Com. v. Lee, M. ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
MICHAEL DYAL LEE
Appellant No. 1116 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 4, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0006185-2012
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and LAZARUS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED MAY 10, 2016
Appellant, Michael Dyal Lee, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Allegheny Court of Common Pleas, following his jury trial
convictions for two (2) counts of possession with intent to deliver a
controlled substance (“PWID”), three (3) counts of simple possession, and
one (1) count each of possession of drug paraphernalia, gambling devices,
and persons not to possess firearms.1 We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows.
On April 16, 2012, Officers Rosato and Woodhall conducted narcotics
surveillance on 3327 Ward Street in Pittsburgh. Appellant lived on the first
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1
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), (a)(16), (a)(32); 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5513(a)(1),
6105(a)(1), respectively.
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floor of the three-story house. Another individual occupied the top two
floors of the house. The officers set up surveillance at 6:15 p.m. At around
6:30 p.m., the officers began to observe people enter the building, stay for
under four minutes, and then leave. At 6:35 p.m., the officers observed a
woman enter the building and exit two or three minutes later. At 6:45 p.m.,
a man parked his motorcycle in front of the premises, entered the house,
and left approximately three minutes later. The officers observed the man
place something from his hand into the gas tank pouch attached to his
motorcycle. The motorcyclist then drove down Ward Street at high speed,
turned right onto another street without signaling, and made a second right
turn without observing a stop sign. The officers initiated a traffic stop of the
motorcyclist. As the motorcyclist pulled over, Office Woodhall observed him
open the gas tank pouch and pull out a clear plastic bag containing unknown
objects. The officers pulled up to the left of the motorcycle, at which point
the motorcyclist placed the objects in the bag in the corner of his mouth.
The officers immediately tried to remove the objects from the motorcyclist’s
mouth but he swallowed the objects before the officers could successfully
extract them. While in custody, the motorcyclist admitted he had purchased
narcotics from 3327 Ward Street, and did so on a regular basis. The officers
obtained a search warrant for 3327 Ward Street that same day. At
approximately 9:40 p.m., Officers Rosato and Woodhall arrived at 3327
Ward Street with several other officers and executed the warrant. Appellant
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was present in his first-floor residence and the officers took him into custody
along with six other individuals. The police also recovered from the
residence a firearm, chunks of crack cocaine, baggies of marijuana, pills,
digital scales, thousands of dollars in cash, and dice used for a gambling
operation. The police briefly detained the resident of the second and third
floors until they determined she was living in an independent dwelling and
was not affiliated with the individuals in Appellant’s first-floor residence.
The Commonwealth charged Appellant with multiple counts of PWID,
gambling devices, persons not to possess firearms, and related offenses. On
February 6, 2013, Appellant filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized
during the search of his residence, as well as any subsequent statements to
the police. Following a hearing, the court denied Appellant’s suppression
motion on February 12, 2013. On April 1, 2013, Appellant filed a motion to
reveal the identity of the Commonwealth’s confidential informant, which the
court denied by order dated April 30, 2013. A jury subsequently convicted
Appellant of PWID, simple possession, possession of drug paraphernalia,
gambling devices, and persons not to possess firearms. The court sentenced
Appellant on December 19, 2013, to concurrent mandatory minimum terms
of five (5) to ten (10) years’ incarceration for the two PWID convictions. On
December 27, 2013, Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion to
reconsider sentence, which the court granted. The court resentenced
Appellant on June 4, 2014, to concurrent terms of eleven-and-one-half
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(11½) to twenty-three (23) months’ incarceration, followed by two (2)
years’ probation, for the PWID convictions. The court imposed no further
penalty for the remaining convictions. Appellant’s new sentence did not
include a mandatory minimum term. On June 10, 2014, the Commonwealth
filed a timely post-sentence motion, which the court denied on June 18,
2014. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on July 11, 2014. On August
11, 2014, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). After the court granted two
extensions, Appellant timely filed a Rule 1925(b) statement on January 2,
2015.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
[APPELLANT’S] MOTION TO SUPPRESS WHEN THE SEARCH
WARRANT APPLICATION FAILED TO STATE WITH
SUFFICIENT SPECIFICITY AND PARTICULARITY THE PLACE
TO BE SEARCHED?
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
[APPELLANT’S] MOTION TO SUPPRESS WHEN THE
INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE FOUR CORNERS OF
THE SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT FAILED TO ESTABLISH
PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH 3327 WARD STREET?
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
[APPELLANT’S] MOTION TO REVEAL THE IDENTITY OF THE
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT WHEN [APPELLANT]
SUFFICIENTLY DEMONSTRATED THAT PRODUCTION OF
THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT WAS MATERIAL TO HIS
DEFENSE, REASONABLE, AND IN THE INTEREST OF
JUSTICE?
(Appellant’s Brief at 7).
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In his first issue, Appellant argues the search warrant for 3327 Ward
Street failed to describe the place to be searched with sufficient particularity.
Appellant avers the search warrant indicated the building might have
separate residences inside. Appellant asserts the police failed to arrange a
controlled drug purchase or conduct additional surveillance on 3327 Ward
Street to ascertain whether it contained multiple living units. Appellant
contends the search warrant failed to describe the particular room or unit to
be searched even though the police had reason to believe the building was a
multiple-occupancy structure. Appellant concludes the search warrant was
constitutionally defective. We disagree.
We review the denial of a suppression motion as follows:
Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial
court’s denial of a suppression motion is limited to
determining whether the factual findings are supported by
the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from
those facts are correct.
[W]e may consider only the evidence of the prosecution
and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains
uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a
whole. Where the record supports the findings of the
suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may
reverse only if the court erred in reaching its legal
conclusions based upon the facts.
Commonwealth v. Williams, 941 A.2d 14, 26-27 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en
banc) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides in
pertinent part: “[N]o warrant to search any place or to seize any person or
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things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without
probable cause[.]” Pa. Const. Art. I, § 8.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has concluded Article 1,
Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution affords greater
protection than the Fourth Amendment, …including a more
demanding particularity requirement; the description must
be as particular as reasonably possible. Commonwealth
v. Grossman, 521 Pa. 290, 555 A.2d 896, 899 (1989).
“The twin aims of Article 1, Section 8 are the safeguarding
of privacy and the fundamental requirement that warrants
shall only be issued upon probable cause.”
Commonwealth v. Waltson, 555 Pa. 223, 724 A.2d 289,
292 (1998).
In order to protect these twin aims, a warrant must
describe the place to be searched and the items to
be seized with specificity, and the warrant must be
supported by probable cause. The place to be
searched must be described “precise enough to
enable the executing officer to ascertain and identify,
with reasonable effort, the place intended, and
where probable cause exists to support the search of
the area so designated, a warrant will not fail for lack
of particularity.”
Id. at 292[.]
Commonwealth v. Belenky, 777 A.2d 483, 486 (Pa.Super. 2001).
Generally, “A search warrant directed against an apartment house, or
other multiple-occupancy structure will be held invalid for lack of specificity if
it fails to describe the particular room or subunit to be searched with
sufficient definiteness to preclude a search of other units.” In Interest of
Wilks, 613 A.2d 577, 579 (Pa.Super. 1992). Nevertheless, “if there is
cause to believe the premises covered by the warrant are being used as a
single unit, a warrant directing the search of more than one unit is valid.”
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Commonwealth v. Chamberlain, 419 A.2d 1261, 1266 (Pa.Super. 1980).
“In the absence of evidence as to any exterior features which would have
indicated the presence of more than one unit, a warrant will not be
invalidated because it authorizes a search of an entire house, although the
house consists of two units.” Commonwealth v. Davis, 480 A.2d 1035,
1040-41 (Pa.Super. 1984). See also Commonwealth v. Andujar, 399
A.2d 1074 (Pa.Super. 1979) (en banc) (holding description of row house in
search warrant was sufficiently specific in light of all facts of record, where
diligent efforts of police to uncover drug operation in building did not
disclose division of interior into two living areas; all outward signs and
reasonably available information indicated building was single-family
residence); Commonwealth v. Simpkins, 36 A.3d 623 (Pa.Super. 2012)
(holding search warrant for row house was valid even though bedrooms in
house were separately rented by multiple individuals, where house was
zoned single family and nothing in building’s appearance gave notice to
police it was being used as rooming house; stating suppression was not
justified simply by officer’s acknowledgment that manner in which house is
zoned is not necessarily way it is used). “[T]he reviewing court must make
a practical, commonsense decision whether the place to be searched has
been specified with sufficient particularity.” Wilks, supra at 579.
Instantly, the search warrant provided the following description of the
place to be searched:
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3327 Ward Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15213. This single
family home may have several separate residences inside,
and is a three (3) story structure, with the first two (2)
adorned in light brick, and the third floor in white siding.
It is adorned with a white fence, a brick porch with
accompanying brick wall, and a Blessed Mary Statue in the
front yard.
(Attachment to Motion to Suppress, filed 2/6/13). At the suppression
hearing, Appellant and the Commonwealth stipulated Officer Rosato would
testify that there were no separate entrances, mailboxes, or meters at the
house to suggest it was being used other than as a single-family home. See
Andujar, supra; Simpkins, supra (considering all facts of record to
determine what information police had regarding number of residences in
building to be searched). The police also examined city real estate records,
which did not disclose the existence of separate dwelling units in the house.
Additionally, the affidavit of probable cause stated the police detained a
motorcyclist, who told the officers he regularly purchased narcotics at 3327
Ward Street. The motorcyclist did not refer to a specific apartment unit.
The officers conducted surveillance on the premises, and no exterior features
alerted them to the existence of more than one residence. Based on the
reasonably available information at the officers’ disposal, they had cause to
believe 3327 Ward Street was a single-family home and did not contain
multiple apartments. See Chamberlain, supra. The warrant was not
invalidated by the acknowledgment that the house might be illegally divided
into separate living units. Absolute certainty regarding the occupancy status
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of the building was not required. In light of the investigating officers’
diligent efforts, including observations of the premises and an examination
of real estate records, the description of the search location was as
particular as reasonably possible. See Andujar, supra; Belenky, supra.
Viewed in a practical, commonsense manner, the warrant described the
location of the search with sufficient specificity.2 See Wilks, supra; Davis,
supra.
In his second issue, Appellant argues the affidavit supporting the
search warrant failed to establish probable cause to search his residence.
Appellant contends Officer Rosato provided no time frame as to when he or
Officer Woodhall received neighborhood complaints and reports from the
University of Pittsburgh police regarding narcotics activity at 3327 Ward
Street. Appellant further asserts the reference to “neighborhood complaints”
was a factual misstatement because the information actually came from a
confidential informant. Appellant maintains the officers’ personal
observations were insufficient to establish probable cause because they
conducted surveillance for only thirty-three minutes and observed only two
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2
Moreover, the constitutional harm that the particularity requirement is
intended to prevent, i.e., overbroad searches, did not occur in this case.
During the execution of the search warrant, the police discovered the house
was in fact divided into two apartments. At that point, the police briefly
detained the resident of the upper two floors and released her after they
confirmed she was not associated with anybody in Appellant’s first-floor
residence. No evidence suggests the scope of the search exceeded the
boundaries of Appellant’s residence.
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individuals enter the house. Appellant claims the affidavit of probable cause
once stated the officers set up surveillance at 3327 Lawn Street, which was
not the building where Appellant resided. Appellant argues the motorcyclist
detained by police was an anonymous source, and the information he gave
to the officers was uncorroborated hearsay. Appellant concludes the
affidavit failed to establish probable cause to search 3327 Ward Street. We
disagree.
As a preliminary matter, issues not raised in a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statement will be deemed waived for appellate review. Commonwealth v.
Castillo, 585 Pa. 395, 888 A.2d 775 (2005). A Rule 1925(b) statement that
is not specific enough for the trial court to identify and address the issues
the defendant wishes to raise on appeal may also result in waiver.
Commonwealth v. Reeves, 907 A.2d 1 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied,
591 Pa. 712, 919 A.2d 956 (2007).
When a court has to guess what issues an appellant is
appealing, that is not enough for meaningful review.
When an appellant fails adequately to identify in a concise
manner the issues sought to be pursued on appeal, the
trial court is impeded in its preparation of a legal analysis
which is pertinent to those issues. In other words, a
Concise Statement which is too vague to allow the court to
identify the issues raised on appeal is the functional
equivalent of no Concise Statement at all.
Id. at 2.
Here, Appellant alleged the following in his Rule 1925(b) statement on
the issue of whether the search warrant was supported by probable cause:
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“The information contained in the four corners of the search warrant affidavit
failed to establish probable cause to search 3327 Ward Street, Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania 15213.” (Rule 1925(b) statement, filed 1/2/15). Appellant
failed to specify any reason that the affidavit was insufficient to establish
probable cause. In particular, Appellant failed to raise any of the specific
arguments he presents on appeal regarding the alleged deficiency of the
affidavit of probable cause. As a result, in its opinion, the trial court merely
recited the facts set forth in the affidavit and disagreed with Appellant’s
“conclusory statement” that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause.
Thus, Appellant’s issue, as generically framed in his Rule 1925(b) statement,
is arguably waived for vagueness. See Reeves, supra.
Moreover, “The standard for evaluating whether probable cause exists
for the issuance of a search warrant is the ‘totality of circumstances’ test as
set forth in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527
(1983), and adopted by [the Pennsylvania Supreme Court] in
Commonwealth v. Gray, 509 Pa. 476, 484, 503 A.2d 921, 925 (1985).”
Commonwealth v. Jones, 542 Pa. 418, 424, 668 A.2d 114, 116 (1995).
A magistrate is to make a practical, common-sense
decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in
the affidavit before him, including the veracity and basis of
knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there
is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place. The information offered
to establish probable cause must be viewed in a common
sense, nontechnical manner and deference must be
accorded to the issuing magistrate. The duty of a court
reviewing the decision is to ensure that the magistrate had
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a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause
existed.
Id. at 424, 668 A.2d at 116-17 (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). A magistrate’s finding of probable cause must be based on facts
described within the four corners of the affidavit. Commonwealth v.
Smith, 784 A.2d 182 (Pa.Super. 2001).
Instantly, the affidavit of probable cause supporting the search
warrant described the following facts: Officers Rosato and Woodhall believed
3327 Ward Street was a site of narcotics trafficking based on neighborhood
complaints, reports from the University of Pittsburgh police, and the officers’
personal observations of specific individuals going in and out of the house;
based on that information, the officers conducted surveillance on the house;
the officers observed a woman enter the house and leave only two or three
minutes later; the officers subsequently observed a man enter the house,
leave approximately three minutes later, and place something from his hand
into the gas tank pouch attached to his motorcycle; the man then sped away
on his motorcycle and disregarded a stop sign; the officers initiated a traffic
stop of the motorcyclist, at which point he pulled out a clear plastic bag from
the gas tank pouch and placed the objects inside the bag into his mouth; the
motorcyclist resisted the officers’ attempts to extract the objects and
eventually swallowed them; while in custody, the motorcyclist admitted he
had purchased narcotics from 3327 Ward Street and did so on a regular
basis. Based on the information contained within the four corners of the
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affidavit of probable cause, the magistrate properly concluded there was a
fair probability the police would find evidence of narcotics activity at 3327
Ward Street. See Jones, supra. The motorcyclist’s confession was
corroborated by the officers’ surveillance and their interaction with the
motorcyclist leading up to his arrest. Further, the single reference in the
affidavit to 3327 Lawn Street was an obvious clerical error with no effect on
the warrant’s validity, where the affidavit referred to Ward Street in all other
respects. See Commonwealth v. Yerger, 482 A.2d 985 (Pa.Super. 1984)
(explaining factual misstatements in affidavit of probable cause will not
invalidate search warrant unless misstatements are deliberate and material).
Likewise, the omission from the affidavit that the “neighborhood
complaints” came from an informant did not constitute a deliberate and
material misstatement of fact. The lynchpin of the officers’ probable cause
was their surveillance of 3327 Ward Street and their interaction with the
motorcyclist. The reference to “neighborhood complaints” was simply a
background fact to explain in part the officers’ initial suspicion of drug
activity at the house. See id. (stating test for whether misstatement in
affidavit is material is whether it is essential to search warrant application,
not whether it merely strengthens application).
Additionally, the warrant was not defective due to the absence of a
specific time frame within which the officers received complaints or reports
from university police. The officers’ personal observations on the day they
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applied for the warrant demonstrated the ongoing nature of the criminal
conduct at issue. See Commonwealth v. Dennis, 618 A.2d 972, 981
(Pa.Super. 1992), appeal denied, 535 Pa. 654, 634 A.2d 218 (stating: “Mere
lapse of time between discovery of criminal activity and issuance of the
warrant will not necessarily dissipate probable cause; a showing that the
criminal activity is likely to have continued up to the time of issuance of the
warrant will render otherwise stale information viable”). Consequently, even
if properly preserved, Appellant’s second issue would merit no relief.
In his third issue, Appellant argues the Commonwealth acknowledged
at the suppression hearing that the police investigation involved the use of a
confidential informant. Appellant asserts the informant apparently prompted
the investigation, but it is unclear what he told the police regarding
Appellant. Appellant contends the informant’s identity was critical to
Appellant’s defense because it would have allowed him to learn the source of
the informant’s knowledge and how fresh or stale that information was.
Appellant concludes the trial court erred when it denied his motion to
disclose the identity of the informant. We disagree.
“Our standard of review of claims that a trial court erred in its
disposition of a request for disclosure of an informant’s identity is confined to
abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Watson, 69 A.3d 605, 607
(Pa.Super. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Washington, 63 A.3d 797,
801 (Pa.Super. 2013)). The following legal principles govern a request to
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disclose a confidential informant’s identity:
[N]o fixed rule with respect to disclosure of the confidential
informant’s identity is justifiable. The problem is one that
calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow
of information against the individual’s right to prepare his
defense. Whether a proper balance renders the
nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular
circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the
crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible
significance of the informer’s testimony and other relevant
factors.
This balance is initially weighted toward the
Commonwealth, which holds a qualified privilege to
maintain an informant’s confidentiality to preserve the
public’s interest in effective law enforcement. However,
the balance tips in favor of disclosure where guilt is found
solely on police testimony from a single observation and
testimony from a disinterested source, such as the
informant, is available.
Commonwealth v. King, 932 A.2d 948, 952 (Pa.Super. 2007) (internal
citations omitted).
“[R]egardless of whether the informant was an eyewitness to the
transaction for which the defendant was charged, the Commonwealth retains
a qualified privilege not to disclose an informant’s identity.”
Commonwealth v. Withrow, 932 A.2d 138, 140-41 (Pa.Super. 2007).
To overcome that privilege, the defendant must show that
his request for disclosure is reasonable and that the
information sought to be obtained through disclosure is
material to the defense. Although the defendant need not
predict exactly what the informant will say, he must
demonstrate at least a reasonable possibility the
informant’s testimony would exonerate him. Only after
this threshold showing that the information is material and
the request reasonable is the trial court called upon to
determine whether the information is to be revealed.
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Id. at 141 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
“Where the confidential informant is not a witness to the incident at
issue, the defendant must show that the Commonwealth’s disclosure of the
identity of the informant is (1) material to his defense; (2) reasonable; and
(3) in the interests of justice.” King, supra at 952 (quoting
Commonwealth v. Hritz, 663 A.2d 775, 778 (Pa.Super. 1995)).
Regarding the element of materiality, the defendant must
show as a threshold matter that the informant’s identity is
germane to the defense. Evidence is relevant and material
to the defense if it tends to show that a specific crime of
which a defendant stands accused was committed by
someone else. The record must disclose a reasonable
possibility that the information sought will materially aid
the defendant in presenting his defense and is not
obtainable from another source.
Id. at 953 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in
original).
Instantly, the record reveals the police initially learned about potential
narcotics activity at Appellant’s address from several sources, including a
confidential informant. No evidence of record indicates, however, that the
informant played any further role in the investigation. The informant was
not a witness to any of the crimes for which Appellant was charged. At
most, the informant merely contributed to the officers’ decision to conduct
surveillance at 3327 Ward Street on April 16, 2012. The informant had no
involvement in that surveillance activity or in the subsequent execution of
the search warrant. Thus, Appellant failed to show testimony from the
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informant would tend to show that someone other than Appellant committed
the offenses in question. See id. Based on the foregoing, Appellant was
unable to establish that knowledge of the informant’s identity was material
to Appellant’s defense, reasonable, and in the interests of justice. See id.
Therefore, the court properly denied Appellant’s request for disclosure of the
informant’s identity. See Withrow, supra. Accordingly, we affirm.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/10/2016
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