Com. v. Sawyer, W. ( 2018 )

J-S49003-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
WALTER SAWYER :
:
Appellant : No. 433 MDA 2018
Appeal from the PCRA Order February 16, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-22-CR-0004317-2013
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., STABILE, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED OCTOBER 16, 2018
Appellant, Walter Sawyer, appeals from the order denying his petition
filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–
9546. We affirm.
This Court previously summarized the factual and procedural history of
this case as follows:
On December 15, 2012, a sixteen-year-old girl, B.B., was
traveling by bus from Indianapolis to Hazleton. During a stop in
Harrisburg, B.B. left the bus station to smoke a cigarette.
[Appellant] approached B.B. and started a conversation. B.B. told
[Appellant] that she was hungry, and [Appellant] offered to drive
B.B. to a gas station so that she could buy food. B.B. accepted
the offer and entered [Appellant’s] vehicle.
[Appellant] subsequently drove B.B. to a secluded parking
lot under a nearby bridge. [Appellant] told B.B. to have sex with
him, or else he would not drive her back to the station in time for
her to catch the bus to Hazleton. As [Appellant] began to pull
down B.B.’s pants, State Capitol Police Sergeant Michael Schmidt,
who was on routine patrol at the time, arrived at the scene.
____________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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[Appellant] provided the birth certificate and Social Security card
of another individual as his own identification.
A jury convicted [Appellant] of kidnapping, unlawful contact
with a minor, and false identification. Prior to sentencing, the
Commonwealth provided notice of its intent to seek a mandatory
minimum sentence under the “three strikes” provision of 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(a)(2). Thereafter, the trial court imposed an
aggregate sentence of 25 to 50 years’ imprisonment, consisting
of 25 to 50 years’ imprisonment for kidnapping, 5 to 10 years’
concurrent imprisonment for unlawful contact with a minor, and 1
to 2 years’ concurrent imprisonment for false identification. The
court imposed the kidnapping conviction pursuant to
§ 9714(a)(2).
[Appellant] timely filed counseled post-sentence motions,
arguing that the court imposed an illegal sentence above the
statutory maximum for the false identification conviction.
[Appellant] also claimed the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence. Before the court ruled on the counseled post-sentence
motions, [Appellant] filed a request to proceed pro se. The court
conducted a hearing, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier,
713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998). Following the hearing, the court
determined that [Appellant’s] waiver of counsel was knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent, and it permitted trial counsel to
withdraw. On the same day of the Grazier hearing, the court
issued an amended sentencing order, modifying [Appellant’s]
sentence for the false identification conviction to 6 to 12 months’
imprisonment. The court did not alter [Appellant’s] remaining
sentences, and it did not rule on the weight claim from the
counseled post-sentence motions.
Thereafter, [Appellant] filed a pro se amendment to his
counseled post-sentence motions. In the pro se amendment,
[Appellant] included claims regarding subject matter jurisdiction,
due process violations, defects in the pretrial proceedings and
charging instruments, Rule 600, the legality of the mandatory
minimum sentence, and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
the convictions. The court subsequently granted [Appellant’s]
post-sentence motions in part. Specifically, the court determined
that [Appellant] had not committed two prior crimes of violence
to support the imposition of a “third strike” sentence under
§ 9714(a)(2); instead, [Appellant] had committed only one prior
crime of violence. Thus, the court vacated [Appellant’s] sentence
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for kidnapping and resentenced him to a mandatory term of 120
months’ imprisonment, pursuant to § 9714(a)(1).1 The court did
not alter [Appellant’s] remaining sentences, and it denied relief on
all other claims raised in the counseled and pro se post-sentence
motions.
1 In the trial court’s opinion and order granting the
post-sentence motions in part, the court initially
states that it had resentenced [Appellant] “pursuant
to § 9714(a) to a term of 120-240 months of
incarceration in a State Correctional Institute at Count
1.” (Trial Court Memorandum Opinion and Order, filed
August 6, 2014, at 13) (emphasis added).
Nevertheless, the court later states that it
resentenced [Appellant] “to a term of 120-140
months of incarceration in a State Correctional
Institute at Count 1.” Id., at 14 (emphasis added).
Further, the relevant docket entry states: “The court
... resentences [Appellant] to a term of 120-140
months of incarceration in a State Correctional
Institute at Count 1.” (Criminal Docket Entries,
printed 1/13/16, at 10) (emphasis added).
[Appellant] subsequently filed a timely direct appeal. In his
appeal, [Appellant] included claims regarding weight of the
evidence, subject matter jurisdiction, due process violations, Rule
600, defects in the pretrial proceedings and charging instruments,
and the legality of the mandatory minimum sentence imposed
pursuant to § 9714(a)(1). This Court, in its memorandum
decision at Commonwealth v. Sawyer, [121 A.3d 1138,] 1530
MDA 2014, at 13-14 (Pa. Super. filed April 22, 2015) (unpublished
memorandum), affirmed the convictions, but vacated the
judgment of sentence based on the fact that it was illegal, since
the maximum sentence of 140 months did not equal twice the
minimum sentence of 120 months, and remanded for
resentencing. [Appellant] subsequently filed a motion for
reconsideration, which this Court denied. Thereafter, pursuant to
this Court’s directive, the trial court resentenced [Appellant] to
120 to 240 months’ imprisonment.
Commonwealth v. Sawyer, 154 A.3d 861, 1981 MDA 2015 (Pa. Super. filed
July 19, 2016 (unpublished memorandum at *1–2).
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Appellant filed a direct appeal “following remand for the limited purpose
of correcting an illegal sentence . . . .” Sawyer, 1981 MDA 2015 (unpublished
memorandum at *2). We determined that none of Appellant’s issues merited
relief, and we affirmed the judgment of sentence. Id. Our Supreme Court
denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v.
Sawyer, 164 A.3d 477, 607 MAL 2016 (Pa. filed December 28, 2016).
Appellant filed the instant, timely, pro se PCRA petition on January 25,
2017. The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed a supplemental PCRA
petition on April 18, 2017. The PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing on
July 25, 2017. On January 18, 2018, the PCRA court entered notice of intent
to dismiss the petition. On February 16, 2018, the PCRA court dismissed
Appellant’s PCRA petition. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal to this
Court on March 7, 2018. Both Appellant and the PCRA court complied with
Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
On appeal, Appellant raises two issues of trial counsel’s ineffective
assistance, arguing counsel permitted the jury to believe the age of consent
was eighteen years old and failed to object to jury instructions to that effect.
Appellant also assails the trial court’s jury instructions, as follows:
A. Whether the trial Court erred by determining that trial counsel
was not ineffective, and that no prejudice resulted from the
repeated references to the age of consent being 18, and the failure
of trial counsel to seek instructions and/or clarification concerning
the age of consent during the trial, when the admitted case
strategy defending the case was that of consent?
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B. Whether the trial Court erred in determining that trial counsel
was not ineffective for failing to object to the erroneous jury
instructions which made the threshold for conviction easier?
C. Whether the trial Court erred when it determined that the jury
instructions provided were the standard jury instructions and thus
no objection by trial counsel was necessary?
D. Whether the trial Court erred when it determined that the
cumulative errors of counsel did not prejudice the Appellant?
E. Whether the trial court erred in failing to provide the correct
analysis concerning erroneous jury instructions?
Appellant’s Brief at 3.
When reviewing the propriety of an order denying PCRA relief, this Court
is limited to determining whether the evidence of record supports the
conclusions of the PCRA court and whether the ruling is free of legal error.
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 139 A.3d 178, 185 (Pa. 2016). The PCRA
court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for them in the
certified record. Commonwealth v. Lippert, 85 A.3d 1095, 1100 (Pa. Super.
2014). Moreover, we consider the record in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party at the PCRA level. Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d
601, 617 (Pa. 2015); Commonwealth v. Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20 (Pa. Super.
2014) (en banc). Where there are allegations of ineffectiveness of counsel,
as here, the claims alleged must have “so undermined the truth-determining
process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken
place.” Commonwealth v. Cousar, 154 A.3d 287, 296 (Pa. 2017); 42
Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2). In addition, a PCRA petitioner must show that the
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claims of error have not been previously waived. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3).
Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 749 (Pa. 2014). “An issue has
been waived ‘if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before
trial, at trial, on appeal or in a prior state post conviction proceeding.’” 42
Pa.C.S. § 9544(b); Blakeney, 108 A.3d at 749. The PCRA court’s findings
will not be disturbed unless there is no support for them in the certified record.
Commonwealth v. Lippert, 85 A.3d 1095, 1100 (Pa. Super. 2014).
We address Appellant’s issues out of order. Regarding issues C and E
assailing the jury instructions, the issues have been waived. Under the PCRA,
an issue is waived “if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so
before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in a prior state
postconviction proceeding.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b). Appellant’s brief makes
clear that issues C and E are not raised in the context of ineffective assistance
of counsel. Appellant’s Brief at 28–29, 30–38. As Appellant could have raised
the propriety of the trial court’s jury instructions in his direct appeal, but he
failed to do so, the claims are waived. Commonwealth v. Lambert, 797
A.2d 232, 240 (Pa. 2001) (PCRA petitioner’s issues that could have been
raised on direct appeal but were not, are waived under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b));
42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3) (instructing that, to be entitled to PCRA relief, an
appellant must establish, inter alia, that his claims have not been waived).
Appellant’s issues A and B aver that trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance by permitting the jury to believe the age of consent was eighteen
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years old and by failing to object to jury instructions to that effect. When
considering an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, we presume that
counsel provided effective representation unless the PCRA petitioner pleads
and proves that: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel
had no reasonable basis for his action or inaction; and (3) petitioner was
prejudiced by counsel’s action or omission. Commonwealth v. Johnson,
179 A.3d 1105, 1114 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citing Commonwealth v. Pierce,
527 A.2d 973, 975–976 (Pa. 1987)). “An [ineffective-assistance-of-counsel]
claim will fail if the petitioner’s evidence fails to meet any one of the three
prongs.” Commonwealth v. Simpson, 66 A.3d 253, 260 (Pa. 2013).
Because courts must presume that counsel was effective, the burden of
proving ineffectiveness rests with the petitioner. Commonwealth v.
Montalvo, 114 A.3d 401, 410 (Pa. 2015). Moreover:
Regarding the prejudice prong, a petitioner must demonstrate
that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different but for counsel’s action or
inaction. Commonwealth v. Dennis, 597 Pa. 159, 950 A.2d
945, 954 (2008). Counsel is presumed to be effective;
accordingly, to succeed on a claim of ineffectiveness the petitioner
must advance sufficient evidence to overcome this presumption.
[Commonwealth v.] Sepulveda, 55 A.3d [1108] at 1117 [(Pa.
2012)].
We need not analyze the prongs of an ineffectiveness claim
in any particular order. Rather, we may discuss first any prong
that an appellant cannot satisfy under the prevailing law and the
applicable facts and circumstances of the case. Id. at 1117–18;
Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31, 720 A.2d 693, 701
(1998). Finally, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing
to raise a meritless claim. Commonwealth v. Jones, 590 Pa.
202, 912 A.2d 268, 278 (2006).
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Commonwealth v. Johnson, 139 A.3d 1257, 1272 (Pa. 2016).
The PCRA court summarized the PCRA evidentiary hearing, wherein trial
counsel testified, as follows:
The hearing was held July 25, 2017, to address allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel. [Defense Counsel] recalled the
defense in the case was that the victim consented to the
encounter, but that Appellant also told her that B.B. (the victim)
said she was of age. (Notes of Testimony, PCRA Evidentiary
Hearing 7/25/17 p. 4-5, 21).
[PCRA Counsel] alleged ineffective assistance of counsel by
allowing the jury to hear during trial that the age of consent for
sex was 18, by failing to object to the inaccurate jury instructions
(which included multiple incorrect instructions concerning the age
of consent), and in failing to request that the court properly
instruct the jury on the crimes of indecent assault, unlawful
contact and kidnapping.
[Defense Counsel] reviewed the transcript during her
testimony. She conceded that she did say “as long as she’s legal,
legal meaning 18[] at one point. She testified that the age of 18
was not related to the attempted indecent assault charge, but
related to the felony charges as being under 18 increased the
grading of the offenses to felonies. Appellant’s subjective belief
regarding her age would not have been a defense to any charges.
[Defense Counsel] admitted she could not recall why she did not
object to jury instructions which used 18 in the context of indecent
assault when the [c]ourt was instructing the jury on unlawful
contact with a minor.
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, 5/2/18, at 4–5 (footnote and internal citations to
the record omitted).
The PCRA court concluded that even if there was jury confusion
regarding the age of consent, and thus, arguable merit to Appellant’s claims,
prejudice could not be shown. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, 5/2/18, at 6. The
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PCRA court acknowledged that it utilized the standard jury instructions and
referenced not the age of consent, but the age of minority. Id. at 5. The
PCRA court stated:
The crux of [PCRA Counsel’s] argument is that because of
confusion about the age of consent, it is possible that the jury
could have found Appellant not guilty on kidnapping and unlawful
contact with a minor if they had known the age of consent for
sexual contact is 16 in Pennsylvania and believed that B.B.
consented. However, B.B. testified at trial that she did not
consent. [Defense counsel] admitted at the PCRA hearing that
the defense was consent; thus if there was jury confusion
regarding the age of consent, it did not cause prejudice. However,
the jury asked whether being guilty of unlawful contact with a
minor automatically meant guilty of criminal attempt indecent
assault because she was a minor. The [c]ourt re-read instructions
and the jury found him not guilty of criminal attempt indecent
assault indicating that the jury did understand the difference
between the issue of being a minor and the issue of consent. No
prejudice resulted from the passing references to 18 being “legal”
nor was there reason for trial counsel to challenge standard jury
instructions.
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, 5/2/18, at 6.
Initially, we are compelled to observe that Appellant’s vague
presentation of issues A and B impedes our ability to address his claims.
Regarding issue A, Appellant asserts that the jury was never informed of the
correct legal age of consent in Pennsylvania. Appellant’s Brief at 15. He
suggests that the jury:
repeatedly either heard or was instructed that because the
complaining witness was 16 at the time of the episode, unless the
Appellant reasonably believed that the complaining witness was
over 18, he was guilty of criminal conduct. Thus, the repeated
failure to correct this false legal narrative allowed the Appellant to
be convicted of crimes for lawful behavior.
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Id. at 16. However, Appellant does not cite any law regarding the age of
consent, he cites no case law in support of his claim, and he does not explain
the nexus between his assertion of error and the law. Id. at 15–22.
Likewise, in issue B, Appellant fails to cite to any case law in support of
his claim that the PCRA Court erred in determining that defense counsel was
not ineffective for failing to object to “erroneous” jury instructions. Appellant’s
Brief at 22–28. Appellant’s first two arguments in his brief are vague and
conclusory, and the claims are undeveloped. Appellant’s Brief at 15–28.
Appellant wholly fails to refer to relevant and controlling case law. Therefore,
we find issues A and B waived. See Commonwealth v. Woodard, 129 A.3d
480, 509 (Pa. 2015) (quoting Wirth v. Commonwealth, 95 A.3d 822, 837
(Pa. 2013), which stated that “where an appellate brief fails to . . . develop
an issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is
waived. It is not the obligation of an appellate court to formulate [the]
appellant’s arguments for him.”) (internal quotations omitted)).
If not waived, however, we conclude, as did the PCRA court, that even
if Appellant’s claims of ineffective assistance have arguable merit, Appellant
cannot prove the prejudice prong of the relevant ineffectiveness test. The
victim, sixteen-year-old B.B., tearfully testified that during a Greyhound Bus
layover in Harrisburg, while on her way from her sister’s home in Indianapolis
to B.B.’s home in Hazelton, Appellant drove B.B. to a secluded location “under
a bridge” and proceeded to force her to have sexual intercourse. N.T., 4/21–
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22/14, at 69–79. As Appellant unbuttoned and pulled down B.B.’s pants,
Sergeant Michael C. Schmidt of the State Capitol Police arrived while he was
completing patrol duty around the State Street Bridge. Id. at 21–23. B.B.
told Sergeant Schmidt that Appellant had forced her to engage in sex; the
officer described B.B.’s demeanor as crying, very upset, and scared. Id. at
34–35. B.B. herself testified that she was “afraid, frantic, crying, and
hysterical.” Id. at 83. This Court has stated, to satisfy the prejudice prong
of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel test:
it must be demonstrated that, absent counsel’s conduct, there is
a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings
would have been different. Commonwealth v. Charleston, 94
A.3d 1012, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2014). If it has not been
demonstrated that counsel’s act or omission adversely affected
the outcome of the proceedings, the claim may be dismissed on
that basis alone, and the court need not first decide whether the
first and second prongs have been met.
Commonwealth v. Perez, 103 A.3d 344, 348 (Pa. Super. 2014).
Thus, we reject Appellant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
because there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different. There was no testimony that B.B. was
engaging in consensual sex; thus it strains credulity that the jury could have
concluded her encounter with Appellant was consensual. Appellant has not
established that but-for the alleged error of counsel, there is a reasonable
probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.
This is especially true when considered in the context of the ample and credible
Commonwealth evidence in support of Appellant’s conviction. Therefore,
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Appellant cannot establish the necessary prejudice from trial counsel’s failure
to act.
Finally, we reject Appellant’s issue D, i.e., that the PCRA court erred
when it determined that “cumulative errors of counsel” did not prejudice
Appellant. Appellant’s Brief at 29. First, we have not found cumulative errors.
Second, we have stated that no number of failed ineffectiveness-of-counsel
claims may collectively warrant relief if they do not do so individually.
Commonwealth v. Elliott, 80 A.3d 415, 450 (Pa. 2013).
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/16/2018
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