Com. v. Francis, R. ( 2015 )


Menu:
  • J. S59031/15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                 :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :          PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee            :
    :
    v.                        :
    :
    ROLAND FRANCIS,                               :
    :
    Appellant           :     No. 364 WDA 2015
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 28, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County
    Criminal Division No(s).: CP-25-CR-0000777-2014
    BEFORE: BOWES, DONOHUE, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.:                            FILED OCTOBER 15, 2015
    Appellant, Roland Francis, appeals from the judgment of sentence
    entered in the Erie County Court of Common Pleas upon his conviction for
    possessing     a   firearm     without   a   license.1      Appellant   claims   the
    Commonwealth failed to establish his constructive possession of the subject
    firearm. We affirm.
    The evidence from Appellant’s nonjury trial reveals the following. On
    February 16, 2014, at 4:30 a.m., Erie Police Sergeant Edward A. Noble
    responded to a report of “a man with a gun.” N.T., 12/3/14, at 4-5. The
    officer arrived at the 1800 block of Buffalo Road, where “there was a female
    *
    Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1
    18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1).
    J.S59031/15
    yelling . . . ‘He has a gun’ in a very excited manner.” Id. at 14. The female
    was pointing at a vehicle.2 Id.
    Officer Noble immediately approached the passenger side of the
    vehicle and ordered the three occupants to raise their hands. Id. at 5, 14.
    The two individuals in the front seats—a male in the driver’s seat, Justin
    Johnson, and a female in the passenger seat, Appellant’s sister, Mary
    Elizabeth Powell—complied with the officer’s order. Id. at 6, 21. Appellant,
    who was in the backseat behind the driver, “looked down and started
    fumbling with something on his lap.”        Id. at 6.   The officer repeatedly
    ordered Appellant to raise his hands.      Id.   Appellant complied five to ten
    seconds after the officer’s first order. Id. at 15.
    Officer Noble then “went around to [Appellant’s] side of the vehicle[,]
    opened the door[, and] ordered him out of the vehicle.”          Id. at 6.   As
    Appellant was exiting the car, the officer saw “a handgun right where
    [Appellant’s] feet [were inside the vehicle.]” Id. at 6-7. According to the
    officer, the handgun “would have been under his feet, or in between his
    feet.” Id. at 16. Johnson and Powell remained seated in the vehicle with
    their hands raised. Id. at 7.
    Officer Noble retrieved the firearm from the vehicle. The weapon was
    functional and loaded with one round in the chamber and one round in the
    2
    We note Officer Noble testified at trial that the female at the scene pointed
    “to the gun.” N.T. at 14. However, there was no evidence the officer saw a
    weapon before he removed Appellant from the vehicle. Id. at 16.
    -2-
    J.S59031/15
    magazine.      Id. at 8, 12.      Later, the officer submitted a form to the
    Pennsylvania State Police to determine Appellant’s licensing status. Id. at
    9-10.     The officer misspelled Appellant’s first name as “Ronald” instead of
    “Roland,” but included the social security number and date of birth Appellant
    provided him.     Id. at 10-11.     The State Police returned a report stating,
    “This subject . . .    did not have a license to carry firearms [or] a valid
    3
    sportsman’s firearm permit . . . .”       Id. at 10. The handgun was tested for
    fingerprints, but none were found. Id. at 12.
    Appellant exercised his right not to testify.    Id. at 18-19.   Powell,
    however, testified for the defense as follows. She and Johnson owned the
    vehicle. Id. at 21, 22-23. She was unaware that a firearm was inside the
    vehicle that night, and she did not see Appellant or Johnson with the
    firearm. Id. at 22. Neither she nor Johnson owned a firearm. Id. at 23-24.
    Appellant was only inside the vehicle for five to eight minutes before his
    arrest. Id. at 21.
    On cross-examination by the Commonwealth, Powell stated she,
    Johnson, and Appellant went to the 1800 block of Buffalo Road to confront
    another female, Quaisha Bolden. Id. at 25, 27. She “called out” Bolden and
    argued with Bolden and Bolden’s cousins. Id. at 26. The dispute between
    Powell and Bolden was about Johnson. Id. at 27.
    3
    Appellant does not assert he was licensed to carry a firearm or challenge
    the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s proof that he did not have a license.
    -3-
    J.S59031/15
    The trial court, on December 3, 2014, found Appellant guilty of
    possessing a firearm without a license.4   The court, on January 28, 2015,
    sentenced Appellant to two to four years’ imprisonment.        Appellant, on
    February 27, 2015, timely filed a notice of appeal and a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
    statement.
    Appellant presents a single question for review. Appellant’s Brief at 3.
    Relying on Commonwealth v. Boatwright, 
    453 A.2d 1058
     (Pa. Super.
    1982), he claims the evidence was insufficient to prove he possessed the
    firearm. Appellant’s Brief at 11. He notes the arresting officer “never saw
    him in physical possession of the firearm” and there was no evidence he
    possessed a holster or ammunition. Id. at 9-10. Appellant emphasizes that
    “he was not the owner or operator of the motor vehicle in which the gun was
    found” and there were “two other people” in the vehicle.       Id.     He thus
    asserts the evidence established only his mere presence in the vehicle. Id.
    at 10. We disagree.
    Our standard of review is well settled:
    In evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the
    evidence, we must determine whether viewing the
    evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner,
    together with all reasonable inferences therefrom, the trier
    of fact could have found that each and every element of
    the crimes charged was established beyond a reasonable
    4
    The trial court found Appellant not guilty of possessing an instrument of
    crime, as well as terroristic threats, recklessly endangering another person,
    and simple assault regarding another female at the 1800 block of Buffalo
    Road.
    -4-
    J.S59031/15
    doubt. The facts and circumstances established by the
    Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
    innocence. However, any questions or doubts are to be
    resolved by the factfinder, unless the evidence is so weak
    and inconclusive that as a matter of law, no probability of
    fact may be drawn from the circumstances. The trier of
    fact is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
    “The standard is equally applicable to cases where the
    evidence is circumstantial rather than direct so long as the
    combination of the evidence links the accused to the crime
    beyond a reasonable doubt.”
    Commonwealth v. Thompson, 
    779 A.2d 1195
    , 1197 (Pa. Super. 2001)
    (citations omitted).
    Section 6106 of the Crimes Code states,
    [A]ny person who carries a firearm in any vehicle or any
    person who carries a firearm on or about his person,
    except in his place of abode or fixed place of business,
    without a valid and lawfully issued license under this
    Chapter commits a felony of the third degree.
    18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a).
    Because there was no evidence that the firearm was on Appellant’s
    person, the Commonwealth was required to demonstrate constructive
    possession.   See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 
    67 A.3d 817
    , 820 (Pa.
    Super.), appeal denied, 
    78 A.3d 1090
     (Pa. 2013). As this Court noted:
    Constructive possession is a legal fiction, a pragmatic
    construct to deal with the realities of criminal law
    enforcement.    Constructive possession is an inference
    arising from a set of facts that possession of the
    contraband was more likely than not. We have defined
    constructive possession as conscious dominion.          We
    subsequently defined conscious dominion as the power to
    control the contraband and the intent to exercise that
    control. To aid application, we have held that constructive
    -5-
    J.S59031/15
    possession may be established by the totality of the
    circumstances.
    
    Id.
     (citation omitted).
    In Boatwright,
    [t]he Commonwealth’s evidence disclosed that . . . Officers
    Charles Roller and Annette Roebuck responded to a radio
    call concerning three “suspicious” men in an automobile
    parked in front of a residence . . . . Upon arriving at the
    location, Officer Roller observed [the defendant], who was
    seated in the front passenger seat of the vehicle, “moving
    towards his left rear.” The officer could not see [the
    defendant’s] hand or arm, only a movement of his body.
    Officer Roller then opened the door of the automobile and
    asked [the defendant] to get out. He shined a light onto
    the left rear floor of the vehicle and saw a gun. In addition
    to [the defendant], the car was occupied by the driver and
    another passenger who was seated in the left rear seat.
    The car was registered to the driver’s girlfriend and the
    gun to one Darlene Simpson.
    Boatwright, 
    453 A.2d at 1058-59
     (record citations omitted).
    On appeal, the Boatwright Court reversed the defendant’s conviction
    for possessing the firearm, concluding:
    The only evidence other than [the defendant’s] mere
    presence was Officer Roller’s testimony that [the
    defendant] made a movement toward the left rear of the
    vehicle. This evidence cannot provide proof beyond a
    reasonable doubt that [he] possessed the firearm in
    question.
    
    Id. at 1059
    .
    Instantly, our review reveals significant differences between the facts
    discussed in Boatwright and the evidence presented at Appellant’s trial.
    Unlike the defendant’s body movement in Boatwright, Appellant’s furtive
    -6-
    J.S59031/15
    movements while failing to comply with the officer’s order to raise his hands
    sustained a reasonable inference that he was attempting to conceal the
    firearm.   Compare Boatwright, 
    453 A.2d at 1058
    , with N.T. at 6, 15.
    Further, the officer in this case found the firearm in an area within
    Appellant’s exclusive control.   Compare Boatwright, 
    453 A.2d at 1059
    ,
    with N.T. at 6-7. Lastly, the defense’s evidence negated the possibility that
    another individual in the vehicle possessed the firearm or placed it in the
    area by Appellant’s feet. See N.T. at 21-24.
    Consequently, we discern no merit to Appellant’s arguments based on
    Boatwright.    We further conclude the instant record supported the trial
    court’s finding that Appellant constructively possessed the firearm.     See
    Hopkins, 
    67 A.3d at 820
    ; Thompson, 
    779 A.2d at 1199
    . Accordingly, we
    have no basis to disturb Appellant’s conviction.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 10/15/2015
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 364 WDA 2015

Filed Date: 10/15/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/15/2015