Com. v. J.C. ( 2018 )

J-A09025-18
2018 Pa. Super. 303
COMMONWEALTH OF : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
v. :
:
:
J.C. :
: No. 1059 WDA 2017
Appellant :
Appeal from the Order Entered February 16, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-02-JV-0001886-2011
BEFORE: BOWES, J., DUBOW, J., and MURRAY, J.
OPINION BY DUBOW, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 09, 2018
Appellant, J.C., appeals from the February 16, 2017 Order entered in
the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, which denied J.C.’s Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus. After careful review, we affirm.
The juvenile court set forth a thorough and accurate factual and
procedural history in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, which we need not repeat
here. See Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/17/17, at 1-5. In sum, on April 9,
2010, the juvenile court adjudicated then 13-year-old J.C. dependent and
placed him at Mel Blount Youth Home. On November 7, 2011, the juvenile
court adjudicated J.C. delinquent after he admitted to Indecent Assault of a
Child Under 13 while living at his dependent placement. At that time, the
juvenile court deferred disposition pending a mental health evaluation. On
November 29, 2011, the juvenile court entered a Delinquency Commitment
Order, which committed J.C. to Adelphoi Village and ordered that the court
J-A09025-18
review J.C.’s placement in five months. The juvenile court made a finding that
“child is in need of treatment, supervision and rehabilitation” and that the
commitment was “consistent with the protection of the public interest[.]”
Delinquency Commitment Order, 11/29/11. At the five-month review hearing
on April 9, 2012, the juvenile court made a finding that the “placement
continues to be necessary and appropriate” and ordered J.C. to remain at
Adelphoi Village. Placement Review Order, 4/9/12.
Following that hearing, the juvenile court conducted five review
hearings.1 At each of the review hearings, the juvenile court provided J.C.
notice of the hearing, an opportunity to be heard, and the assistance of
counsel. Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/17/17, at 8. Additionally, at each review
hearing, the juvenile court “addressed whether the commitment would be
extended or modified and whether a modification would effectuate the purpose
of the original order” and made a determination of whether the disposition
and commitment of J.C. was consistent with the purpose of the Juvenile Act.
Id.
On March 3, 2015, eight months prior to J.C.’s four-year commitment
anniversary, J.C.’s probation officer filed a Failure to Adjust Allegation alleging
that J.C. viewed pornography on a computer while in placement, which was
against the rules and regulations, and that Adelphoi Village requested J.C.’s
removal from the program. On the same day, after an emergency hearing
____________________________________________
1The juvenile court held review hearings on September 17, 2012, December
13, 2012, March 7, 2013, September 8, 2014, and January 26, 2015.
-2-
J-A09025-18
where J.C. was present, the juvenile court issued a Detention Order that
committed J.C. to a secure detention at the Shuman Center pending
alternative placement, and made a finding that he posed a threat to the
community. See Detention Order, 3/3/15. On March 10, 2015, after a
hearing where J.C. was present, the juvenile court ordered that J.C. remain
committed, placed J.C. at Cove Prep, and made findings that “child is in need
of treatment, supervision and rehabilitation” and that the commitment was
“consistent with the protection of the public interest[.]” Delinquency
Commitment Order, 3/10/15.
Subsequently, the juvenile court held six additional review hearings.2
At each of the review hearings, the juvenile court provided J.C. notice of the
hearing, an opportunity to be heard, and the assistance of counsel. Trial Court
Opinion, filed 10/17/17, at 8. Additionally, at each review hearing, the
juvenile court “addressed whether the commitment would be extended or
modified and whether a modification would effectuate the purpose of the
original order” and made a determination of whether the disposition and
commitment of J.C. was consistent with the purpose of the Juvenile Act. Id.
On January 11, 2017, J.C. filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
alleging that the juvenile court detained J.C. illegally for over a year. After
hearing oral argument on the matter, the juvenile court denied the Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus on January 20, 2017. On January 24, 2017, J.C.
____________________________________________
2The juvenile court held review hearings on June 29, 2015, October 5, 2015,
May 16, 2016, August 8, 2016, August 22, 2016, and September 1, 2016.
-3-
J-A09025-18
filed a Petition for Reconsideration, which the juvenile court denied on
February 16, 2017. On March 8, 2017, J.C. filed a Motion to Certify
Interlocutory Order for Appeal, which the juvenile court granted on April 8,
2017.
On April 27, 2017, J.C. filed a Petition for Review with this Court. On
July 24, 2017, this Court granted the Petition for Review and ordered the
matter to proceed as an appeal. Both parties complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
J.C. raises the following issue for our review:
When J.C. has been adjudicated delinquent of a first-degree
misdemeanor punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment, J.C.
was initially committed to a placement facility for an indefinite
period of time, the Commonwealth now wants to extend J.C.’s
commitment beyond four years, but J.C. has already been
continuously detained for more than the statutory maximum
sentence of five years, whether J.C. must be released when the
plain language of 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 6353(a) requires a hearing to
have been held specifically to address whether to extend or modify
J.C.’s initial commitment period and that such hearing needs to be
held prior to the expiration of four years since the initial
commitment, but the Commonwealth never filed for an extension
pursuant to th e statute and, therefore, the trial court never held
a hearing pursuant to the statute?
Appellant’s Brief at 5.
J.C. avers that the juvenile court detained him illegally in violation of
Section 6353 of the Juvenile Act, which, inter alia, prohibits a court from
detaining a child for more than four years unless the juvenile court meets
-4-
J-A09025-18
certain requirements.3 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6353(a). Specifically, J.C. argues
that the Commonwealth failed to file a petition requesting to extend J.C.’s
initial commitment beyond four years and the juvenile court failed to hold a
hearing on the issue prior to the expiration of four years as required by the
statute, rendering J.C.’s commitment illegal. See Appellant’s Brief at 13.
In turn, the Commonwealth argues that the language of the statute does
not require the Commonwealth to file a petition for extension or the juvenile
court to hold a hearing on said petition. See Appellee’s Brief at 8. Rather,
the Commonwealth asserts that the statute requires the juvenile court to
conduct regularly scheduled commitment review hearings, which occurred and
indicated a need for continued confinement.4 Id. at 8.
____________________________________________
3 Section 6353 prohibits a court from detaining a child for more “than four
years or a period longer than he could have been sentenced by the court if he
had been convicted of the same offense as an adult, whichever is less.” 42
Pa.C.S. § 6353(a). In this case, J.C. admitted to Indecent Assault as a
misdemeanor of the first degree, an offense punishable by up to five years
imprisonment when committed by an adult. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 1104(1).
Because four years is less than the potential five-year adult sentence, the
statute prohibits the juvenile court from detaining J.C. for more than four
years unless the court meets certain requirements.
4 The Commonwealth also argues that this appeal is moot because J.C. turned
21 years old on August 8, 2017, and is no longer subject to court supervision
as a juvenile. See Appellee’s Brief at 19. “Generally, an actual claim or
controversy must be present at all stages of the judicial process for the case
to be actionable or reviewable . . . [and] [a]n issue before a court is moot if
in ruling upon the issue the court cannot enter an order that has any legal
force or effect.” Deutsche Bank Nat. Co. v. Butler, 868 A.2d 574, 577 (Pa.
Super. 2005). J.C. is currently committed for involuntary treatment pursuant
to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6403, which states, in relevant part, that a person may be
subject to court-ordered commitment for involuntary treatment if the person
-5-
J-A09025-18
The interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law. C.B.
v. J.B., 65 A.3d 946, 951 (Pa. Super. 2013). As with all questions of law, we
must employ a de novo standard of review and a plenary scope of review to
determine whether the court committed an error of law. Id.
When interpreting a statute, this court is constrained by the rules of the
Statutory Construction Act of 1972 (the “Act”). 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1501-1991. The
Act makes clear that the goal in interpreting any statute is to ascertain and
effectuate the intention of the General Assembly while construing the statute
in a manner that gives effect to all its provisions. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a).
The Act provides: “[w]hen the words of a statute are clear and free from all
ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of
pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). It is well settled that “the best
indication of the General Assembly's intent may be found in a statute's plain
language.” Cagey v. Commonwealth, 179 A.3d 458, 462 (Pa. 2018).
Additionally, we must presume that the General Assembly does not intend a
result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable. See 1 Pa.C.S.
§ 1922(1). Moreover, the Act requires penal provisions of statutes to be
strictly construed and any ambiguity in the language of a penal statute should
____________________________________________
has been adjudicated delinquent for an act of sexual violence, has been
committed to an institution or facility and remains there at age 20, and is still
in need of treatment. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6403(a). Reversing the trial court’s
ruling would have legal force or effect on J.C.’s current commitment.
Accordingly, the issue is not moot.
-6-
J-A09025-18
be interpreted in the light most favorable to the accused. Commonwealth
v. Hall, 80 A.3d 1204, 1212 (Pa. 2013); see also 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(b)(1).
Instantly, J.C. is asking this Court to interpret and apply Section 6353
of the Juvenile Act, which states, in relevant part:
No child shall initially be committed to an institution for a period
longer than four years or a period longer than he could have been
sentenced by the court if he had been convicted of the same
offense as an adult, whichever is less. The initial commitment may
be extended for a similar period of time, or modified, if the court
finds after hearing that the extension or modification will
effectuate the original purpose for which the order was entered.
The child shall have notice of the extension or modification hearing
and shall be given an opportunity to be heard. The committing
court shall review each commitment every six months and shall
hold a disposition review hearing at least every nine months.
42 Pa.C.S. § 6353(a).
As stated above, J.C. argues that before his commitment exceeded four
years, Section 6353 required the Commonwealth to file a petition asking to
extend his initial commitment and required the juvenile court to hold a hearing
specifically addressing whether the court should extend the commitment. See
Appellant’s Brief at 13. J.C. asserts that the plain language of the statute
references a “commitment review” hearing, a “disposition review” hearing,
and an “extension or modification” hearing. Therefore, J.C. contends, the
statute distinguishes between the three types of hearings and specifically
requires the Commonwealth to request, and the juvenile court to hold, an
“extension or modification” hearing prior to extending J.C.’s commitment
beyond four years. Id. at 21. We disagree.
-7-
J-A09025-18
As an initial matter, the plain language of Section 6353 does not require
the Commonwealth to file a petition prior to a child’s commitment exceeding
four years. Rather, Section 6353 requires notice of an extension or
modification hearing, a hearing, and an opportunity for the child to be heard.
There is no language in the statute that requires that the Commonwealth file
a petition or make a formal request to extend a child’s commitment.
Further, we disagree with J.C.’s assertion that the juvenile court did not
comply with Section 6353 when it extended J.C.’s commitment beyond four
years. We recognize that the language in the statute requires a court to
review a child’s commitment every six months, hold a disposition review
hearing at least every nine months, and conduct an “extension or
modification” hearing prior to extending a commitment beyond the statutorily
allotted period. However, there is no language in the statute requiring that a
juvenile court conduct these reviews and hearings at separate times. The
clear purpose of the statute is to ensure that: (1) a court reviews a child’s
commitment and disposition on a regular basis; and (2) a child is given
appropriate notice and an opportunity to be heard, and the court makes
certain findings prior to committing a child beyond the statutorily allotted
period.
As stated above, we must presume that the General Assembly does not
intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable. See
1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1). Without the plain language of the statute explicitly
compelling such a result, it would be unreasonable and redundant to impose
-8-
J-A09025-18
the condition that a court, who is already holding regularly scheduled review
hearings, hold separate hearings to review “commitment,” “disposition,” and
“extension and modification.” Accordingly, we hold that any review hearing
can serve as an “extension and modification” hearing if the child has
appropriate notice, the child has an opportunity to be heard, and the court
makes certain findings pursuant to Section 6353.
In this case, on November 29, 2011, the juvenile court initially
committed J.C. to Adelphoi Village for approximately five months, making a
finding that J.C. was in need of treatment, supervision, and rehabilitation, and
that placement was consistent with the protection of the public interest. At
the five-month review hearing, the juvenile court made a finding that J.C.’s
placement continued to be necessary and appropriate. The trial court
continued to hold review hearings to address J.C.’s commitment and
disposition, each time giving J.C. notice and an opportunity to be heard. Then,
eight months prior to J.C.’s four-year commitment anniversary, the March 3,
2015 Failure to Adjust Allegation and Detention Hearing provided clear notice
to J.C. that his next scheduled hearing would be an “extension or modification”
hearing as J.C. was unable to remain in placement at Adelphoi Village. On
March 10, 2015, after a hearing, the juvenile court made a finding that J.C
continued to be in need of treatment, supervision, and rehabilitation, and that
placement was consistent with the protection of the public interest – the same
findings that originally made J.C.’s placement necessary. Accordingly, the
-9-
J-A09025-18
juvenile court complied with the requirements of Section 6353 prior to
detaining J.C. for more than four years.
J.C. cites Matter of Firster, 457 A.2d 546 (Pa. Super. 1983), to support
his claim that his commitment beyond four years is illegal. However, Firster
is easily distinguished from this case. In Firster, the appellant remained
confined beyond the ninety-day sentence that she could have received as an
adult for Retail Theft as a summary offense. The juvenile court did not hold a
review hearing until four months after the ninety-day deadline, and, therefore,
this Court found that the juvenile court illegally detained appellant. Id. at
548-49. Unlike Firster, in this case, J.C. had at least ten review hearings
prior to his four-year commitment anniversary. Accordingly, Firster is
unpersuasive.
In conclusion, our review of the record reveals that prior to J.C.’s four-
year commitment anniversary, J.C. had notice of an extension or modification
hearing, J.C. had an opportunity to be heard, and the court made specific
findings pursuant to Section 6353. As the juvenile court complied with Section
6353, J.C. was not committed illegally and the juvenile court properly denied
J.C.’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Accordingly, we find no error.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
- 10 -
J-A09025-18
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/9/2018
- 11 -