Orman, L. v. Mortgage I.T. , 118 A.3d 403 ( 2015 )

J-S18039-15
2015 Pa. Super. 130
LESLIE-EVE ORMAN IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
MORTGAGE I.T., MORTGAGE
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS,
INC., CITIMORTGAGE, INC.
Appellee No. 2178 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered June 12, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County
Civil Division at No(s): 2012-04352
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., ALLEN, J., and MUNDY, J.
OPINION BY MUNDY, J.: FILED JUNE 02, 2015
Appellant, Leslie-Eve Orman, appeals pro se from the June 12, 2014
order granting the motion for summary judgment and entering judgment in
favor of Appellees, Mortgage I.T. (MortgageIt), Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems (MERS), and Citimortgage, Inc. (Citi). After careful
review, we vacate and remand with instructions.
The trial court summarized the relevant factual and procedural
background of this case as follows.
This case involves a dispute over a residential
mortgage. In [sic] actually began in January of
2011, when [Appellant] along with Thomas Orman
filed inter alia, an Action to Quiet Title and reform
the mortgage in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against …
MortgageIt … and others. The substance of the
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Federal suit was that [Appellant] wanted to have the
mortgage removed as a lien on the title. The
Defendants therein filed a Motion to Dismiss
[Appellant]’s Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
The documents at issue in Federal Court were
a loan and mortgage against [Appellant]’s home at
888 Woodlawn Ave., Phoenixville, PA 19460.
MortgageIt was the original lender on the note (loan)
and mortgage. MortgageIt subsequently transferred
its interest in the note and mortgage to
CitiMortgage. [Appellant] acknowledged the transfer
when, in filing one of her Amended Complaints, she
dropped MortgageIt as a defendant.
[Appellant] then began filing a series of
Amended Complaints, Requests for Information,
Qualified Written Requests all of which were
responded to by [Citi]. On March 30, 2012, in a
detailed Opinion, which reviewed all of the
documents and allegations, [the District Court]
granted Defendants[’] Motion to dismiss. [Appellant
did not file a notice of appeal with the Court of
Appeals.]
…
On April 30, 2012, [Appellant] commenced the
instant matter in the [trial court]. In her Original
Complaint [Appellant] named MortgageIt as the only
defendant. [Appellant] raised here all of the same
substantive issues. Specifically, [Appellant] sought
to reform the mortgage and note and to Quiet Title.
MortgageIt filed an answer and [Citi] filed an Answer
and New Matter as the successor to MortgageIt.
[Appellant obtained a default judgment on
June 18, 2012. On August 9, 2012, MortgageIt filed
a petition to open said default judgment. The trial
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court entered an order granting MortgageIt’s petition
to open on October 2, 2012.1]
[Appellant] then began filing [a] Request for
Admissions, [a] Request for Documents, Motions to
Strike Answers, [a] Motion for Summary Judgment,
[a] Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, [a] Motion
to Amend First Amended Complaint, [a] Second
Motion to Amend Complaint, [a] Motion for
Interlocutory Summary Judgment, a Third Amended
Complaint and various “Statements of Indisputable
Facts”. As to the various Amended Complaints,
[Appellant] never sought leave of [the trial c]ourt
nor the assent and acquiescence of any defendant.
As a result the [trial c]ourt was unaware of the
pendency of these filings. [Citi] filed answers to
each of the above. [Citi] also filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/12/14, at 1-2.
On June 12, 2014, the trial court entered an order granting Citi’s
motion for summary judgment and entering judgment in favor of Appellees.
The trial court concluded that Appellant failed to join an indispensable party,
her husband Thomas Orman. Id. at 4. The trial court further concluded
that Appellant’s entire lawsuit is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Id.
On June 20, 2014, Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, which the
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1
We note that an order granting a petition to open or strike a judgment is
not immediately appealable under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure
311(a)(1), only an order denying such a petition will give rise to an
interlocutory appeal of right. See generally Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(1).
Therefore, the instant appeal was Appellant’s first opportunity to challenge
the trial court’s decision to open the default judgment.
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trial court denied on June 26, 2014. On July 11, 2014, Appellant filed a
timely notice of appeal.2
On appeal, Appellant raises the following ten issues for our review.
1) Was opening the default judgment
appropriate?
2) Is Mr. Orman a necessary party to this case?
3) Was Summary Judgment proper?
4) Should amendment of the complaint been
permitted?
5) Does using MERS in a Mortgage violate
statutes of Pennsylvania?
6) Have successors defaulted on the mortgage?
7) Is the subject Mortgage recordable?
8) Do forged documents remain publicly
recorded?
9) Is a Mortgage without recorded beneficiary
abandoned?
10) Is THIS mortgage a nullity in the public
records?
Appellant’s Brief at 12-13.
We begin by addressing Appellant’s second issue, as it is dispositive of
this appeal. In her second issue, Appellant avers the trial court erred when
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2
Appellant and the trial court have timely complied with Pennsylvania Rule
of Appellate Procedure 1925.
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it held that her husband, Thomas Orman, was an indispensable party to the
underlying action. Id. at 27.
Under Pennsylvania law, the failure to join an indispensable party
implicates the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Sabella v.
Appalachian Dev. Corp., 103 A.3d 83, 90 (Pa. Super. 2014). “Failure to
join an indispensable party goes absolutely to the court’s jurisdiction and the
issue should be raised sua sponte.” Barren v. Dubas, 441 A.2d 1315,
1316 (Pa. Super. 1982) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
This requirement is reflected in our Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 1032. Waiver of Defenses. Exceptions.
Suggestion of Lack of Subject Matter
Jurisdiction or Failure to Join Indispensable
Party
(a) A party waives all defenses and objections
which are not presented either by preliminary
objection, answer or reply, except a defense which is
not required to be pleaded under Rule 1030(b), the
defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, the defense of failure to join an
indispensable party, the objection of failure to state
a legal defense to a claim, the defenses of failure to
exercise or exhaust a statutory remedy and an
adequate remedy at law and any other nonwaivable
defense or objection.
…
(b) Whenever it appears by suggestion of the
parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction
of the subject matter or that there has been a failure
to join an indispensable party, the court shall order
that the action be transferred to a court of the
Commonwealth which has jurisdiction or that the
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indispensable party be joined, but if that is not
possible, then it shall dismiss the action.
Pa.R.C.P. 1032; see also id. at 2227(a) (stating, “[p]ersons having only a
joint interest in the subject matter of an action must be joined on the same
side as plaintiffs or defendants[]”). Whether a court has subject matter
jurisdiction presents a question of law, making our standard of review de
novo and the scope of our review plenary. Mazur v. Trinity Area Sch.
Dist., 961 A.2d 96, 101 (Pa. 2008).
“[A] party is indispensable ‘when his or her rights are so connected
with the claims of the litigants that no decree can be made without impairing
those rights.’” City of Phila. v. Commonwealth, 838 A.2d 566, 581 (Pa.
2003), quoting Sprague v. Casey, 550 A.2d 184, 189 (Pa. 1988). “If no
redress is sought against a party, and its rights would not be prejudiced by
any decision in the case, it is not indispensable with respect to the
litigation.” Grimme Combustion, Inc. v. Mergantime Corp., 595 A.2d
77, 81 (Pa. Super. 1991), citing Sprague, supra. We have consistently
held that a trial court must weigh the following considerations in determining
if a party is indispensable to a particular litigation.
1. Do absent parties have a right or an interest
related to the claim?
2. If so, what is the nature of that right or interest?
3. Is that right or interest essential to the merits of
the issue?
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4. Can justice be afforded without violating the due
process rights of absent parties?
Martin v. Rite Aid of Pa., Inc., 80 A.3d 813, 814 (Pa. Super. 2013);
accord Mechanicsburg Area Sch. Dist. v. Kline, 431 A.2d 953, 956 (Pa.
1981). “In determining whether a party is indispensable, the basic inquiry
remains ‘whether justice can be done in the absence of a third party.’” Pa.
State Educ. Ass’n v. Commonwealth, 50 A.3d 1263, 1277 (Pa. 2012),
quoting CRY, Inc. v. Mill Serv., Inc., 640 A.2d 372, 375 (Pa. 1994).
This Court has held that in a quiet title action, all parties who claimed
title to the property at issue must be joined as indispensable parties.
Hartzfeld v. Green Glen Corp., 552 A.2d 306, 310 (Pa. Super. 1989).
More specifically, this Court has held that “in actions intended to affect the
title to property which is either held or claimed by tenants by the entireties,
both spouses are indispensable parties and must be joined.” Miller v.
Benjamin Coal Co., 625 A.2d 66, 68 (Pa. Super. 1993), appeal denied, 641
A.2d 311 (Pa. 1994). We further elaborated on this principle as follows.
A party was said to be indispensable, in Hartley v.
Langkamp & Elder, 90 A. 402 (Pa. 1914), “when
he has such an interest that a final decree cannot be
made without affecting it, or leaving the controversy
in such a condition that the final determination may
be wholly inconsistent with equity and good
conscience…. Thus where the object of a bill is to
divest a title to property, the presence of those
holding or claiming such title is indispensable.” Id.
at 403-404.
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Miller v. Benjamin Coal Co., 625 A.2d 66, 67-68 (Pa. Super. 1993),
appeal denied, 641 A.2d 311 (Pa. 1994) (parallel citations omitted).
Applying these principles to the case sub judice, it is undisputed that
Thomas Orman signed the mortgage in question for the subject property.
Appellant’s Complaint, 4/27/12, at Exhibit A at 3, Exhibit B at 15. As he is
listed on the disputed mortgage, the trial court correctly concluded that he is
an indispensable party to the action. Trial Court Opinion, 6/12/14, at 4.
Despite determining that Thomas Orman was an indispensable party, the
trial court’s June 12, 2014 order nevertheless granted judgment in favor of
all defendants, which, similar to the default judgment entered on June 18,
2012 in Appellant’s favor, is an adjudication on the merits. Trial Court
Order, 6/12/14, at 1. This was in error. See Gaynor v. Gyuris, 707 A.2d
534, 535 n.1. (Pa. Super. 1998) (noting the trial court correctly conceded
that after concluding an indispensable party was not joined, “rather than
entering judgment, it should have, pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1032(b), dismissed
Appellant’s action[]”), appeal denied, 727 A.2d 131 (Pa. 1998).
Thomas Orman is, and always has been, an indispensable party in this
case. Therefore, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter
judgment in favor or against any party when it entered its June 12, 2014
order granting summary judgment. By logical extension, the trial court was
also without subject matter jurisdiction to grant Appellant’s default judgment
and then open the same. The proper remedy was always to dismiss
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Appellant’s August 7, 2013 complaint without prejudice, rather than enter
any form of judgment. See Gaynor, supra; Hartzfeld, supra.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the trial court correctly
determined that Thomas Orman is an indispensable party to the instant
action. However, we also conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
enter judgment in favor of any party.3 Accordingly, the trial court’s June 18,
2012 judgment and its October 2, 2012 and June 12, 2014 orders are
vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions for the trial court to
enter an order dismissing Appellant’s complaint without prejudice, consistent
with this opinion.
Judgment and orders vacated. Case remanded with instructions.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/2/2015
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3
In light of this conclusion, we express no opinion on the res judicata
analysis conducted by the trial court. Furthermore, we need not address
Appellant’s remaining issues on appeal.
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