Com. v. Reddick, L. ( 2015 )


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  • J-S61023-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                          IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    LAMEEK SABEEZ REDDICK
    Appellant                     No. 605 MDA 2015
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of March 9, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
    Criminal Division at No.: CP-22-CR-0001858-2014
    BEFORE: PANELLA, J., WECHT, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.:                               FILED OCTOBER 15, 2015
    Lameek Reddick appeals the March 9, 2015 judgment of sentence. We
    affirm.
    On December 5, 2013, Harrisburg City Police Officer Chad McGowan
    observed     Reddick     driving   a    Chevrolet   Suburban   after   dark    without
    illuminated headlamps.         Officer McGowan activated his emergency lights,
    intending to make a routine traffic stop. After “an abnormal amount of time”
    had passed, Reddick pulled over and exited the Suburban.                      Notes of
    Testimony (“N.T.”), 10/14/2014, at 6. Officer McGowan ordered Reddick to
    get back into the vehicle. Reddick complied with that instruction, but after
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S61023-15
    returning to the Suburban, he drove away “at a high rate of speed.” Id. at
    8.
    Officer   McGowan     pursued     Reddick,   who   eventually    parked   the
    Suburban on the 600 block of Seneca Street in Harrisburg.                Reddick then
    jumped out of the vehicle and ran from the scene. Officer McGowan gave
    chase, but ultimately lost sight of Reddick. He then went back to the area
    where Reddick had abandoned the Suburban, where he discovered a
    Samsung cell phone on the ground next to the driver’s-side door of the
    vehicle.     Officer McGowan also detected an odor of marijuana emanating
    from the driver’s-side window of the SUV, which was “partially cracked.” Id.
    at 11.
    Because Reddick had abandoned the vehicle, Officer McGowan called
    his supervisor, Sergeant Rodriguez,1 and received permission to have it
    towed from the scene.           Before the tow truck arrived, Officer McGowan
    conducted what the Commonwealth contends was an inventory search of the
    vehicle’s passenger compartment. In the center console, Officer McGowan
    found a black wallet containing Reddick’s Pennsylvania identification card.
    Also in the wallet was the Suburban’s registration, which indicated that a
    woman named Star King was the registered owner of the vehicle.                 Beside
    the wallet, Officer McGowan found several plastic bags, which contained
    ____________________________________________
    1
    The record does not contain Sergeant Rodriguez’ first name.
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    marijuana and cocaine.          After discovering these items, Officer McGowan
    stopped searching the vehicle because he intended to apply for a search
    warrant. Id. at 15.
    Officer McGowan went to King’s home hoping to locate Reddick. King
    gave Officer McGowan consent to search her residence, but Reddick was not
    there.    King also gave Officer McGowan written consent to search the
    Suburban.      Officer McGowan had the vehicle towed to King’s residence,
    where he searched the entire passenger compartment, but he did not
    discover any additional contraband.
    As a result of these events, Reddick was charged with two counts of
    possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, possession of
    drug paraphernalia with intent to deliver, fleeing or attempting to elude a
    police officer, periods for requiring lighted lamps, driving while suspended,
    and escape.2 On September 17, 2014, Reddick filed a motion to suppress
    the physical evidence that Officer McGowan seized from the Suburban. On
    December 16, 2014, following a hearing, the trial court denied Reddick’s
    motion to suppress.
    On March 9, 2015, following a stipulated non-jury trial, the trial court
    found Reddick guilty of possession of a controlled substance with intent to
    deliver, fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, periods for requiring
    ____________________________________________
    2
    35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30), and 780-113(a)(33); 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3733,
    4302(a)(2), and 1543(a); 18 Pa.C.S. § 5121(a), respectively.
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    lighted lamps, driving while suspended, and escape. On that same day, the
    trial court sentenced Reddick to an aggregate sentence of two to twelve
    months’     imprisonment,   followed    by   eighteen   months’   intermediate
    punishment.
    On April 5, 2015, Reddick timely filed a notice of appeal. On April 15,
    2015, the trial court ordered Reddick to file a concise statement of errors
    complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).         Reddick timely
    complied.
    Reddick presents one issue for our consideration:
    Whether the [trial] court erred in denying [Reddick’s] motion
    to suppress evidence where police conducted an unlawful
    inventory search in violation of Article I, Section 8 of the
    Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the
    United States Constitution?
    Brief for Reddick at 5.
    Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial
    court’s denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining
    whether the factual findings are supported by the record and
    whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are
    correct. Our scope of review is limited: “[W]e may consider
    only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the
    evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in
    the context of the record as a whole. Where the record supports
    the findings of the suppression court, we are bound by those
    facts and may reverse only if the court erred in reaching its legal
    conclusions based upon the facts.”
    Commonwealth v. Levanduski, 
    907 A.2d 3
    , 23 (Pa. Super. 2006) (en
    banc) (quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 
    874 A.2d 108
    , 115 (Pa. Super.
    2005)).
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    Initially, the Commonwealth contends that Reddick cannot prevail on
    his challenge to the inventory search because he failed to demonstrate a
    legitimate expectation of privacy in the Suburban. “[I]n order to prevail [on
    a motion to suppress,] the defendant, as a preliminary matter, must show
    that he had a privacy interest in the area searched.”               Commonwealth v.
    Perea, 
    791 A.2d 427
    , 429 (Pa. Super. 2002). In arguing that Reddick failed
    to   demonstrate   a     cognizable    privacy     interest    in    the   vehicle,   the
    Commonwealth notes that the vehicle was not registered in Reddick’s name,
    and Reddick did not present any evidence that King had given him
    permission to use the vehicle. We agree.
    “The proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing
    that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged
    search or seizure.” Rakas v. Illinois, 
    439 U.S. 128
    , 130 n.1 (1978). This
    is so because “Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like
    some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted.”                
    Id. at 133-34
     (quoting Alderman v. United States, 
    394 U.S. 165
    , 174 (1969)).
    Thus, before a defendant may challenge a search or seizure on Fourth
    Amendment grounds, he or she must demonstrate a reasonable expectation
    of privacy in the area searched or thing seized. Hawkins, 718 A.2d at 267;
    Commonwealth        v.     Torres,      
    764 A.2d 532
    ,        542    (Pa.   2001);
    Commonwealth v. Black, 
    758 A.2d 1253
    , 1256-58 (Pa. Super. 2000).
    Whether a defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy is a
    component     of   the    merits      analysis    of    the    suppression        motion.
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    Commonwealth v. Millner, 
    888 A.2d 680
    , 691 (Pa. 2005).                      The
    suppression court must determine whether the defendant has met this
    burden by evaluating the evidence presented both by the Commonwealth
    and by the defendant. This Court has explained as follows:
    [G]enerally under Pennsylvania law, a defendant charged with a
    possessory offense has automatic standing to challenge a
    search. “However, in order to prevail, the defendant, as a
    preliminary matter, must show that he had a privacy interest in
    the area searched.”
    An expectation of privacy is present when the individual,
    by his conduct, exhibits an actual (subjective) expectation
    of privacy and that the subjective expectation is one that
    society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.          The
    constitutional legitimacy of an expectation of privacy is not
    dependent on the subjective intent of the individual
    asserting the right but on whether the expectation is
    reasonable in light of all the surrounding circumstances.
    Pennsylvania law makes clear there is no legally cognizable
    expectation of privacy in a stolen automobile. Additionally, this
    Court has declined to extend an expectation of privacy to an
    “abandoned” automobile.
    Jones, 
    874 A.2d at 118
     (internal citations omitted).
    In Jones, we held that a defendant did not have a privacy interest
    sufficient to challenge the constitutionality of a search of the rental car that
    he was driving. In so holding, we explained that the defendant’s “subjective
    expectation of privacy was not reasonable where he was the operator of a
    rental car but not the named lessee, was not an authorized driver, the
    named lessee was not present in the vehicle, [the defendant] offered no
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    explanation of his connection to the named lessee, and the return date for
    the rental car had passed.” 
    Id. at 120
    .
    Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Burton, 
    973 A.2d 428
     (Pa. Super.
    2009), an en banc panel of this Court held that a defendant did not have a
    reasonable expectation of privacy in an automobile that was not registered
    to him.   Like the defendant in Jones, Burton offered no evidence that he
    was authorized to operate the vehicle in question, nor did he explain his
    relationship to the vehicle’s registered owner.
    Instantly, as in Jones and Burton, Reddick did not own or lease the
    vehicle that the police searched.      The vehicle was registered to King.
    Reddick offered no evidence that he was using the vehicle with King’s
    permission.   Nor did he offer evidence explaining his connection to the
    vehicle or his relationship with King. Because Reddick failed to demonstrate
    that he had a cognizable privacy interest in the Suburban, the trial court did
    not err in denying his motion to suppress. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130 n.1
    (“The proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that
    his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or
    seizure.”).
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    J-S61023-15
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 10/15/2015
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