Com. v. Hippensteel, B. ( 2015 )

J-A14030-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
BRIAN R. HIPPENSTEEL
Appellant No. 1630 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 3, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0002715-2013
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., JENKINS, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED MAY 21, 2015
Appellant Brian Hippensteel appeals from the June 3, 2014 judgment
of sentence1 entered following his jury trial convictions for criminal attempt
to commit murder,2 aggravated assault,3 terroristic threats,4 simple assault,5
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
Following the filing of timely post-sentence motions, the trial court
amended the June 3, 2014 judgment of sentence on September 23, 2014.
2
18 Pa.C.S. § 901.
3
18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1).
4
18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(a)(1).
5
18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(1).
J-A14030-15
two counts of recklessly endangering another person,6 and two counts of
criminal mischief.7 We affirm.
On September 21, 2013, Appellant shot the victim, Timothy Bouder,
who sustained bleeding from his head. N.T., 3/17/2014, at 13-14, 52.
Appellant also hit the victim’s pick-up truck, with one bullet entering near
the registration and inspection stickers on the truck’s windshield. Id. at 19-
20. Police discovered fragments of another bullet in a nearby building. Id.
at 22-23.
Appellant shot the victim because the victim was in a relationship with
Appellant’s estranged wife. See, e.g., N.T., 3/17/2014, at 30-40.49-52. On
the day of the shooting, Appellant spent the entire day drinking beer. Id. at
178-80. Appellant claimed, although he shot the victim, he never intended
to kill him. Id. at 186. He argued he was a 12-year veteran of the United
States Army and received commendations as an expert marksman. Id. at
166-70. He claimed he aimed toward the victim and wanted to scare him,
but did not intend to kill or seriously hurt the victim. Id. at 186.
On March 17, 2014, a jury trial commenced. The jury convicted
Appellant of the aforementioned crimes. On June 3, 2014, the trial court
sentenced Appellant to an aggregate sentence of 14 to 28 years’
____________________________________________
6
18 Pa.C.S. § 2705.
7
18 Pa.C.S. § 3304(a)(2).
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imprisonment.8 Appellant filed post-sentence motions, which the trial court
granted in part. Because it had applied a mandatory minimum pursuant to
42 Pa.C.S. § 9712, the trial court found the sentence was unconstitutional
pursuant to Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013) and
Commonwealth v. Newman, 99 A.3d 86 (Pa.Super.2014) (en banc). The
trial court ordered that Appellant appear for a re-sentencing hearing on
September 23, 2014. On September 23, 2014, the trial court issued the
following order: “[O]ur sentencing order of June 3, 2014, is amended to
reflect the sentence imposed at Count 2, Aggravated Assault, is not a
mandatory sentence.”
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. The trial court did not order,
and Appellant did not file, a statement of errors complained of on appeal
pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925. The trial court
did not issue a Rule 1925(a) opinion.9
____________________________________________
8
The trial court sentenced Appellant to 14 to 28 years’ imprisonment for the
criminal attempt to commit murder conviction; 5 to 10 years’ imprisonment
for the aggravated assault conviction; 6 to 24 months’ imprisonment for the
terroristic threats conviction; 6 to 24 months’ imprisonment for the simple
assault conviction; and 1 to 24 months’ imprisonment for the recklessly
endangering another person conviction. The court did not impose a
sentence of imprisonment for the criminal mischief conviction. All sentences
ran concurrently.
9
Although the trial court did not issue a Rule 1925(a) opinion, or statement
in lieu thereof, we will review this appeal without remanding for the issuance
of a 1925(a) opinion because the trial court addressed the issue raised on
appeal in its opinion addressing Appellant’s post-sentence motions.
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J-A14030-15
Appellant raises the following issue on appeal:
Since, like first degree murder, intent to kill is required to
be convicted of attempted murder, is an accused entitled
to a jury instruction that voluntary intoxication negates the
mens rea for the charge, as it would for first degree
murder?
Appellant’s Brief at 5 (capitalization removed). Appellant maintains the jury
should have been instructed that voluntary intoxication is a defense to
attempted murder. Id. at 10-13. We disagree.
“[O]ur standard of review when considering the denial of jury
instructions is one of deference—an appellate court will reverse a court’s
decision only when it abused its discretion or committed an error of law.”
Commonwealth v. Baker, 24 A.3d 1006, 1022 (Pa.Super.2011) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Galvin, 985 A.2d 783, 798–799 (Pa.2009) (alteration in
original)).
Pursuant to Pennsylvania law:
Neither voluntary intoxication nor voluntary drugged
condition is a defense to a criminal charge, nor may
evidence of such conditions be introduced to negative the
element of intent of the offense, except that evidence of
such intoxication or drugged condition of the defendant
may be offered by the defendant whenever it is relevant to
reduce murder from a higher degree to a lower degree of
murder.
18 Pa.C.S. § 308. This Court has found voluntary intoxication is not a
defense to attempted murder. Commonwealth v. Williams, 730 A.2d
507, 512 (Pa.Super.1999); accord Commonwealth v. Constant, 925 A.2d
810 (Pa.Super.2007), overruled on other grounds at Commonwealth v.
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Minnis, 83 A.3d 1047 (Pa.Super.2014). In Williams, we reasoned there is
“no such crime as attempted second or third degree murder.” Id. at 511.
We concluded that if voluntary intoxication could:
negate the specific intent to kill element of attempted
murder[,] [the Court] would be condoning the accused’s
voluntarily self-induced intoxication as a complete defense
to a charge of attempted murder. Such a conclusion is
contrary to the prohibition of such defense expressed in §
308.
Id. at 512.
Appellant acknowledges that we have found voluntary intoxication is
not a defense to attempted murder. Appellant’s Brief at 11. He notes the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has not addressed whether voluntary
intoxication is a defense to attempted murder and argues he is seeking a
limited application of the voluntary intoxication defense. Id. at 12-13. The
Williams court, however, found the claim that voluntary intoxication should
be a defense to attempted murder lacks merit. 730 A.2d at 511-12.
The trial court correctly refused to instruct the jury on the voluntary
intoxication defense. Opinion, 8/29/2014, at A-1 – A-2.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/21/2015
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