Manuel Reyna Cantu v. State ( 2005 )

                         COURT OF APPEALS

               THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                  CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

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                             NUMBER 13-04-146-CR

ARACELY GARZA CANTU,                                         Appellant,

                                           v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                              Appellee.

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                             NUMBER 13-04-148-CR

MANUEL REYNA CANTU,                                          Appellant,

                                           v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                              Appellee.

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                  On appeal from the 105th District Court

                           of Kleberg County, Texas.

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                     MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Hinojosa and Rodriguez

                      Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rodriguez

Appellants, Manuel Reyna Cantu and Aracely Garza Cantu, were tried before a jury and convicted of money laundering.  See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. ' 34.02 (Vernon 2003).  By two issues, appellants argue that the evidence was both legally and factually insufficient to support their convictions.  The trial court has certified that these cases are not plea-bargain cases and the defendants have the right of appeal.  See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2).  We affirm.

                                                              I.  BACKGROUND

As this is a memorandum opinion and because all issues of law presented by these cases are well settled and the parties are familiar with the facts, we will not recite the law and the facts in this memorandum opinion except as necessary to advise the parties of the Court's decision and the basic reasons for it.  See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.  Furthermore, because the two companion cases arise from the same fact situation and present the same issues for our review, they will be disposed of in a single opinion.

II.  ANALYSIS

A.  Legal Sufficiency

By their first issue, appellants argue that the evidence offered at trial was legally insufficient to sustain their convictions.

In a legal sufficiency review, this Court must examine the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense present beyond a reasonable doubt.  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Young v. State, 14 S.W.3d 748, 753 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).  In making this determination, the reviewing court considers all the evidence admitted that will sustain the conviction, including improperly admitted evidence.  Conner v. State, 67 S.W.3d 192, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Questions concerning the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony are to be resolved by the trier of fact.  Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).

On appeal, we measure the legal sufficiency of the evidence in a jury trial by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge for the case.  See Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).  This hypothetically correct jury charge would set out the law, be authorized by the indictment, not necessarily increase the State's burden of proof or necessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately describe the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.  Id. at 240; see Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).  We must decide whether a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellants knowingly concealed, possessed, transferred, or transported the proceeds of criminal activity.  See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. ' 34.02 (Vernon 2003).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find that the direct and circumstantial evidence could have led a rational jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that appellants did knowingly conceal, possess, transfer or transport the proceeds of criminal activity.  At trial, Special Agent Edward Cruz testified that $48,950 in cash was found hidden in the engine compartment of Mr. Cantu=s car.  Mrs. Cantu was a passenger in the car.  A videotape was admitted into evidence containing conversations between appellants while sitting in the back seat of the patrol car.  The statements made by appellants on the videotape show that they both had knowledge that something was hidden in the engine compartment. Additionally, the comments made by appellants indicate they knew their actions were illegal.  A handwritten note found in possession of appellants evidenced their knowledge that they were transporting money.  We find this evidence legally sufficient to establish the Aknowingly conceal, possess, transfer or transport@ element of money laundering.

To establish the Aproceeds of criminal activity@ element, Special Agent Cruz testified that the money found in the car was bundled, rubber-banded and vacuum-sealed in wrappers which is a common method used by drug traffickers for transporting money.  Agent Cruz additionally testified that several money wrappers tested positive for amphetamines.  Special Agent Augustine Olivarez testified that in his opinion, the money found was the proceeds of criminal activity.  His reasons included the location of the money within the car and the method by which the money was concealed.  Special Agent Fidel Gonzales also testified that based on his training and experience, the method by which the money was wrapped was consistent with drug trafficking and illegal smuggling.  We find this evidence legally sufficient to establish the Aproceeds of criminal activity@ element.

From this record we conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to establish that appellants committed the offense of money laundering.  Appellants= first issue is overruled.

B.  Factual Sufficiency

By their second issue, appellants contend that the evidence was factually insufficient to support their conviction.

In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the elements of the offense on which the State carries the burden of proof, we impartially examine all of the evidence and set aside the verdict only if Aproof of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the jury's determination, or the proof of guilt, although adequate if taken alone, is greatly outweighed by the contrary proof.@  Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (citing Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)).  We are not bound to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and may consider the testimony of all the witnesses.  Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 10‑12.  In our factual sufficiency review, we are again required to accord due deference to the jury's determinations on the weight and credibility of the evidence and may not merely substitute our own judgment.  Swearingen, 101 S.W.3d at 97; Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 7; Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 254.  We also measure the factual sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge for the case.  See Adi v. State, 94 S.W.3d 124, 131 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 2002, pet. ref'd).

In light of the above evidence and lack of evidence to the contrary, we conclude that the proof of guilt is not so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the jury's determination nor is the proof of guilt greatly outweighed by contrary evidence.  See Swearingen, 101 S.W.3d at 97. Accordingly, we conclude the evidence is also factually sufficient to support the verdict.  Appellants= second issue is overruled.

III.  CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.                                                                                                   

NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ

Justice

Do not publish.

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

Memorandum Opinion delivered and

filed this 14th day of July, 2005.