Com. v. Jackson, R. ( 2018 )

J-A18034-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
RAHEIM JACKSON, :
:
Appellee : No. 2515 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Order June 29, 2017
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003500-2017
BEFORE: STABILE, J., STEVENS, P.J.E.* and STRASSBURGER,** J.
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 14, 2018
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the June 29, 2017
order granting the motion to quash charges filed by Raheim Jackson
(Jackson). Upon review, we reverse and remand for trial.
In late 2016, Jackson was arrested and charged with carrying a firearm
without a license, carrying a firearm in public in Philadelphia, possession of a
controlled substance, and possession of a small amount of marijuana.1 A
preliminary hearing was held on April 21, 2017. At the hearing, the
Commonwealth offered the testimony of Sergeant Christian Duchossois and
Officer Timothy Linahan. As summarized by the trial court:
1
At the beginning of the preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth amended
the complaint to add one count of conspiracy. The Commonwealth “specified
the firearm charges as the substantive offenses of the conspiracy.” Trial Court
Opinion, 10/3/2017, at 1. See also N.T., 4/21/2017, at 4-5.
*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
**Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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On December 16, 2016[,] at approximately two o’clock in
the afternoon, Sergeant Duchossois and [Officer] Linahan were
traveling in uniform in an unmarked vehicle on the 3900 block of
Old York Road[ in Philadelphia]. They observed a silver Chevy
Impala make a right turn onto Old York Road behind the police
vehicle. Sergeant Duchossois testified that Tyreek Collier
operated the [Chevy] and observed it [as well as a white Dodge
Charger] traveling at a very high rate of speed weaving in and out
of cars[, and at one point, both vehicles crossed over into the
southbound lane while driving northbound to pass the vehicle
Sergeant Duchossois and Officer Linahan were in]. The officers
initiated a vehicle stop of both vehicles by activating their lights
and sirens. [The two vehicles pulled over to the side of the road].
As the officers exited their vehicle, the Chevy and the Dodge drove
off[.] After circling the block, the police relocated the Chevy.
Officer Linahan testified that they lost sight of the Chevy for
“[m]aybe ten seconds.” Upon relocating the Chevy, Sergeant
Duchossois testified that [the officers] observed both defendants
leaving the [Chevy]. Sergeant [Duchossois] clarified upon cross-
examination that “Collier [left] the driver’s side. [Jackson left] the
passenger side.” After they exited the Chevy, both males “met
up on the sidewalk. At that time, [Jackson] discarded a green
backpack into a recycle bin on the sidewalk. Both [Jackson and
Collier] began to run south into the street into the parking lane....”
Officer Linahan testified that he observed Collier exiting the
Chevy with a black bag and that he discarded it “in front of the
vehicle that was parked on the highway.” He further testified that
he did not know specifically where the black bag came from as
Collier exited the vehicle. Upon cross-examination, Officer Linahan
testified that Collier ran after discarding the black bag.
Upon stopping [Jackson], Sergeant Duchossois recovered
cash and marijuana from his person. [Sergeant Duchossois]
recovered the black backpack in front of the parked Chevy.
Recovered within the black backpack was a loaded firearm along
with marijuana that matched in quantity and packaging the
marijuana recovered from [Jackson’s] person. Upon first
describing the recovery location of the black backpack, Officer
Linahan testified that “[it] wasn’t under anything. It was right in
front [of] the vehicle. It was right in the open.” Officer Linahan
further clarified, “[i]t was like sticking out of the front of the
vehicle, but it wasn't covered enough to where it couldn’t be
seen.”
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Sergeant Duchossois also recovered a green backpack from
the recycle bin and it contained mail in the name of “Tyreek
Jackson” along with a prayer rug and “[n]umerous credit cards in
names not belonging to either[” Jackson or Collier]. At the
recovery scene, Collier identified himself as “Tyreek Jackson[.]”
The record does not indicate whether anything was recovered
from Collier’s person.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/3/2017, at 2-4 (record citations and some quotation
marks omitted). Following the hearing, the magisterial district judge held over
all charges for trial. N.T., 4/21/2017, at 28-29. On April 26, 2017, Jackson
filed a motion to quash.
On June 28, 2017, the Honorable Scott DiClaudio heard
[Jackson’s] motion to quash wherein the [trial c]ourt incorporated
the preliminary hearing notes of testimony into the record and
thereafter heard argument. On June 29, 2017, after holding the
motion under advisement, t[he trial c]ourt quashed the firearms
and conspiracy charges. The Commonwealth filed a [m]otion for
[r]econsideration of th[e trial c]ourt’s order quashing the firearm
and conspiracy charges. On July 13, 2017, th[e trial c]ourt
granted the Commonwealth’s request to hold a reconsideration
hearing. On August 2, 2017, th[e c]ourt denied the
Commonwealth’s reconsideration motion.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/3/2017, at 2-4. This timely-filed appeal followed.2,3
2
Both the trial court and the Commonwealth complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
3 The Commonwealth has the right to appeal the trial court’s June 29, 2017
order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(d), which provides that “[t]he Commonwealth
may take an appeal as of right from an order that does not end the entire case
where the Commonwealth certifies in the notice of appeal that the order will
terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution.” In this case, the
Commonwealth certified in its notice of appeal that the order quashing the
firearm and conspiracy charges “terminates or substantially handicaps the
prosecution.” Notice of Appeal, 8/8/2017.
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The Commonwealth presents one issue for this Court’s review: “Did the
Commonwealth present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case that
[Jackson] committed the crimes of carrying a firearm without a license,
carrying a firearm in public in Philadelphia, and conspiracy?” Commonwealth’s
Brief at 2.
We consider the Commonwealth’s issue mindful of the following.
[I]t is settled that the evidentiary sufficiency, or lack thereof, of
the Commonwealth’s prima facie case for a charged crime is a
question of law as to which an appellate court’s review is plenary.
Indeed, the trial court is afforded no discretion in ascertaining
whether, as a matter of law and in light of the facts presented to
it, the Commonwealth has carried its pre-trial, prima facie burden
to make out the elements of a charged crime. … To properly
dispose of this appeal, we must proceed to examine the merits of
the underlying substantive issues under the correct standard—
i.e., we will engage in plenary review of both claims as questions
of law.
Commonwealth v. Karetny, 880 A.2d 505, 513 (Pa. 2005) (citations
omitted).
At the pre-trial stage of a criminal prosecution, it is not necessary
for the Commonwealth to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, but rather, its burden is merely to put forth a
prima facie case of the defendant’s guilt. A prima facie case exists
when the Commonwealth produces evidence of each of the
material elements of the crime charged and establishes sufficient
probable cause to warrant the belief that the accused committed
the offense. The evidence need only be such that, if presented at
trial and accepted as true, the judge would be warranted in
permitting the case to go to the jury. Moreover, [i]nferences
reasonably drawn from the evidence of record which would
support a verdict of guilty are to be given effect, and the evidence
must be read in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth’s
case.
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Commonwealth v. Huggins, 836 A.2d 862, 866 (Pa. 2003) (citations and
quotation marks omitted).
In this case, the trial court held that the Commonwealth did not provide
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case for the firearm and
conspiracy charges because the Commonwealth did not prove that Jackson
had possession of the firearm found in the backpack. Trial Court Opinion,
10/3/2017, at 6.
Because Jackson was not found with the firearm on his person, the
Commonwealth was required to present evidence that Jackson had
constructive possession of the firearm. Commonwealth v. Kirkland, 831
A.2d 607, 611 (Pa. Super. 2003). “Constructive possession is an inference
arising from a set of facts that possession of the contraband was more likely
than not.” Commonwealth v. Jackson, 659 A.2d 549, 551 (Pa. 1995)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Mudrick, 507 A.2d 1212, 1213 (Pa. 1986)).
Constructive possession is a legal fiction, a pragmatic construct to
deal with the realities of criminal law enforcement. Constructive
possession is an inference arising from a set of facts that
possession of the contraband was more likely than not. We have
defined constructive possession as “conscious dominion.” We
subsequently defined “conscious dominion” as “the power to
control the contraband and the intent to exercise that control.” To
aid application, we have held that constructive possession may be
established by the totality of the circumstances.
Commonwealth v. Parker, 847 A.2d 745, 750 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal
citations omitted). “To find constructive possession, the power and intent to
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control the contraband does not need to be exclusive to the defendant. Our
Supreme Court has recognized that constructive possession may be found in
one or more actors where the item [at] issue is in an area of joint control and
equal access.” Commonwealth v. Vargas, 108 A.3d 858, 868 (Pa. Super.
2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The trial court found that the “Commonwealth failed to show [that it
was] more likely than not that [Jackson] had knowledge of the firearm and as
a result, there was insufficient evidence to prove that [Jackson] had the power
to control the firearm, a prerequisite to a finding of constructive possession.”
Trial Court Opinion, 10/3/2017, at 6. Specifically, the trial court found the
Commonwealth did not elicit testimony establishing: (1) where Jackson was
seated in the vehicle; (2) Jackson’s “vantage point, if any, of the black
backpack while inside the vehicle, and (3) whether Jackson “knew the black
backpack contained the gun.” Id. at 7.
The court found Jackson’s flight after abandoning the vehicle to be
“more indicative of his consciousness of guilt relating to the marijuana
recovered from his person and the credit cards belonging to other persons
recovered from the green backpack that [Jackson] discarded[,]” and held that
the evidence “directly refute[d] the Commonwealth’s contention that
[Jackson] and Collier exited the vehicle in a ‘hurry’ causing them to mistakenly
grab each other’s backpack.” Id. at 7-8 (emphasis in original omitted).
Further, although the court acknowledged “the marijuana recovered from the
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black backpack matched the marijuana found on [Jackson’s] person,” it opined
that this did not prove that Jackson knew what was in the black backpack, and
instead “may lend an inference that [Jackson] and Collier had purchased
marijuana from the same source.” Id. at 7.
The trial court also concluded that, because there was insufficient
evidence to establish Jackson had knowledge of the firearm, he was
“incapable” of exercising control over it. Id. at 9. Finding the Commonwealth
failed to submit sufficient evidence to prove that Jackson constructively
possessed the firearm, “it logically follows that [Jackson] and Collier did not
have joint constructive possession of the firearm.” Id. at 10-14. In sum, the
trial court found there was “insufficient evidence, even at a prima facie level,
to show that [Jackson] constructively possessed the firearm.” Id. at 15. For
these reasons, the trial court submitted that it properly quashed the firearm
and conspiracy charges.
The evidence in the record before [the trial court did] not permit
a reasonable inference that [Jackson] had the power to control or
knew about the firearm. Furthermore, th[e trial c]ourt
conclude[d] that there is not a scintilla of evidence that [Jackson]
intended to control the firearm as Collier exerted affirmative steps
to demonstrate his exclusive control over the gun. Furthermore,
th[e the trial court found] that the Commonwealth also failed to
show sufficient prima facie evidence that [Jackson] conspired with
Collier to possess the firearm.
Id.
Viewing this case in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the
evidence established that Jackson and his cohort Collier were observed exiting
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a vehicle, each discarding a backpack as they began their flight from police.
N.T., 4/21/2017, at 9-10. Once apprehended, Jackson was subjected to a
search of his person, and Sergeant Duchossois recovered cash and marijuana.
Id. at 12-13. The marijuana recovered from Jackson’s person matched the
quantity and packaging of the marijuana recovered from the black backpack,
which also contained the firearm at issue. Id. at 13-14.
When deciding whether a prima facie case was established, we
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, and we are to consider all reasonable inferences
based on that evidence which could support a guilty verdict. The
use of inferences is a process of reasoning by which a fact or
proposition sought to be established is deduced as the logical
consequence from the existence of other facts that have been
established. An inference is no more than a logical tool enabling
the trier of fact to proceed from one fact to another, if the trier
believes that the weight of the evidence and the experiential
accuracy of the inference warrant so doing. Evidentiary inferences
are constitutionally infirm unless the inferred fact is more likely
than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to
depend.
Commonwealth v. Williams, 911 A.2d 548, 552 (Pa. Super. 2006) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
Drawing all reasonable inferences from these facts, Jackson’s presence
in the vehicle with the backpack, his flight from police, and the marijuana
recovered from his person that matched the marijuana in the backpack with
the firearm, provided circumstantial evidence to allow the court to infer that:
(1) the black backpack containing the firearm and identically packaged
marijuana was Jackson’s backpack such that Jackson may have had
knowledge of the contents of the backpack; and (2) Jackson, who was in the
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Chevy with Collier and the backpack, had the ability to possess and control
the backpack. The former inference is bolstered by the fact that the green
backpack the officers observed Jackson discard contained mail addressed to
“Tyreek Jackson,” the same name Collier provided to police. Id. at 15.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, it is reasonable to infer that
Jackson had joint constructive possession of the firearm. While this evidence
may not be sufficient to sustain a conviction, that is not the burden that the
Commonwealth must overcome at this juncture.4
In light of the foregoing, we find a prima facie case exists for carrying a
firearm without a license, carrying a firearm in public in Philadelphia, and
conspiracy.
Order reversed. Case remanded for trial. Jurisdiction relinquished.
4 Furthermore, we agree with the Commonwealth that the court’s conclusion
that Jackson and Collier could have purchased the marijuana from the same
source or that Jackson’s flight was more indicative of his consciousness of guilt
for having marijuana on his person, “departs from the proper standard of
review.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 15. See Commonwealth v. Landis, 48
A.3d 432, 448 (Pa. Super. 2012) (finding “the trial court improperly weighed
the evidence and failed to properly view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth” when it concluded that Landis “only intended
to frighten, as opposed to inflict bodily injury” when discharging a firearm,
placing great emphasis on where the bullet landed in relation to the police
officers).
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/14/18
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