox rule, we deem a prose document filed on the date it is
placed in the hands of prison authorities for mailing."); see also Commonwealth v. Little, 716 A.2d 1287,
1289 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) ("We therefore hold that the prisoner mailbox rule is applicable to petitions
filed pursuant to the PCRA .... "). Petitioner then submitted a prose "MOTION FOR RELEASE ON
NOMINAL BAIL" on April 6, 2012. I deem this Motion to have been filed on April 6, 2012, pursuant to the
"prisoner mailbox rule" because the envelope was postmarked with that date. All subsequent references
in this Opinion to dates of prose filings will reflect the prisoner mailbox rule where applicable.
8
Attorney Spotts stated that the deadly weapon enhancement associated with the Aggravated Assault
charge would normally preclude Defendant from being Boot Camp eligible. (N.T. Guilty Plea &
Sentencing Hr'g. at 20:1-4.)
3
At the November 8, 2012 hearing, I accepted a seven-page written guilty plea
colloquy, a guilty plea slip, a written Plea Agreement, and a sentencing guidelines
sheet. (lfL. at 5:3-18.) I also conducted an on-the-record colloquy.9 After some initial
explanation of Petitioner's rights, I asked him if he "still wish[ed] to plead guilty." (lfL. at
7:21-22) He responded "I guess I have to. I just want to get it behind me." (lfL. at 7:22-
23.) At this point in the hearing, I expressly reminded Petitioner that he did not have to
plead guilty, that he had a right to a trial, and explained that I had to make sure that
Petitioner was making a "knowing, voluntary, [and] intelligent decision to plead guilty."
(lfL. at 7:25-8:10.) I again asked Petitioner if he understood the rights I had explained to
him and if he still wanted to plead guilty. (lfL. at 8:8-14.) Petitioner answered "Yes" to
both questions. (lfL. at 8: 11, 15.)
After Assistant District Attorney Todd Brown stated the factual basis for the
charges, Petitioner admitted using a box cutter to slash the faces of Tim and Mark
Miranda, but claimed he did so to defend himself. (lfL. at 8:16-18.) I then asked
Petitioner if he admitted using the box cutter to slash the Miranda Brothers, which he
did, reminded him of his absolute right to a jury trial if he so chose, and continued the
colloquy, emphasizing his trial rights. (lfL. at 9: 19-11:10.) During the colloquy, Petitioner
stated that his plea was fully voluntary and that he was satisfied with the services of
Attorney Spotts. (lfL. at 11: 12-12:6.)
9
See N.T. Guilty Plea & Sentencing Hr'g. at 5:3-18; Guilty Plea Colloquy (indicating that Petitioner signed
written guilty plea colloquy, understood all questions in the guilty plea colloquy, ensured the accuracy of
all handwritten answers before signing the written guilty plea colloquy, and understood the meaning and
legal effect of signing the written guilty plea colloquy); ].st at 5: 19-6:3; Guilty Plea Slip (indicating that
Petitioner signed guilty plea slip fully understanding its meaning and legal effect after consultation with
Petitioner's attorney); Plea Agreement (demonstrating that Petitioner signed Plea Agreement.)
4
Attorney Spotts then made a statement. (See generally kl 13:6-16:9.) She noted
that Petitioner had completed the tenth grade and was well-read and experienced. (kl
at 13:16-17.) She indicated that the Petitioner and the Miranda brothers worked near
each other along the. same conveyor belt line at the Newgistics facility at different
workstations separated from each other by a table. (kl at 13: 11-15.) She said that
Petitioner's job involved using a box cutter while the Miranda brothers' job was to use a
scanner to scan barcodes on boxes. (kl at 13:12-13, 15:9-12.) Attorney Spotts stated
that there were two verbal confrontations that preceded the assault. (See id. at 13:22-
14: 1, 14:10-18.) She said that, on the morning of the assault, Petitioner was
approached in the Newgistics parking lot and accused of damaging a motorcycle. (See
id. at 13:22-14:1.) She stated that Petitioner was accosted a second time at his line and
that the second verbal confrontation was interrupted by a supervisor who ordered all
participants back to their assigned workstations. (kl at 14: 10-18.) She said that
Petitioner felt threatened but nevertheless left his workstation to speak with someone
about the motorcycle. (See id. at 14:22-15:3.) She stated that Petitioner then argued
with the Miranda brothers and that the assault occurred soon thereafter. (See id. at
14:22-15:24.)
She explained that she had talked with Petitioner about potential defenses,
including the "Castle Doctrine" and self-defense, adding that she felt they were not likely
to be successful at trial because she said Petitioner had no right to be outside his
assigned work area at the time of the assault. (kl at '16:10-19:18.) She said she and
Petitioner "had a lot of talk about [why] the Castle Doctrine would not apply ... because
[Petitioner] was in some else's work station, [and] that he brought a box cutter to a fist
5
fight, if you want to accept that. And again, that's not a definition of self defense." (kl at
18:2-7.) She also stated that she explained the difference between street reality and law
reality telling Petitioner that, had Petitioner felt threatened, he should have told his
supervisor and demanded that the police be called. (kl at 17:3-11.)
Attorney Spotts then expressed her view that the Plea Agreement was a good
deal for Petitioner because he would be able to pursue a GED and other educational
opportunities at Boot Camp, while a conviction on Count 1-Aggravated Assault (F-1)
would disqualify him from these programs. (kl at 18:12-19:18, 20:2-4.) Following that, I
determined that Petitioner's plea was voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly made,
accepted his guilty plea, and imposed sentence in accordance with the Plea Agreement
(kl at 20:17-23; N.T. PCRA Hr'g. at 30:18-31 :1.)
On November 13, 2012, while still represented by Attorney Spotts, Petitioner
unilaterally submitted a prose "Motion for Withdraw [sic] of Guilty Plea." (Post-Sentence
Motion nune pro tune and Motion to Withdraw as Counsel ,I 5.) He then submitted
another handwritten prose "Motion to Withdraw guilty plea [sic]" on November 17, 2012.
On November 26, 2q12, Attorney Spotts filed a Post-Sentence Motion nune pro tune
and Motion to Withdraw as Counsel requesting to withdraw Petitioner's guilty plea and
requesting to withdraw as Petitioner's counsel. I denied both motions in this Court's
November 28, 2012 Order. On December 4, 2012, Petitioner submitted an untitled, pro
se letter again requesting to withdraw his guilty plea. I denied that request in my
December 7, 2012 Order. On December 6, 2012, Petitioner submitted a prose "Motion
for extraordinary relief [sic]." On December 10, 2012, Petitioner submitted a prose
"Motion for Ineffective Counselin [sic]" followed by a December 18, 2012, prose "Motion
6
for post conviction collateral relier [sic]." He then submitted a prose "Motion for
Ineffective Counseln [sic]" on December 28, 2012.
In this Court's January 7, 2013 Order, I deemed Petitioner's December 28, 2012
Motion a "Petition for Post-Conviction Collateral Relief," and appointed Vincent J. Quinn,
Esquire to represent"Petitioner. On January 8, 2013, Petitioner submitted a pro se
"Notice for Lawsuite [sic]". On July 26, 2013, Petitioner submitted an "Amended Motion
for Post-Conviction Collateral Relief." On July 30, 2013, the Commonwealth submitted
its Response. In its response, the Commonwealth agreed that an evidentiary hearing
was necessary.
The PCRA hearing was held on December 15, 2014. Three witnesses testified:
Patricia K. Spotts, Esquire; Monique Hill, a co-worker, and Petitioner. Vincent J. Quinn,
Esquire represented Petitioner at the PCRA hearing while Travis Anderson represented
the Commonwealth. (N.T. PCRA Hr'g. at 1.) Attorney Spotts offered credible testimony
about her representation that conflicted with Petitioner's testimony, which was not
credible. (See generally id. at 4-32 (Attorney Spotts' testimony); kl at 40-64 (Petitioner's
testimony).) After the PCRA Hearing, Petitioner submitted a "Brief sur Amended PCRA"
on February 27, 2015 and the Commonwealth submitted a "Brief in Opposition to Post-
Conviction Relief" on March 27, 2015.
DISCUSSION
Prior to any testimony at the PCRA hearing, I asked Attorney Quinn to specify
the exact grounds for relief. (N.T. PCRA Hr'g. at 3:8-9.) He limited the grounds for relief
to the four provided in Paragraph 9(A)-(D) of Petitioner's Amended Motion for Post-
7
Conviction Collateral Relief."? (kl at 3:14-17.) The four grounds are as follows: (1)
Attorney Spotts failed to provide Petitioner with any written discovery materials before
Petitioner's guilty plea despite Petitioner's request to review them; (2) Attorney Spotts
met Petitioner only four times between Petitioner's arrest and ~uilty plea; (3) Attorney
Spotts refused to interview any potential witnesses in a timely manner; and (4) Attorney
Spotts told Petitioner that a Lancaster County jury would not acquit Petitioner because
of Petitioner's race, notwithstanding the potential merits of any defense. (Pet. Am. Mot.
For Post-Conviction Collateral Relief ,r 9(A)-(D).)
On grounds (1) and (2), the Commonwealth counters that Attorney Spotts'
counsel was not ineffective because she personally reviewed the discovery materials
with Petitioner a number of times, regularly corresponded with Petitioner by mail, and
had her investigators regularly meet with Petitioner. (Commw.'s Br. at 4-5.) On ground
(3), the Commonwealth replies that Attorney Spotts diligently attempted to locate
witness Monique Hill and that, even if she had testified, her testimony would not have
supported Petitioner's self-defense claim that he was attacked first because Ms. Hill did
not see the beginning of the fight.11 (kl at 6.) The Commonwealth also argues that
Petitioner's guilty plea was his own decision and was thus not involuntary. (kl at 7-8.)
10 To the extent that paragraphs 8, and 10-12 of Petitioner's Amended Motion for Post-Conviction Relief
state alternate grounds for relief, those grounds are waived due to Attorney Quinn's limiting statement at
the PCRA hearing.
11 In a footnote, the Commonwealth argues that Petitioner waived the issue of Attorney Spotts' alleged
failure to discuss "trial strategy" with Petitioner because the Commonwealth claims that issue was raised
initially in Petitioner's Brief rather than in Petitioner's Amended PCRA Petition. (Commw.'s Br. at 4 n.1.) I
find that this issue was not waived by Petitioner for the following reasons. To the extent that Petitioner's
Brief discusses trial strategy, it only does so in the context of self-defense and the "Castle Doctrine,"
which are included in ground (4). (Pet's Br. at 5; Pet's Am. Mot. For Post-Conviction Collateral Relief,~
9(0). Furthermore, the Commonwealth expressly addresses Attorney Spotts' discussions with Petitioner
regarding self-defense and the "Castle Doctrine in its own brief. (Commw.'s Br. at 6-7.) The
Commonwealth cannot have it both ways: it cannot claim that the Petitioner waived a certain issue and
then address it in its own brief.
8
The Commonwealth does not specifically address ground (4). I conclude that, not only
has Petitioner failed to establish that Attorney Spotts provided ineffective assistance of
counsel, he has also failed to show that this purported ineffective assistance resulted in
his tendering an unknowing, involuntary, or unintelligent plea. These two intertwined but
separate claims will be addressed in turn.
The Post-Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA") provides for an action by which a
defendant convicted of a crime they did not commit or serving an illegal sentence may
obtain collateral relief. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542. To be eligible for relief under the PCRA, a
defendant must plead and prove all four of the elements of the statute by a
preponderance of the evidence. kL_ § 9543(a). First, the PCRA Petition must be timely.
Here, Defendant's PCRA Petition was timely filed.12 Second, a defendant must have
"been convicted of a crime under the laws of this Commonwealth," and must be
imprisoned, on probation, or on parole at the time that relief is requested. kL_ §
9543(a)(1)(i-iii). Defendant was convicted on November 8, 2012 and was incarcerated
at Lancaster County Prison when he filed his pro se PCRA Petition and was
incarcerated at the Quehanna Boot Camp when the Amended PCRA Petition was filed.
Accordingly, this element is established. Third, Defendant must show that the issue has
not been previously litigated or waived.~§ 9543(a)-(b).13 The issue here has not been
12 Judgment of sentence was entered on November 8, 2012. A PCRA Petition must be filed within one
year of the date the judgment becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Judgment becomes final at the
conclusion of direct review, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.~ §9545(b)(3). The time
for direct appeal concluded on or about December 8, 2012. See Pa.RA. P. 903 ("the notice of appeal . .
shall be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken.) Thus, to be
timely, Petitioner's PCRA Petition must have been filed on or about December 8, 2013. Here, Petitioner
filed his prose PCRA Petition on January 7, 2013 and his Amended PCRA Petition on July 24, 2013, well
within the one-year filing period. Thus, the PCRA Petition was timely.
13
"An issue has been previously litigated when the highest appellate court in which the petitioner could
have had review as a matter of right has ruled on the merits of the issue or the issue has been raised and
decided in a proceeding collaterally attacking the conviction or sentence." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(a)
(internal punctuation omitted). An issue is waived "if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so
9
reviewed by the highest potential appellate court, has not been previously raised or
decided in a prior collateral proceeding, and could not have been raised previously by
Petitioner. Thus, this element is established.
Finally, a defendant must prove that his sentence or conviction was the result of
one or more errors enumerated in the statute. kl§ 9543(a)(2). Petitioner claims that his
guilty plea counsel's Ineffective assistance induced him to enter an involuntary plea.
Such a claim is cognizable under the PCRA. Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185,
191 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (citation omitted). It will provide a basis for relief only:
if the ineffectiveness caused an involuntary or unknowing plea. This is
similar to the. 'manifest injustice' standard applicable to all post-sentence
attempts to withdraw a guilty plea. The law does not require that the
appellant be pleased with the outcome of his decision to enter a plea of
guilty. All that must be shown is that the appellant's decision to plead guilty
be knowing, voluntary and intelligently made.
Commonwealth v. Diaz, 913 A.2d 871, 872 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (citing Commonwealth
v. Lewis, 708 A.2d 497, 500-01 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998)). "[A] manifest injustice occurs
when a plea is not tendered knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily, and understandingly."
Commonwealth v. Prendes, 97 A.3d 337, 352 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014) (citation omitted).
To determine the voluntariness of a guilty plea, the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal
Procedure "require the court to conduct an on-the-record colloquy to ascertain whether
a defendant is aware of his rights and the consequences of his plea." kl (citing
Commonwealth v. Hodges, 789 A.2d 764, 765 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002)); see Pa.R.Crim.P.
590.
before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in a prior state post-conviction proceeding." UL§
9544(b).
10
In an ineffectiveness claim, a court presumes that defense counsel provided
effective assistance. Commonwealth v. Rollins, 738 A.2d 435, 441 (Pa. 1999); accord
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984), Commonwealth v. Reyes-
Rodriguez, 111 A.3d 775, 779-80 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015). To overcome the presumption,
a defendant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the
underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable basis for the action
or inaction; and (3) Defendant has been prejudiced by the ineffectiveness of counsel.
Reyes-Rodriguez, 111 A.3d 775 at 780. A defendant's claim of ineffectiveness fails if he
is unable to prove one or more of the three prongs. Commonwealth v. Reyes, 870 A.2d
888, 896-97 (Pa. 2005); accord Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 804 (Pa. 2014).
Regarding prong (1 ), "counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a
meritless claim." Commonwealth v. Rivera, 108 A.3d 779, 789 (Pa. 2014) (citation
omitted). Regarding prong (2), counsel will not be deemed ineffective if any reasonable
basis exists for his actions. Commonwealth v. Diehl, 61 A.3d 265, 268 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2013) (citing Commonwealth v. Carter, 656 A.2d 463, 465 (Pa. 1995)). Regarding prong
(3), "to establish prejudice, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would
have insisted on going to trial." Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 191 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Grounds (1)-(2): Discovery Materials and Alleged Failure to Meet
Because grounds (1) and (2) of Petitioner's Motion are so closely related, I shall
evaluate them together. At the PCRA hearing, Attorney Spotts testified about why she
did not give Petitioner the discovery packet. She explained that she did not give
II
Petitioner the discovery packet because her office has a policy of not providing
discovery materials to an incarcerated defendant due to concerns that another inmate
might review the materials and be a witness against that defendant. (See N.T. PCRA
Hr'g. at 5:9-19). Attorney Spotts added that she nevertheless personally reviewed
discovery materials with Petitioner on "numerous occasions," that they read the
discovery materials with each other, that she communicated regularly with Petitioner by
mail, and that investigators from her office also met with Petitioner. (.!9..c at 5:9-23, 8:7-
10, 15:3-6, 16:20-23; 17:6-7 (describing meeting with petitioner); id. at 8:9-10, 15:23-
16:7 (describing mail correspondence.).) She asserted that Petitioner was familiar with
the information contained in the discovery packet because he was present at the
preliminary hearing and observed Attorney Spotts cross-examine the police, a
representative of Newgistics, and the Miranda brothers. (.!9..c at 17: 17-22.) Finally, she
claimed that Petitioner was so familiar with the discovery materials that he "knew [them]
by heart," basing he~ observation on Petitioner's writing her with questions about the
discovery materials even though Petitioner did not have the physical discovery packet.
(.!9..c at 17:8-16.) Attorney Spotts also testified about why she did not obtain a copy of the
video of the incident. She said that her office attempted to procure a video of the
incident from Petitioner's employer due to Petitioner's strong feeling that it would help
his case. (.!9..c at 17:23-18:15.) She added that both the Commonwealth and Attorney
Spotts requested the video, but Petitioner's employer never gave a copy to either
attorney or the police. (.!9..c at 18:12-19:13.) Finally, Attorney Spotts claimed that a police
officer told her that Petitioner's employer told him that the video did not show the actual
12
altercation, but only showed Defendant's workstation in the moments leading up to the
incident. (kl at 19:5:13.)
In contrast, Petitioner claimed that Attorney Spotts had discussed the discovery
packet with him only for about forty-five minutes a few days before he entered his guilty
plea. (kl at 41 :8-24.) Petitioner quickly backtracked, testifying that he met with Attorney
Spotts about five times in the week before his guilty plea and that none of these
meetings exceeded forty-five minutes. (kl at 42:2-10.) He also testified that his letters
were not answered until a week before his guilty plea. (kl at 42:2-12.) The Court asked
Petitioner about the video of the incident Petitioner claimed to have. (kl at 64:6-10.)
Petitioner testified that he had forwarded the video to Attorney Quinn, and that a video
of the incident was on YouTube. (kl at 64:10-17.) Attorney Quinn stated that he never
received a video from Petitioner but obtained a video from Monique Hill's cell phone,
adding that the video was useless because it only showed a "general melee." (kl at
64:18-23.)
On grounds (1 )-(2) of Petitioner's claim, I agree with the Commonwealth that
Attorney Spotts' number of meetings with Petitioner, not giving Petitioner a physical
copy of the discovery packet, and not procuring the video of the fight did not constitute
ineffective assistance that would render Petitioner's guilty plea involuntary for the
following reasons.
. Concerning the number of meetings, I find Petitioner's claim in his Amended
Motion that Attorney Spotts only met with him four times between his arrest and guilty
plea devoid of credibility. Attorney Spotts gave credible testimony that she met with
petitioner on numerous occasions at Lancaster County Prison, maintained written
13
correspondence with Petitioner, and had investigators meet with him. Attorney Spotts
had a reasonable basis for not going to Lancaster County Prison as frequently as
Petitioner would like because she had to represent other clients, sent investigators from
her office to visit Petitioner and help answer his questions, and regularly answered
Petitioner's questions by mail.
Petitioner's claim also fails because he suffered no prejudice based on the
number of meetings with Attorney Spotts. To establish prejudice, Petitioner must show
that there was "beneficial information or issues" that Attorney Spotts failed to consider
and that, had Petitioner and Attorney Spotts discussed this information, Petitioner would
have gone to trial rather than pleaded guilty. See Commonwealth v. Elliott, 622 Pa. 236,
263-64 (2013) cert. denied sub nom. Elliott v. Pennsylvania, 135 S. Ct. 50 (2014)
(describing prejudice standard in preparation for trial). Petitioner here has not shown
that Attorney Spotts failed to discover any new information that she would have learned
"had [s]he engaged in a more thorough pretrial consultation" with Petitioner that would,
in turn, have convinced Petitioner to go to trial rather than to plead guilty. Elliott, 622 Pa.
236 at 263-64. Indeed, Petitioner's own testimony reveals that Attorney Spotts was well-
aware of Petitioner's concerns. Petitioner testified that "[e]very idea I came up with, she
shot them [sic] down[,]" indicating that Petitioner and Attorney Spotts had extensive
discussions about the potential defenses Petitioner wanted to use, witnesses Petitioner
wanted to call, and evidence such as the video that Petitioner considered vital to his
case. (N.T. PCRA Hr'g. at 42:14-18.) Thus, Petitioner has failed to show that there was
beneficial information or issues that Attorney Spotts failed to consider and that the
voluntariness of Petitioner's plea would have been affected as a result.
14
Regarding the discovery packet, Petitioner's claim fails because Attorney Spotts
had a reasonable basis based on protecting her client's interests for not handing
Petitioner a physical copy of the discovery packet and because Petitioner suffered no
prejudice as a result of that failure. Attorney Spotts testified that she did not give
Petitioner a copy of the discovery packet because it was her employer's policy not to
give incarcerated defendants their discovery packets due to concerns that that another
inmate might read the packet and testify against the defendant. See Commonwealth v.
Lowery, 9 Pa.D.&C. 5th 449, 458-59, 2009 WL 5909151 (Pa.Com.Pl., Crawford Co.,
2009) (holding that trial counsel's not providing defendant with copy of entire discovery
packet in accordance with that attorney's general practice and based on a strategy of
protecting client interests that resulted in a favorable negotiated plea agreement was
not ineffective assistance). Thus, Petitioner's first claim fails because Attorney Spotts
had a reasonable basis for withholding the discovery packet from Petitioner.
Even if Attorney Spotts did not have a reasonable basis for withholding the
discovery packet, Petitioner's first claim also fails because he has failed to show that he
suffered prejudice as a result of this failure. To demonstrate prejudice, Petitioner must
show that, had Attorney Spotts given him a physical copy of the discovery packet, there
is a reasonable probability that he would have insisted on going to trial instead of
pleading guilty. Com~onwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 191 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013).
Petitioner has failed to establish a reasonable probability that he would have chosen to
go to trial rather than plead guilty if he had possessed a physical copy of the discovery
packet because the record reflects that Petitioner was familiar with the information in the
discovery packet at least a week before pleading guilty and chose to plead guilty
15
anyway. Reading the same information alone in his cell in addition to reviewing it with
Attorney Spotts would not have provided Petitioner with any new information affecting
his decision to plead guilty. Attorney Spotts provided credible testimony that she
personally reviewed the discovery materials with Petitioner on "numerous occasions" at
Lancaster County Prison, read through the materials with him, and communicated with
him regularly by mail. This testimony belies Petitioner's claim that Attorney Spotts only
discussed the discovery packet with him once for forty-five minutes a few days before
his guilty plea. Also, Petitioner was able to observe Attorney Spotts' cross-examination
of the Miranda Brothers and a representative of his former employer at the Preliminary
hearing. Finally, Attorney Spotts provided credible testimony that Petitioner was so
familiar with the discovery materials that he knew them by heart, even without having
the discovery packet with him.
Concerning the video, Petitioner's claim fails because Attorney Spotts had two
reasonable bases for not obtaining the video. First, Newgistics refused to supply it to
either her or the Commonwealth. Second, Attorney Spotts provided credible testimony
that the video would not have been helpful to Petitioner's defense because a police
officer told her that the video did not show the assault or the events outside of
Petitioner's workstation preceding it. Her testimony was corroborated by Petitioner's
own PCRA counsel who told the Court that a witness video of the incident was "useless"
because it did not show the initial aggressor and whether Petitioner was defending
himself when using the box cutter and whether he met his duty to retreat. Therefore,
Petitioner's first and second claims fail.
16
Ground 3: Alleged Refusal to Interview Witnesses
At the PCRA hearing, Attorney Spotts testified that she found it difficult to locate
potential witnesses because Petitioner only knew the first names or nicknames of many
of his co-workers, but that she tried to use this information to find them. (N.T. PCRA
Hr'g. at 7:3-13 (describing attempted identification of witnesses by first names); & at
19:17-20:3 (describing attempted identification of witnesses by nicknames).) She stated
that she asked Newgistics to supply a list identifying all the employees who worked on
the morning of June 24, 2011, but Petitioner's employer was "completely uncooperative"
and did not supply that information. (19..c at 7:8 (describing Petitioner's employer as
unhelpful in locating witnesses); 20:1-3 (describing requesting list of co-workers from
employer).) Attorney Spotts asserted that she made special efforts to contact the only
witness she felt would have been helpful to Petitioner's case, even working with the
assistant district attorney to obtain his identity. (19..c at 22:7-23:4.) Attorney Spotts
claimed that Petitioner's employer stonewalled her efforts by providing her with a first
and last name for that individual but eventually informing her that Petitioner's co-worker
was no longer employed at Newgistics and that they had no contact information for him.
(19..c at 22:20-23:4.) She added that her office attempted to reach Monique Hill by leaving
a contact letter at 173 South Fifth Street in Columbia, Pennsylvania, but never received
a response. (19..c at 7: 10-8:3.) Attorney Spotts testified that she could not explain why her
investigator's report was dated one day before Petitioner's guilty plea, but stated that
the investigator had been working on it for several months and had been contacting
potential witnesses during that time. (19..c at 6:20-23.)
17
In contrast, Petitioner claimed that he supplied Attorney Spotts with the first and
last names of two potential witnesses, but that neither spoke with her. (.!9..c at 43:4-9.) He
added that he had hoped that Attorney Spotts would have contacted the temp agency
that hired many Newgistics employees to get more information to identify potential
witnesses, which he did not think would be very difficult. (.!9..c at 49:4-51 :16.)
At the PCRA hearing, one such witness, Monique Hill, testified that she was a co-
worker of Petitioner and was in the same general area of the confrontation when it
occurred. She testified that she did not see where the fight started, but only where it
finished, never received any correspondence from Attorney Spotts, and that she never
reached out to Attorney Spotts to testify on Petitioner's behalf because they were not
"best friends or anything like that." (.!9..c at 35:3-38:21.)
On ground (3) of Petitioner's claim, I agree with the Commonwealth that Attorney
Spotts' efforts to contact witnesses, specifically Monique Hill, did not constitute
ineffective assistance that would render Petitioner's guilty plea involuntary for the
reasons that follow. Under the PCRA, two prerequisites, one procedural, one
substantive, must be met to gain relief for an ineffectiveness claim based on a failure to
have a witness testify. Commonwealth v. Reid, 99 A.3d 427, 438 (Pa. 2014). The
procedural prerequisite is met in the instant case for Monique Hill but not for any other
potential witness.14 A key element to a missing witness claim is that the absence of the
testimony of that witness prejudiced Petitioner and denied him a fair trial. Reid, 99 A.3d
14 "The PCRA requires that, to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing, a petitioner must include in his PCRA
petition 'a signed certification as to each intended witness stating the witness's name, address, date of
birth and substance of testimony."' Commonwealth v. Reid, 99 A.3d 427, 438 (Pa. 2014) (quoting 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(d)(1); Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(A)(15)). Petitioner only included such a certification for
Monique Hill.
18
427 at 438 (citation omitted). In this case, Petitioner has not met that burden because
Monique Hill testified that she only saw how the fight ended, not how it started. She
could not have testified to whether Petitioner met his duty to retreat or was defending
himself. Thus, her testimony would have been useless to any defense based on self-
defense or the "Castle Doctrine." Therefore, the absence of her testimony did not
prejudice Petitioner and his third ground for ineffective assistance of counsel fails.
Ground 4: Alleged Comments aboutRace and Merits of Defenses
At the PCRA hearing, Attorney Spotts testified that she discussed the jury
selection process with Petitioner, that he never mentioned race as an issue during that
process but did feel that he was charged because he was African-American. (N.T.
PCRA Hr'g. at 10:14~11:13 (describing jury selection and Petitioner's race); id. at 13:4
(describing race of witnesses.) She added that she never told Petitioner that he would
not prevail at trial due to his race. (~ at 28:19-29:6.) She also testified that her concern
with arguing self-defense and the "Castle Doctrine" at trial was that the Commonwealth
could successfully arque that Petitioner had violated his duty to retreat by entering
another's workspace before the altercation. (~ at 9:7-10:6.) She asserted that she was
concerned that a jury would not find Petitioner's account of the incident credible
because the Commonwealth's witnesses would have supported the complaining
witnesses' view that Petitioner was the aggressor and was not touched before he used
the box cutter. (~ at 24:23-27:5.)
On the other hand, Petitioner testified that Attorney Spotts told him that he, as an
African-American male, would be judged by an all-white jury who would view him with
disfavor but that she·never told him he would not get a fair trial. (~ at 47:3-9.) He
19
added that he wanted to go to trial but that he pied after speaking with his mother. (19.:. at
47:13-18.) Petitioner then recounted the incident, testifying that six co-workers
confronted him, that he was so nervous he went into the bathroom until told by a boss
that he needed to return to work, and that he left his workstation to speak with a co-
worker about the damaged motorcycle. (19.:. at 43: 10-46:8.) He conceded that the box
cutter was in his pocket when he left his workstation. (19.:. at 52:20-54:6.) He claimed that
he was not the first aggressor and did not pull the box cutter out of his pocket until after
he had been punched in the face and felt in imminent danger, and that a video would
confirm his account. (19.:. at 45:22-46:8). He further testified that he had discussed self-
defense and the "Castle Doctrine" with Attorney Spotts, that she told him they would not
be effective, and claimed that Attorney Spotts did not understand the "Castle Doctrine."
(19.:. at 42:12-24.)
On ground (4), first, I find Attorney Spotts' testimony that she never made these
alleged statements in the first place to be credible. Second, even if Attorney Spotts had
made these statements, Petitioner has still failed to establish that her making this
statement constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel because he has failed to show
that Attorney Spotts had no reasonable basis for not asserting the defenses of self-
defense and the "Castle Doctrine." It is the defendant's burden to prove that "the failure
to litigate the issue p_rior to or during trial, during unitary review or on direct appeal could
not have been the result of any rational, strategic or tactical decision by counsel." 42 Pa.
C.S.A. § 9543(a)(4); Commonwealth v. Diehl, 61 A.3d 265, 268 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013).
Successfully asserting a justification defense such as the "Castle Doctrine" or self-
defense at trial would have required some evidence to show that Petitioner did not
20
violate his duty to retreat or avoid the danger. See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 108 A.3d
779, 791 (Pa. 2014) (describing requirements for justification defenses). Here, Attorney
Spotts provided credible testimony that she thought that, at trial, the Commonwealth
would be able to show that Petitioner violated his duty to retreat because he walked
over to his co-worker's workstation with the box cutter immediately before the assault
and because she provided credible testimony that she could not produce witnesses to
testify that Petitioner was attacked first. Thus, she was concerned that, at trial, the
Commonwealth would be able to "satisf[y] its burden of disproving self-defense" or the
"Castle Doctrine." Rivera, 108 A.3d 779 at 791. Therefore, her decision not to pursue
justification defenses such as the "Castle Doctrine" or self-defense did not amount to
ineffective assistance because it could have resulted from a "rational, strategic or
tactical decision." See Diehl, 61 A.3d 265 at 268.
Third, Attorney Spotts did not render ineffective assistance by failing to argue a
justification defense such as the "Castle Doctrine" or self-defense because Petitioner's
own account of the confrontation and altercation at the PCRA hearing indicates that
these defenses were baseless. See Commonwealth v. Parker, 564 A.2d 246, 250 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1989); accord Rivera, 108 A.3d 779 at 789 (citation omitted). Petitioner
recounted that he was frightened and entered the bathroom as a result of his anxiety.
However, he testified that, rather than tell his supervisor that he felt threatened and
demand that the police be called, he voluntarily left his workstation while carrying a box
cutter to talk with one of the complaining witnesses. It defies belief that, moments before
walking away from his workstation to speak with a co-worker about the damaged
motorcycle, he felt so terrified that he had to hide from those same co-workers in the
21
bathroom. Moreover, Petitioner's own testimony shows that he voluntarily left his
workstation before the confrontation, violating his duty to retreat or avoid the danger.
See Rivera, 108 A.3d 779 at 793 (holding that Petitioner failed to satisfy requirements of
self-defense when he admitted that he could have retreated safely). Thus, Attorney
Spotts did not render ineffective assistance by failing to zealously assert a meritless
claim.
Voluntariness of Petitioner's GuiltyPlea
At the PCRA hearinq, Attorney Spotts testified that she never pressured
Petitioner to accept the deal before completing the written guilty plea colloquy, post-
sentence rights form, written plea agreement, and guilty plea slip together. (N.T. PCRA
Hr'g. at 28:4-15, 29:7-31 :18.) Attorney Spotts also testified that she felt that the
negotiated plea agre.ementwas a good offer by the Commonwealth because even a
guideline sentence would have resulted in significant jail time for Petitioner and that
Petitioner was aware of the deal the week before the scheduled trial date. (kl at 13: 11-
14:7.)
Petitioner admitted signing these same documents understanding their meaning
and legal effect. (kl at 60:3-10.) However, he claimed that his real reason for signing
them was his desire to end his period of incarceration. (See id. at 55:18-62:14). He
added that his statements at his Guilty Plea/Sentencing hearing that his decision to
plead guilty was his own and that his written, signed assertions on the guilty plea slip,
guilty plea colloquy, and written plea agreement were all untrue. (kl at 60:3-10.) Finally,
Petitioner admitted stating at his Guilty Plea/Sentencing hearing that he was satisfied
22
with the services of Attorney Spotts but claimed at the PCRA hearing that this was a lie.
(~ at 62:23-63:3.)
I find now, as I did at that time, that Petitioner entered a knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent guilty plea as demonstrated by the extensive on-the-record colloquy. During
this colloquy, Petitioner acknowledged that he understood the charges against him,
listened to Assistant District Attorney Todd Brown describe the factual basis for the
charges, stated that he understood that he was forfeiting his right to trial by jury,
understood that he was presumed innocent and that the Commonwealth had the burden
of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, that he understood the permissible
ranges of sentences and fines, and that I was not bound by the terms of the negotiated
plea agreement unless I accepted the plea. See Commonwealth v. Prendes, 97 A.3d
337, 352 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014) (stating requirements for adequate guilty-plea colloquy).
Furthermore, it is settled law that "one is bound by one's statements made during
a plea colloquy, and may not successfully assert claims that contradict such statements.
Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794 A.2d 378, 384 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (citation
omitted); accord Commonwealth v. Capelli, 489 A.2d 813, 819 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). In
other words, a "defendant may not knowingly lie to the court while under oath" while
entering a guilty plea. Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d. 517, 524 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2003). Statements that may not be later contradicted include assertions that one is
satisfied with the services of one's attorney and that one's plea has been voluntarily
entered. See Stork, 737 A.2d 789 at 791. Mere "disappointment by a defendant in the
sentence actually imposed does not represent manifest injustice" warranting the relief of
withdrawal of a guilty plea. Muhammad, 794 A.2d at 384 (quoting Commonwealth v.
23
Munson, 615 A.2d 343 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)). In other words, Pennsylvania "does not
require that a defendant be totally pleased with the outcome of his decision to plead
guilty, only that his decision be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent." Pollard, 832 A.2d
517 at 524. Finally, "the desire of an accused to benefit from a plea bargain is a strong
indicator of the voluntariness of the plea."~
Here, during his guilty plea colloquy, Petitioner signed the guilty plea colloquy,
guilty plea slip, and plea agreement form, told me that his decision to plead guilty was
voluntary and was his own decision, that he fully understood what he was doing and the
rights he was forfeiting, and that he was fully satisfied with the services of Attorney
Spotts. However, during his PCRA hearing, he contradicted these statements by saying
that they were all untrue. Petitioner cannot claim at his PCRA hearing that he was lying
during his Guilty Plea/Sentencing hearing about the voluntariness of his guilty plea.
While Petitioner may not be happy with the outcome of his guilty plea and might now
regret his decision, he is bound by the statements that he made during the quiltyplea
colloquy. Petitioner was of sufficient age and intelligence to understand what he was
doing when he pied guilty and cannot, in hindsight, assert that his guilty plea was not
voluntary or that he was not satisfied with Attorney Spotts' representation. Finally,
Petitioner's demonstrating a desire to benefit from the negotiated plea agreement is a
strong indicator of the voluntariness of the guilty plea. Under the plea agreement,
Petitioner's aggravated assault charge with a deadly weapon enhancement was no/le
prossed, making Petitioner eligible for Boot Camp, with its attendant educational and
vocational opportunities. It is unconscionable that he could accept these very real
24
benefits of the bargain while simultaneously avoiding its burdens. Thus, Petitioner's
guilty plea was not involuntary.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, I conclude Attorney Spotts did not provide
Petitioner ineffective assistance of counsel and that Petitioner's guilty plea was not
involuntary.
Accordingly, I enter the following:
25
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LANCASTER COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
CRIMINAL DIVISION
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
v. No. 3030-2011
SHAWN D. HANSLEY
ORDER
BY: WRIGHT, J. June ~ , 2015
I fi~ -
AND NOW, this .si.: day of June, 2015, upon consideration of Petitioner's pro
se filings, deemed to be a Petition for Post-Collateral Relief, Amended Motion for Post-
Collateral Relief, Supporting Brief, Commonwealth's Brief in Opposition, and hearings
thereon:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that said Petition is DENIED for the reasons set forth
in the preceding opinion.
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Copies to:
Travis S. Anderson, Assistant District Attorney
Patricia K. Spotts, Assistant Public Defender
Vincent J. Quinn, 1347 Fruitville Pike, Lancaster, PA 17601