ACLU v. Super. Ct. ( 2015 )


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  • Filed 5/11/15 (unmodified opn. attached)
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION THREE
    AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION                        B259392
    FOUNDATION OF SOUTHERN
    CALIFORNIA et al.,                                    (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. BS143004)
    Petitioners,
    ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
    v.                                            [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
    THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    LOS ANGELES COUNTY,
    Respondent;
    COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al.,
    Real Parties in Interest.
    THE COURT:
    It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on May 6, 2015, be modified as follows:
    On page 2, the first paragraph should be deleted and replaced with the following:
    Collins Collins Muir + Stewart, Eric Brown, Tomas A. Guterres and James
    C. Jardin for Real Parties in Interest County of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles
    Sheriff’s Department.
    Katie Townsend for the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and
    4 Media Organizations as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.
    James R. Wheaton and Cherokee D.M. Melton for Northern California
    Chapter of Society of Professional Journalists as Amicus Curiae on behalf of
    Petitioners.
    Jones & Mayer, Martin J. Mayer, James R. Touchstone and Deborah
    Pernice Knefel, for the California State Sheriffs’ Association, California Policy
    Chiefs’ Association, and the California Peace Officers’ Association as Amici
    Curiae on behalf of Respondent.
    There is no change in the judgment.
    2
    Filed 5/6/15 (unmodified version)
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION THREE
    AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION                      B259392
    FOUNDATION OF SOUTHERN
    CALIFORNIA et al.,                                  (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. BS143004)
    Petitioners,
    v.
    THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    LOS ANGELES COUNTY,
    Respondent;
    COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al.,
    Real Parties in Interest.
    PETITION for Writ of Mandate from an order of the Superior Court of Los
    Angeles County, James C. Chalfant, Judge. Petition denied.
    Peter Bibring for Petitioner American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of
    Southern California.
    Jennifer Lynch for Petitioner Electronic Frontier Foundation.
    No Appearance for Respondent.
    Michael N. Feuer, City Attorney, Carlos De La Guerra, Managing Assistant City
    Attorney, Debra L. Gonzales, Assistant City Attorney, and Heather L. Aubry, Deputy
    City Attorney, for Real Parties in Interest City of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles
    Police Department.
    Collins Collins Muir + Stewart, Eric Brown, Tomas A. Guterres and James C.
    Jardin for Real Parties in Interest County of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles Sheriff’s
    Department.
    _____________________
    INTRODUCTION
    In this writ proceeding we must determine whether the California Public Records
    Act (CPRA) exemption for law enforcement records of investigations (Gov. Code,
    § 6254, subd. (f))1 applies to records generated by a system of high-speed cameras that
    automatically scan and catalogue license plate images to aid law enforcement in locating
    vehicles associated with a suspected crime. We conclude the exemption applies.
    For more than a decade, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and Los
    Angeles Sheriff’s Department (LASD), agencies of Real Parties in Interest the City and
    County of Los Angeles (collectively, Real Parties), have used Automatic License Plate
    Reader (ALPR) technology to automate a process that officers ordinarily perform
    manually—checking license plates to determine whether a vehicle is stolen or otherwise
    wanted in connection with a crime. Real Parties’ ALPR systems consist of specialized
    cameras mounted to patrol cars or stationary structures that scan license plates in their
    immediate vicinity and record the license plate number together with the time and
    location of the scan. At virtually the same time, the ALPR system checks every license
    plate number it scans against a list of known license plates associated with suspected
    crimes—a so-called “hot list.” If the system registers a hit, patrol officers are
    immediately notified that a hot list vehicle is in their vicinity. Regardless of whether
    there is a hit, the system records the plate scan data, which Real Parties retain for up to
    five years for use in future investigations.
    1
    Subsequent statutory references are to the Government Code, unless otherwise
    designated.
    2
    Petitioners American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Southern California and
    Electronic Frontier Foundation sent Real Parties a CPRA request for their policies and
    guidelines concerning use of ALPR technology, as well as all ALPR plate scan data Real
    Parties collected during a single week in August 2012. Real Parties agreed to produce the
    policies and guidelines, but refused to disclose the week’s worth of ALPR data, citing the
    law enforcement investigative records exemption and privacy concerns. Petitioners filed
    a petition for writ of mandate seeking to compel production of the ALPR data under the
    CPRA. The trial court denied the petition, concluding the records are exempt as records
    of law enforcement investigations under section 6254, subdivision (f). Guided by
    Supreme Court precedent extending the exemption to “records of investigations
    conducted for the purpose of uncovering information surrounding the commission of the
    violation [of law] and its agency” (Haynie v. Superior Court (2001) 
    26 Cal. 4th 1061
    ,
    1071 (Haynie)), we likewise conclude the exemption applies to records generated by the
    ALPR system in the course of scanning license plates to locate automobiles associated
    with a suspected crime under investigation. Accordingly, we deny the writ petition.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    The relevant facts are not in dispute. Real Parties each maintain an ALPR system
    that consists of several high-speed cameras mounted on fixed structures and patrol cars
    that automatically capture an image of every passing vehicle’s license plate in their
    immediate vicinity. The system uses “character recognition software” to read the license
    plate’s number from the image and “almost instantly” checks the number against a list of
    “known license plates” associated with suspected crimes—or a “hot list”—to determine
    whether a vehicle may be stolen or otherwise associated with a crime, AMBER alert or
    outstanding warrant. If a mobile ALPR unit detects a license plate on the hot list, officers
    are notified of the “hit” by an audible alert and notation on their patrol car’s computer
    screen. ALPR fixed positions similarly notify a central dispatch unit when a hit is
    detected.
    3
    In addition to extracting the license plate number, the ALPR system records the
    date and location where it captured the plate’s image. The system transmits this “plate
    scan data” to an ALPR server within Real Parties’ confidential computer networks.
    LAPD estimates it records plate scan data for approximately 1.2 million cars per week;
    LASD estimates that figure to be between 1.7 and 1.8 million plate scans for its ALPR
    system. LAPD retains plate scan data for five years under its current policy. LASD
    retains the data for two years, although it would prefer to retain the data indefinitely.
    In addition to receiving immediate notification from the ALPR system when it
    locates a license plate on the hot list, Real Parties can also query stored plate scan data to
    assist in subsequent law enforcement investigations. For instance, LAPD investigators
    have used stored ALPR data to identify a vehicle that was present at an armed robbery
    and, in another instance, a vehicle directly linked to a homicide. Real Parties maintain
    policies restricting access to plate scan data for law enforcement purposes only.
    On August 30 and September 4, 2012, Petitioners sent substantially identical
    CPRA requests to LAPD and LASD seeking records related to those agencies’ use of
    ALPR technology, including “all ALPR data collected or generated” during a one-week
    period in August 2012, consisting of, “at a minimum, the license plate number, date,
    time, and location information for each license plate recorded.” The CPRA request also
    sought “any policies, guidelines, training manuals and/or instructions on the use of ALPR
    technology and the use and retention of ALPR data, including records on where the data
    is stored, how long it is stored, who has access to the data, and how they access the data.”
    Real Parties each agreed to produce records responsive to Petitioners’ requests for
    policies, guidelines and training manuals concerning the use, access, and retention of
    ALPR plate scan data. Real Parties refused to produce the requested week’s worth of
    plate scan data, however, citing, among other things, the exemption for records of law
    enforcement investigations.
    On May 6, 2013, Petitioners filed a verified petition for writ of mandate to compel
    production of the ALPR plate scan data under the CPRA.
    4
    Real Parties each opposed the petition, again citing the exemption for records of
    law enforcement investigations under section 6254, subdivision (f), as well as the
    “catchall” exemption under section 6255.2 With their opposition briefs, Real Parties filed
    supporting declarations by their subject matter experts detailing the technical aspects of
    their respective ALPR systems and the ways each law enforcement agency uses the
    technology in practice.
    On August 21, 2014, the court held a trial on Petitioners’ writ petition. On August
    27, 2014, the court entered an order affirming Real Parties’ decision to withhold the
    ALPR plate scan data, concluding the data was subject to the records of investigations
    exemption under section 6254, subdivision (f) and the catchall exemption under section
    6255.
    DISCUSSION
    1.     Standard of Review
    A trial court order under the CPRA, either directing disclosure by a public official
    or affirming the public official’s decision to refuse disclosure, is immediately reviewable
    by petition to the appellate court for issuance of an extraordinary writ. (§ 6259, subd.
    (c).) “The standard for review of the order is ‘an independent review of the trial court’s
    ruling; factual findings made by the trial court will be upheld if based on substantial
    evidence.’ ” (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1999) 
    74 Cal. App. 4th 1008
    , 1016.)
    The interpretation of the CPRA, and application of the statute to undisputed facts is a
    question of law subject to de novo review. (Lorig v. Medical Board (2000)
    
    78 Cal. App. 4th 462
    , 467.)
    2
    Under section 6255, a public agency may justify withholding records otherwise
    subject to CPRA disclosure requirements by demonstrating that “on the facts of the
    particular case the public interest served by not disclosing the record clearly outweighs
    the public interest served by disclosure of the record.”
    5
    2.     The Records of Investigations Exemption Under Government Code Section
    6254, Subdivision (f)
    The CPRA declares that “access to information concerning the conduct of the
    people’s business is a fundamental and necessary right of every person in this state.”
    (§ 6250.) The statute’s explicit purpose is to increase freedom of information by giving
    the public access to information in the public agencies’ possession. (CBS, Inc. v. Block
    (1986) 
    42 Cal. 3d 646
    , 651.) “Maximum disclosure of the conduct of governmental
    operations was to be promoted by the [CPRA].” (Id. at pp. 651-652.) To that end, the
    CPRA provides that “every person has a right to inspect any public record, except as
    hereafter provided.” (§ 6253, subd. (a).) Hence, “all public records are subject to
    disclosure unless the Legislature has expressly provided to the contrary.” (Williams v.
    Superior Court (1993) 
    5 Cal. 4th 337
    , 346 (Williams); 
    Haynie, supra
    , 26 Cal.4th at
    p. 1068.) Consistent with the CPRA’s purpose, “[s]tatutory exemptions from compelled
    disclosure are narrowly construed.” (California State University, Fresno Assn., Inc. v.
    Superior Court (2001) 
    90 Cal. App. 4th 810
    , 831.)
    Real Parties contend, and the trial court found, that the plate scan records
    generated by the ALPR system constitute records of investigations which are exempt
    from disclosure under section 6254, subdivision (f). In pertinent part, subdivision (f)
    authorizes a public agency to withhold “[r]ecords of . . . investigations conducted by . . .
    any state or local police agency, or any investigatory or security files compiled by any
    other state or local police agency . . . .” While broadly shielding the records themselves
    from disclosure, the CPRA requires law enforcement agencies to disclose certain
    information derived from the records, as provided in subdivisions (f)(1) and (f)(2).3
    3
    Notwithstanding the general directive to narrowly construe such exemptions, our
    Supreme Court has explained that section 6254, subdivision (f) “articulates a broad
    exemption from disclosure for law enforcement investigatory records,” which is limited
    only by requirements in subdivisions (f)(1) and (f)(2) to “provide certain information
    derived from the records about the incidents under investigation.” 
    (Williams, supra
    ,
    5 Cal.4th at p. 349, italics added.) That is, “[i]nstead of adopting criteria that would
    require the exemption’s applicability to be determined on a case-by-case basis,” the
    6
    
    (Williams, supra
    , 5 Cal.4th at p. 353; 
    Haynie, supra
    , 26 Cal.4th at p. 1068.) The parties
    agree that the derivative categories of information to be disclosed under these
    subsections—information about arrests and arrestees (§ 6254, subd. (f)(1)) and
    complaints and requests for assistance (§ 6254, subd. (f)(2))—are not at issue in this case.
    What is at issue is the meaning of the term “investigations” in section 6254,
    subdivision (f), and whether the functions performed by the ALPR system can properly
    be characterized as investigations under the statute. Though the CPRA does not define
    the term, and no case has considered whether records generated by an automated process,
    like that performed by the ALPR system, qualify for exemption under subdivision (f), our
    Supreme Court has articulated some general principles to guide our analysis.
    First, the exemption for records of investigation encompasses routine
    investigations undertaken to determine if a violation of law has, or may have, occurred.
    In rejecting an interpretation that would exclude such records from the exemption’s
    purview, the Supreme Court in Haynie explained, “The Court of Appeal, in ordering
    disclosure, reasoned that the citizen report . . . did not ‘necessarily’ describe a crime and
    that the [law enforcement action] was a ‘routine police inquiry’ based on mere suspicion
    of criminal conduct. These factors are of no significance under the statute. In exempting
    ‘[r]ecords of complaints to, or investigations conducted by’ law enforcement agencies,
    section 6254(f) does not distinguish between investigations to determine if a crime has
    been or is about to be committed and those that are undertaken once criminal conduct is
    apparent.”4 (
    Haynie, supra
    , 26 Cal.4th at p. 1070, fn. 6, italics added.)
    Legislature “limited the CPRA’s exemption for law enforcement investigatory files . . .
    [by] adopt[ing] a series of amendments that required the disclosure of information
    derived from the records while, in most cases, preserving the exemption for the records
    themselves.” (Id. at p. 353.)
    4
    This distinguishes the records of investigations from “investigatory . . . files
    compiled by any . . . local agency for correctional, law enforcement, or licensing
    purposes. . . .” (§ 6254, subd. (f), italics added.) As the Supreme Court explained in
    Williams, it is “well established that ‘information in public files [becomes] exempt as
    “investigatory” material only when the prospect of enforcement proceedings [becomes]
    concrete and definite.’ ” 
    (Williams, supra
    , 5 Cal.4th at p. 356.) “Such a qualification is
    7
    Second, while routine investigations are within the exemption’s ambit, not
    everything that law enforcement does is shielded from disclosure. As the court explained
    in Haynie, “[o]ften, officers make inquiries of citizens for purposes related to crime
    prevention and public safety that are unrelated to either civil or criminal investigations.
    The records of investigation exempted under section 6254(f) encompass only those
    investigations undertaken for the purpose of determining whether a violation of law may
    occur or has occurred. If a violation or potential violation is detected, the exemption also
    extends to records of investigations conducted for the purpose of uncovering information
    surrounding the commission of the violation and its agency.” (
    Haynie, supra
    , 26 Cal.4th
    at p. 1071, italics added.)
    Third, the exemption shielding records of investigations from disclosure does not
    lapse when the investigation that prompted the records’ creation ends. As the high court
    stated in Williams with respect to the exemption for investigatory files, “It is noteworthy
    that nothing [in the statute’s language] purports to place a time limit on the exemption for
    investigatory files. Indeed, a file ‘compiled by . . . [a] police agency’ or a file ‘compiled
    by any other state or local agency for . . . law enforcement . . . purposes’ continues to
    meet that definition after the investigation has concluded. If the Legislature had wished
    to limit the exemption to files that were ‘related to pending investigations,’ words to
    achieve that result were available. It is not the province of courts ‘to insert what has been
    omitted.’ ” 
    (Williams, supra
    , 5 Cal.4th at p. 357.) The same is true for records of
    investigations—they continue to be “[r]ecords of . . . investigations conducted by . . . any
    necessary to prevent an agency from attempting to ‘shield a record from public
    disclosure, regardless of its nature, simply by placing it in a file labelled
    “investigatory.” ’ ” (
    Haynie, supra
    , 26 Cal.4th at p. 1069, quoting Williams, at p. 355.)
    However, the “ ‘concrete and definite’ qualification to the exemption in section 6254(f)
    ‘relates only to information which is not itself exempt from compelled disclosure, but
    claims exemption only as part of an investigatory file. Information independently
    exempt, such as “intelligence information” [or records of investigations at issue in
    Haynie], is not subject to the requirement that it relate to a concrete and definite prospect
    of enforcement proceedings.’ ” (Haynie, at p. 1069, quoting American Civil Liberties
    Union Foundation v. Deukmejian (1982) 
    32 Cal. 3d 440
    , 449, fn. 10.)
    8
    state or local police agency” even after the investigation that prompted their creation
    ends. (§ 6254, subd. (f).)
    Finally, as alluded to in the foregoing quotation from Williams, the Supreme Court
    has cautioned against courts placing nonstatutory limitations on the scope of section
    6254, subdivision (f). As the court elaborated in Williams, referring to the required
    disclosures under section 6254, subdivisions (f)(1) and (f)(2), “These provisions for
    mandatory disclosure from law enforcement investigatory files represent the
    Legislature’s judgment, set out in exceptionally careful detail, about what items of
    information should be disclosed and to whom. Unless that judgment runs afoul of the
    Constitution it is not our province to declare that the statutorily required disclosures are
    inadequate or that the statutory exemption from disclosure is too broad. . . . Requests for
    broader disclosure must be directed to the Legislature.” 
    (Williams, supra
    , 5 Cal.4th at
    p. 361.)
    With these principles in mind, we turn to whether the plate scan data generated by
    the ALPR system constitute records of investigation under section 6254, subdivision (f).
    3.     Plate Scan Data Generated by the ALPR System Are Records of
    Investigations Exempt from Disclosure Under Government Code Section
    6254, Subdivision (f)
    Drawing on the guidance from Haynie and Williams, Real Parties contend the
    plate scans performed by the ALPR system are “investigations” within the meaning of
    section 6254, subdivision (f) because they are “conducted for the purpose of uncovering
    information surrounding the commission of the violation [of law] and its agency.”
    (
    Haynie, supra
    , 26 Cal.4th at p. 1071.) Citing the declaration by LAPD’s subject matter
    expert, Real Parties stress that the ALPR system uses “character recognition software” to
    read license plate numbers and “almost instantly” checks those numbers against a list of
    “known license plate[s]” associated with suspected crimes to “determine whether a
    vehicle may be stolen or otherwise associated with a crime.” The LASD’s declarant
    described the ALPR system’s function in similar terms, explaining that by utilizing the
    system to “automatically” check license plate scans against a “hot list” of plates
    9
    associated with suspected crimes, “[t]he [LASD] uses ALPR technology to investigate
    specific crimes that involve motor vehicles, including but not limited to stolen motor
    vehicles, Amber alerts that identify a specific motor vehicle, warrants that relate to the
    owner of a specific motor vehicle, and license plates of interest that relate to a specific
    investigation being conducted by [LASD] investigatory personnel.” Thus, Real Parties
    contend the license plate scan and almost instantaneous check against the hot list
    constitutes an investigation under section 6254, subdivision (f), because the ALPR
    system is attempting to detect and uncover criminal activity. (Haynie, at p. 1071.)
    Expanding on the foregoing analysis, Real Parties argue the records generated by
    the ALPR system in performing the scans and hot list checks are records of investigations
    and, therefore, exempt from disclosure under section 6254, subdivision (f). As counsel
    for the LASD put it at the trial below, plate scan data generated by the ALPR system is
    necessarily a record of an investigation because “[t]hese records would not exist were the
    County or the City not investigating specific crimes in an attempt to locate persons who
    are suspected of having committed crimes.” We agree. In the Haynie court’s words,
    these records exist only because Real Parties are trying to “uncover[ ] information
    surrounding the commission of [a] violation [of law] and its agency.” (
    Haynie, supra
    ,
    26 Cal.4th at p. 1071.) As evidenced by the LAPD and LASD declarations, Real Parties
    have deployed the ALPR system to assist in law enforcement investigations involving an
    identified automobile’s license plate number. It follows that the records the ALPR
    system generates in the course of attempting to detect and locate these automobiles are
    records of those investigations. The exemption under section 6254, subdivision (f)
    broadly shields these records from disclosure, subject to requirements pertaining to
    derivative information (see § 6254, subds. (f)(1) & (f)(2)) not at issue here. (See
    
    Williams, supra
    , 5 Cal.4th at pp. 353, 361; Haynie, at p. 1068.)
    Petitioners argue the ALPR plate scans are not investigations within the
    exemption’s purview. Unlike the cases that have applied the exemption, which all
    “involve[d] requests for documents related to targeted investigations of specific criminal
    acts” (italics added), Petitioners argue the plate scans conducted by ALPR systems “are
    10
    not precipitated by any specific criminal investigation.” Rather, Petitioners assert, ALPR
    systems “photograph every license plate that comes into view . . . regardless of whether
    the car or its driver is linked to criminal activity.” They contend, ALPR systems “do not
    conduct investigations; they collect data.” We disagree.
    Contrary to Petitioners’ premise, the plate scans performed by the ALPR system
    are precipitated by specific criminal investigations—namely, the investigations that
    produced the “hot list” of license plate numbers associated with suspected crimes. As
    Real Parties’ experts both testified, the ALPR system’s principal purpose is to check
    license plates against the hot list to determine whether a vehicle is connected to a crime
    under investigation. In this way, the ALPR system replicates, albeit on a vastly larger
    scale, a type of investigation that officers routinely perform manually by visually reading
    a license plate and entering the plate number into a computer to determine whether a
    subject vehicle might be stolen or otherwise associated with a crime.5 The fact that the
    ALPR system automates this process does not make it any less an investigation to locate
    automobiles associated with specific suspected crimes.
    Nor does the fact that the ALPR system scans every license plate within view,
    “regardless of whether the car or its driver is linked to criminal activity,” mean the
    system is not performing an investigation. As explained in Haynie, “[i]n exempting
    ‘[r]ecords of . . . investigations conducted by’ law enforcement agencies, section 6254(f)
    does not distinguish between investigations to determine if a crime has been or is about
    to be committed and those that are undertaken once criminal conduct is apparent.”
    5
    Petitioners suggest the “collection of plate data”—i.e., the photographing and
    scanning of a license plate—can be separated from “its later investigative uses”—i.e., the
    near instantaneous check against the hot list. This argument ignores that the plate scan is
    an integral part of the ALPR system’s process for locating automobiles on the hot list.
    Just as an officer cannot investigate whether an automobile has been associated with a
    suspected crime without visually observing and reading its license plate number, so too
    the ALPR system cannot determine whether a license plate number is on the hot list
    without scanning the plate. The collection of plate data and hot list check are part and
    parcel of the same investigative process—without the plate scan there can be no
    investigation.
    11
    (
    Haynie, supra
    , 26 Cal.4th at p. 1070, fn. 6, italics added.) Contrary to Petitioners’
    implicit contention, our Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the notion that a “concrete
    and definite” prospect of enforcement must be shown to exempt records of investigations
    from disclosure. (Id. at pp. 1069-1071; see also 
    Williams, supra
    , 5 Cal.4th at pp. 354-
    356.) The ALPR system necessarily scans every car in view, just as human officers
    would in attempting to identify a stolen vehicle. The fact that non-hot list vehicles are
    necessarily checked does not mean there was no investigation. (See fn. 6, post.)
    Lastly, Petitioners emphasize the volume and retention of plate scan data to
    highlight the differences between ALPR scans and more traditional investigative
    techniques. In Petitioners’ view, because Real Parties’ ALPR systems each generate
    more than a million system-wide scans each week, and retain data from these scans for
    two to five years, they “do not conduct investigations; they collect data.”
    There are two problems with this argument. We have already discussed the first—
    the ALPR systems are not merely recording data; rather, Real Parties have deployed these
    systems primarily to detect and locate vehicles that have been connected to a suspected
    crime. The fact that ALPR technology generates substantially more records than an
    officer could generate in manually performing the same task does not mean the ALPR
    plate scans are not records of investigations.6
    6
    For instance, setting practical considerations aside, Real Parties could
    hypothetically deploy human patrol units to photograph every license plate they pass
    during a specific period on a specific route in order to later compare those photographs
    against a hot list of license plates associated with suspected crimes. Though this tactic
    would generate a massive number of license plate photographs, of which very few could
    be expected to appear on the hot list, no one could claim these photographs, and the
    associated time and location data logged by the officers, were not records of the
    investigations these officers performed. The fact that the ALPR system automates this
    process and generates exponentially more records than officers could humanly produce
    has no bearing on whether those plate scans and associated data are records of
    investigations under section 6254, subdivision (f).
    12
    Second, though ALPR data is retained for two to five years after the initial hot list
    check, this does not strip an investigative record of its exempt status under section 6254,
    subdivision (f). As our Supreme Court explained in Williams, “nothing [in the statute’s
    language] purports to place a time limit on the exemption for investigative files.”
    
    (Williams, supra
    , 5 Cal.4th at p. 357.) Records generated by the ALPR system for the
    purpose of locating automobiles associated with a suspected crime, like the investigative
    files discussed in Williams, continue to meet the applicable statutory definition even after
    the investigations for which they were created conclude—that is, they continue to be
    “[r]ecords of . . . investigations conducted by . . . any state or local police agency.”
    (§ 6254, subd. (f); see Williams, at p. 357.) Thus, for our purposes in interpreting the
    exemption, it is of no moment that Real Parties retain the records in a database for years
    after the initial hot list check.
    To be sure, the automated nature of the ALPR system, with its capacity to capture
    and record millions of plate scans throughout Los Angeles City and County, sets it apart
    from the traditional investigatory techniques that courts have considered in earlier cases
    addressing the scope of the investigative records exemption. But that distinction is
    irrelevant to the question of whether the ALPR system’s core function is to “uncover[ ]
    information surrounding the commission of the violation [of law] and its agency”—i.e.,
    to investigate suspected crimes. (
    Haynie, supra
    , 26 Cal.4th at p. 1071.). We conclude
    that it is, and that the records generated in the course of performing that function are
    records of these investigations. The investigative records exemption applies and shields
    the plate scan data from disclosure under the CPRA.
    Because we conclude the exemption under section 6254, subdivision (f) supports
    Real Parties’ decision to withhold the ALPR plate scan data, we do not address whether
    Real Parties also met their burden under section 6255’s catchall exemption.
    13
    DISPOSITION
    The petition for writ of mandate is denied. Real Parties are entitled to recover
    their costs in this writ proceeding.
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    KITCHING, Acting P. J.
    We concur:
    ALDRICH, J.
    EGERTON, J.*
    *
    Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
    article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
    14
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B259392M

Filed Date: 5/11/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/11/2015