Com. v. Knox, R. ( 2019 )

J-S69017-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
RASHAWN TAHI KNOX :
:
Appellant : No. 498 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Order Entered February 20, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-22-CR-0000772-2014
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and MURRAY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 15, 2019
Rashawn Tahi Knox appeals from the order, entered in the Court of
Common Pleas of Dauphin County, denying his motion to dismiss on double
jeopardy grounds.1 Upon careful review, we affirm.
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1 An order denying a motion to dismiss charges on double jeopardy grounds
is technically interlocutory. However, such an order is immediately appealable
as a collateral order where the trial court does not make a finding that the
motion was frivolous. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 587(B)(6). Here, the court did not
find that Knox’s motion was frivolous. Thus, the order denying his motion is
immediately appealable as a collateral order. Pa.R.A.P. 313. See
Commonwealth v. Orie, 22 A.3d 1021 (Pa.2011) (reiterating that direct
appeal from denial of motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds is not
permitted where hearing court has considered the motion and made written
findings that motion is frivolous; however, absent such finding, appeal may
be taken from denial of motion). See also Commonwealth v. Brady, 508
A.2d 286, 289–91 (Pa. 1986) (allowing an immediate appeal from denial of
double jeopardy claim under collateral order doctrine where trial court does
not make a finding of frivolousness).
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On March 11, 2015, a jury convicted Knox of one count of attempted
homicide, two counts of aggravated assault and related weapons charges
arising from the following factual scenario:
On September 13, 2013, Office [Donald] Bender [of the
Harrisburg Bureau of Police] was on patrol duty in the city of
Harrisburg. He was dispatched to the intersection of Crescent and
Kittatinny Streets for multiple reports of multiple gunshots. He
arrived at the scene about 4:45 p.m. and began to look for any
active shooting. Finding none, and finding no immediate danger,
he began to interview witnesses. He instructed other officers who
arrived nearly simultaneously to secure the crime scene, which
they did. Witnesses indicated that the victims had left in a van
and the officers did not observe anyone who might be a suspect.
[Jerrell Thompson], a victim, testified [at trial]. [ ] Thompson is
currently incarcerated in Cumberland County Prison for both a
parole violation and a theft. About three years prior to the
incident, [ ] Thompson began using heroin. By August or
September of 2013, he was using it on a daily basis. He purchased
it in Harrisburg from someone named “Tip”, whom he identified
as [Knox]. He would contact [Knox] by cell phone, both calls and
texts. They would then meet up somewhere in Harrisburg, often
in the Hall Manor area.
Two days prior [to the incident in question], [on] September 11,
2013, [ ] Thompson had arranged to meet [Knox] to buy heroin.
They made the trade and as [ ] Thompson walked away, he saw
a lot of policemen converge on the van that [Knox] was driving.
He saw [Knox] jump out of the van and start running and then
[ ] Thompson also ran. As far as [Thompson] could see, [Knox]
was able to elude the police. [ ] Thompson denied having
contacted police or having any connection to that raid. He agreed
that it was suspicious that the police converged upon [Knox] just
after their deal.
Usually [ ] Thompson would buy a bundle (about ten bags) for
himself and other users. On [September 13, 2013], [ ] Thompson
was planning on buying ten bundles for him and others. [Knox]
instructed [ ] Thompson to meet him at the dead end of Crescent
Street.
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Once [ ] Thompson and his compatriots arrived, they parked and
waited for [Knox]. [Knox] arrived and [ ] Thompson got out of
the van to walk with him. The two of them walked around a corner
and [ ] Thompson saw another man standing there. [ ] Thompson
and [Knox] were speaking about the incident on September 11
when the other man pulled out a gun as did [Knox]. Neither
[Knox] nor the other man with a gun seemed surprised to see
each other or that they both had guns. [ ] Thompson ran off
towards the van[.] [H]e ran first to the passenger’s side, but in
an attempt to avoid getting shot in the back, he then ran to the
driver’s side. [Knox] ran to the front of the car and started
shooting. The driver [Starr Shopp] was hit and then [ ] Thompson
was shot in the back.
. . . [Detective Richard] Iachini was dispatched to Harrisburg
Hospital on September 13, 2013, related to a shooting. . . .
Following [his] investigation, [Detective] Iachini developed a
suspect and created a photo array. He met with [ ] Thompson on
September 20, 2013, at the hospital and [ ] Thompson identified
[Knox] from the photo array.
Commonwealth v. Knox, 142 A.3d 863, 864–65 (Pa. Super. 2016), quoting
Trial Court Opinion, 9/29/15, at 1–3, 7–8 (footnotes, citations and some
brackets omitted).
Following a two-day trial, Knox was convicted by a jury of the above
charges. On May 12, 2015, the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate
term of 20 to 40 years’ incarceration. Knox appealed and, on June 21, 2016,
this Court vacated his judgment of sentence and awarded him a new trial,
concluding that the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to
determine whether a certified interpreter was available to assist a Spanish-
speaking witness and, instead, allowed the witness’ sister – who was also a
witness at trial – to translate for him.
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On October 30, 2017, Knox filed a motion to dismiss the charges against
him, arguing that his retrial was barred by prosecutorial misconduct that
allegedly occurred during the course of his first trial. The trial court held a
hearing on February 20, 2018, and denied the motion that same day. Knox
filed a timely notice of appeal followed by a court-ordered statement of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 2 On appeal, Knox
raises the following issue for our review:
Whether the trial court erred in denying Knox’s motion for
dismissal following a mistrial where the Commonwealth engaged
in prosecutorial misconduct by having one prosecution witness
interpret and assist in the testimony of another prosecution
witness and by presenting facts not in evidence including
reference to a gun that was excluded by the [c]ourt’s pretrial
rulings to the jury in closing?
Brief of Appellant, at 5.
We begin by noting that “[a]n appeal grounded in double jeopardy
raises a question of constitutional law. This court’s scope of review in making
a determination on a question of law is, as always, plenary. As with all
questions of law, the appellate standard of review is de novo[.]”
Commonwealth v. Vargas, 947 A.2d 777, 780 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal
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2 On November 20, 2018, we issued a judgment order dismissing Knox’s
appeal for failure to order the transcription of the notes of testimony from the
February 20, 2018 hearing on his motion to dismiss. On December 4, 2018,
Knox filed for reconsideration/reargument on the basis that the transcript had,
in fact, been belatedly made part of the certified record on September 10,
2018. By order dated January 10, 2019, we granted reconsideration and
remanded the record to the trial court for the preparation of an opinion
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). The trial court has complied and the matter is
now ripe for disposition.
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citations omitted). To the extent that the trial court’s factual findings impact
its double jeopardy ruling, we apply a more deferential standard of review to
those findings:
Where issues of credibility and weight of the evidence are
concerned, it is not the function of the appellate court to substitute
its judgment based on a cold record for that of the trial court. The
weight to be accorded conflicting evidence is exclusively for the
fact finder, whose findings will not be disturbed on appeal if they
are supported by the record.
Commonwealth v. Wood, 803 A.2d 217, 220 (Pa. Super. 2002), quoting
Commonwealth v. Young, 692 A.2d 1112, 1114–15 (Pa. Super. 1997).
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits
retrial of a defendant when the conduct of the prosecutor is intentionally
undertaken to prejudice the defendant to the point of denying him a fair trial.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321 (Pa. 1992). However, because of
the compelling societal interest in prosecuting criminal defendants to
conclusion, our Supreme Court has recognized that dismissal of charges is an
extreme sanction that should be imposed sparingly and only in cases of blatant
prosecutorial misconduct. Commonwealth v. Burke, 781 A.2d 1136, 1144
(Pa. 2001). An error by a prosecutor does not deprive a defendant of a fair
trial. Commonwealth v. Kearns, 70 A.3d 881, 884 (Pa. Super. 2013),
quoting Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 777 A.2d 459, 464 (Pa. Super. 2001)
(where prosecutor’s conduct changes from mere error to intentionally
subverting court process, then fair trial is denied). Even a mere finding of
willful prosecutorial misconduct will not necessarily warrant dismissal of
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charges. Burke, 781 A.2d at 1145; Commonwealth v. Moose, 602 A.2d
1265 (Pa. 1992) (although prosecutor’s failure to inform defense counsel of
witness statement containing incriminating admissions allegedly made by
defendant amounted to willful discovery violation and raised significant ethical
concerns, court did not dismiss charges, but rather remanded for new trial).
[U]nder Pennsylvania jurisprudence, it is the intentionality behind
the Commonwealth’s subversion of the court process, not the
prejudice caused to the defendant, that is inadequately remedied
by appellate review or retrial. By and large, most forms of undue
prejudice caused by inadvertent prosecutorial error or misconduct
can be remedied in individual cases by retrial. Intentional
prosecutorial misconduct, on the other hand, raises systematic
concerns beyond a specific individual’s right to a fair trial that are
left unaddressed by retrial.
Kearns, 70 A.3d at 884–85.
Here, Knox bases his claim on two separate incidents that occurred
during his first trial. The first involved the testimony of Commonwealth
witness Dalvin Rosario, a native Spanish speaker. During his testimony,
Rosario was asked to refresh his recollection by reading the statement he gave
to police on the day of the incident. The following exchange then transpired:
Q: Dalvin, just read from here to here by yourself. Okay? Just
read that to yourself to see if it refreshes your recollection. Okay?
A: I don’t read English well.
Q: Okay. Would—having [your sister] in here to help translate,
would that help?
A: Yeah.
MR. JASON: Your Honor, would she be permitted —
THE COURT: Yes.
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N.T. Trial, 3/11/15, at 153. The court then swore in Rosario’s sister as a
translator and she proceeded to assist Rosario during his direct examination.
Knox asserts that he was “denied a fair trial not only because of the lack of a
certified interpreter in this case, but more significantly because Attorney Jason
had one Commonwealth witness clandestinely assist another Commonwealth
witness during [his] testimony.” Brief of Appellant, at 16. Knox claims that
“it was the conscious object of [Attorney] Jason[] to call Ms. Marte to assist
Mr. Rosari[o] . . . so that he would testify consistent with what was in the
police report.” Id. at 16, 17.
The second alleged incident of prosecutorial misconduct occurred during
Attorney Jason’s closing argument. By way of background, prior to Knox’s
2015 trial, the trial court issued an order granting a motion in limine filed by
the Commonwealth, allowing evidence of prior drug dealing incidents involving
Knox and the victims pursuant to Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2), as well as evidence of an
event that occurred on September 11, 2013, two days prior to the incident
forming the basis for the current prosecution, in which Knox had attempted to
sell drugs to the victim, but fled the scene when police approached. During
the September 11 incident, police raided and seized the vehicle in which Knox
had been a passenger and recovered a gun. The Commonwealth sought to
introduce evidence of the September 11 incident to establish an inference that
Knox shot Thompson as a retaliatory measure because he believed Thompson
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had set him up on September 11.3 At trial, evidence of the September 11
incident was admitted through the testimony of one of the victims, Jerrell
Thompson. Later during the course of the trial, the court sustained a defense
objection to the introduction of further testimony regarding the September 11
incident by Detective Richard Iachini. The parties instead entered into a
stipulation that was communicated to the jury as follows:
Ladies and gentlemen, the stipulation between the parties is that
during Detective Iachini’s discussion with the defendant, he
mentioned the September 11th incident that was testified [to] by
victim Thompson, and that the defendant did acknowledge the
sale on that September 11th day.
N.T. Trial, 3/11/15, at 266.
Subsequently, during closing remarks, the Commonwealth used a
PowerPoint presentation that made two references to the gun discovered in
Knox’s van by police during the September 11 raid, in violation of the court’s
ruling earlier that day that further evidence concerning the September 11 raid
was inadmissible. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, which the court
denied. Knox now asserts that Attorney Jason’s inclusion in the PowerPoint
presentation of references to the gun amounted to misconduct intended to
mislead the jury.
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3 The Commonwealth argued that “the fact that [Knox] made a deal with the
victim two days prior, that [Knox] was subsequently—or nearly arrested, he
had to escape from his van and run from police at that point, does provide a
motive to at least believe that the victim was the one who set up that
transaction and set up for the police to come . . . arrest him.” N.T. Trial,
8/10/15, at 12.
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At the hearing on Knox’s motion to dismiss, Attorney Jason testified
that, although in retrospect it was a mistake to ask Rosario’s sister to translate
for him, he “[d]idn’t intend anything by it.” N.T. Motion Hearing, 2/20/18, at
22. In fact, Attorney Jason testified that, after interviewing Rosario and his
sister prior to trial, he believed that neither of them would require a translator
during their testimony. See id. at 21.
With regard to his PowerPoint presentation, Attorney Jason testified as
follows:
Q: Okay. But you still had some stuff in your PowerPoint that
referenced that evidence that was not in front of the jury, not on
the record.
A: Well, let’s be perfectly clear. Just to back up a little bit, before
we get to the PowerPoint, I had—and I’m sure you have a copy of
my extensive motion in limine which outlined both—all of the prior
drug dealing incidents, the prior drug dealing incidents involving
the defendant and the victims in this case, and the prior occasion
on September 11th in which guns and drugs were found in a van
that was raided as a result of probation officers approaching the
defendant and the victim in Hall Manor.
I’d outline that all extensively. And during a pretrial ruling, the
judge at that point, I believe, allowed all of that in. Again, I don’t
have the transcript right in front of me. But from what I
remember, “It’s all coming in,” was approximately the language
that was used at that time.
Throughout the course of the testimony of the last witness in this
case, which is Detective Iachini, I believe the judge at that time
revised that ruling. But this was after approximately two days[’]
worth of testimony, and the last witness prior to the closings. So
at that point I had not, I believe, the opportunity to review and
make the necessary two-word change to the PowerPoint that I
think resulted in the issue.
...
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Q: Okay. And so, if you didn’t have time to take it out, you knew
it was in there, but you just didn’t—you didn’t have time to take
it out.
A: I mean, I think that it’s an unfair distinction, because at the
time in which all this change had been happening—there are a lot
of things that go into being in the middle of a serious trial. Not
having the time, quote/unquote, is that there’s a lot of things
happening and that it was inadvertent.
It’s not that I intentionally said, That’s a mistake and I’m leaving
it in there. Or that it was, I intentionally know that’s there, and I
physically don’t have the opportunity.
It’s—there’s a lot going on. There’s a condensed lunch break.
There’s a lot of—there’s still witness testimony. There’s potential
defense witness testimony. And there’s a lot happening.
And so when I say that I may not have had the time or I didn’t
have the time to take it out, that I didn’t have—there wasn’t, like,
an evening break that I could have sat back and pored over my
closing PowerPoint and realized that that subsequently changed
ruling affected the nature of my PowerPoint. That’s what I mean
by that.
Id. 25-26, 33-34.
In its opinion, the trial court concluded as follows:
In this case, Appellant availed himself of the appellate system
which rectifies errors and which has granted him a new trial.
Further, the Superior Court found that the issue related to
translation was a trial court error and thus we believe it is not
attributable to the prosecutor for a claim of prosecutorial
misconduct. The second claim of misconduct relates to the
PowerPoint presentation during closing arguments.
...
We do not find that the prosecutor intentionally left the slides in
the presentation. We did rule that there should be no mention of
the gun or heroin about two hours prior to closing and we can
accept that the prosecutor was unable to adjust his presentation
in time. However, it does not appear to have prejudiced the jury
in any way. The jury did come back with questions during
deliberations, but the issue of the slides was never raised by the
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jury. The record indicates that the jury took their duty seriously
and considered their verdict carefully. The prosecutor did not
barrage the jury with inadmissible information, he did not appeal
to emotions rather than reason.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/22/19, at 4-6.
Upon review, we can discern no error of law or abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial court in concluding that Attorney Jason did not act
intentionally “to prejudice the defendant to the point of denying him a fair
trial.” Smith, supra. With regard to the use of witness Rosario’s sister as a
translator, there is no evidence to support Knox’s claims that “the
Commonwealth failed to adequately prepare for trial and to request an
interpreter” or that Attorney Jason’s intent was to have one Commonwealth
witness “clandestinely assist another Commonwealth witness during their
testimony.” Brief of Appellant, at 15-16. Rather, the evidence demonstrates
that, based on his pre-trial conversations with Rosario, Attorney Jason did not
believe that Rosario would require an interpreter at trial and it was only when
Rosario became “somewhat uncooperative” that Attorney Jason concluded an
interpreter might be of assistance. N.T. Motion Hearing, 2/20/18, at 22.
Indeed, the majority of Rosario’s testimony was given in English, in response
to English, without his sister’s translation assistance. The record is devoid of
any evidence that Rosario was “clandestinely” assisted by his sister to benefit
the Commonwealth’s case.
As to the PowerPoint presentation, the court credited Attorney Jason’s
testimony and concluded that, while he “made a mistake by not removing the
slide,” there was no “overt, intentional conduct.” Id. at 49. This conclusion
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is supported by the record. At trial, the court revised its earlier ruling
approximately two hours before closing statements. Attorney Jason, in the
midst of a felony trial and with only a very short break between the conclusion
of testimony and the commencement of closing arguments, simply did not
think to remove the offending slide, which contained information that would
have been admissible only two hours before, and which he turned off as soon
as defense counsel noted the objectionable content. There was no evidence
that Attorney Jason’s use of the slides was anything but an unfortunate
oversight. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Knox’s motion to
dismiss.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 02/15/2019
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