Stonecrest Aquisitions v. Hall, D. ( 2017 )


Menu:
  • J. S02002/17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    STONECREST ACQUISITIONS, LLC            :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :           PENNSYLVANIA
    v.                    :
    :
    DAYEN HALL,                             :          No. 2077 EDA 2016
    :
    Appellant        :
    Appeal from the Order, June 22, 2016,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Civil Division at No. 001560-12
    BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., STABILE AND MOULTON, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.:                  FILED MARCH 21, 2017
    Dayen Hall appeals the order of the Court of Common Pleas of
    Philadelphia County that granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings
    of Stonecrest Acquisitions, LLC (“appellee”) and ordered appellee to take
    immediate possession of the property located at 2222 Greenwich Street,
    Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19146 (“the Property”).
    The procedural history, as recounted by the trial court, is as follows:
    On December 17, 2015, [a]ppellee initiated
    this action by filing a Complaint in Ejectment against
    John Does No. 1 to 3 with regard to the property
    located at 2222 Greenwich Street in the City of
    Philadelphia.[1] On January 5, 2016, [appellant]
    filed an Answer to the Complaint. On February 22,
    1
    In the complaint, appellee indicated that it was the legal and record owner
    of the Property and that appellant had been occupying the Property for an
    indeterminate period of time without any legal or equitable right to do so
    and without appellee’s permission.
    J. S02002/17
    2016, [appellee] filed Preliminary Objections to
    [appellant’s] Answer, which this Court sustained on
    March 21, 2016 and further directed [appellant] to
    file an Answer comporting with the Pennsylvania
    Rules of Civil Procedure.      On April 12, 2016,
    [appellee] filed an Amended Answer to the
    Complaint.[2] On April 22, 2016, [appellee] filed
    Preliminary Objections to [appellant’s] Amended
    Answer. On May 17, 2016, this Court overruled the
    Preliminary Objections without prejudice to raise the
    issues in a motion for judgment seeking possession
    of the property.
    On May 31, 2016, [appellee] filed a Motion for
    Judgment on the Pleadings, to which no response
    was filed. On June 23, 2016, this Court granted
    [appellee] judgment in possession of the property
    located at 2222 Greenwich Street in the City of
    Philadelphia, with the caveat that no writ of
    execution could be issued until [appellant’s] name
    was substituted upon the docket, in accordance with
    the Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 410. On
    June 27, 2016, [appellee] filed a Praecipe to
    Substitute John Does No. 1 to 3 with [appellant] and,
    on June 28, 2016 [appellee] filed a Praecipe for Writ
    of Possession. On June 29, 2016, [appellant] filed a
    Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court of
    Pennsylvania.
    Trial court opinion, 8/23/16 at 1-2 (emphasis in original).
    Appellant raises the following issue before this court:
    [D]id the court err as a matter of law in holding a
    summary judgment, the case was supposed to be
    heard by the judge in January 2017 since the
    ongoing debates over who has legal rights and that
    Pennsylvania not recognize [appellee’s] claim of
    property this matter should not be determent [sic]
    2
    In the answer, appellant claimed negligence, asserted that appellee was
    partially responsible, and claimed that he had paid $88,500 to Bank of
    America. Bank of America held the mortgage at one time.
    -2-
    J. S02002/17
    by default because        true   ownership    is   the
    [appellant][?]
    Appellant’s brief at 1.3
    [Appellate review of an order granting a
    motion for judgment on the pleadings] is
    plenary. The appellate court will apply
    the same standard employed by the trial
    court.    A trial court must confine its
    consideration to the pleadings and
    relevant documents.       The court must
    accept     as   true  all   well  pleaded
    statements of fact, admissions, and any
    documents properly attached to the
    pleadings presented by the party against
    whom the motion is filed, considering
    only those facts which were specifically
    admitted. Further, the court may grant
    judgment on the pleadings only where
    the moving party’s right to succeed is
    certain and the case is so free from
    doubt that trial would clearly be a
    fruitless exercise.
    Steiner v. Bell of Pennsylvania, 426 Pa.Super. 84,
    87-88, 
    626 A.2d 584
    , 586 (1993). (Citations and
    footnote omitted). We must determine if the trial
    court’s action was based on a clear error of law or
    whether there were facts disclosed by the pleadings
    which should properly go to the jury. Kelly v.
    Nationwide Insurance Company, 414 Pa.Super.
    6, 10, 
    606 A.2d 470
    , 471 (1992).
    Kafando v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
    704 A.2d 675
    , 676
    (Pa.Super. 1998).
    3
    Appellant’s brief contains no page numbers.      For the ease of our
    discussion, we have assigned each page a corresponding number.
    -3-
    J. S02002/17
    A   motion     for   judgment   on    the   pleadings   is   governed   by
    Pa.R.Civ.P. 1034, which provides:
    (a)     After the pleadings are closed, but within such
    time as not to delay the trial, any party may
    move for judgment on the pleadings.
    (b)     The court shall enter such judgment or order
    as shall be proper on the pleadings.
    Pa.R.Civ.P. 1034.
    The plaintiffs’ burden in an action in ejectment
    at law is clear: they must establish the right to
    immediate exclusive possession. Recovery can be
    had only on the strength of their own title, not the
    weakness of defendant’s title.        The crux of an
    ejectment action, therefore, rests with the plaintiffs’
    ability to identify, by a preponderance of the
    evidence, the boundaries of a parcel of land to which
    they are out of possession but for which they
    maintain paramount title.
    Doman v. Brogan, 
    592 A.2d 104
    , 108 (Pa.Super. 1991) (citations omitted).
    Here, the trial court determined that appellee set forth in its complaint
    that appellee acquired the Property from Bank of New York Mellon, that
    appellee was in possession of the recorded deed, and that appellant
    remained on the property without the authority or permission of appellee.
    The trial court further determined that appellant’s amended answer did not
    set forth any admissions or denials but provided a series of documents which
    apparently attempted to challenge the original mortgage foreclosure action.
    A review of the record confirms the trial court’s assessment.
    -4-
    J. S02002/17
    In his brief, appellant again focuses on his prior dealings with his
    lender rather than whether appellee met its burden for ejectment and
    judgment on the pleadings. He appears to argue that his lender engaged in
    fraudulent foreclosures and that the Philadelphia Sheriff’s Department was
    involved in this corruption. He argues that appellee’s fight is not with him
    but with loan servicer Bank of America and its inconsistent and fraudulent
    practices. He also argues that his debt has been legally settled. A party is
    barred from using an ejectment action to challenge the propriety of the
    underlying foreclosure matter. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n v. Citiano, 
    834 A.2d 645
    , 647 (Pa.Super. 2003).
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 3/21/2017
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Stonecrest Aquisitions v. Hall, D. No. 2077 EDA 2016

Filed Date: 3/21/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/21/2017