Barksdale, M. v. Barksdale, J. ( 2016 )

J-A23004-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
MARISSA S. BARKSDALE IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JUSTIN T. BARKSDALE
Appellant No. 1891 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Dated November 6, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Civil Division at No(s): FD 14-7960-011
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 18, 2016
Justin Barksdale (“Husband”) appeals from the order entered in the
Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County denying his Motion to Enforce
Consent Order against Marissa Barksdale (“Wife”). After our review, we
affirm.
Husband and Wife were married on December 19, 2004. Two children
were born of the marriage, ages five and eleven. On September 26, 2014,
Wife filed for divorce. On June 11, 2015, Husband and Wife entered into a
consent order, which resolved the issues of equitable distribution and
custody. With respect to the marital home, the order provided that Wife
would sign over the deed to Husband and Husband would assure that Wife
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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was not obligated on the mortgage. The court entered a divorce decree on
July 17, 2015.
Thereafter, on October 26, 2015, Husband filed a Motion to Enforce
Consent Order. In his motion, Husband averred Wife failed to sign over the
deed to the marital home, and although Wife’s name was still listed on the
mortgage instrument, she “is not named in the Mortgage Note.” Motion to
Enforce Consent Order, 10/26/15, at ¶5. Further, Husband averred that he
contacted the mortgagee, and has “been assured that because [W]ife is not
named in and did not sign the Mortgage Note, she cannot be held
responsible for the mortgage in any way.” Id. at ¶ 6. Husband claimed that
Wife’s failure to sign over the deed violated the parties’ agreement.
On November 6, 2015, the court heard argument on Husband’s motion
and concluded that Wife was not required to sign over the deed until
Husband removed Wife from the mortgage note. The court entered an order
denying Husband’s motion and ordering him to remove Wife from the
mortgage. See Order, 11/6/15. Husband filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was denied, and this appeal followed.
Husband raises one issue for our review:
Whether the trial court erred in failing to enforce the parties’
unambiguous agreement and in requiring the husband to remove
the wife’s name from the mortgage on the marital residence.
Appellant’s Brief, at 3.
It is well-established that the law of contracts governs marital
settlement agreements, and under the law of contracts, the
court must ascertain the intent of the parties when interpreting a
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contractual agreement. Kripp v. Kripp, 849 A.2d 1159, 1163
(Pa. 2004) (citations omitted). The standard of enforceability of
a contractual agreement is also clear: absent fraud,
misrepresentation, or duress, spouses should be bound by the
terms of their agreements. As such, a trial court may interpret a
property settlement agreement as it would a contract, but it has
neither the power nor the authority to modify or vary the decree
unless there is conclusive proof of fraud or mistake. Moreover,
the long-standing law of this Commonwealth is that property
settlement agreements are presumed to be valid and binding
upon the parties. When construing agreements involving clear
and unambiguous terms, a trial court need only examine the
writing itself to give effect to the parties' understanding. A court
may not modify the plain meaning of the words under the guise
of interpretation.
Crispo v. Crispo, 909 A.2d 308, 312–13 (Pa. Super. 2006)(citations and
quotations omitted).
The parties’ consent order provides, in pertinent part:
Husband shall retain the marital residence and assume
responsibility for all costs associated with it, including payment
of the mortgage loan, property taxes, and insurance. Deed to be
signed and transferred to Husband. Husband to assure Wife is
not obligated in any way on the mortgage.
Consent Order, 6/16/15, ¶1 (emphasis added).
Husband argues that absent a provision allowing for modification, the
court may not modify the terms of the agreement, which is treated as a
contract between the parties. Osial v. Cook, 803 A.2d 209, 213 (Pa. Super.
2002). He claims that the consent order did not specifically obligate him to
refinance the mortgage and thus his assurances satisfy the condition that
Wife is not obligated on the mortgage.
The Mortgage Instrument states:
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Any Borrower who co-signs this Security Instrument but does
not execute the Note: (a) is co-signing this Security Instrument
only to mortgage, grant and convey that Borrower’s interest in
the Property under the terms of this Security Instrument; (b) is
not personally obligated to pay the sums secured by this
Security Instrument; and (c) agrees that Lender and any
other Borrower may agree to extend, modify, forbear or make
any accommodations with regard to the terms of this Security
Instrument or the Note without that Borrower’s consent.
Mortgage, 2/6/12, at ¶12 (emphasis added). A mortgage is generally
accompanied by a promissory note. The note is evidence of the debt
obligation for which the mortgage is given. The mortgage and the note,
while separate instruments, secure the same debt. However, the note is a
personal obligation of the obligor (mortgagor). Here, Husband signed the
Note; Wife did not. See Note, 2/6/12, at 2. Although Wife is not personally
liable on the Note, if Husband defaults on the Note and the mortgagee
(“Lender”) pursued a foreclosure action against the property, Wife would be
named and required to defend that action. Additionally, Wife, named as
Borrower on the Mortgage (“Security Instrument”), retains obligations on
the Mortgage apart from the Note, such as governmental or municipal
charges, fines and impositions that are not included in the monthly payment
as set forth in the Note. See Mortgage, at ¶ 7.
If Borrower fails to make these payments . . . or fails to perform
any other covenants and agreements contained in this Security
Instrument, or there is a legal proceeding that may significantly
affect Lender’s rights in the Property (such as a proceeding in
bankruptcy, for condemnation or to enforce laws or regulations),
then Lender may do and pay whatever is necessary to protect
the value of the Property and Lender’s rights in the Property,
including payment of taxes hazard insurance and other items
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mentioned in paragraph 2. Any amounts disbursed by
Lender under this paragraph shall become an additional
debt of Borrower and be secured by this Security
Instrument.
Mortgage, ¶7 (emphasis added).
Husband’s and mortgagee’s assurances that Wife will not be financially
responsible for the debt secured by the mortgage is not a satisfactory
release of Wife from association with the marital home and from all
obligations under the mortgage. The court determined that it was the
intention of the parties to “sever Wife’s financial obligation to the mortgage”
and that in order to enforce the consent order, Husband was required “to
remove [Wife] from all mortgage documents associated with the marital
home.” Trial Court Opinion, 1/7/16, at 6-7 (emphasis added). The trial
court’s interpretation gives effect to the parties’ agreement. Crispo, supra.We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s order.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/18/2016
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