Com. v. Coleman, S. ( 2016 )

J-S68023-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
SHERMAN COLEMAN
Appellant No. 40 WDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order entered December 7, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0000275-1988
CP-02-CR-0000279-1988
CP-02-CR-0000281-1988
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., SOLANO, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY SOLANO, J.: FILED DECEMBER 15, 2016
Appellant, Sherman Coleman, appeals pro se from the order denying
his motion to compel, which the trial court treated as a serial petition filed
pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
We affirm.
Appellant, who is incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at
Albion, is serving sentences for convictions in 1988, the facts of which are
not relevant to our disposition of this appeal. At issue here is his pro se
motion to compel, which was dated September 27, 2015, and docketed on
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S68023-16
October 2, 2015. The motion seeks copies of the orders under which
Appellant was sentenced, and requests that the court “exercise its
Supervisory Powers/Authority and issue an ORDER of Court directed to Kate
Barkman, Esquire, Director, Department of Court Records directing and/or
commanding that she forthwith provide this Petitioner with a copy of the
specified separate sentencing order(s) or a verified statement, stating that
these court document(s) are not in her possession, under her custody or
under her control.” Motion to Compel, 10/2/15, at 6. On November 17,
2015, Appellant filed a motion to expedite his motion to compel.
In a decision by the Honorable John Zottola, the trial court treated
Appellant’s filings as requests for post-conviction relief, and issued an order
denying relief on December 7, 2015. Appellant mailed a notice of appeal,
dated December 17, 2015, from prison, and the appeal was docketed on
January 7, 2016.1 On February 16, 2016, the court filed an opinion stating
that it denied the motion because it was time-barred under the PCRA. Trial
Court Opinion, 2/16/16.
In his Statement of Questions Involved, Appellant presents one
question for our review, stated as follows:
APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT JUDGE JOHN A. ZOTTOLA,
ABUSED ITS [sic] DISCRETION BY RULING ON A MATTER IN
____________________________________________
1
Under the “prisoner mailbox rule,” courts deem a pro se document “filed”
on the date it is placed in the hands of prison authorities for mailing.
Commonwealth v. Crawford, 17 A.3d 1279, 1281 (Pa. Super. 2011).
-2-
J-S68023-16
WHICH HE DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY/JURISDICTION
TO DO, AS HE IS NOT A PRESIDENT JUDGE OF THE COURT
OF COMMON PLEAS OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA?
Appellant’s Brief at 6.
Before we proceed to address the substance of Appellant’s claim, we
turn to the Commonwealth’s observation that Appellant’s motion to compel
did “not appear to challenge the propriety of his conviction or sentence,” and
therefore “does not appear to be contemplated by the PCRA, nor does the
Act offer an available remedy.” Commonwealth Brief at 12 n.14. The
Commonwealth further notes that, despite the lower court’s treatment of
Appellant’s claim under the PCRA, this Court may affirm a lower court on
different grounds, and suggests that we do so, “because the record shows
that copies of [the sentencing orders that Appellant seeks] were, in fact,
sent to [Appellant].” Commonwealth Brief at 9; see also Commonwealth
v. Thompson, 778 A.2d 1215, 1223 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2001) (it is well settled
that we may affirm on different grounds from those advanced by the trial
court).
Relative to treatment under the PCRA, we have explained:
PCRA review is limited to defendants who claim that they were
wrongfully convicted and/or are serving an illegal sentence. 42
Pa.C.S. § 9542; [Commonwealth v.] Judge, [916 A.2d 511(Pa. 2007); Commonwealth v. West, [938 A.2d 1034 (Pa.
2007)]; see also Coady v. Vaughn, 564 Pa. 604, 770 A.2d 287(2001) (Castille, J. concurring). The specifically-enumerated
substantive issues that are reviewable pursuant to the PCRA
relate to matters affecting conviction and sentence. 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9543(a)(2).
-3-
J-S68023-16
Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2010).
Appellant’s appeal relates to an alleged denial of his motion to be supplied
with copies of records (sentencing orders), and not to any denial of
substantive relief with respect his conviction or sentence. Therefore, the
Commonwealth is correct that Appellant’s motion did not present a claim
under the PCRA and, accordingly, is not time-barred under the PCRA. Thus,
we proceed to review Appellant’s claim independent of the lower court’s
invocation of the PCRA.
The single issue framed by Appellant’s Statement of Questions
Involved is whether his motion to compel should have been decided by the
Honorable John Zottola of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
or whether it should have been decided instead by that Court’s President
Judge, the Honorable Jeffrey Manning. Appellant contends that Judge
Zottola lacked jurisdiction to decide Appellant’s motion to compel production
of his sentencing orders and that a decision by Judge Zottola therefore
deprived him of his rights. In his summary of argument, after asserting that
he has a right to receive copies of the sentencing orders, Appellant states:
Appellant further contends that he has a Statutory and
Constitutional Right to be heard in the proper Court with
jurisdiction to adjudicate a matter that is solely designated for
the President Judge of the said Court of Common Pleas.
Subsequently, the Honorable John A. Zottola, J., elected to rule
upon a matter in which he lacked the proper jurisdiction/
authority to deprive/deny this Appellant the same access to
these court records/public information afforded to any branch of
government or private/public citizen in this Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania.
-4-
J-S68023-16
Appellant’s Brief at 10.
Appellant bases his argument on Rule 116 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which provides:
Rule 116. General Supervisory Powers of President Judge
The President Judge shall be responsible for ensuring that the
judicial district is in compliance with the Pennsylvania Rules of
Criminal Procedure, other rules, and statutes, applicable to the
minor judiciary, courts, clerks of courts, and court
administrators.
Comment: By this rule, the Supreme Court is imposing on the
president judges the responsibility of supervising their respective
judicial districts to ensure compliance with the statewide Rules of
Criminal Procedure, other rules, and statutes.
Appellant reads this rule to give President Judge Manning exclusive
supervisory authority over any matter relating to compliance with court
requirements, and, therefore, exclusive jurisdiction over his motion for
compliance with his request for court records.
Appellant misinterprets Rule 116. Although Rule 116 does indeed give
supervisory authority to a judicial district’s president judge, nothing in the
rule addresses or limits the authority or jurisdiction of other criminal court
judges to rule on criminal matters and cases to which they have been
assigned, including cases dealing with compliance with Commonwealth
statutes, rules, and other directives. The Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S.
§ 325(e)(1), states that the president judge shall “[b]e the executive and
administrative head of the court, supervise the judicial business of the court,
promulgate all administrative rules and regulations, make all judicial
-5-
J-S68023-16
assignments, and assign and reassign among the personnel of the court
available chambers and other physical facilities.” It therefore explicitly
contemplates judicial assignments to other duly-commissioned judges. All
judges on a court of common pleas have “unlimited original jurisdiction” of
the matters before them. See 42 Pa. C.S. § 931(a). There is thus no merit
to Appellant’s argument that his motion to compel was within the exclusive
jurisdiction of President Judge Manning and could not be heard by Judge
Zottola.
The jurisdiction question is the only issue framed by Appellant’s
Statement of Questions Involved, and our rules provide that any issue not
set forth in the Statement of Questions Involved is waived. See Pa.R.A.P.
2116(a) (“No question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement
of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby”); see also
Commonwealth v. Samuel, 102 A.3d 1001, 1005-1006 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(relying on Rule 2116(a) in declining to address the merits of an argument
that the appellant did not raise in his statement of questions raised on
appeal). For this reason, Appellant has failed to preserve any other issue in
this case.
We note, however, that much of Appellant’s brief relates to his concern
that, even though he has been provided with copies of the orders he seeks,
he has not been provided with the correct copies of those orders.
Appellant’s sentences were entered at three dockets in the Allegheny County
Court of Common Pleas: CP-02-CR-00275-1988; CP-02-CR-279-1988; and
-6-
J-S68023-16
CP-02-CR-00281-1988. Appellant concedes that he received copies of
sentencing orders under those docket numbers from the Department of
Court Records. Appellant’s Brief at 12. Nonetheless, Appellant challenges
the legitimacy or validity of the orders he was provided because “they are
not separately titled, separately captioned, or separately entered in the
appropriate Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Docket
Entries.” Id. Appellant maintains that the sentencing orders provided to
him fail to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 301(b) (“[e]very order shall be set forth on
a separate document”), and he appears to suggest that there therefore must
be some other separate orders that he has not yet obtained. See id. at 12-
13.2
The Commonwealth responds that Appellant was provided with copies
of the orders endorsed on the back of each criminal information, and that
these are the controlling orders in the case. See Commonwealth Brief at
10-11, citing Commonwealth v. Fleming, 480 A.2d 1214, 1223 (Pa.
Super. 1984); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 280 A.2d 651, 654 (Pa. Super.
1971). The Commonwealth observes further that because these orders are
consistent with the sentencing transcript, there can be no question regarding
____________________________________________
2
To emphasize his point, Appellant appends to his brief copies of two orders
that, he says, exemplify what a proper sentencing order should look like.
See Appellant’s Brief at 13. He provided these same examples to the trial
court and to the Department of Court Records in support of his claim that he
did not receive what he requested. See id. at 7-8.
-7-
J-S68023-16
their legitimacy. Id., citing Commonwealth v. Glunt, 96 A.3d 365, 372
(Pa. Super. 2014) (lack of written sentencing order did not make sentence
illegal because “[b]oth the criminal docket provided by the trial court and
the transcript of the sentencing hearing confirm[ed] the imposition, and
legitimacy, of [defendant]’s sentence”), appeal denied, 101 A.3d 787 (Pa.
2014). We note that Appellant has been able to appeal from and file PCRA
petitions with respect to these same orders in the past, and that it is far too
late to raise any issue now regarding their legitimacy or validity.
Because Appellant has not preserved any separate issue on this point,
we have no need to address it further in this appeal, except to observe that
the issue appears to be moot. Appellant’s complaint is not that he failed to
receive the orders that he requested, but that the orders that he received do
not look the way that he believes the orders should look. Whether or not
that is true, the Commonwealth concedes that the orders that were given to
Appellant are the orders that exist. In light of these concessions, it appears
that Appellant has received all that he requested.
Order affirmed.
Judge Shogan concurs in the result.
Judge Strassburger files a dissenting memorandum.
-8-
J-S68023-16
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/15/2016
-9-