Com. v. Miller, R. ( 2022 )


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  • J-S09009-22
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    RICKY LEE MILLER                           :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 2022 EDA 2021
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 18, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-45-CR-0000052-2007,
    CP-45-CR-0001641-2006, CP-45-CR-0001675-2006,
    CP-45-CR-0001676-2006
    BEFORE:      LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                                FILED MAY 17, 2022
    Ricky Lee Miller appeals, pro se, from the order,1 entered in the Court
    of Common Pleas of Monroe County, dismissing his second petition filed
    ____________________________________________
    *   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1 Miller filed a single notice of appeal from the PCRA court’s order that lists
    four docket numbers. On November 24, 2021, this Court issued a rule to show
    cause why the appeal should not be quashed pursuant to Commonwealth v.
    Walker, 
    185 A.3d 969
    , 977 (Pa. 2018) (stating “the proper practice under
    Rule 341(a) is to file separate appeals from an order that resolves issues
    arising on more than one docket. The failure to do so requires the appellate
    court to quash the appeal.”). See also Pa.R.A.P. 341. Miller filed a pro se
    response on December 14, 2021, attempting to distinguish Walker. On
    December 20, 2021, this Court discharged the rule and referred the matter to
    this panel. We note that the PCRA court’s order dismissing Miller’s PCRA
    petition informs him that he has the right to file “a Notice of Appeal [] within
    thirty (30) days[.]” Order, 8/18/21 (emphasis added). Pursuant to
    Commonwealth v. Larkin, 
    235 A.3d 350
     (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc), and
    Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 
    219 A.3d 157
    , 160 (Pa. Super. 2019), this
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    J-S09009-22
    pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
    After review, we affirm the order of the PCRA court.2
    This Court has previously set forth the facts and procedural history of
    this case:
    On January 10, 2007, Miller was charged with various crimes
    related to four armed robberies that occurred between November
    16, 2004, and November 21, 2004. At the time the charges were
    filed, Miller was incarcerated in Warren County, New Jersey, on
    charges related to similar robberies. The Commonwealth
    attempted to have Miller extradited to Monroe County for trial.
    Miller was eventually delivered to Monroe County from Pike
    County, Pennsylvania, where he had also been charged. On May
    29, 2007, after a bench trial, Miller was convicted in Monroe
    County of charges relating to the four armed robberies. On August
    8, 2007, the trial court sentenced Miller to an aggregate prison
    term of 24 to 48 years, to be served consecutively to any other
    sentence in Pennsylvania or New Jersey. After his post-sentence
    motions were denied, Miller filed a direct appeal. This Court
    affirmed the judgment of sentence on February 13, 2009. On April
    7, 2011, Miller filed a pro se PCRA Petition. On November 14,
    2011, counsel for Miller, Bradley Weidenbaum, Esquire, filed an
    Amended PCRA Petition. The PCRA court conducted a three-day
    hearing, and dismissed Miller’s Petition as untimely filed on June
    25, 2012.
    ____________________________________________
    amounts to a breakdown in court operations and, thus, we decline to quash
    this appeal. See Larkin, supra at 354 (where defendant is misinformed or
    misled regarding his appellate rights, this amounts to breakdown in court
    operations; Court declined to quash pursuant to Walker); Stansbury, supra
    at 159 (PCRA court advised appellant he could appeal dismissal of PCRA
    petition by filing within thirty days “a written notice of appeal to the Superior
    Court[;] this Court held this amounted to breakdown in court operations that
    overlooked defective nature of notice of appeal) (emphasis in original).
    2   We note the Commonwealth has not filed an appellee’s brief.
    -2-
    J-S09009-22
    Commonwealth v. Miller, 2135 EDA 2012 (Pa. Super. filed May 31, 2013)
    (unpublished memorandum decision), at 1-2. This Court affirmed the PCRA
    court’s order. Id. at 6.      On November 19, 2013, the Pennsylvania Supreme
    Court denied Miller’s petition for allowance of appeal.     Commonwealth v.
    Miller, 
    80 A.3d 776
     (Pa. 2013) (Table).
    Miller filed the instant PCRA petition on May 5, 2021. On May 17, 2021,
    the PCRA court entered an order pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, providing
    notice of intent to dismiss Miller’s petition. See Order, 5/17/21. Miller filed a
    pro se response, and, on August 18, 2021, the PCRA court denied that petition.
    See Order 8/18/21. Miller filed this timely appeal.3 Both the PCRA court and
    Miller complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    On appeal, Miller raises the following issues:
    1. Whether [Miller’s] newly[-]discovered evidence, agreement
    on detainers Article IV, Form V, introduces a new set of
    facts, to establish a new claim, to invoke an exception to the
    PCRA filing deadline?
    2. Whether trial counsel was ineffective where failing to fully
    investigate the process that the Commonwealth utilized to
    ____________________________________________
    3 Miller’s notice of appeal, filed on September 21, and dated September 14,
    2021, was due to be filed by September 20, 2021. See Notice of Appeal,
    9/21/21. The envelope containing the notice of appeal is postmarked
    September 16, 2021. Thus, Miller’s pro se notice of appeal was timely filed
    pursuant to the prisoner mailbox rule. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 
    700 A.2d 423
     (Pa. 1997); see also Pa.R.A.P. 121(f) (“A pro se filing submitted by
    a person incarcerated in a correctional facility is deemed filed as of the date
    of the prison postmark or the date the filing was delivered to the prison
    authorities for purposes of mailing as documented by a properly executed
    prisoner cash slip or other reasonably verifiable evidence.”).
    -3-
    J-S09009-22
    obtain temporary custody of [Miller] from the state of New
    Jersey?
    3. Where the Commonwealth utilized a writ of habeas corpus
    to obtain temporary custody of [Miller], is said writ of
    habeas corpus a request for temporary custody, pursuant to
    the Agreement on Detainers?
    4. Did [Miller] plead or establish enough facts and evidence to
    present a prima facie showing that a miscarriage of justice
    has occurred?
    Appellant’s Brief, at 2.
    We begin by noting our standard and scope of review:
    This Court analyzes PCRA appeals in the light most favorable to
    the prevailing party at the PCRA level. Our review is limited to
    the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record and we
    do not disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it is supported by evidence
    of record and is free of legal error. Similarly, we grant great
    deference to the factual findings of the PCRA court and will not
    disturb those findings unless they have no support in the record.
    However, we afford no such deference to its legal conclusions.
    Where the petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of
    review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Finally, we
    may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any grounds if the record
    supports it.
    Commonwealth v. Dozier, 
    208 A.3d 1101
    , 1103 (Pa. Super. 2019).
    A petition for post-conviction relief must be filed within one year of the
    date that the petitioner’s judgment of sentence becomes final, except as
    otherwise provided by statute. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). “A judgment
    becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review
    in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of
    Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.’’         42
    Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).
    -4-
    J-S09009-22
    An untimely PCRA petition may be considered timely if a petitioner
    alleges and proves one or more of the following:             (1) governmental
    interference with the presentation of his claims; (2) discovery of previously
    unknown facts, upon which the claim is predicated, which could not have been
    discovered with due diligence; or (3) an after-recognized constitutional right
    given retroactive application.    See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii).       Any
    petition invoking one of the exceptions must be filed within one year of the
    date the claim could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).
    The PCRA’s timeliness requirements “are mandatory and jurisdictional
    in nature,” and such requirements may not be disregarded in order to reach
    the merits of the claims raised. Commonwealth v. Murray, 
    753 A.2d 201
    ,
    203 (Pa. 2000). Moreover,
    a PCRA petitioner is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary
    hearing. We review the PCRA court’s decision dismissing a
    petition without a hearing for an abuse of discretion. [T]he right
    to an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction petition is not
    absolute. It is within the PCRA court’s discretion to decline to hold
    a hearing if the petitioner’s claim is patently frivolous and has no
    support either in the record or other evidence.            It is the
    responsibility of the reviewing court on appeal to examine each
    issue raised in the PCRA petition in light of the record certified
    before it in order to determine if the PCRA court erred in its
    determination that there were no genuine issues of material fact
    in controversy and in denying relief without conducting an
    evidentiary hearing.
    Commonwealth v. Miller, 
    102 A.3d 988
    , 992 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations
    omitted; brackets in original).
    -5-
    J-S09009-22
    Here, this Court affirmed Miller’s judgment of sentence on February 13,
    2009. Miller did not file a petition for allowance of appeal in the Supreme
    Court of Pennsylvania from this Court’s February 13, 2009 decision. Thus, his
    judgment of sentence became final on March 15, 2009, and Miller had until
    March 15, 2010 to file a timely PCRA petition. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).
    Miller’s present PCRA petition, filed more than twelve years after his judgment
    of sentence became final, is facially untimely.
    Miller asserts his petition falls within the newly-discovered evidence
    exception, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii), arguing that the Commonwealth
    violated his speedy trial rights pursuant to Article IV of the Interstate
    Agreement on Detainers ("IAD") at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9101 et seq.4 Accordingly,
    Miller must establish that “1) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
    unknown and 2) could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due
    diligence.” Commonwealth v. Bennett, 
    930 A.2d 1264
    , 1272 (Pa. 2007)
    (italics in original). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). If a petitioner can
    establish both components, then jurisdiction over the matter may be
    exercised. Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 
    193 A.3d 350
     (Pa. 2018).
    ____________________________________________
    4 The IAD is an agreement between forty-eight states, the District of Columbia,
    Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the United States, that establishes
    procedures for the transfer of prisoners incarcerated in one jurisdiction to the
    temporary custody of another jurisdiction which has lodged a detainer against
    a prisoner. Carchman v. Nash, 
    473 U.S. 716
     (1985). The IAD is consistent
    with Rule 1100 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure in its concern
    with bringing offenders to a speedy trial. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9101, Article
    VI(a). See also Commonwealth v. Woods, 
    663 A.2d 803
    , 807 (Pa. Super.
    1995).
    -6-
    J-S09009-22
    Miller raised this IAD issue in his first PCRA petition, couched in a claim
    of ineffectiveness of counsel, as well as in a prior direct appeal.         See
    Commonwealth v. Miller, 2135 EDA 2012 (Pa. Super. filed May 31, 2013)
    (unpublished memorandum decision), at 3.        See also Commonwealth v.
    Miller, 1501-1504 EDA 2008 (Pa. Super. filed Feb. 13, 2009) (unpublished
    memorandum decision) (wherein Miller raised, on direct appeal, trial court
    error in denying motion to dismiss on both IAD and Rule 600 grounds). He,
    therefore, has failed to establish that the facts upon which the claim is
    predicated were unknown to him. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 
    111 A.2d 171
    , 176 (Pa. Super. 2015). Miller has failed to invoke the newly-discovered
    evidence exception to the PCRA’s time requirement, and, therefore, the PCRA
    court was without jurisdiction to consider Miller’s claims. We discern no error
    of law. Dozier, supra. Accordingly, we affirm the PCRA court’s order.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 5/17/2022
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2022 EDA 2021

Judges: Lazarus, J.

Filed Date: 5/17/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/17/2022