Com. v. Chambers, E. ( 2014 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
ERIC A. CHAMBERS, : No. 1961 MDA 2013
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, July 17, 2013,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Criminal Division at No. CP-22-CR-0000392-2012
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., OLSON AND STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 25, 2014
Eric A. Chambers appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
July 17, 2013, in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County.
The facts of this matter are as follows. On September 9, 2011,
Jalil Walters (“Jalil”) and his two brothers, Ibrahiim Muhammad (“Ibrahiim”)
and Lewin Chism, Jr. (“Lewin”), were drinking at their grandmother’s house
with family members and their friend, Mike Burgress (“Mike”). (Notes of
testimony, 5/13-16/2013 at 76-78.) Lewin was admittedly intoxicated,
having consumed three beers and several shots of liquor. (Id. at 80.) Jalil
had also consumed several shots and a beer. The group decided to continue
drinking at the Jazzland Bar, located on Walnut Street in Harrisburg. (Id. at
79-81.)
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Upon arrival, at approximately 11:00 p.m., Lewin began to feel
anxious and uncomfortable; he told his brothers that he wanted to leave as
he thought other people in the bar were thugs and gangsters. (Id. at 135,
224-226.) Lewin left the bar, which prompted Jalil, Ibrahiim, and Mike to
follow in an effort to calm him down. (Id. at 86, 209.)
Appellant and Demond Bates, who was security at the bar, followed
them outside. Appellant approached Lewin and asked him what he had been
saying about the clientele in the bar. (Id. at 86, 136, 227-228.) Appellant
then took a gun out of his pants and pointed it in Lewin’s face. (Id. at
87-89.) The brothers asked Bates to interject, which he refused to do.
Appellant then secreted the gun on his person and went back inside the bar.
(Id. at 90.)
A short time later, appellant exited the bar again, and this time he was
“even more aggressive.” (Id. at 232.) Appellant stated he was going to kill
one of them. (Id.) Appellant, who was “irate and angry,” pointed the gun
at Ibrahiim’s chest. (Id. at 91-92, 229-232.) The brothers claimed
appellant pulled the trigger and at that split second, Jalil jumped in front of
the gun taking the bullet that was fired.1 (Id. at 231, 233.) All of the
brothers identified appellant as the shooter in a photographic lineup and in
the courtroom. (Id. at 97, 148-149, 237-239.) All of the brothers also
1
At the preliminary hearing, Jalil also testified that he jumped in front of his
brother and took the bullet that was intended for him. (Notes of testimony,
1/1/12 at 9.)
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stated that the gun used was a revolver. (Id. at 98-100, 146-148,
229-230.)
After Jalil was shot, the group flagged down a police vehicle, which
then called for an ambulance. (Id. at 95-96.) Jalil was hospitalized for six
to eight days and underwent two surgeries. (Id. at 243.) The bullet had
traveled through his left elbow, which it shattered, and his abdomen. The
bullet is to remain in his abdomen indefinitely, as the doctors were afraid his
internal organs might rupture if they removed it. (Id. at 240-244.)
Mike, however, claimed that the shooting occurred right after the
group exited the bar, and that the bouncer was most likely the shooter. (Id.
at 211-212.) Mike was standing approximately five feet from the shooter
who he described as heavy set with hair on his head and a beard, not a
goatee. (Id. at 210, 216.) Mike testified he was “unsure” if any of the
individuals present at trial was the shooter, including appellant, who was
bald with a goatee; he averred he did not see the shooter in the courtroom.
(Id. at 216, 217-220.) Lewin, Ibrahiim, Jalil, and Mike were also unable to
give consistent descriptions of the shooter or what he was wearing.
Demond Bates, who worked as a bouncer on the night in question, was
familiar with appellant but did not see him in the area at any point.
Detective Quinten Kennedy of the Harrisburg Police Department
testified that on January 9, 2012, he was informed that appellant had been
arrested at a motel. (Id. at 281-282.) He was instructed to go to the motel
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and execute a search pursuant to a warrant that had been issued. (Id. at
282-283.) They searched the room and also discovered appellant’s vehicle
parked outside a motel room. (Id. at 286-287.) Officer Kennedy had the
vehicle towed to the impound lot and then searched the vehicle, finding
several pieces of paper in the driver’s side door panel. One of these items
was an envelope containing appellant’s handwritten notes. (Id. at 291-293,
310.)
During trial, Detective Ryan Neal testified to the search warrant and
subsequent search of the vehicle. He was asked to read the contents of the
notes to the jury on direct examination: “On one side [of the envelope
appears] the abbreviation for criminal attempt homicide, and then former
convict not to possess firearms.” (Id. at 291.) Defense counsel objected
and moved for a mistrial because the statement suggested that appellant
had previously been guilty of another crime; prior to trial, the count of
persons not to possess firearms had been bifurcated. The court denied his
motion and his request for a curative instruction, as it found the error
harmless. (Id. at 300-301.)
After a jury trial, appellant was convicted of criminal attempt
(homicide), aggravated assault, firearms not to be carried without a license,
simple assault, recklessly endangering another person, and possession of a
firearm prohibited. On July 17, 2013, appellant received an aggregate
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sentence of 25 to 50 years’ incarceration and a fine of $4,000. Appellant
was also ordered to pay restitution.
A timely post-sentence motion was filed, and defense counsel filed a
motion to withdraw, which was granted on July 22, 2013. Appellant’s new
counsel, Andrea Haynes, Esq., filed a supplemental post-sentence motion on
July 31, 2013. On September 3, 2013, appellant filed an amended
post-sentence motion. A hearing was held on September 27, 2013, and
thereafter, the court denied the motion on October 3, 2013. Appellant filed
a timely notice of appeal on Monday, November 4, 2013.2 The Honorable
Andrew H. Dowling issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion on December 11, 2013,
whereby it incorporated its memorandum and order from October 3, 2013.
The following issues have been presented for our review:
I. Whether the trial court committed reversible
error in instructing the jury that the victim of
the attempted murder was
Ibrahiim Muhammad, not Jalil Walters, where a
variance existed that was fatal to the verdict
between the criminal information and the jury
instructions in violation of Appellant’s Due
Process protections of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Article 1, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution?
II. Whether the trial court committed reversible
error in denying Appellant’s motion for a
mistrial where a prosecution witness read from
a document, in front of the jury, that Appellant
is a convict who cannot own or possess a
2
Because November 2, 2013, fell on a Saturday, appellant had until the
following Monday to file his appeal. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908.
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firearm, where Appellant’s charge for Persons
Not to Possess a Firearm had been bifurcated
from Appellant’s other charges prior to trial to
eliminate prejudice to Appellant?
III. Whether the Commonwealth failed to adduce
sufficient evidence at trial to sustain the jury’s
verdict of guilty on all counts where the
Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Appellant committed the
crimes alleged?
IV. Whether the jury’s verdict of guilty on all
counts was contrary to the weight of the
evidence so as to shock one’s sense of justice
where there was conflicting testimony as to
when the shooting occurred, the description of
the shooter, and whether Appellant was
present on the night in question?
V. Whether Appellant’s sentence is excessive and
unreasonable and constitutes too severe a
punishment in light of Appellant’s rehabilitative
needs and where the punitive measures
inherent in this sentencing scheme could have
been accomplished with the imposition of a
lesser sentence?
Appellant’s brief at 9-10.
In the first issue presented, appellant claims the trial court committed
reversible error where a variance existed between the criminal information
and the jury instructions. Specifically, he directs our attention to a jury
instruction that identified Ibrahiim as the victim rather than Jalil, which went
against the criminal information sheet. Appellant avers that the criminal
information led him to believe the Commonwealth intended to prove at trial
that appellant attempted to kill Jalil. (Id. at 24.) Appellant also argues that
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the trial court, in effect, amended the criminal information when it gave a
special interrogatory where the jury was asked to determine whether Jalil
had suffered serious bodily injury during the commission of the attempted
murder of Ibrahiim. (Id. at 25.)
The purpose of the information is to provide the accused with sufficient
notice to prepare a defense. Commonwealth v. Alston, 651 A.2d 1092,
1095 (Pa. 1994). “An information is sufficient if it sets forth the elements of
the offense intended to be charged with sufficient detail that the defendant
is apprised of what he must be prepared to meet, and may plead double
jeopardy in a future prosecution based on the same set of events.” Id.Additionally, the information must be read in a common sense manner, and
should not be construed in an overly technical sense. Commonwealth v.
Jones, 912 A.2d 268, 289 (Pa. 2006). A purported variance between a
criminal information and evidence produced at trial is not fatal, “unless it
could mislead the defendant at trial, involves an element of surprise
prejudicial to the defendant’s efforts to prepare his defense, precludes the
defendant from anticipating the prosecution’s proof, or impairs a substantial
right.” Id.We find no error with either the trial court’s decision or rationale.
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the trial court, it is our
determination that there is no merit to this question raised on appeal. The
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trial court’s opinion, filed on December 11, 2013, comprehensively discusses
and properly disposes of the question presented. We will adopt it as our
own and affirm on that basis. (Trial court opinion, 12/11/13 at 2-3.)
We note our agreement with the trial court and the Commonwealth
that appellant’s argument regarding the variance is factually incorrect. The
information did not identify a victim or intended victim with regard to
attempted murder.3 (Docket #11-2.) The criminal information only states
that Jalil suffered gunshot wounds to his upper body as a result of the
commission of the crime. (Id.) Thus, appellant’s argument that the
Commonwealth put him on notice that it “intended to prove at trial that the
defendant attempted to kill Jalil Walters” is erroneous. (Appellant’s brief at
26.) During its instruction to the jury, Ibrahiim was only named as an
intended victim, not the victim; the trial court specifically instructed “that
the defendant did a certain act; that is fired a handgun at Ibrahiim
Muhammad.” (Notes of testimony, 5/13-16/2013 at 368.)
Included in the argument section of the first issue, appellant also
includes a claim concerning the special interrogatory; we find this argument
is waived as it was not included in his Rule 1925(b) statement. See
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii); Commonwealth v. Mattison, 82 A.3d 386, 393
(Pa. 2013) (defendant waived his challenges to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support his burglary and robbery convictions where he failed to
3
The information did name a victim for the crime of aggravated assault.
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include these challenges in his statement of matters complained of on
appeal).
The second issue concerns whether the trial court erred in denying his
motion for a mistrial. Our standard of review of a court’s denial of a motion
for mistrial is as follows:
A motion for a mistrial is within the discretion
of the trial court. A mistrial upon motion of one of
the parties is required only when an incident is of
such a nature that its unavoidable effect is to deprive
the appellant of a fair and impartial trial. It is within
the trial court’s discretion to determine whether a
defendant was prejudiced by the incident that is the
basis of a motion for a mistrial. On appeal, our
standard of review is whether the trial court abused
that discretion.
Commonwealth v. Akbar, 91 A.3d 227, 236 (Pa.Super. 2014), quoting
Commonwealth v. Tejeda, 834 A.2d 619, 623 (Pa.Super. 2003) (internal
citations and footnote omitted).
Appellant claims he suffered prejudice when the jury heard “evidence
that [a]ppellant was a former convict.” (Appellant’s brief at 33.) We
disagree with appellant’s characterization of the testimony. Here, the
Commonwealth did not elicit testimony of appellant’s status as a former
convict; in fact, the trial court properly bifurcated proceedings related to
appellant’s charge of persons not to possess a firearm during the trial.
Rather, during direct examination of Officer Neal, he read what was written
on an envelope found during the search of appellant’s car: “on the one side
it has the abbreviation for criminal attempt homicide, and then former
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convict not to possess firearm.” (Notes of testimony, 5/13-16/2013 at 290-
291.)
We cannot find this brief remark entitles appellant to a new trial. This
court has held that a witness’ isolated, passing reference, which did not give
details of a prior offense and which the Commonwealth did not elaborate
upon or otherwise exploit, warrantied no relief. Commonwealth v. Miller,
481 A.2d 1221, 1222 (Pa.Super. 1984). When considering the officer’s
testimony as a whole, the reference to a “former convict” did not stand out
on its own; in fact, the remaining testimony of the officer concerning the
words written on the envelope was far more damaging. When the officer
continued to testify after the sidebar, he described the remaining contents of
the envelope as follows:
[A]lso in the handwriting it has the name of
Jalil Walters. In parenthesis it has left arm and
abdomen. Also the name of Ibrahiim Muhammad
and Lewin Chism. Then below that a little bit there’s
Walters and Muhammad identified me from photo
array. And then below that it says Jalil push
Ibrahiim out of the way -- d-a way and got hit. And
then it lists my name and my officer telephone
number. And I think at the bottom it says Carter,
and then it has a -- I think it’s a colon or semicolon,
and it says I got ten eyewitnesses.
Notes of testimony, 5/13-16/13 at 310.
Therefore, we find appellant suffered no prejudice from the officer’s
fleeting mention of the crime. Additionally, the trial court offered to issue a
curative instruction and defense counsel rejected the offer.
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The third claim concerns the sufficiency of the evidence. However,
appellant’s entire argument concerns credibility as he avers the
Commonwealth’s witnesses gave conflicting descriptions of the shooter and
he avers he was not present at the Jazzland Bar on the evening in question.
(See appellant’s brief at 40-41.) Appellant also contends that the jury
should have credited the testimony of Mike and the bouncer whose
description did not match his appearance. An argument that the finder of
fact should have credited one witness’ testimony over that of another
witness goes to the weight of the evidence, not the sufficiency of the
evidence. Commonwealth v. W.H.M., Jr., 932 A.2d 155, 160 (Pa.Super.
2007) (claim that the jury should have believed appellant’s version of the
event rather than that of the victim goes to the weight, not the sufficiency of
the evidence); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 825 A.2d 710, 713-714
(Pa.Super. 2003) (a review of the sufficiency of the evidence does not
include an assessment of the credibility of testimony; such a claim goes to
the weight of the evidence); Commonwealth v. Gaskins, 692 A.2d 224,
227 (Pa.Super. 1997) (credibility determinations are made by the finder of
fact, and challenges to those determinations go to the weight, not the
sufficiency of the evidence). Thus, we will not review appellant’s asserted
sufficiency of the evidence claim as it is, in fact, a weight of the evidence
claim.
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Nevertheless, appellant properly preserved and presented a claim
regarding the weight of the evidence.
Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the
exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question
of whether the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence. Because the trial judge has had the
opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented,
an appellate court will give the gravest consideration
to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial
judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination
that the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for
granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s
conviction that the verdict was or was not against
the weight of the evidence and that a new trial
should be granted in the interest of justice.
This does not mean that the exercise of discretion by
the trial court in granting or denying a motion for a
new trial based on a challenge to the weight of the
evidence is unfettered. In describing the limits of a
trial court’s discretion, we have explained[,] [t]he
term ‘discretion’ imports the exercise of judgment,
wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate
conclusion within the framework of the law, and is
not exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the
will of the judge. Discretion must be exercised on
the foundation of reason, as opposed to prejudice,
personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary actions.
Discretion is abused where the course pursued
represents not merely an error of judgment, but
where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or
where the law is not applied or where the record
shows that the action is a result of partiality,
prejudice, bias or ill-will.
Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013) (emphasis in the
original omitted) (citations omitted).
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There was no abuse of discretion by the trial court. Appellant
essentially asks us to reassess the credibility of the witnesses. Issues of
credibility are for the trier of fact to decide, and the jury obviously chose to
believe the Commonwealth’s version of the facts and believed the
recollection of the three brothers, regardless of the fact that they had
consumed alcohol. As the trial court observed, while appellant “emphasizes
that Mike Burgress testified that, unlike [appellant], the shooter had hair on
his head and a beard, Mr. Burgress originally testified that he was not able
to see who shot Jalil even though he testified he was standing five feet away
at the time.” (Trial court opinion, 12/11/13 at 9.) We conclude appellant is
entitled to no relief.
The final claim presents a challenge to the discretionary aspects of
sentencing. “It is well settled that, with regard to the discretionary aspects
of sentencing, there is no automatic right to appeal.” Commonwealth v.
Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 807-808 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citation omitted).
[T]he right to appeal such an aspect of sentencing is
not absolute and is waived if the appellant does not
challenge it in post-sentence motions or by raising
the claim during sentencing proceedings. To reach
the merits of a discretionary sentencing issue, this
Court will conduct a four-part analysis to determine:
(1) whether Appellant has filed a timely
notice of appeal; (2) whether the issue
was properly preserved at sentencing or
in a motion to reconsider and modify
sentence; (3) whether Appellant’s brief
has a fatal defect; and (4) whether there
is a substantial question that the
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sentence appealed from is not
appropriate under the sentencing code.
Commonwealth v. Bullock, 948 A.2d 818, 825-826 (Pa.Super. 2008),
appeal denied, 968 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 2009) (citation omitted).
Here, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and preserved his claim
that the restitution portion of his sentence is excessive. He has also
included in his appellate brief a separate Rule 2119(f) statement. Therefore,
we proceed to determine whether appellant has presented a substantial
question that his sentence is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code.
Appellant argues that his combined fine and restitution amount of
$13,635.26 is excessive and unreasonable. (Appellant’s brief at 21.) He
avers that the fine goes beyond what is necessary to protect the public and
the money will not impact the victim or the community. He also states he
will never be able to afford to pay the fine and claims that the fine “does not
consider his rehabilitative needs.” (Id.) This issue implicates the
discretionary aspects of appellant’s sentence and raises a substantial
question. Commonwealth v. Walker, 666 A.2d 301, 307, 310 (Pa.Super.
1995), appeal denied, 680 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1996) (challenges alleging that
a sentence of restitution is excessive under the circumstances are challenges
to the discretionary aspects of sentencing).
Our standard of review in an appeal from the discretionary aspects of
a sentence is well settled:
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Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion
of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be
disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of
discretion. In this context, an abuse of discretion is
not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
the appellant must establish, by reference to the
record, that the sentencing court ignored or
misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for
reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
Commonwealth v. Hardy, 939 A.2d 974, 980 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citation
omitted).
Appellant contends that the combined fine and restitution amount of
$13,635.26 ($9,635 in restitution and $4,000.26 in fines) is excessive, given
his financial situation. At the outset, we note that restitution is penal in
nature and may be imposed without regard to the defendant’s ability to pay
when incorporated as part of a defendant’s direct sentence.
Commonwealth v. Karth, 994 A.2d 606, 607 (Pa.Super. 2010). The
sentencing court is not required to consider evidence of a defendant’s ability
to pay when imposing restitution; such ability need only be considered upon
default. Commonwealth v. Colon, 708 A.2d 1279, 1283 (Pa.Super. 1998).
However, the applicable provision of the Sentencing Code provides, in
pertinent part,
(b) Fine as additional sentence.--The court may
sentence the defendant to pay a fine in
addition to another sentence, either involving
total or partial confinement or probation, . . . .
....
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(c) Exception.--The court shall not sentence a
defendant to pay a fine unless it appears of
record that:
(1) the defendant is or will be able to
pay the fine;
(2) the fine will not prevent the
defendant from making restitution
or reparation to the victim of the
crime.
(d) FINANCIAL RESOURCES.--In determining
the amount and method of payment of a fine,
the court shall take into account the financial
resources of the defendant and the nature of
the burden that its payment will impose.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9726(b), (c) (d). “Imposition of a fine is not precluded
merely because the defendant cannot pay the fine immediately or because
he cannot do so without difficulty.” Commonwealth v. Thomas, 879 A.2d
246, 264 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal denied, 989 A.2d 917 (Pa. 2010).
We have read the sentencing transcript, which reveals that the trial
judge considered both appellant’s character and the particular circumstances
of the offenses. However, the record is silent as to the court’s inquiry into
appellant’s ability to pay the fines imposed as required by Section 9726(c)
and (d). While the trial court had a pre-sentence investigation report which
may contain evidence to support the trial court’s imposition of a fine, the
report was not made part of the certified record. Nor does the trial court’s
opinion provide insight into its investigation of his ability to pay. Because of
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the inadequate record, we vacate the fine imposed against appellant and
remand for resentencing.
Affirmed in part; vacated in part. Matter remanded for proceedings
consistent with this memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/25/2014
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