Com. v. Cisne, J. ( 2019 )


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  • J   -S59033-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                      :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    v.
    JASON CISNE
    Appellant                     :   No. 1179 EDA 2017
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 10, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006829-2008
    BEFORE:     GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and OTT, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.:                                       FILED JANUARY 07, 2019
    Jason Cisne appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed on March
    10, 2017, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, following the
    entry of a negotiated guilty plea of 25 to 50 years' incarceration on the charges
    of third degree murder, possession of            a   firearm prohibited and possession of
    an instrument of       crime.'   Cisne pled guilty on March 1, 2010.               However,
    defense counsel failed to file      a   direct appeal, as requested. Pursuant to      a   Post
    Conviction Relief Act petition, Cisne was granted nunc pro tunc relief and was
    allowed to file   a   direct appeal. Cisne has done so. The appeal         is now     before
    us and appointed counsel has filed an                Anders brief along with   a   motion to
    withdraw as counsel.        After       a   thorough review of the submissions by the
    '   18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(c), 6105(a)(1) and 907(a), respectively.
    J   -S59033-18
    parties, relevant law, and the certified record, we affirm and grant counsel's
    petition to withdraw.
    Because this matter has been                a   procedural nightmare,      a   recital of the
    factual and procedural history is in order to provide the necessary context of
    our review.
    On March 1, 2010, Cisne entered into a negotiated                     guilty plea to third
    degree murder,        a   violation of the Uniform Firearms Act, and possession of an
    instrument of crime.               The notes of testimony of the guilty plea reveal that
    Cisne stood over the victim, Phillip Underwood, and while Underwood was,
    "laying on the sidewalk face-up...Cisne pulled                 a   gun and shot him in the left
    shoulder, two times in the chest, the abdomen and the left thigh." N.T. Guilty
    Plea,   3/1/2010, at 9.           No   direct appeal was filed.
    Cisne filed       a   timely petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
    (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.            §   9541 et seq. Appointed counsel filed        a   Turner/Finley2
    no   merit letter accompanied by             a   motion to withdraw as counsel. Pursuant to
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, the PCRA court sent Cisne notice of its intent to dismiss the
    matter without        a   hearing. Cisne responded to the Rule 907 notice by claiming
    PCRA counsel had failed to raise the claim                 that trial counsel was ineffective for
    failing to file   a   requested direct appeal. Cisne attached             a   copy of    a   letter he
    had purportedly sent to trial counsel asking a direct appeal be filed. Without
    ruling on PCRA counsel's motion to withdraw, the PCRA court denied Cisne's
    2Commonwealth v. Turner, 
    544 A.2d 927
     (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v.
    Finley, 
    550 A.2d 213
     (PA. Super. 2008) (en banc).
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    PCRA    petition. On appeal,     a   panel of our Court agreed that the issues raised
    were without merit, but recognized that Cisne's claim that trial counsel failed
    to file    a   direct appeal as requested was arguably meritorious.                        See
    Commonwealth v. Cisne,                  
    2014 WL 10979661
           (Pa.   Super.       2014)
    (unpublished memorandum).                The matter was then            remanded for an
    evidentiary hearing to determine the status of Cisne's direct appeal rights.
    Upon remand, Cisne's direct appeal rights were reinstated, and                a   direct
    appeal was filed. Counsel improperly filed             a   Turner/Finley     no   merit letter
    along with     a   motion to withdraw as counsel.          On September 15, 2015,           this
    Court filed    a   per curiam order noting the matter was       a   direct appeal nunc pro
    tunc and instructing counsel to file either an advocate's brief or an Anders
    brief. Counsel subsequently filed two (2) deficient Anders briefs before being
    relieved, sua sponte, of his responsibilities to Cisne. Subsequent counsel also
    filed an Anders brief along with        a   motion to withdraw as counsel. This brief
    was addressed by our Court. See             Commonwealth v. Cisne, 
    159 A.3d 580
    (Pa.    Super. 2016)(unpublished memorandum).                   Our Court agreed with
    counsel that no meritorious issues existed regarding the entry of the guilty
    plea.     There was no evidence of record to suggest, much less demonstrate,
    that the plea was invalid.            However, that panel noted the record was
    inconclusive        regarding   whether        Cisne   had     been    subjected      to     an
    unconstitutional mandatory minimum sentence. Accordingly, the judgment of
    sentence for third degree murder was vacated and the matter was remanded
    for an evidentiary hearing. See 
    Id.
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    Upon remand, the trial court determined Cisne had not been subjected
    to an unconstitutional mandatory minimum sentence and reimposed the prior
    sentence.     Cisne now appeals.
    Counsel has filed an Anders brief, explaining there are no meritorious
    issues.3 Our review leads us to agree.
    We begin by noting,
    The standard of review when an      Anders/McClendon brief         has
    been presented is as follows:
    To be permitted to withdraw pursuant to   Anders, counsel
    must: (1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating
    that after making a conscientious examination of the
    record it has been determined that the appeal would be
    frivolous; (2) file a brief referring to anything that might
    arguably support the appeal, but which does not resemble
    a "no merit" letter or amicus curiae brief; and (3) furnish
    a copy of the brief to the defendant and advise him of his
    right to retain new counsel or raise any additional points
    that he deems worthy of the court's attention.
    Commonwealth v. Boyd, 
    763 A.2d 421
    , 423 (Pa. Super.
    2000). If these requirements are met, the Court may then
    evaluate the record to determine whether the appeal is
    frivolous. 
    Id.
    Pursuant to the recent amendments of Rule 1925, if counsel
    intends to submit an Anders/McClendon brief, the proper
    procedure is provided in Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4):
    In a criminal case, counsel may file of record and serve on
    the judge a         statement of intent to file an
    Anders/McClendon brief in lieu of filing a Statement. If,
    upon review of the Anders/McClendon brief, the
    appellate court believes that there are arguably
    3The matter was initially remanded because counsel had failed to provide
    documentation that he had informed Cisne of his rights under Anders.
    Counsel has provided the proper documentation, and we may substantively
    address this appeal.
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    meritorious issues for review, those issues will not be
    waived; instead, the appellate court may remand for the
    filing of a Statement, a supplemental opinion pursuant to
    1925(a) or both. Upon remand, the trial court may, but is
    not required to, replace appellant's counsel.
    Rule 1925 provides two options which were available to
    Appellant's counsel at the time the trial court directed him
    to file a concise statement. Appellant's counsel could have
    complied with the order and filed a concise statement
    under Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), or alternatively, could have filed
    a statement of intent to file an Anders/McClendon brief.
    See Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 
    928 A.2d 287
    , 293
    (Pa. Super. 2007) (en banc) (finding that under the newly
    promulgated Rule 1925, the concise statement filed by
    appellant's attorney indicating that 'there were no non -
    frivolous matters that can be raised on appeal', would be
    accepted by the Court as a statement of intent to file an
    Anders/McClendon brief). These options are detailed in
    the Note to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4):
    Even lawyers seeking to withdraw pursuant to the
    procedures set forth in Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 
    87 S.Ct. 1396
    , 
    18 L.Ed.2d 493
     (1967) and
    Commonwealth v. McClendon, 
    495 Pa. 467
    , 
    434 A.2d 1185
     (1981) are obligated to comply with all
    rules, including the filing of a Statement. See
    Commonwealth v. Myers, 
    897 A.2d 493
    , 494-496
    (Pa. Super. 2006); Commonwealth v. Ladamus,
    
    896 A.2d 592
    , 594 (Pa. Super. 2006). However,
    because a lawyer will not file an Anders/McClendon
    brief without concluding that there are no non -
    frivolous issues to raise on appeal, this amendment
    allows a lawyer to file, in lieu of a Statement, a
    representation that no errors have been raised
    because the lawyer is (or intends to be) seeking to
    withdraw under Anders/McClendon. At that point,
    the appellate court will reverse or remand for a
    supplemental Statement and/or opinion if it finds
    potentially    non -frivolous    issues    during its
    constitutionally required review of the record.
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925 at Note (2007) (emphasis added).
    Commonwealth v. McBride, 
    957 A.2d 752
    , 756-57           (Pa. Super. 2016).
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    Here,   counsel   has   complied with the technical           requirements of
    Anders/McClendon. Accordingly, we proceed. Counsel has filed                 a   Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(b) statement in which the sole issue raised          is a   claim that his plea was
    involuntary due to the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Specifically,
    [Cisne] is claiming that the Negotiated Plea was coerced because
    his counsel failed to investigate witnesses, was unprepared, and
    thus forced [Cisne] to plead guilty when he was actually innocent.
    Further, because of this coercion, the sentence imposed as a
    "Negotiated Guilty Plea" was unreasonable.
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 5/3/2017, at 1-2.
    As noted, the prior decision of our Court in 2016,       see Cisne, 
    supra
     at
    
    159 A.3d 580
     has already determined there are no meritorious issues
    regarding the voluntariness of the plea in the direct appeal.             To the extent
    that Cisne's claims are based upon claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,
    a    defendant cannot challenge trial counsel's ineffectiveness on direct appeal,
    but must raise such claims in      a   timely   PCRA   petition. See Commonwealth
    v.   Grant, 
    813 A.2d 726
         (Pa. 2002). See      also Commonwealth v. Holmes,
    
    79 A.3d 562
     (Pa. 2013) ) addressing the limited circumstances, none of which
    are present instantly, in which ineffective assistance of counsel claims may be
    addressed on direct appeal).4
    4   Cisne has filedresponse to counsel's Anders brief. However, this response
    a
    details allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. As noted, such claims
    are properly raised in a timely PCRA petition, not on direct appeal.
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    There are only three avenues of appeal following          a   negotiated guilty
    plea, jurisdiction (which has never been in question), voluntariness of the plea
    (which has been previously addressed) and legality of sentence.5 Cisne argues
    his sentence is unreasonable, not illegal.           Such   a   claim challenges the
    discretionary aspects of       a    sentence, not the legality of the sentence.
    Moreover, we note that the hearing on remand, immediately prior to this
    appeal, determined Cisne had not been subjected to an unconstitutional
    mandatory minimum sentence and                so   the sentence was not illegal.
    Accordingly, there is no meritorious issue to be found regarding sentencing.
    Because the     certified    record   amply demonstrates        there are no
    meritorious issues to be found on direct appeal, we affirm the judgment of
    sentence.        Additionally, we grant counsel's motion to withdraw from
    representation.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed. Motion to withdraw granted.
    Judge Lazarus joins this memorandum.
    President Judge Gantman concurs in the result.
    5   Commonwealth v. Heaster,        
    171 A.3d 268
    , 271 (Pa. Super. 2017) (upon
    the entry of a      negotiated guilty plea, a defendant waives all claims and
    defenses other than those sounding in the jurisdiction of the court, the validity
    of the plea, and what has been termed the "legality" of the sentence imposed).
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    Judgment Entered.
    seph D. Seletyn,
    Prothonotary
    Date: 1/7/19
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