Com. v. Fike, E. ( 2016 )


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  • J. A29004/16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :          PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                      :
    :
    EDWIN A. FIKE,                           :
    APPELLANT               :
    :
    :     No. 329 WDA 2016
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 8, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-26-CR-0002026-2014
    BEFORE: DUBOW, J., MOULTON, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    JUDGMENT ORDER BY DUBOW, J.:                  FILED NOVEMBER 17, 2016
    Appellant, Edwin A. Fike, appeals from the Judgment of Sentence
    entered by the Fayette County Court of Common Pleas on January 7, 2016,
    following his December 7, 2015 guilty plea to one count each of Indecent
    Assault and Corruption of Minors.1 Appellant avers that his two convictions
    should be merged for sentencing purposes, urging this Court to adopt a
    hybrid test for our merger analysis.   As this Court has previously rejected
    1
    These charges arose out of a January 2009 incident in which Appellant
    repeatedly grabbed the chest of his victim, a female cousin less than 13
    years of age. Trial Court Opinion, filed 3/30/16, at 1. Appellant had two
    prior convictions for Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse and Indecent
    Assault. Id. During sentencing, Appellant told the trial court he has “a hard
    time with young girls.” Id.
    J. A29004/16
    the hybrid test and found that Indecent Assault and Corruption of Minors do
    not merge for sentencing purposes, we affirm.
    Appellant relies on Commonwealth v. Jones, 
    912 A.2d 815
     (Pa.
    2006), for the proposition that courts in this Commonwealth should apply a
    hybrid approach to merger analysis in which they consider both the statutory
    elements of the offenses as well as the facts in the well-pleaded complaint.
    Appellant’s Brief at 7-9. However, Appellant ignores the fact that Jones is a
    fractured, non-binding, plurality Opinion that the legislature superseded by
    statute and that this Court rejected in favor of a statutory elements test.2
    See Commonwealth v. Williams, 
    920 A.2d 887
     (Pa. Super. 2007) (noting
    the nonbinding nature of Jones and its inapplicability to offenses committed
    after 42 Pa.C.S. § 9765 became effective).
    In Williams, this Court thoroughly analyzed the lead and dissenting
    opinions of Jones in light of the legislature’s enactment of 42 Pa.C.S. §
    9765, governing merger. Under Section 9765, “[n]o crimes shall merge for
    sentencing purposes unless the crimes arise from a single criminal act and
    all of the statutory elements of one offense are included in the statutory
    2
    Under a hybrid test, courts are instructed to “evaluate the statutory
    elements of each crime [as charged], with an eye to the specific allegations
    leveled in the case” to determine “whether the defendant was charged and
    convicted on a single set of facts that satisfies both offenses.”
    Commonwealth v. Williams, 
    920 A.2d 887
    , 889 (Pa. Super. 2007)
    (citation and quotation omitted). Under a statutory elements test, no two
    offenses may merge unless “all of the statutory elements of one offense
    coincide with the statutory elements of the other offense.” 
    Id. at 891
    .
    -2-
    J. A29004/16
    elements of the other offense.”   42 Pa.C.S. § 9765.    In light of the clear
    statutory language in Section 9765, this Court rejected the hybrid test in
    favor of the statutory elements test. Williams, 
    920 A.2d at 891
    .
    In Commonwealth v. Martz, 
    926 A.2d 514
    , 526-27 (Pa. Super.
    2007), this Court applied the statutory elements test adopted in Williams to
    the issue now raised: whether Indecent Assault and Corruption of Minors
    should merge for sentencing purposes. As this Court recognized, merger is
    not required because:
    18 Pa.C.S.[] § 6301(a)(1) (corruption of minors) contains a
    statutory element that 18 Pa.C.S.[] § 3126(a)(7) (indecent
    assault) does not; namely, a person eighteen years and upwards
    engages in “any act” which corrupts or tends to corrupt the
    morals of a minor less than eighteen years of age is guilty of
    violating Section 6301(a)(1).   Under Section 6301(a)(1), the
    Commonwealth need not prove that the defendant had “indecent
    contact” with the complainant to be guilty of corruption of
    minors, “any act” which tends to corrupt the minor contravenes
    the statute. In contrast, to be guilty of violating Section
    3126(a)(7), the complainant has to be less than thirteen years
    of age and the defendant must have had “indecent contact” with
    the complainant, whereas “any act” engaged in by the defendant
    tending to corrupt the complainant will constitute a violation
    of Section 6301(a)(1).
    Id. at 526.
    Put simply, binding precedent clearly dictates that (i) the hybrid test
    does not apply to merger analysis in this Commonwealth; and (ii) under a
    statutory elements test, the trial court did not err in finding that Indecent
    Assault and Corruption of Minors do not merge for sentencing purposes.
    Judgment of Sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    -3-
    J. A29004/16
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 11/17/2016
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 329 WDA 2016

Filed Date: 11/17/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/18/2016