Burgess, J. v. Clark Electrical Contractors ( 2017 )


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  • J-S89005-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    JAMES BURGESS AND KAY SHARON                     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    BURGESS, H/W,                                          PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellants
    v.
    CLARK ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS,
    INC., CHRISTOPHER CLARK, CABOT OIL
    AND GAS CORPORATION, CABOT
    PETROLEUM CORPORATION, CABOT OIL
    & GAS CORPORATION OF DELAWARE,
    CABOT OIL & GAS CORPORATION OF
    WEST VIRGINIA, CABOT OIL & GAS
    HOLDINGS COMPANY, CABOT OIL & GAS
    MARKETING CORPORATION, CABOT OIL
    & GAS WESTERN CORPORATION, CABOT
    PETROLEUM NORTH SEA, LIMITED,
    CABOT OIL, DIALIGHT CORPORATION,
    ROYAL ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY,
    D/B/A ROYAL ELECTRIC SUPPLY CO.,
    NATIONAL OILWELL VARCO, INC.,
    NATIONAL OILWELL VARCO, L.P.,
    NATIONAL OILWELL VARCO HOLDINGS
    LLC, NATIONAL OILWELL VARCO,
    Appellees
    ----------------------------------------------
    JAMES BURGESS AND KAY SHARON
    BURGESS, H/W,
    v.
    PATTERSON UTI, PATTERSON-UTI
    ENERGY, INC., PATTERSON-UTI
    DRILLING COMPANY, LLC, PATTERSON-
    UTI DRILLING COMPANY SOUTH LP,
    PATTERSON-UTI DRILLING COMPANY
    WEST LP, PATTERSON-UTI DRILLING
    INTERNATIONAL, INC., PATTERSON
    DRILLING SERVICES LP, PATTERSON UTI
    MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LLC,
    J-S89005-16
    PATTERSON-UTI INTERNATIONAL
    HOLDINGS, INC., PEI/GENESIS INC.,
    PATTERSON-UTI DRILLING SERVICES
    LP, LLLP, PATTERSON-UTI DRILLING
    COMPANY, LP, PATTERSON-UTI
    DRILLING COMPANY LP, LLLP,
    Appellees                  No. 3018 EDA 2015
    Appeal from the Order August 27, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Civil Division at No(s): 1412-01798, 1412-01813
    BEFORE: SHOGAN, MOULTON, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.:                         FILED FEBRUARY 03, 2017
    James Burges and Kay Sharon Burgess, husband and wife (collectively
    “Appellants”), appeal from the order entered on August 27, 2015, in the
    Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas that sustained Appellees’1
    preliminary objections as to improper venue and transferred this matter to
    Susquehanna County. We reverse and remand with instructions.
    The factual background of this matter is as follows:
    On December 12, 2012, a light fixture fell off a drill rig and
    hit [Appellant James Burgess] while he was working on the drill
    rig. As a result, Mr. Burgess is now a quadriplegic. This incident
    occurred in Susquehanna County, Pennsylvania.
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1
    The underlying actions were filed separately and later consolidated by the
    trial court. For purposes of our discussion, we shall refer to all remaining
    parties in our caption collectively as “Appellees.”
    -2-
    J-S89005-16
    In December of 2014, [Appellants] commenced this action,
    and reinstated their Complaint on March 20, 2015. Against all
    [Appellees], [Appellants] brought claims for negligence,
    recklessness with a request for punitive damages, and a loss of
    consortium claim on behalf of [Appellant Kay Sharon Burgess].
    On August 18th, 2015, this case was consolidated with
    another related case under Case ID 141201813. On August 27 th,
    this [c]ourt issued an order in this case, sustaining [Appellees’
    preliminary objections] as to improper venue in Philadelphia
    County and to transfer venue to Susquehanna County. On
    September 22, 2015, this [c]ourt issued an Order denying
    [Appellants’] Motion for Reconsideration.
    On October 5, 2015,[2] [Appellee] Royal Electric Supply
    Company, whose principal place of business is in Philadelphia,
    PA, was excused from this case. On July 8, 2015, [Appellee]
    PEI/Genesis, Inc., whose principal place of business is in
    Philadelphia, PA, was also excused [by stipulation on July 8,
    2015].
    Trial Court Opinion, 4/11/16, at 2.
    Appellants filed a timely appeal on September 25, 2015. On appeal,
    Appellants present the following issues:
    I. Whether the lower court committed an error of law or abused
    its discretion by transferring this matter to the Court of Common
    Pleas of Susquehanna County despite the fact that venue in
    Philadelphia County was appropriate under Rule 1006(c)(1)
    because several defendants joined at the initiation of the case
    maintained principal places of business in Philadelphia County?
    II. Alternatively, whether the lower court committed an error of
    law or abused its discretion by not considering any evidence and
    not permitting the parties to complete venue discovery before
    ____________________________________________
    2
    While the stipulation dismissing Royal Electric Supply Company was
    entered on the docket on October 5, 2015, the signatures of counsel for
    Appellants and counsel for Royal Electric Supply Company were dated
    July 23, 2015 and July 16, 2015, respectively.
    -3-
    J-S89005-16
    ruling on the preliminary objections and transferring the case to
    the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas?
    Appellants’ Brief at 4.
    The decision to transfer venue is within the discretion of the trial court,
    and we shall not disturb that decision absent an abuse of discretion.
    Scarlett v. Mason, 
    89 A.3d 1290
    , 1293 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
    omitted). “Ordinarily, a plaintiff’s choice of forum carries great weight, but it
    is not absolute or unassailable.”     
    Id.
     (citation omitted).   “Moreover, the
    presumption in favor of a plaintiff’s choice of forum has no application to the
    question of whether venue is proper in the plaintiff’s chosen forum; venue
    either is or is not proper.” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted).
    The exclusive method to challenge venue as “improper” is by filing a
    preliminary objection. Pa.R.C.P. 1006(e) (“Improper venue shall be raised
    by preliminary objection and if not so raised shall be waived.”).
    A Rule 1006(e) challenge to improper venue by preliminary
    objection has two key components: one substantive and one
    procedural.      Substantively, the basis for a Rule 1006(e)
    challenge is the defendant’s belief that venue is improper in the
    plaintiff’s chosen forum. The meaning of the word improper, as
    used in subsection (e), is, as previously noted, shaped by Rules
    2179 (providing where a personal action against a corporation
    may be brought), 1006(a) and (b) (providing where an action
    may be brought) and, relevant to this proceeding, 1006(c) (An
    action ... against two or more defendants ... may be brought
    against all defendants in any county in which the venue may be
    laid against any one of the defendants.). These rules exclusively
    address where venue properly may be laid at the time the suit is
    initiated. Thus, [a] question of improper venue is answered by
    taking a snapshot of the case at the time it is initiated: if it is
    proper at that time, it remains proper throughout the
    litigation.
    -4-
    J-S89005-16
    Zappala v. Brandolini Property Management, Inc., 
    909 A.2d 1272
    ,
    1281 (Pa. 2006) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and ellipsis omitted)
    (emphasis added). In its opinion, the trial court, pursuant to the holding in
    Zappala, concedes that it erred in sustaining Appellees’ preliminary
    objections based on improper venue and transferring venue to Susquehanna
    County. We agree.
    As the Supreme Court in Zappala explained, venue is to be considered
    as a “snapshot” taken at the time the case is initiated. Zappala, 909 A.2d
    at   1281.        Thus,     the    snapshot      here   included   the   Philadelphia
    defendants/Appellees Royal Electric Supply Company, PEI/Genesis Inc.,
    Patterson, and Cabot. As such, venue was proper in Philadelphia at the time
    the case was initiated. Id. Accordingly, the trial court erred as a matter of
    law, and we reverse its order sustaining the preliminary objections regarding
    improper venue and transferring venue to Susquehanna County.3
    However, our decision with respect to venue does not impact
    Appellees’ motion to transfer venue based on forum non conveniens because
    that motion is considered separately from venue.             Zappala, 909 A.2d at
    1284; Pa.R.C.P. 1006(d). Here, Appellees filed a motion raising forum non
    conveniens on July 30, 2015, which the trial court deemed moot due to its
    ____________________________________________
    3
    As our disposition of Appellants’ first issue is dispositive, we do not reach
    Appellants’ second issue concerning discovery.
    -5-
    J-S89005-16
    ruling on the preliminary objections based on improper venue.           Order,
    8/27/15.
    Because we conclude that the trial court erred in sustaining the
    preliminary objections as to improper venue and transferring venue to
    Susquehanna County, Appellees’ motion raising forum non conveniens is no
    longer moot.4      As such, we reverse the order sustaining the preliminary
    objections based on improper venue that resulted in this case being
    transferred to Susquehanna County.               Thus, venue remains proper in
    Philadelphia County. Accordingly, we remand this matter to the Philadelphia
    Court of Common Pleas to address Appellees’ motion to transfer based on
    forum non conveniens.5
    ____________________________________________
    4
    See Consolidation Coal Co. v. District 5, United Mine Workers of
    America, 
    485 A.2d 1118
    , 1124 (Pa. Super. 1984) (“That an action is ‘moot’
    suggests that there is a legal issue involved in a case, but because of the
    circumstances surrounding the case, the issue has become an academic one
    and will not be resolved. What ‘mootness’ does not suggest is that an issue
    was fully considered and a final judgment entered.”).
    5
    The order denying as moot Appellees’ motion to transfer for forum non
    conveniens was not a final appealable order. Centerre Bank of Kansas
    City, N.A. v. Arthur Young & Co., 
    502 A.2d 251
     (Pa. Super. 1985);
    Pa.R.A.P. 311. The order did not become final until the August 27, 2015
    order on appeal that disposed of all claims and all parties. See Betz v.
    Pneumo Abex LLC, 
    44 A.3d 27
    , 54 (Pa. 2012) (holding that “an appeal of a
    final order subsumes challenges to previous interlocutory decisions”);
    Pa.R.A.P. 341 note (“A party needs to file only a single notice of appeal to
    secure review of prior non-final orders that are made final by the entry of a
    final order[.]”). While we could simply reverse the order sustaining the
    preliminary objections as to improper venue that transferred venue to
    Susquehanna County and permit Appellees to file new motions raising forum
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    -6-
    J-S89005-16
    Order reversed.           Case remanded with instructions.   Jurisdiction
    relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 2/3/2017
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    non conveniens, in the interests of judicial economy, we place the previously
    filed motion before the trial court and leave to the trial court’s discretion
    whether it requires additional filings or hearings on the issue of forum non
    conveniens.
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 3018 EDA 2015

Filed Date: 2/3/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/3/2017