Meade, M. v. BBVA Compass Bank ( 2015 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
MARK C. MEADE IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
BBVA COMPASS BANK
Appellee No. 2629 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Order entered August 8, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County
Civil Division at No: 203-CIVIL-2014
BEFORE: BOWES, DONOHUE, and STABILE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED MAY 12, 2015
Mark C. Meade appeals pro se from an order of the Court of Common
Pleas of Wayne County, which sustained the demurrer of Appellee, BBVA
Compass Bank (BBVA), in this quiet title action. Upon review, we affirm.
In another case pending before the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne
County, BBVA filed a complaint in foreclosure against Meade (the foreclosure
action), to foreclose upon a residential property located in Damascus
Township, Wayne County. In the foreclosure action, the trial court granted
BBVA’s motion for summary judgment, and Meade appealed to this Court,
docketed at No. 1137 EDA 2013. While the appeal was pending, BBVA
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realized the Act 61 notice sent to Meade might have been defective.
Therefore, BBVA voluntarily discontinued its appeal, vacated the judgment
entered in its favor, and dismissed the foreclosure action without
prejudice.
On April 8, 2014, Meade filed a pro se complaint to quiet title. In his
complaint, Meade alleged that BBVA’s dismissal of the foreclosure action
constituted an abandonment of its interest in the subject property. As relief,
he requested removal of the mortgage lien on the property. BBVA did not
file a responsive pleading, but instead filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. In its motion, BBVA contended Meade failed to state a claim on
which relief may be granted. The trial court treated BBVA’s motion as
preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, sustained the demurrer,
and dismissed this action with prejudice. Meade then appealed to this Court.
On appeal, we read Meade’s brief as encompassing three arguments:
the trial court erred in (1) considering the motion for judgment on the
pleadings as preliminary objections; (2) sustaining the demurrer; and (3)
denying leave to amend the complaint.
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Act of Jan. 30, 1974, P.L. 13, No. 6, as amended, 41 P.S. §§ 101-605.
Section 403 of Act 6, 41 P.S. § 403 requires residential mortgage lenders to
provide notice of intent to foreclose before initiating foreclosure proceedings.
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“After the relevant pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to
unreasonably delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the
pleadings.” Pa.R.C.P. No. 1034(a).
Entry of judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when there
are no disputed issues of fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Our scope of review is plenary and
we will reverse only if the trial court committed a clear error of
law or if the pleadings disclose facts that should be submitted to
a trier of fact. We accept as true all well-pleaded allegations in
the complaint.
Sisson v. Stanley, 109 A.3d 265, 274 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting
Consolidation Coal Co. v. White, 875 A.2d 318, 325 (Pa. Super. 2005)).
In considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court is guided
by the same principles that apply to preliminary objection in the nature of a
demurrer. London v. Kingsley, 81 A.2d 870, 871 (Pa. 1951). “The
question presented in a demurrer is whether, on the facts averred, the law
says with certainty that no recovery is possible.” Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co.,
106 A.3d 48, 56 (Pa. 2014) (internal quotation omitted).
Although we agree with Meade that BBVA’s motion for judgment on
the pleadings was premature, the trial court did not err in converting the
motion into preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer. Rule
1034(a) permits a motion for judgment on the pleadings only “after the
relevant pleadings are closed,” and here the relevant pleadings were not
closed. We do not find reversible error for several reasons. First, the same
legal standard governs judgment on the pleadings and preliminary
objections in the nature of a demurrer. Sisson, supra; London, supra;
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Bruno; supra. Second, to the extent that BBVA defaulted by failing to
plead in response to the complaint, we note Meade never moved the trial
court to enter default judgment as required under Pa.R.C.P. No. 1066(a).
Third, the trial court gave Meade a full and fair opportunity to contest BBVA’s
motion through briefing and oral argument. Therefore, he suffered no
prejudice when the trial court disregarded BBVA’s procedural misstep. See
Pa.R.C.P. No. 126 (proving for liberal construction of the rules and
disregarding of procedural defects that do not affect a party’s substantial
rights). In sum, the trial court did not err in converting BBVA’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings into preliminary objections.
Having rejected Meade’s first argument, we turn to his second
argument that the trial court erred in granting BBVA’s motion for judgment
on the pleadings. Meade argues BBVA’s dismissal of the foreclosure action
abandoned its interest in the subject property. Rule 1061 provides that a
person may bring a quiet title action:
(1) to compel an adverse party to commence an action of
ejectment;
(2) where an action of ejectment will not lie, to determine any
right, lien, title or interest in the land or determine the validity or
discharge of any document, obligation or deed affecting any
right, lien, title or interest in land;
(3) to compel an adverse party to file, record, cancel, surrender
or satisfy of record, or admit the validity, invalidity or discharge
of, any document, obligation or deed affecting any right, lien,
title or interest in land; or
(4) to obtain possession of land sold at a judicial or tax sale.
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Pa.R.C.P. No. 1061(b). The trial court considered Meade’s complaint under
subsections (2) and (3), based upon BBVA’s alleged discharge of its
ownership interest in the subject property.
We hold the trial court did not err in granting BBVA’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings. Meade bases his quiet title action on an
allegation that BBVA abandoned its interest in the subject property by
dismissing the foreclosure action. That dismissal, however, was without
prejudice. “Without prejudice” means “[w]ithout loss of any rights; in a way
that does not harm or cancel the legal rights or privileges of a party.” Black’s
Law Dictionary 1740 (9th ed. 2009). This definition is directly at odds with
any notion of abandonment, which is “[t]he relinquishing of a right or
interest with the intention of never reclaiming it.” Id. at 2; see also J.W.S.
Delavau, Inc. v. E. Am. Transp. & Warehousing, Inc., 810 A.2d 672,
684-85 (Pa. Super. 2002) (quoting Commonwealth v. Wetmore, 447 A.2d
1012, 1014 (Pa. Super. 1982)) (“Abandonment involves an intention to
abandon, together with an act or omission to act by which such intention is
apparently carried into effect.”). Therefore, BBVA’s dismissal without
prejudice in no way impaired its interest in the subject property or its right
to reinstitute foreclosure proceedings.
Finally, Meade argues the trial court erred in dismissing the quiet title
action with prejudice, and should have granted him leave to amend. “While
the right to amend should not be withheld where there is some reasonable
possibility that amendment can be accomplished successfully, “[w]here
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allowance of an amendment would . . . be a futile exercise, the complaint
may be properly dismissed without allowance for amendment.” Wiernik v.
PHH U.S. Mortg. Corp., 736 A.2d 616, 624 (Pa. Super. 1999) (quoting
Carlino v. Whitpain Inv’rs, 453 A.2d 1385, 1388 (Pa. 1982)). Here, the
trial court found that amendment would be futile, because Meade’s legal
theory rested entirely on the effect of BBVA’s dismissal of the foreclosure
action without prejudice. Moreover, Meade has not stated how he would
amend his complaint to plead a viable cause of action. Therefore, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/12/2015
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