P.J.A. v. H.C.N. ( 2017 )


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  • J-A24020-16
    
    2017 PA Super 34
    P.J.A.                                              IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant
    v.
    H.C.N.
    Appellee                     No. 3199 EDA 2015
    Appeal from the Order Entered September 18, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County
    Civil Division at No(s): 2014-C-3694
    BEFORE: BOWES, J., OTT, J., and SOLANO, J.
    OPINION PER CURIAM:                                 FILED FEBRUARY 13, 2017
    P.J.A. appeals from the order entered September 18, 2015, in the
    Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County, sustaining the preliminary
    objections of H.C.N. and dismissing P.J.A.’s amended complaint with
    prejudice. P.J.A.’s amended complaint set forth an abuse of process action
    and a “Dragonetti” action.1 P.J.A. claims the trial court erred in (1) holding
    ____________________________________________
    1
    “Abuse of process is a state common law claim. However, allegations of
    malicious prosecution invoke Pennsylvania’s statutory law in the form of the
    wrongful use of civil proceedings statute or ‘Dragonetti Act.’ §§ 42 Pa.C.S.A.
    8351-8355.” Werner v. Plater-Zyberk, 
    799 A.2d 776
    , 785 (Pa. Super.
    2002).
    An action for wrongful use of civil proceedings differs from an
    action for abuse of process. The gist of an action for abuse of
    process is the improper use of process after it has been issued,
    that is, a perversion of it. Malicious use of civil process has to do
    with the wrongful initiation of such process. Wrongful use of civil
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    J-A24020-16
    that P.J.A.’s abuse of process claim was barred by the statute of limitations,
    (2) deciding, at the preliminary objection stage, the factual question of
    whether P.J.A.’s abuse of process claim adequately pleaded H.C.N.’s
    improper purpose, and (3) concluding that P.J.A.’s Dragonetti claim failed to
    satisfy the element of a termination in his favor in the underlying
    proceedings. See P.J.A.’s Brief at 4. Based upon the following, we affirm.
    The trial court has summarized the background of this case, as
    follows:
    The parties married in February of 2006. Their marriage lasted
    until March of 2007, at which time they separated and initiated
    divorce proceedings.      There is one child born from their
    marriage, [Child], born in August of 2006.
    From March of 2007 to the present, the parties have continually
    engaged in extraordinarily contentious litigation in their custody
    action, Lehigh County Case No. 2007-FC-0427. Throughout the
    preceding eight years, the parties demonstrated a consistent
    inability to meaningfully co-parent their mutual child, leading to
    countless custody petitions, petitions for special relief, and
    allegations of contempt between the parties. Both parties
    continuously call on the courts to make determinations about all
    major aspects of [Child’s] life, including, inter alia, religious
    affiliation and training, daycare, selection of an appropriate
    school, sports, and whether and under what circumstances the
    child can ride the school bus. Because of the ongoing series of
    petitions and court appearances, both parties have spent
    innumerable hours in court engaging in protracted hearings.
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    proceedings is a tort which arises when a person institutes civil
    proceedings with a malicious motive and lacking probable cause.
    Sabella v. Milides, 
    992 A.2d 180
    , 187-88 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quotations
    and citations omitted).
    -2-
    J-A24020-16
    They have also incurred significant legal costs through counsel
    fees, filing fees, and their presence in court as it impacts upon
    their respective careers.
    In the instant litigation, [P.J.A.] initiated this matter by filing a
    pro se Writ of Summons on November 17, 2014. He filed a pro
    se complaint against [H.C.N.] on December 31, 2014 alleging
    Abuse of Process and Wrongful Use of Civil Proceedings in the
    parties’ custody action. [H.C.N.] filed preliminary objections to
    [P.J.A.’s] complaint. The Court scheduled oral argument on
    [H.C.N.’s] preliminary objections. On April 14, 2015, Attorney
    Todd Mosser entered his appearance and appeared on [P.J.A.’s]
    behalf on the same day for oral argument. Attorney Mosser
    requested time to file an Amended Complaint. The Court struck
    the original complaint without prejudice and granted Attorney
    Moser time to file an Amended Complaint.
    On May 4, 2015, [P.J.A.] filed his Amended Complaint. [H.C.N.]
    filed the instant Preliminary Objections on May 26, 2015, and
    [P.J.A.] filed a response on June 16, 2015. The Court heard oral
    argument on September 8, 2015.
    On September 18, 2015, the Court entered an order with an
    opinion sustaining the preliminary objections and dismissing the
    case with prejudice.
    [P.J.A.] filed a Notice of Appeal on October 16, 2015. The Court
    directed him to file a Concise Statement of Matters Complained
    of on Appeal, which he filed on November 6, 2015.
    Trial Court Opinion, 11/30/2015, at 1–4 (footnote omitted).
    At the outset, we state our standard of review:
    Our review of a challenge to a trial court’s decision to grant
    preliminary objections is guided by the following standard:
    [o]ur standard of review of an order of the trial court
    overruling or granting preliminary objections is to
    determine whether the trial court committed an error of
    law. When considering the appropriateness of a ruling on
    preliminary objections, the appellate court must apply the
    same standard as the trial court.
    -3-
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    Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer test
    the legal sufficiency of the complaint. When considering
    preliminary objections, all material facts set forth in the
    challenged pleadings are admitted as true, as well as all
    inferences reasonably deducible therefrom. Preliminary
    objections which seek the dismissal of a cause of action
    should be sustained only in cases in which it is clear and
    free from doubt that the pleader will be unable to prove
    facts legally sufficient to establish the right to relief. If
    any doubt exists as to whether a demurrer should be
    sustained, it should be resolved in favor of overruling the
    preliminary objections.
    Feingold v. Hendrzak, 
    15 A.3d 937
    , 941 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation
    omitted).
    ABUSE OF PROCESS
    P.J.A. first contends the trial court erred in determining his abuse of
    process claim was barred by the statute of limitations. There is no dispute
    that an abuse of process claim is subject to a two-year statute of limitations.
    42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(1). Here, what is in contention is the date upon which
    that two-year time period began to run.
    The limitations period for any claim begins to run “from the time the
    cause of action accrued.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5502(a).           As the Supreme Court
    explained in Fine v. Checcio, 
    870 A.2d 850
     (Pa. 2005):
    In Pennsylvania, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff
    could have first maintained the action to a successful conclusion.
    Thus, we have stated that the statute of limitations begins to run
    as soon as the right to institute and maintain a suit arises. ...
    Once a cause of action has accrued and the prescribed statutory
    period has run, an injured party is barred from bringing his
    cause of action.
    -4-
    J-A24020-16
    Id. at 857 (internal citations omitted). Accord Kapil v. Ass'n of
    Pennsylvania State Coll. & Univ. Faculties, 
    470 A.2d 482
    , 485 (Pa.
    1983) (“The true test in determining when a cause of action arises or
    accrues is to establish the time when the plaintiff could have first maintained
    the action to a successful conclusion.”).
    The common law cause of action for abuse of process “is defined as
    the use of legal process against another ‘primarily to accomplish a purpose
    for which it is not designed.’” Rosen v. American Bank of Rolla, 
    627 A.2d 190
    , 192 (Pa. Super. 1993) (citation omitted).
    To establish a claim for abuse of process it must be
    shown that the defendant (1) used a legal process
    against the plaintiff, (2) primarily to accomplish a
    purpose for which the process was not designed; and (3)
    harm has been caused to the plaintiff.
    Abuse of process is, in essence, the use of legal process as a
    tactical weapon to coerce a desired result that is not the
    legitimate object of the process. Thus, the gravamen of this tort
    is the perversion of legal process to benefit someone in
    achieving a purpose which is not an authorized goal of the
    procedure in question.
    Werner v. Plater-Zyberk, 
    799 A.2d 776
    , 785 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations
    omitted).    See Weiss v. Equibank, 
    460 A.2d 271
    , 276 (Pa. Super. 1983
    (“If the plaintiff sues the defendant on a valid cause of action but brings the
    suit, for example, not to collect his just debt but for a collateral purpose
    such as blackmail the action is a malicious abuse of process.”). Therefore, it
    follows that, in an abuse of process case, the statute of limitations is
    -5-
    J-A24020-16
    triggered when the defendant uses “legal process” against the plaintiff for an
    improper purpose, which, in turn, causes harm to the plaintiff.
    Here, the trial court determined P.J.A.’s cause of action for abuse of
    process arose on July 3, 2012, and, because P.J.A. did not file a writ of
    summons until November 17, 2014, his claim was time-barred by the two
    year statute of limitations.    The trial court explained its reasoning, as
    follows:
    In [P.J.A.’s] Amended Complaint, [P.J.A.] averred that on June
    28, 2012, he filed a petition in the parties’ custody case
    requesting leave of Court to enroll the parties’ child in a summer
    camp program. [H.C.N.] filed an Answer with New Matter on July
    3, 2012. In her New Matter, [H.C.N.] requested sole legal
    custody of the parties’ child. [P.J.A.] alleged [H.C.N.] made
    several “knowingly false allegations” in support of her request for
    sole legal custody. The Amended Complaint in this case asserted
    [H.C.N.] falsely alleged that [P.J.A.] baptized the parties’ child
    without [H.C.N.’s] knowledge or consent, and further alleged
    that [P.J.A.] covertly enrolled the parties’ child in kindergarten.
    [P.J.A.] averred that [H.C.N.’s] “true purpose in initiating that
    legal process [the New Matter] was to attempt to destroy
    [P.J.A.’s] good name and reputation; to disrupt [P.J.A.’s] work
    obligations; and to compel [P.J.A.] to incur significant financial
    expense and emotional distress.” (Amended Complaint, at ¶ 36.)
    ****
    The statute of limitations applicable to a claim for Abuse of
    Process is two years. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §5524(1). The date that a
    claim for Abuse of Process accrues is different from the date
    when a claim for Wrongful Use of Civil Proceedings accrues.
    Wrongful Use of Civil Proceedings claims accrue on the date of
    termination of the allegedly wrongful suit because a necessary
    element of the claim is that the prior suit terminated in the
    current Appellant’s favor. By contrast, Abuse of Process claims
    accrue on the date the alleged abuse occurred.
    -6-
    J-A24020-16
    In this case, [P.J.A.] identified [H.C.N.’s] New Matter she filed in
    conjunction with her Answer on July 3, 2012, as the allegedly
    abusive filing. Because that filing is the alleged abuse about
    which [P.J.A.] now complains, the cause of action accrued on
    July 3, 2012. Therefore, the statute of limitations ran until July
    3, 2014. [P.J.A.] did not initiate his claim until November 17,
    2014, when he filed a Writ of Summons. At that point, his claim
    for Abuse of Process was time-barred.
    On appeal, [P.J.A.] argues that the damages he is seeking in the
    form of legal fees were not realized prior to the rejection of
    [H.C.N.’s] allegedly false claims. He also notes that “it is error
    to require an abuse of process plaintiff to immediately file an
    abuse of process lawsuit while the validity of the underlying
    process has yet to be determined.” [P.J.A.] does not cite any
    authority for this proposition of law, and the Court cannot
    substantiate it with its own independent research.
    ****
    Based upon [the] definition of Abuse of Process, the rationale
    behind a cause of action under that theory accruing upon the
    filing of the documents allegedly seeking to accomplish an
    unlawful purpose for which the purpose was not intended
    becomes clear. Once those documents are filed, the tort has
    occurred. The subsequent occurrence of legal fees may impact
    upon damages, but it does not impede a litigant’s ability to plead
    the cause of action or the requisite elements thereof. [P.J.A.]
    could allege as a component of harm that his reputation was
    harmed, for example, or that he will incur attorney’s fees to
    defend against the abusive filing. This does not change the
    timing for the application of the statute of limitations.
    Trial Court Opinion, 11/30/2015, at 6–9 (citations omitted).
    P.J.A. contends he could not have maintained an abuse of process suit
    until it was shown that the process was abused, and “[t]hat did not occur
    until March 27, 2013, when the [trial] court rejected H.C.N.’s request for
    primary legal custody[.]” P.J.A.’s Brief at 11. He argues, “Any suggestion
    that P.J.A. was required to file his abuse of process claim immediately upon
    -7-
    J-A24020-16
    receiving H.C.N.’s false allegations in her New Matter is problematic. Such an
    approach encourages extra, possibly premature litigation where it might not
    be necessary or warranted [and also] forces an abuse of process plaintiff to
    make a claim before his damages are actually suffered.” Id. at 11–12. In
    support of his position, P.J.A. argues:
    The better approach is found in Shivone v. Wash. Mut. Bank,
    F.A., 
    2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59212
     (E.D. Pa. 2008). There, the
    court observed that “The date of the last significant event giving
    rise to a cause of action determines the point at which the
    statute of limitations begins to run” citing Resolution Trust
    Corp. v. Farmer, 
    865 F.Supp. 1143
    , 1149 (E.D. Pa. 1994). The
    Farmer court stated, “For tort actions, the general rule in
    Pennsylvania is that the statute begins to run when the cause of
    action arises, as determined by the occurrence of the final
    significant event necessary to make the claim suable,” citing
    Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., 
    68 A.2d 517
     (Pa. 1949);
    Bell v. Brady, 
    31 A.2d 547
     (Pa. 1943); Shaffer’s Estate, 
    76 A. 716
     (Pa. 1910)
    Id. at 12.
    P.J.A. maintains H.C.N.’s filing of her new matter “was not the last or
    final significant event, but rather, that action was the first significant event.”
    P.J.A.’s Brief at 12 (italics in original). He maintains “[H.C.N.’s] decision to
    subsequently litigate [her averments] as well constituted the continuing
    abuse of process.” Id. at 13.
    Having carefully considered the arguments presented by P.J.A., we
    find no basis upon which to disturb the trial court’s decision that determined
    P.J.A.’s abuse of process claim was time-barred.
    At the outset, it is important to note that termination in the underlying
    proceeding in favor of the current plaintiff is not an element of an abuse of
    -8-
    J-A24020-16
    process claim.      See Werner, 
    supra.
               Furthermore, we find the federal
    district court cases cited by P.J.A. do not support his position.
    In Shivone v. Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A., 
    2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59212
    (E.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 2008), the plaintiff filed numerous tort claims, including
    abuse of process and wrongful use of civil proceedings.2 These claims were
    based upon a mortgage foreclosure action which had been commenced in
    March, 2004, and discontinued in June, 2004, and which the plaintiff became
    aware of on April, 2006. The plaintiff contended the 2004 action contained,
    inter alia, materially false information, and the praecipe for discontinuance
    falsely represented the matter had been settled with her consent. Id. at *3.
    The Shivone Court held, “The date of the last significant event giving rise
    to a cause of action determines the point at which the statute of
    limitations begins to run.”       Id. at *8 (emphasis supplied). Addressing the
    tort claims collectively, the Shivone Court determined the plaintiff’s 2007
    action was filed beyond the two year statute of limitations because
    “[t]he last significant event giving rise to a potential cause of action occurred
    on or about June 8, 2004 when Defendants filed the Praecipe to discontinue
    the 2004 mortgage foreclosure action.” Id. at *8-9.
    ____________________________________________
    2
    As will be discussed more fully below, an action for wrongful use of civil
    proceedings requires a favorable termination of the underlying proceeding in
    favor of the current plaintiff. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 8351(a)(2).
    -9-
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    At issue in Resolution Trust Corp. v. Farmer, 
    865 F.Supp. 1143
    ,
    1149 (E.D. Pa. 1994), were a bank receiver’s tort actions against the bank’s
    former officers and directors, and attorneys, based upon certain unsound
    loan transactions. The Honorable Marjorie Rendell stated, “For tort actions,
    the general rule in Pennsylvania is that the statute begins to run when the
    cause of action arises, as determined by the occurrence of the final
    significant event necessary to make the claim suable.” Farmer, 865
    F.Supp 1149 (emphasis supplied). Although the bank’s receiver had argued
    that the claims accrued when the bank wrote off the losses as a result of the
    transactions, Judge Rendell found “[the bank] sustained a legally cognizable
    injury long before it chose to recognize the losses … At the moment the
    money left the bank, [the bank] suffered enough legal injury to trigger the
    running of the statute of limitations.” 
    Id. at 1150
    .
    The Shivone and Farmer decisions are consistent with Pennsylvania
    case law holding that once the plaintiff knows of any damages, the statute of
    limitations begins to run. See Adamski v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
    738 A.2d 1033
    , 1041-42 (Pa. Super. 1999) (“[O]ur Court has repeatedly held that, for
    purposes of the statute of limitations, a claim accrues when a plaintiff is
    harmed and not when the precise amount or extent of damages is
    determined.”). Therefore, we conclude Shivone and Farmer do not help to
    advance P.J.A.’s argument. Furthermore, “It is well settled that this Court is
    not bound by the decisions of federal court, other than the United States
    - 10 -
    J-A24020-16
    Supreme Court, … however, we may use them for guidance to the degree we
    find them useful and not incompatible with Pennsylvania law.” Eckman v.
    Erie Exchange, 
    21 A.3d 1203
    , 1207 (Pa. Super. 2011).
    We agree with the trial court that P.J.A.’s abuse of process claim
    accrued upon the date H.C.N. filed the answer with new matter, July 3,
    2012, containing the allegedly false allegations, and not the later date,
    March 27, 2013, when the trial court denied H.C.N.’s request for sole legal
    custody. Accordingly, we reject P.J.A.’s claim that the trial court erred in
    determining that his abuse of process claim, instituted on November 17,
    2014, was barred by the two year statute of limitations.3
    WRONGFUL USE OF CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
    In his final issue, P.J.A. claims the trial court erred in concluding that
    he failed to state a wrongful use of civil proceedings action by failing to show
    the underlying proceedings terminated in his favor.
    “An action for wrongful use of civil proceedings differs from an
    action for abuse of process.” Hart v. O'Malley, 
    436 Pa. Super. 151
    , 
    647 A.2d 542
    , 546 (Pa.Super. 1994). “The gist of an action
    for abuse of process is the improper use of process after it has
    been issued, that is, a perversion of it. Malicious use of civil
    process has to do with the wrongful initiation of such process.”
    Rosen v. American Bank of Rolla, 
    426 Pa. Super. 376
    , 
    627 A.2d 190
    , 192 (Pa.Super. 1993) (internal citations omitted).
    “Wrongful use of civil proceedings is a tort which arises when a
    ____________________________________________
    3
    Due to our disposition of P.J.A.’s first argument, we need not address
    P.J.A.’s second argument that the trial court erred in deciding, at the
    preliminary objection stage, the factual question of whether P.J.A.’s abuse of
    process claim adequately pleaded H.C.N.’s improper purpose.
    - 11 -
    J-A24020-16
    person institutes civil proceedings with a malicious motive and
    lacking probable cause.” Pennsylvania codified the tort as
    follows:
    § 8351. Wrongful use of civil proceedings
    (a) Elements of action.--A person who takes part in the
    procurement,    initiation   or    continuation  of   civil
    proceedings against another is subject to liability to the
    other for wrongful use of civil proceedings:
    (1) He acts in a grossly negligent manner or without
    probable cause and primarily for a purpose other
    than that of securing the proper discovery, joinder of
    parties or adjudication of the claim in which the
    proceedings are based; and
    (2) The proceedings have terminated in favor of the
    person against whom they are brought.
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8351(a)(1)-(2). A successful cause of action for
    wrongful use of civil proceedings must prove three elements: 1)
    the underlying proceedings were terminated in their favor; 2)
    defendants caused those proceedings to be instituted against
    plaintiffs without probable cause; and 3) the proceedings were
    instituted primarily for an improper cause. Hart, 
    supra at 547
    .
    Sabella v. Milides, 
    992 A.2d 180
    , 187–188 (Pa. Super. 2010).
    Here, P.J.A. alleged that H.C.N. is liable for wrongful use of civil
    proceedings because, in 2012, she responded to his petition seeking to
    enroll the child in a summer camp by filing “New Matter” that contained
    scurrilous allegations about P.J.A. and sought termination of the parties’
    joint legal custody, so that she could gain sole legal custody of the child.
    P.J.A. further alleged that H.C.N.’s claim that she should gain sole legal
    custody was rejected by the trial court, and that the trial court’s decision
    constitutes a termination of the custody proceeding in his favor.
    - 12 -
    J-A24020-16
    Specifically, in Count I, “Wrongful Use of Civil Proceedings – 42
    Pa.C.S.A. § 8351,” P.J.A. alleged:
    27. All prior averments of this Complaint are incorporated by
    reference as set forth fully herein.
    28. [H.C.N.] used the legal process against [P.J.A.], to wit, filing
    New Matter seeking sole legal custody of [child], which forced a
    full blown custody trial.
    29. Upon information and belief, [H.C.N.’s] true purpose in
    initiating that legal process was to attempt to destroy [P.J.A.’s]
    good name and reputation; to disrupt [P.J.A.’s] work obligations;
    and to compel [P.J.A.] to incur significant financial expense and
    emotional distress.
    30. The true purposes outlined above in ¶29 were improper
    bases for [H.C.N.’s] New Matter and request for sole legal
    custody.
    31. The proceedings terminated in favor of [P.J.A.], as his
    request to allow his son to attend the summer camp of his
    choice during his custodial time was granted; and [H.C.N.’s]
    request for sole legal custody was denied.
    32. [H.C.N.’s] actions caused [P.J.A.] to incur in excess of
    $55,000 in attorney’s fees.
    33. [H.C.N.’s] actions as described infra [sic] were wanton and
    outrageous, manifesting a flagrant disregard for [P.J.A.’s] rights
    and meriting an award of punitive damages.
    P.J.A.’s First Amended Complaint, 5/4/2015, at ¶¶ 27–33.
    P.J.A. argues his amended complaint states a cause of action for
    wrongful use of civil proceedings, because
    - 13 -
    J-A24020-16
    the Amended Complaint avers that [H.C.N.’s] request in her New
    Matter (which contained knowingly false allegations) for sole
    custody was denied - in favor of [P.J.A.] - on March 27, 2013.
    See Amended Complaint, ¶31 and Exhibit ‘C.’[4] That same Order
    granted [sic] [P.J.A.’s] request to allow his son to go to the
    summer camp of his choosing during his own custodial time.
    Id.[5] The Amended complaint further avers that [H.C.N]. filed
    her New Matter without probable cause.           See, Amended
    Complaint at ¶26. The Amended Complaint also alleges that
    [H.C.N.] initiated her New Matter for an improper purpose. See,
    Amended Complaint at ¶¶29-30. Thus, the Amended Complaint
    sufficiently states a cause of action for wrongful use of civil
    proceedings.
    P.J.A.’s Brief at 15-16.
    The trial court observed that “[t]here is a paucity of case law
    nationwide addressing whether and under what circumstances a custody
    dispute can be said to have terminated in a party’s favor for purposes of
    ____________________________________________
    4
    The custody order, stated, in relevant part:
    The request stated by defendant, [H.C.N.] (Mother), in her
    new matter filed on July 3, 2012, to be made sole legal
    custodian is DENIED, and the parties shall continue to share
    legal custody of their minor child[.]
    Order, 3/27/2013, at ¶1, attached as Exhibit “C” to P.J.A.’s Amended
    Complaint, 5/4/2015.
    5
    In fact, the order stated:
    Father’s request in his petition filed on June 28, 2013, and
    Mother’s oral request that the court designate a summer camp
    program for the child are DENIED; and each parent shall
    hereafter determine how the child shall spend his time over that
    parent’s respective summer custody time.
    Id. at ¶3.
    - 14 -
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    subsequently pursuing a cause of action for Wrongful Use of Civil
    Proceedings or comparable actions in other states.”         Trial Court Opinion,
    11/30/2015, at 9. The trial court identified Logan v. Lille, 
    728 A.2d 995
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999), which involved a wrongful use of civil proceedings
    action filed by a father, after the child’s mother had filed a custody petition
    alleging sexual abuse and caused his visitation rights to be temporarily
    suspended. The trial court pointed out:
    The Commonwealth Court affirmed [the order sustaining
    mother’s preliminary objections], reasoning that the wrongful
    use [of civil proceedings action] was unsubstantiated due, in
    part, to the fact that in the custody proceedings, father’s
    visitation rights were temporarily suspended, which did not
    constitute a favorable ruling for purposes of the subsequent
    wrongful use claim.
    Id. at 10, citing Logan, 
    728 A.2d at 1000
    . Here, the trial court determined
    P.J.A.’s averment in his amended complaint that the proceedings terminated
    in his favor was “belied by the record.” Id. at 10.
    Analyzing P.J.A.’s claim, the trial court stated that in the underlying
    proceeding P.J.A. had countered H.C.N.’s new matter request seeking sole
    legal custody of the parties’ child with his own request for sole legal custody.
    The trial court reasoned that, as both parties’ requests had been denied,
    P.J.A. could not prove there was a favorable termination in his favor. See
    id. at 10–11.    On this basis, the trial court determined P.J.A. could not
    maintain an action for wrongful use of civil proceedings.
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    While our reasoning differs from the trial court’s, we agree with the
    trial court’s ultimate conclusion to dismiss P.J.A.’s claim for wrongful use of
    civil proceedings.6 As more fully discussed below, we conclude that P.J.A. is
    unable to pursue a viable Dragonetti claim because H.C.N.’s “New Matter” is
    not the type of pleading that gives rise to an action under the Dragonetti
    Act.
    The history of these proceedings dates to the parties’ separation in
    March 2007. The record shows that the parties have jockeyed for custody
    since the time their marriage fell apart.
    H.C.N.’s request for sole custody in the “New Matter” she filed in 2012
    was yet another riposte in that series of parries. H.C.N. responded to P.J.A.’s
    petition to have the child attend a summer camp by including in her New
    Matter a series of historical complaints about how she believed P.J.A. was
    not properly complying with the joint custody order and, in her ad damnum
    clause, she coupled several more incident-specific requests for relief with a
    general request that the court “[a]ward Mother sole Legal Custody of the
    parties’ minor child.”      Notably, H.C.N. did not make that request in any
    formal petition. Predictably, P.J.A. responded to this request in H.C.N.’s New
    Matter with his own “counter-petition” requesting that he be granted sole
    ____________________________________________
    6
    An appellate court may affirm the trial court on any basis if the result is
    correct. See Lerner v. Lerner, 
    954 A.2d 1229
    , 1240 (Pa. Super. 2008).
    - 16 -
    J-A24020-16
    legal custody and primary physical custody. Those pleadings therefore were
    consistent with the parties’ normal back and forth.
    For Dragonetti purposes, it is significant that H.C.N.’s New Matter does
    not readily fall within the normal category of pleadings that give rise to
    Dragonetti litigation. The statute makes actionable misconduct in “the
    procurement, initiation or continuation of civil proceedings.” 42 Pa.C.S. §
    8351(a).   In normal litigation, “New Matter” does none of those things.
    Rather, “New Matter” is a part of an answer to a pleading that sets forth
    affirmative defenses. Pa.R.C.P. 1030. Although there is little law on the
    subject, a common sense interpretation of the statute makes clear that it
    should not apply to answers or defensive pleadings, because such
    documents are designed to bring an action to an end, not to “procure,”
    “initiate,” or “continue” it. See generally Walasavage v. Nationwide Ins.
    Co., 
    633 F. Supp. 378
    , 380 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (discussing view that Dragonetti
    Act does not create cause of action for a “malicious defense”).
    Here, however, the trial court treated the request for sole custody in
    H.C.N.’s “New Matter” as the equivalent of a counterclaim seeking a
    modification of a custody order. Our Court has held that the filing of a
    counterclaim may constitute the “continuation” of litigation for purposes of a
    Dragonetti action, but we have directed that “an action for the wrongful use
    of a counterclaim demands that courts examine such claims closely, lest the
    defendant be punished for nothing more than defending himself or herself
    - 17 -
    J-A24020-16
    against a claim made by another.” Mi-Lor, Inc. v. DiPentino, 
    654 A.2d 1156
    , 1158 (Pa. Super. 1995). The rules applicable to custody actions
    require a formal request for modification of a custody order to be in the form
    of a petition, Pa.R.C.P. 1915.15(b), and that a counterclaim be in the form
    of an initial pleading, Pa.R.C.P. 1915.5(b). H.C.N.’s New Matter did not
    comply with these requirements.
    The trial court chose to treat the “New Matter” as serving the function
    of such a pleading in light of the parties’ litigation history and their repeated
    custody claims.     Nevertheless, we exercise caution in treating the “New
    Matter” as a formal counterclaim giving rise to a Dragonetti action.
    Exercising that caution in light of our direction in Mi-Lor, we conclude that,
    given the parties’ litigation history, this is not the type of pleading that the
    Dragonetti Act was intended to cover.
    The parties’ litigation history makes clear that their competing claims
    for custody of their child are only the tip of the iceberg. The record shows
    that the parties have squabbled and litigated incessantly, not only over
    primary physical custody and legal custody, but over just about every
    minute detail of their child’s life. The court opinions issued in the various
    proceedings document a disheartening inability of adult parents to try to get
    along for their child’s benefit and a persistent penchant to resort to repeated
    litigation in an effort to get their way.
    - 18 -
    J-A24020-16
    Viewed in this context, we conclude that H.C.N.’s 2012 “New Matter”
    requesting sole custody is not the type of pleading that should be subject to
    a Dragonetti action. First, the request was nothing new: H.C.N. and P.J.A.
    each have sought sole custody on several occasions. Nor was the trial court’s
    denial of that request anything new: the court has steadfastly attempted to
    preserve a joint custody arrangement that will further the child’s best
    interests, despite incessant squabbling by the parents that has interfered
    with that goal.
    It is also noteworthy that H.C.N. did not file a formal counterclaim, but
    instead merely included in her New Matter complaints along the same lines
    that she had voiced in the past, coupled with a request for relief — sole
    custody — that she had sought in the past. Although H.C.N.’s request could,
    at some level, be viewed as a “continuation” of the ongoing custody fight
    under Section 8351(a) of the Dragonetti Act, it is essentially more of the
    same conduct in which both sides have engaged since their marriage ended.
    H.C.N. again voiced complaints and sought sole custody; P.J.A. again
    responded with his own complaints and request for sole custody; and, once
    again, the trial court, with seemingly endless patience, responded with an
    order continuing joint custody.
    Allowing H.C.N.’s “New Matter” to now be characterized as a basis for
    a new element of warfare between the parties — a tort action for wrongful
    use of civil proceedings — would serve no salutary purpose under the
    - 19 -
    J-A24020-16
    statute. We have disapproved in the past of allowing the Dragonetti Act to
    be used “to engage the court in another episode in the long saga of
    disagreements between the parties” or to “waste . . . judicial resources to
    mediate the historically confused relationship between the parties.” Lerner
    v. Lerner, 
    954 A.2d 1229
    , 1240 (Pa. Super. 2008). That is the case here.
    This does not mean that the parties have no recourse if either of them
    use the custody proceedings improperly. The Custody Act contains its own
    mechanism for addressing a party’s bad faith. Specifically, Section 5339
    permits a court to “award reasonable interim or final counsel fees, costs and
    expenses to a party if the court finds that the conduct of another party was
    obdurate, vexatious, repetitive or in bad faith.”    23 Pa.C.S. § 5339.     The
    parties’ extensive litigation history shows that neither of them is shy about
    charging the other with the slightest misconduct under the statute, and the
    trial court, with its extensive knowledge of the parties and their history, is
    fully able to assess whatever claims of misconduct the parties make during
    the custody proceedings.
    In sum, we agree with the trial court that P.J.A.’s claim for abuse of
    process is barred by the statute of limitations, and we affirm the trial court’s
    dismissal of P.J.A.’s claim of wrongful use of civil proceedings because, in
    light of the history of these proceedings and our admonition in Mi-Lor,
    H.C.N.’s filing of her New Matter was not the type of litigation conduct that
    gives rise to an action under the Dragonetti Act.
    - 20 -
    J-A24020-16
    Finally, we address H.C.N.’s request, made in her brief, for counsel
    fees in connection with this appeal. See H.C.N.’s Brief at 22–25. This Court
    may grant such relief “if it determines that an appeal is frivolous or taken
    solely for delay or that the conduct of the participant against whom costs are
    to be imposed is dilatory, obdurate or vexatious.”          Pa.R.A.P. 2744.    Here,
    while we have rejected P.J.A.’s contentions of trial court error, we decline to
    find that this appeal warrants an award of counsel fees to H.C.N. pursuant to
    Rule 2744.
    Accordingly, we affirm the order of the trial court sustaining H.C.N.’s
    preliminary     objections    and    dismissing    the   amended   complaint    with
    prejudice.
    Order affirmed. Motion for correction of reply brief granted.7
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 2/13/2017
    ____________________________________________
    7
    P.J.A.’s reply brief has been considered by this Court in resolving the
    appeal.
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