Com. v. Rentas, M. ( 2019 )

J-S65042-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MARQUELL ROBERT RENTAS :
:
Appellant : No. 62 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 1, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-36-CR-0004356-2016
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 15, 2019
Marquell Robert Rentas appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
following his convictions for assault of a law enforcement officer 1 and related
offenses. Roberts argues that the mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years’
incarceration imposed by the court pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9719.1 is
unconstitutional. We affirm.
The evidence presented at Rentas’s jury trial established that on July
29, 2016, when Rentas was 17 years old, he, “without provocation, fired a
high-powered rifle at [West Hempfield Township Sergeant Timothy Coyle],
with the intent to kill him.” Trial Court Opinion, filed March 6, 2018, at 4
(unpaginated). Sergeant Coyle was not injured in the shooting. The jury
convicted Rentas of assaulting a law enforcement officer under 18 Pa.C.S.A.
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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702.1(a).
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§ 2702.1(a) for “attempt[ing] to cause . . . bodily injury to a law enforcement
officer, while in the performance of duty and with knowledge that the victim
is a law enforcement officer, by discharging a firearm.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
2702.1(a). Accordingly, the trial court thereafter sentenced Rentas under 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9719.1(a), which provides that anyone convicted of assault of a
law enforcement officer under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702.1(a) be sentenced to a
mandatory minimum term of 20 years’ imprisonment. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9719.1(a).
Rentas appealed, and raises a sole issue:
In the context of imposing sentence for assault[ing a] law
enforcement officer, does Pennsylvania’s entire sentencing
scheme violate Mr. Rentas’s constitutional rights to equal
protection of the laws and [his] right against cruel and unusual
punishment because it imposes a vastly greater sentence for
assaulting a law enforcement officer by discharging a firearm
without an injury occurring by means of the 20 year mandatory
provision at 42 Pa.C.S.[A. § ]9719.1 than it does for other serious,
violent crimes against law enforcement officers where injur[i]es
occurred?
Rentas’s Br. at 6. Rentas argues that several other crimes which actually result
in serious bodily injury to law enforcement officers—such as attempted
homicide of a law enforcement officer and aggravated assault of a law
enforcement officer—do not carry mandatory minimum sentences, and
offenders convicted of those crimes can receive minimum sentences of
incarceration as low as three years. Rentas further argues that “[t]he vast
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majority of other states do not have a sentencing scheme akin to
Pennsylvania’s for discharging a firearm at law enforcement.” Id. at 17.2
The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law, over which we
exercise plenary and de novo review. Commonwealth v. Grove, 170 A.3d
1127, 1141, 1144 (Pa.Super. 2017). We are guided by the principle that
statutes are presumptively constitutional, and will not be deemed
unconstitutional absent a clear, palpable, and plain showing of
unconstitutionality. Id. at 1144-45.
We first address Rentas’s claim that his mandatory minimum sentence
violates equal protection under the Pennsylvania and federal constitutions.
See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Pa.Const. art. 1, § 26.3 The guarantee of
equal protection “requires that uniform treatment be given to similarly
situated parties.” Grove, 170 A.3d at 1144 (quoting Commonwealth v.
Kramer, 378 A.2d 824, 826 (Pa. 1977)). Legislators may “resort[] to
legislative classifications, provided that those classifications are reasonable
rather than arbitrary and bear a reasonable relationship to the object of the
legislation.” Id. (quoting Curtis v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265, 267-68 (Pa. 1995)).
Rentas’s claim that Pennsylvania’s legislative scheme imposes a harsher
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2 Rentas asserts that the standards for assessing a violation of equal
protection and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment overlap
because both require “rationality” within a legislative scheme. We reject the
invitation to analyze these constitutional precepts using only a broad
“rationality” standard.
3Both provisions are analyzed using the same standards. Grove, 170 A.3d at
1144.
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penalty upon him for using a firearm than for not using a firearm does not
implicate a suspect class or fundamental right, and we therefore engage in a
rational basis analysis. See Commonwealth v. Bullock, 913 A.2d 207, 215
(Pa. 2006).
We have previously held that a rational basis exists for applying
enhanced penalties to offenses committed using firearms. See
Commonwealth v. Irving, 500 A.2d 868, 872 (Pa.Super. 1985);
Commonwealth v. Norris, 499 A.2d 644, 647 (Pa.Super. 1985). We reassert
today that the basis for imposing a severe penalty where an offender attempts
to injure a police officer through the discharge of a firearm, regardless of
whether injury occurred, is entirely rational.
We next address Rentas’s argument that the imposition of the
mandatory minimum violates the constitutional prohibitions against cruel and
unusual punishment. U.S. Const. Amend. VIII; Pa. Const. Art. 1, § 13.4 These
provisions do not require “strict proportionality between the crime committed
and the sentence imposed.” Commonwealth v. Succi, 173 A.3d 269, 285
(Pa.Super. 2017) (quoting Commonwealth v. Baker, 78 A.3d 1044, 1047
(Pa. 2013)). Rather, a sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment if
it is “grossly disproportionate to the crime,” as evidenced by examination of
“(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the
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4 The protections against cruel and unusual punishment provided by the
federal and state constitutions are coterminous. Commonwealth v. Elia, 83
A.3d 254, 267 (Pa.Super. 2013).
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sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the
sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.”
Id. (quoting Baker, 78 A.3d at 1047). A court need not examine the latter
criteria without a threshold showing if gross disproportionality between the
gravity of the offense and resulting penalty. Id.
Rentas’s argument is premised solely on the comparison of the sentence
for assault of a law enforcement officer with sentences imposed for other
crimes, and he has thus failed to establish as a threshold matter how his 20-
year sentence is grossly disproportionate to his crime of attempting to
severely injure or kill a law enforcement officer by firing a high-powered rifle
at him. That the Crimes Code may contain discrepancies within its sentencing
provisions is irrelevant to this inquiry. See Elia, 83 A.3d at 269.
To the extent that Rentas posits his sentence was grossly
disproportionate simply because the victim was uninjured in this case, we
have previously rejected this assertion and reaffirm that rejection. See
Commonwealth v. Parker, 718 A.2d 1266, 1269 (Pa.Super. 1998)
(rejecting argument “that since no actual violence occurred, the crime should
not be considered violent”; finding 25-year minimum sentence for third
robbery conviction, where defendant did not possess a firearm or attempt to
harm anyone during bank robbery, not so grossly disproportionate as to
require further constitutional analysis). Because a 20-year mandatory
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minimum is not grossly disproportionate to Rentas’s crime, the court’s
imposition of that sentence was not cruel and unusual.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 02/15/2019
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