Com. v. Shick, S. ( 2016 )


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  • J-A29034-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,               :      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :            PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee                :
    :
    v.                            :
    :
    STEVEN SHICK,                               :
    :
    Appellant               :          No. 1950 WDA 2014
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 31, 2014
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County,
    Criminal Division, No. CP-43-SA-0000043-2014
    BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BOWES and MUSMANNO, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:                        FILED JANUARY 19, 2016
    Steven Shick (“Shick”), pro se, appeals from the judgment of sentence
    entered following his summary conviction of defiant trespass.1 We affirm.
    The trial court summarized the factual history underlying the instant
    appeal as follows:
    On June 6, 2014, [Shick] attended a Methodist Conference
    at Grove City College.      [Shick’s] purpose for being at the
    conference was to protest the church, and [Shick] stood outside
    the conference site holding a sign displaying messages of, inter
    alia, hypocrisy within the Methodist [C]hurch.        As [Shick]
    continued his protest, Lance Tucker [“Officer Tucker”], a security
    officer for the Methodist Conference, asked [Shick] to leave the
    premises. [Shick] refused.
    In response, [Officer] Tucker informed Kent McFadden
    [“McFadden”], the Assistant Director of Campus Safety at Grove
    City College, of the protest and asked for assistance from the
    college. [] McFadden approached [Shick] and also asked him to
    leave the campus or [McFadden] would have to call the police.
    1
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(b).
    J-A29034-15
    [Shick] again refused to leave the premises. [] McFadden then
    contacted the Grove City Police Department. [Grove City Police]
    Officer [Michael] Allias [“Officer Allias”] responded and arrived to
    find … [Shick] still on the premises holding his sign. Officer
    Allias asked [Shick] to leave twice, but [Shick] refused[,] saying
    that [Officer Allias] would just have to arrest him. Officer Allias
    did so, and [Shick] was convicted of defiant trespass[] by
    Magisterial District Judge Neil McEwen on June 25, 2014.
    [Shick] appealed his conviction to [the trial c]ourt. After a
    de novo hearing on October 31, 2014, [the trial c]ourt upheld
    the defiant trespass conviction ….
    Trial Court Opinion, 1/13/15, at 1-2.    The trial court sentenced Shick to
    seven to fourteen days in jail, and ordered him to pay the costs of
    prosecution. Thereafter, Shick filed the instant timely appeal, followed by a
    court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of matters complained
    of on appeal.
    Shick presents the following issues for our review:
    I.    Whether trial counsel, William Jack Cline, Esquire
    (“Attorney Cline”), rendered ineffective assistance by not
    presenting certain witnesses, who would have testified that
    Shick had permission to be on the property and protest at
    the Conference?
    II.   Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain Shick’s
    conviction of defiant trespass where (a) the property is not
    marked as private property; (b) Grove City College does
    not restrict entry or exit by means of security personnel or
    gates; (c) Grove City College failed to notify Shick that he
    is not permitted on the property during the United
    Methodist Annual Conference, (d) Shick had informed
    Patricia Priester (“Priester”), the campus events and
    conference manager, regarding his intention to protest the
    Conference, and she did not prohibit Shick’s presence on
    the property to protest, and, in fact, delegated the matter
    to the Methodist Conference for their response and
    permission; (e) Bishop Thomas Bickerton (“Bishop
    -2-
    J-A29034-15
    Bickerton”),   the    highest   authority  attending     the
    conference, granted Shick permission to be on campus and
    attend the Conference as a visitor and member of the
    denomination; (f) Shick had registered for the Conference
    and proof of his registration was worn by Shick at the time
    he was contacted by security officers; (e) the Reverend
    Greg Cox (“Reverend Cox”), by email, approved Shick’s
    attendance at the Conference; (g) testimony established
    that Shick was not bothering anyone or protesting in any
    building; and (h) contrary to the charges against him,
    Shick was not protesting the fact of the Conference being
    held on Grove City College campus?
    See generally Brief for Appellant at 1-12 (unnumbered).2
    Shick first claims that Attorney Cline rendered ineffective assistance
    when he failed to present certain witnesses at trial. See id. at 4. According
    to Shick, he had asked Attorney Cline to subpoena Bishop Bickerton,
    Reverend Cox, and Bishop Bickerton’s executive secretary. Id. Shick claims
    that the testimony of those witnesses “would have been so important to
    prove without a doubt their approval of my presence and conduct at this
    2
    “Although this Court is willing to liberally construe materials filed by a pro
    se litigant, pro se status confers no special benefit upon the appellant.”
    Commonwealth v. Adams, 
    882 A.2d 496
    , 498 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citing
    Commonwealth v. Lyons, 
    833 A.2d 245
    , 252 (Pa. Super. 2003)). “To the
    contrary, any person choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding
    must, to a reasonable extent, assume that his lack of expertise and legal
    training will be his undoing.”           Adams, 
    882 A.2d at
    498 (citing
    Commonwealth v. Rivera, 
    685 A.2d 1011
     (Pa. Super. 1996)). While the
    defects in Shick’s brief are numerous, and warrant dismissal of the appeal,
    we decline to do so in this instance.
    -3-
    J-A29034-15
    2014 Annual Conference.” 
    Id.
    Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are to be deferred
    to collateral review under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 3     Under
    the plain language of the PCRA, an appellant is only eligible for post-
    conviction relief if he is “currently serving a sentence of imprisonment,
    probation or parole for the crime.”         42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(1).       Our
    Supreme Court has declined to create an exception to this rule where the
    appellant was serving a “short sentence.” Commonwealth v. O’Berg, 
    880 A.2d 597
    , 602 (Pa. 2005).            Accordingly, we cannot address Shick’s
    ineffectiveness claim in this direct appeal.4
    Shick next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his
    conviction of defiant trespass. In his pro se brief, Shick refers to testimony
    indicating that he had permission to protest during the conference. Brief for
    Appellant at 10 (unnumbered).         Shick points out that he had informed
    Officer Tucker that Reverend Cox had granted him permission to protest.
    
    Id.
        Shick further argues that Officer Tucker refused Shick’s request to
    consult with Reverend Cox and Bishop Bickerton. 
    Id.
     According to Shick,
    he “was a victim of very poor communication that could have been corrected
    by a simple call to either Reverend [] Cox or Bishop [Bickerton].” 
    Id.
    3
    See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
    4
    Even if we could address Shick’s ineffectiveness claim, we would conclude
    that he is not entitled to relief for the reasons stated in the trial court’s
    January 13, 2015 Opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/13/15, at 4.
    -4-
    J-A29034-15
    In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we
    evaluate the record “in the light most favorable to the verdict winner[,]
    giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn
    from the evidence.”    Commonwealth v. Bibbs, 
    970 A.2d 440
    , 445 (Pa.
    Super. 2009) (citation omitted).
    Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it
    established each element of the crime charged and the
    commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Nevertheless, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a
    mathematical certainty, and may sustain its burden by means of
    wholly circumstantial evidence.[5] Significantly, [we] may not
    substitute [our] judgment for that of the factfinder; if the record
    contains support for the convictions they may not be disturbed.
    
    Id.
     (citation and quotation marks omitted, footnote added).        “Any doubt
    about the defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the factfinder unless the
    evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability
    of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances.” Commonwealth
    v. Scott, 
    967 A.2d 995
    , 998 (Pa. Super. 2009).
    Upon our review of the parties’ briefs, and the certified record, we
    agree with the sound reasoning of the trial court, as stated in its Opinion,
    that Shick’s claim lacks merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/13/15, at 4-6. We
    therefore affirm on the basis of the trial court’s Opinion with regard to this
    claim. See id.; see also Commonwealth v. Toland, 
    995 A.2d 1242
    , 1245
    5
    “[C]ircumstantial evidence is reviewed by the same standard as direct
    evidence—a decision by the trial court will be affirmed so long as the
    combination of the evidence links the accused to the crime beyond a
    reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Bricker, 
    882 A.2d 1008
    , 1014 (Pa.
    Super. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    -5-
    J-A29034-15
    (Pa. Super. 2010) (stating that the trier of fact, while passing upon the
    credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to
    believe all, part or none of the evidence); Commonwealth v. Manley, 
    985 A.2d 256
    , 262 (Pa. Super. 2009) (recognizing that an appellate court cannot
    substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact).
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 1/19/2016
    -6-
    Circulated 12/17/2015 04:21 PM
    IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MERCER COUNTY, PENNSYLVANI
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    STEVEN SHICK,                                                                         --i C·
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    Defendant.                                                                                          (.}l
    1925 OPINION
    Defendant Steven Shick has appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania this
    Court's October 31, 2014 Order finding Defendant guilty of defiant trespass, in violation
    of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(b). To the best of its ability, this Court understands Defendant to
    raise two main issues for appeal in his pro se "Statement of Issues for Complaint of
    1
    Appeal to the Superior Court of Pittsburgh, PA":
    1.       Ineffective Attorney: William Jack Cline
    a. Attorney Cline did not subpoena all the witnesses
    I requested to prove my not guilty plea.
    b. Attorney Cline excused one witness Reverend
    Greg Cox from appearing in court at my request.
    Greg Cox did not give a complete or correct
    statement to Attorney Cline - Attorney Cline did
    not investigate his claims thoroughly.
    2.       The charges against me in the police criminal report
    are false. Attorney Cline neglected to enter and prove
    they were false.
    a. False charge: I was protesting the Methodist
    convention currently in session.
    b. False charge: that I was not licensed or privileged
    to be on Grove City College Campus and remain
    there.
    (Statement of Issues for Complaint of Appeal to the Superior Court of Pittsburgh, PA, 1-
    7).
    I
    This Court lists Defendant's issues on appeal nearly identically to the way Defendant does in his
    statement.
    ,
    {.                                                   Circulated 12/17/2015 04:21 PM
    BACKGROUND
    On June 6, 2014, Defendant attended a Methodist Conference at Grove City
    College. Defendant's purpose for being at the conference was to protest the church, and
    Defendant stood outside the conference site holding a sign displaying messages of, inter
    alia, hypocrisy within the Methodist church. As Defendant continued his protest, Lance
    Tucker, a security officer for the Methodist Conference, asked Defendant to leave the
    premises. Defendant refused.
    In response, Mr. Tucker informed Kent McFadden, the Assistant Director of
    Campus Safety at Grove City College, of the protest and asked for assistance from the
    college. Mr. McFadden approached Defendant and also asked him to leave campus or
    that he would have to call the police. Defendant again refused to leave the premises. Mr.
    McFadden then contacted the Grove City Police Department. Officer Allias responded
    and arrived to find Defendant, Steven Shick, still on the premises holding his sign.
    Officer Allias asked the Defendant to leave twice, but Defendant refused saying that he
    would just have to arrest him. Officer Allias did so, and Defendant was convicted of
    violating 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(b)(l), defiant trespass, by Magisterial District Judge Neil
    McEwen on June 25, 2014.
    Defendant appealed his conviction to this Court. After a de nova hearing on
    October 3 I, 2014, this Court upheld the defiant trespass conviction below. The evidence
    from the Commonwealth overwhelmingly demonstrated that Defendant was trespassing
    on Grove City College property and that he refused to leave. Defendant's defense at the
    hearing was that Defendant had permission by the Methodist Conference to protest
    outside the event space. However, the Commonwealth presented evidence that the
    2
    Circulated 12/17/2015 04:21 PM
    Methodist Conference reserved to right to have Lance Tucker ask Defendant to stop
    protesting, if he found Defendant to be a disruption. Further, the Commonwealth
    provided testimony that Grove City College still maintained security responsibilities
    during these events and that the college could respond to disturbances on campus.
    Defendant has submitted a prose Statement of Issues for Complaint of Appeal to
    the Superior Court of Pittsburgh, PA, where Defendant lists two issues, one of which
    relates to alleged errors by defense counsel. The remaining issue relates to Defendant's
    "privilege" and "preparedness"    to protest the Methodist Convention.
    DISCUSSION
    Defendant inartfully raises two issues on appeal. The Court interprets these issues
    as 1) ineffective assistance of counsel and 2) sufficiency of the evidence. For the reasons
    discussed below, the ineffective assistance claim would be more appropriately reviewed
    collaterally, and the sufficiency of the evidence claim is without merit.
    A.      Defendant's claims against counsel William Cline
    In his first issue on appeal, Defendant claims that his counsel failed to subpoena
    witnesses and to thoroughly investigate certain claims. This essentially amounts to a
    claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Regarding these types of claims on direct
    appeal, the Superior Court has stated "as a general rule, a petitioner should wait to raise
    claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel until collateral review." Com. v. Grant,
    
    813 A.2d 726
    , 738 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003). The Superior Court adopted this rule, at least in
    part, because ineffective assistance   claims are often not apparent on the record. 
    Id. at 737
    .
    The Grant court suggested that exceptions to the general rule could exist when "there has
    been a complete or constructive denial of counsel or that counsel has breached his or her
    3
    Circulated 12/17/2015 04:21 PM
    duty of loyalty." Id, fn 14. However, Defendant has not asserted any such complete
    denial of counsel or a breach of the duty of loyalty.
    Here, Defendant alleges that his attorney failed to subpoena all of the witnesses
    that Defendant requested. Defendant further alleges that his attorney failed to investigate
    the claims of a Reverend Greg Cox. The record lacks any facts indicating which
    witnesses Defendant's counsel purportedly failed to subpoena. In his statement listing
    issues on appeal, Defendant does not name specific witnesses that his attorney refused to
    subpoena (except Reverend Greg Cox) or how subpoenaing any of those witnesses would
    have created a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have
    been different. Because the record is devoid of necessary facts, it is more appropriate for
    Defendant to raise this issue on collateral review, as per Grant.
    B.      Defendant's claims of false charges
    In his second issue on appeal, Defendant claims that the charges brought against
    him are false. Essentially Defendant argues that he had a right to protest at the college at
    the time he was arrested. This Court interprets Defendant's language to raise a
    sufficiency of the evidence challenge, contending that the Commonwealth did not prove
    beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was guilty of defiant trespass. Assuming this
    to be the crux of Defendant's issue, it is without merit.
    Regarding sufficiency of the evidence, the Superior Court has stated:
    The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
    evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial
    in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is
    sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
    element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying
    the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute
    our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the
    4
    Circulated 12/17/2015 04:21 PM
    facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth
    need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any
    doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the
    fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive
    that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn
    from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may
    sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
    beyond     a reasonable doubt by means of wholly
    circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above
    test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence
    actually received must be considered. Finally, the trier of
    fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the
    weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part
    or none of the evidence.
    Com. v. Snyder, 
    870 A.2d 336
    , 350 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005). In order to find the defendant
    guilty of defiant trespass, the Commonwealth must demonstrate that Defendant, knowing
    that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, entered or remained in any place as to which
    notice against trespass is given. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(b)(l).   Notice can be given by direct
    communication with the actor or through a posting in a manner prescribed by law. 18
    Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(b)(l)(i),   (ii).
    At the hearing, Kent McFadden and Officer Allias testified that Defendant had
    been asked by several individuals to stop protesting and to leave campus at least four
    times. Hearing Transcript, pp. 5, 7. Defendant also admitted to protesting on the campus
    at the time he was arrested. Hearing Transcript, p. 28. Defendant's primary defense at the
    hearing was that he had been in contact with people in the Methodist Conference and that
    he had permission    to protest outside the conference. However, the Commonwealth
    provided credible testimony stating that Grove City College still maintained the right to
    oversee security of these events and, if necessary, to ask people to leave. Hearing
    Transcript,   p. 15. Further, Defendant admitted that even though he had an agreement with
    the Methodist Conference that he could protest outside the event, he could still be asked
    5
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    ~   I   •   •
    to stop protesting by Lance Tucker if it was determined that he was causing a disruption.
    Hearing Transcript, pp. 30-31.
    This Court found the testimony of the Commonwealth witnesses to be fully
    credible. Further, this Court found that Defendant's defense (i.e., that he had permission
    to protest from the Methodist Conference) did not negate the charge of defiant trespass
    after Defendant was asked to leave the campus by Lance Tucker, Kent McFadden, and
    Officer Allias, yet Defendant refused to do so. Defendant was given multiple warnings
    that he would be arrested if he did not leave, and Defendant still chose to remain on the
    campus protesting. The Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
    Defendant is guilty of defiant trespass. As such, there is sufficient evidence for
    Defendant's conviction and therefore this issue is without merit.
    Accordingly, the Superior Court should reject Defendant Steven Shick's appeal
    and uphold this Court's Order finding Defendant guilty of defiant trespass.
    BY THE COURT,
    ~--'- -\       _·_,J.
    Robert G. Yeatts, Judge
    6