In Re: E.G. Appeal of: E.G. ( 2015 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: E.G. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: E.G., :
: No. 1255 WDA 2014
Appellant :
Appeal from the Order Dated July 2, 2014,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Orphans’ Court Division at No. 1022 of 2014
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., DONOHUE AND STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 15, 2015
E.G.1 appeals from the final order of the trial court that denied his
petition for review of a commitment order entered pursuant to Section 303
of the Mental Health Procedures Act (“MHPA”), 50 P.S. § 7303, extending his
confinement to a mental health facility for an additional 20 days. We affirm.
The facts underlying appellant’s involuntary commitment have been
summarized by the trial court as follows:
On June 22, 2014, the Appellant, [E.G.], was
admitted to Western Psychiatric Institute and Clinic
(WPIC) pursuant to the provisions of 50 P.S. § 7302.
According to the Application for Involuntary
Emergency Examination and Treatment it was
reported, inter alia, that the Appellant continually
talked to his neighbor about a “Pittsburgh chainsaw
massacre”. The Appellant then purchased a
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
Mindful of the sensitive nature of the case, we have amended the case
caption to utilize only the initials of the appellant.
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chainsaw and told the neighbor that he needed to
get a sharper blade for it. The Appellant also,
according to the neighbor, loves fires and would
“make large pillars of flames.”
On June 23, 2014, during a medical
examination at WPIC the Appellant admitted to
purchasing a chainsaw and making statements about
using it. He denied any thoughts of harming himself
or others. As a result of the exam, Dr. Robin E.
Valpey, M.D. found that the Appellant was:
“hyperverbal with overproductive speech, grandiose
and very irritable. Admits to some paranoia in the
past and perceiving things others don’t perceive, but
would not share further.”
On June 24, 2014, a hearing was held
pursuant to 50 P.S. § 7303 before Mental Health
Review Officer (MHRO) Wrenna L. Watson, Esq. The
Appellant was present at the hearing and was
represented by the Office of the Public Defender.
The Allegheny County Solicitor presented the
testimony of Dr. Valpey that the Appellant was
severely mentally disabled. A neighbor testified
concerning the Appellant obtaining and displaying a
chainsaw and that the Appellant had 4 tanks of
gasoline in his backyard and would often build large
fires with flames that reached 10 feet high or more.
Furthermore, the neighbor testified that the
Appellant’s driving was erratic, fast, and dangerous.
The neighbor testified that he felt unsafe living next
door to the Appellant and had his locks changed.
Based on the testimony of the Doctor and the
neighbor, the MHRO found that the Appellant
continued to be severely mentally disabled and in
need of involuntary inpatient and outpatient care for
a period not to exceed 20 days.
Trial court opinion, 12/10/14 at 1-2.
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On June 2, 2014, following a hearing, the trial court upheld the
certification of severe mental illness by final order. Appellant raises one
issue on appeal:
I. WAS THE EVIDENCE INSUFFICIENT TO
ESTABLISH THAT [APPELLANT] WOULD POSE A
CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TO HIMSELF OR
OTHERS WHERE THE COMMONWEALTH
ESTABLISHED ONLY THAT [APPELLANT]
SUFFERS FROM A MENTAL ILLNESS AND MADE
ANOTHER PERSON UNCOMFORTABLE?
Appellant’s brief at 4.
This court reviews determinations pursuant to the MHPA “to determine
whether there is evidence in the record to justify the hearing court’s
findings.” In re T.T., 875 A.2d 1123, 1126 (Pa.Super. 2005), citing
Commonwealth ex rel. Gibson v. DiGiacinto, 439 A.2d 105, 107 (Pa.
1981). Although “we must accept the trial court’s findings of fact that have
support in the record, we are not bound by its legal conclusions from those
facts.” Id. citing Gibson, 439 A.2d at 107.
The legislature’s purpose in enacting the Mental
Health Procedures Act was “to assure the availability
of adequate treatment to persons who are mentally
ill” and “to make voluntary and involuntary
treatment available where the need is great and its
absence could result in serious harm to the mentally
ill person or to others.” Mental Health Procedures
Act, § 102. See also In re McMullins, 315
Pa.Super. 531, 462 A.2d 718, 722 (1983). To
achieve these objectives within the constraints of
due process “the scheme adopted by the legislature
here envisions that more extensive procedural or
‘due process’ protections will apply as the amount of
time a person may be deprived of liberty increases
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above a bare minimum.” Matter of Seegrist, 517
Pa. 568, 574, 539 A.2d 799, 802 (1988). The
resulting progression in sections 302, 303, and 304,
evinces the legislature’s clear concern that the
procedural protections afforded our citizens reflect
the extent of the deprivation of liberty at stake.
In re Hancock, 719 A.2d 1053, 1057
(Pa.Super.1998).
Section 302, which provides for involuntary
emergency examination and treatment, allows
confinement of the patient for up to 120 hours upon
certification by a physician, or authorization by the
county mental health administrator. Mental Health
Procedures Act, § 302(a), (d). Though action by the
administrator requires issuance of a warrant, “[i]n
light of the emergency nature, therapeutic purpose
and short duration” of a section 302 commitment,
the warrant need not be supported by probable
cause and may be based upon hearsay. In re J.M.,
556 Pa. [63,] 75-76 n. 9, 726 A.2d [1041,] 1046-47
n. 9 [(1999)].
Section 303 provides for extended involuntary
emergency treatment whenever, following a patient’s
commitment under section 302, “the facility [where
the individual is currently under treatment]
determines that the need for emergency treatment is
likely to extend beyond 120 hours.” Mental Health
Procedures Act § 303(a). To ensure that the
individual’s liberty interest is protected, section 303
subjects the facility’s determination to substantial
legal scrutiny. Application for continued treatment
must be made to the court of common pleas and
shall state the grounds on which treatment is to be
imposed along with the name of any examining
physician and the substance of his opinion regarding
the mental condition of the patient. Id. at § 303(a).
Because a patient may be confined under
section 303 for as long as twenty days, the
legislature has mandated a right to counsel, and the
right to an informal hearing, at which counsel may
question the examining physician and other
witnesses. Id. at § 303(b), (c). Though the rules of
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evidence need not be applied, the reviewing judge or
mental health review officer (MHRO) must confine
his consideration to evidence he deems reliable. Id.
at § 303(c). Moreover, we have held that a patient
may not be confined under section 303 on a showing
of less than “clear and convincing evidence.” In re
Hancock, supra at 1058.
In re R.D., 739 A.2d 548, 555-556 (Pa.Super. 1999), appeal denied, 751
A.2d 192 (Pa. 2000).
Instantly, appellant’s commitment was extended under Section 303
after an informal commitment hearing.2 To prove the necessity for
emergency involuntary commitment under Section 303, the petitioner must
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the person being
committed is severely mentally disabled and in need of extended involuntary
treatment. In re S.B., 777 A.2d 454 (Pa.Super. 2000).
The MHPA defines a person who is severely mentally disabled in
pertinent part as follows:
§ 7301. Persons who may be subject to
involuntary emergency examination and
treatment
(a) Persons Subject.--Whenever a person
is severely mentally disabled and in need
of immediate treatment, he may be
2
This court notes that although the commitment order in this appeal has
since expired, “appeals from involuntary commitment orders which have
expired are not moot because involuntary commitment affects an important
liberty interest, and because by their nature most involuntary commitment
orders expire before appellate review is possible.” In re Condry, 450 A.2d
136, 137 (Pa.Super. 1982) (citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted);
In re Woodside, 699 A.2d 1293 (Pa.Super. 1997). Accordingly, appellant’s
arguments are not moot, and will be considered on their merits.
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made subject to involuntary emergency
examination and treatment. A person is
severely mentally disabled when, as a
result of mental illness, his capacity to
exercise self-control, judgment and
discretion in the conduct of his affairs
and social relations or to care for his own
personal needs is so lessened that he
poses a clear and present danger of
harm to others or to himself.
50 P.S. § 7301.
Pursuant to 50 P.S. § 7301(b), “a clear and present danger of harm to
others may be demonstrated by proof that the person has made threats of
harm and has committed acts in furtherance of the threat to commit harm.”
Instantly, appellant argues the evidence presented at his certification
did not establish that he was a clear and present danger to himself or
others. Appellant claims that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he
committed any acts in furtherance of the threat to commit harm. He
contends that there is no indication that he did anything more than cut up
sticks in his backyard with a chainsaw. There was no allegation that he
attempted to strike his neighbor with the chainsaw or swing it in a
threatening manner. Appellant contends that the testimony established only
that appellant made one of his neighbors “really uncomfortable” and that
merely making another person uncomfortable did not justify his involuntary
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commitment. We disagree with appellant’s version of the evidence and find
that the record amply supports the hearing court’s findings.3
The Commonwealth called two witnesses, (1) Charlie Hron-Weigle,
appellant’s neighbor and friend, and (2) Dr. Robin Valpey, appellant’s
treating physician at WPIC.
Hron-Weigle testified that over the previous 30 days, he had become
“increasingly uncomfortable” by appellant. Hron-Weigle testified that
appellant was “talking about chainsawing me.” (Hearing audio, 6/24/14 at
1:40.) Appellant then obtained a chainsaw and began using it near
Hron-Weigle. While holding the chainsaw near Hron-Weigle, appellant
repeated the threat, “maybe I should chainsaw Charlie [Hron-Weigle].” (Id.
at 2:53.) Hron-Weigle also testified that appellant stated that he needed to
sharpen the chainsaw blades. Appellant then had the blades sharpened.
Hron-Weigle felt so unsafe that he changed the locks on his door, could not
sleep until sunrise, and slept with a knife. Hron-Weigle also testified that
appellant poured kerosene on a live fire near the apartment building and the
flames reached ten feet high (id. at 3:10), and that appellant’s driving had
become erratic, fast, and dangerous. (Id. at 4:22.)
3
The audio recording of the June 24, 2014, hearing before the health review
officer has been made part of the record. This court has reviewed the
recordings. References to the audio recording will be cited using this
format: (Hearing audio, 6/24/14 at __:__.)
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Dr. Valpey testified that appellant was previously diagnosed with
schizophrenia and ADHD. She also stated that he was diagnosed with
“Mood Disorder” during his initial commitment. (Id. at 9:42.) Dr. Valpey
stated that appellant admitted to stopping his medications from a prior
hospitalization and was reluctant to take the medications while at the
hospital. She testified that appellant drew a picture of blood dripping from
the acronym WPIC. (Id. at 11:48.) Dr. Valpey expressed her belief that
appellant required further inpatient treatment.
In In re Woodside, 699 A.2d 1293 (Pa.Super. 1997), a man argued
that his initial involuntary commitment was improper because the petition
filed by his estranged wife failed to allege a threat and acts in furtherance of
the threat. He claimed first that his statement to another, that he “might as
well get a scope and a rifle and get rid of the problem, my soon-to-be-ex-
wife,” did not constitute a threat. Id. at 1296. We rejected that argument.
The question remaining was whether there was an overt act in furtherance
of the threat. We held that the man’s purchase of a rifle scope from a
sporting goods store on the day of his commitment constituted an overt act
in furtherance of the threat.
In In re R.D., 739 A.2d 548 (Pa.Super. 1999), this court held that an
elderly woman’s act of picking up her cane in an effort to hit another,
together with verbal threats of harm, constituted an act in furtherance of the
threat to commit harm, as contemplated by the statute.
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Here, the record demonstrates that appellant stated to Hron-Weigle,
“maybe I should cut up Charlie.” The threat to cut someone up with a
chainsaw could reasonably be determined to be a threat of harm. Having
established the existence of a threat, we must determine under
Section 7301(b) whether appellant “committed acts in furtherance of the
threat to commit harm.” Contrary to appellant’s argument, the fact that
there was no allegation that appellant attempted to strike Hron-Weigle with
the chainsaw or swing it in a threatening manner is of no moment. We
agree with the trial court that appellant’s subsequent procurement of a
chainsaw after the verbal threat constituted an overt act in furtherance of
the threat directed at Hron-Weigle. As we noted in In re Woodside, “the
stakes are simply too high to require, beyond this conduct, a more explicit
demonstration of appellant’s intention to carry out his threat.” In re
Woodside, 699 A.2d at 1298.
Based on our review of the record, we conclude the trial court properly
certified appellant’s continued involuntary treatment under Section 7303
based on sufficient evidence of a clear and present danger to others. See
50 P.S. § 7301(b). Accordingly, we affirm.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/15/2015
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