Tenth Presbyterian Church v. Snyder, P. ( 2023 )


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  • J-S04035-23
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    TENTH PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    PHILIP SNYDER                              :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 2580 EDA 2022
    Appeal from the Order Entered September 20, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
    No(s): 190703016
    BEFORE: MURRAY, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.:                            FILED MARCH 1, 2023
    This case returns to us a third time in an ongoing dispute involving Philip
    Snyder (Snyder) and his protests of his former church, Tenth Presbyterian
    Church (the Church). In our most recent remand, we directed the Court of
    Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) to explain why its distance
    restriction of 1,000 feet was “the least necessary distance to protect Church
    property, permit the congregants’ and Church employees access to the Church
    and to hold services without distraction, with the least possible impingement
    on Snyder's constitutional right to convey his dissatisfaction with the Church
    and its leadership on public streets and sidewalks.” On remand, the trial court
    ____________________________________________
    *   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S04035-23
    shortened the distance requirement to 500 feet and made several factual
    findings in support of the new restriction.
    Snyder now appeals from the most recent order and asserts that the
    trial court’s new distance requirement is still not the least necessary distance
    to protect the Church’s property and congregants while also not impinging on
    his constitutional right to protest. After review, we are constrained to reverse
    the trial court’s distance requirement and remand again with instructions.
    I.
    A.
    We have previously summarized the facts and procedural history of this
    dispute as follows:
    The Church owns several properties in Philadelphia. The
    Church’s primary facility is located at 1701 Delancey Street (“the
    Property”). Snyder moved to Philadelphia in 2008, after which he
    joined the Church, where he remained a member until the Church
    excommunicated Snyder in August 2016. Snyder thereafter
    began picketing at the Property regarding his excommunication
    and the conduct of certain current and prior Church officials.
    Snyder brought a defamation action against individual members
    of the Church, but ultimately, a jury tendered a verdict against
    Snyder.
    After the verdict in the defamation action, Snyder protested
    outside of the Property every Sunday, before and after Church
    services. On July 24, 2019, the Church filed a Complaint for an
    injunction and an Emergency Motion for Injunctive Relief for a
    preliminary injunction. The Church sought to restrict Snyder from
    coming within 1,000 feet of all properties owned by the Church.
    Following oral argument, Snyder temporarily agreed to the
    Church's requested relief.
    The trial court subsequently conducted a hearing on the
    Church’s Motion for a preliminary injunction on January 30, 2020,
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    and February 10, 2020. The trial court described the evidence
    presented at that hearing as follows:
    Snyder testified that he began picketing outside of the
    Property after the March 22, 2019, jury verdict more
    frequently, with a sign that contained the phrase “naked
    beatings,” “lying,” and “rape,” because he was displeased
    with the results of the case. Snyder further testified that
    he had protested while wearing a body camera and filmed
    congregants outside of the Property. Snyder testified that
    a trial court Order and subsequent Opinion in the
    defamation case misrepresented the truth. Douglas Baker
    (Baker), the Church’s former administrator, testified that
    Snyder frequently wore a visibly “concealed” firearm to
    church services when he was a member, and that he
    continued the practice while picketing with the sign and
    body camera. Baker testified that Snyder would verbally
    harass and yell at congregants outside the Property and
    then post body camera videos on a blog. Dr. William
    Goligher (Dr. Goligher), senior minister for the Church,
    testified that Snyder called him the “son of Satan” and a
    liar.   Dr. Goligher testified that Snyder had verbally
    disparaged Snyder’s own family for not committing to his
    protest and not being faithful, including referring to
    Snyder’s wife as Job’s wife ... Dr. Goligher also testified
    that Snyder seemed preoccupied with safety and firearms,
    such that he would stand beside Dr. Goligher and point out
    individuals whom he thought were carrying firearms.
    Snyder’s fixation on security and policing, even minor
    behaviors of the Church congregants, went on for years
    and included concerns about stolen phones, money, and
    immigrants. Snyder himself provided testimony that he
    has been the only individual telling the truth, that he has
    mailed 100 pages of material to 200 members of the
    Church, that he will never stop any of his behaviors until
    the Church’s leadership has resigned in full, and that the
    Church was trying to poison him and hire a hitman to
    assassinate him. Susan Elzey (Ms. Elzey), a congregant,
    testified that outside of Church services on June 16, 2019,
    Snyder told her he was an instrument of God, similar to a
    prophet, and that only Snyder knows the true nature of Dr.
    Goligher’s soul. Snyder went on to tell Ms. Elzey that Dr.
    Goligher was a son of Satan, and that any congregants who
    support Dr. Goligher are doing Satan’s work. Snyder also
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    told Ms. Elzey that he was unhappy with his wife, described
    her as Job’s wife because she did not support him, and that
    his oath to remove Dr. Goligher from the Church was more
    important to him than his family.
    By Order dated February 10, 2020, the trial court granted
    the Church’s Motion and enjoined Snyder from appearing
    within five thousand (5,000) feet of the Church’s
    properties located at (1) 1701 Delancey Street; (2) 1700
    Spruce Street; (3) 315 S. 17th Street; (4) 1710 Spruce
    Street; and (5) 1716 Spruce Street.
    Trial Court Opinion, 8/21/20, at 1-5 (emphasis added).
    Tenth Presbyterian Church v. Snyder, 
    2021 WL 4839339
    , at *1-2 (Pa.
    Super. filed October 18, 2021) (unpublished memorandum) (brackets and
    some quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original).
    Snyder timely appealed the trial court’s order granting the Church’s
    motion. On appeal, we affirmed the trial court's order in part, reversed in
    part, and remanded for further proceedings. First, we affirmed the trial court’s
    determination as to the propriety of the preliminary injunction because
    “Snyder engaged in aggressive and agitated behavior that frightened and
    agitated Church members inside and outside of the Property.” Id. at *8. We
    reversed, however, the 5,000-foot distance requirement against Snyder as far
    exceeding the appropriate scope of relief. Accordingly, we remanded for the
    trial court “to fashion a limitation that achieves the specific needs of this case,
    i.e., a distance that is sufficient to protect congregants’ access to the Church
    and its services, yet continues to uphold Snyder's constitutional right to
    convey his dissatisfaction with the Church and its leadership.” Id.
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    As for the Church’s initial request for a uniform 1,000-foot prohibition
    on Snyder’s protests at all of the properties, we noted: “the Church broadly
    requested a one-thousand-foot prohibition on Snyder’s protests.             The
    Complaint couches the requested relief in the broadest terms but does not
    afford Snyder his constitutional right to protest the Church and its leadership.
    Any preliminary injunction must be narrowly tailored to address the physical
    realities of each Church property, while balancing Snyder’s federal and state
    right to free speech.” Id. at *7 n.3 (citing Santoro v. Morse, 
    781 A.2d 1220
    ,
    1230 (Pa. Super. 2001)).1
    B.
    On November 10, 2021, in accordance with our remand directive, the
    trial court issued an order vacating the terms of its initial injunction and
    granting the Church’s emergency motion for injunctive relief. The trial court
    decreased the distance requirement against Snyder from 5,000 to 1,000 feet,
    applicable to all Church-owned properties and reads in relevant part:
    The Defendant Philip Snyder is ENJOINED from:
    1. Distributing, picketing, leafleting, harassing, intimidating,
    placing in fear, threatening or otherwise communicating to Church
    members within one thousand (1,000) feet of the church located
    at 1701 Delancey Street, Philadelphia, PA 19103 on Sundays;
    ____________________________________________
    1   Snyder petitioned for allowance of appeal to the Supreme Court of
    Pennsylvania, which denied his petition on May 3, 2022. Snyder went on to
    file a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, which
    denied his petition.
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    2. Appearing within one thousand (1,000) feet of all property
    owned and/or occupied by Tenth Presbyterian Church, including
    but not necessarily: 1700 Spruce Street, 1701 Delancey Street,
    315 S. 17th Street; 1710 Spruce Street, and 1716 Spruce Street,
    Philadelphia, PA 19103.
    Order, 11/10/21, at 1.
    After Snyder timely appealed, the trial court explained its reasoning for
    the 1,000-foot restriction, as it acknowledged that “the content of [Snyder’s]
    speech is protected as his subjective opinion,” and determined that a 1,000-
    foot distance requirement “is narrowly tailored because [Snyder] is free to
    protest and distribute material more than 1000 feet from [the Church’s]
    properties.” Trial Court Opinion, 4/7/22, at 12-13. The trial court stated that
    it “couched [the injunction] in the narrowest terms possible because it is a
    restriction that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective of protecting
    Appellee’s leadership and congregants while they worship,” and noted the
    parties’ litigious history and Snyder’s “threat of potentially violent behavior”
    as reasons for its decision.   Id. at 13.
    On appeal, Snyder argued that the injunction was not narrowly tailored
    to address the harm alleged by the Church and that the 1,000-foot distance
    restriction applicable to all Church owned and/or occupied properties must be
    vacated.   He further argued that the distance requirement prohibiting him
    from appearing/protesting within the specified boundary deprived him of his
    right to engage in constitutionally protected expressive conduct without
    leaving open ample alternative methods of communication.
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    After review, we agreed with Snyder and held that the trial court’s
    uniform 1,000-foot restriction was not narrowly tailored to permit him to
    effectively protest the Church and its leadership. As we explained:
    The trial court … has issued an order on remand that does
    not indicate it weighed the physical characteristics of each
    Property and tailored the distance requirement accordingly, as it
    broadly enjoins Snyder from “appearing” within 1,000 feet of any
    Church “owned and/or occupied” Property. Although the order
    prohibits active picketing only at the primary facility where
    congregants attend regular services on Sundays, Snyder’s mere
    presence within 1,000 feet of any Church Property is a violation of
    the order.
    Additionally, the injunction not only encompasses Property
    owned by the Church, but also includes any facilities the Church
    “occupies.” While the order lists the street addresses of five such
    properties, the restriction is “not necessarily” limited to those
    specified. This language is far from precise or narrow in scope, as
    it potentially captures unidentified locations that Snyder is
    unaware of.
    Furthermore, the injunction disregards our prior finding that
    the Church’s requested relief of a uniform 1,000-foot distance
    restriction is not sufficiently narrowly tailored to balance the
    congregants’ ability to access Church Properties with Snyder’s
    right to free speech.
    Tenth Presbyterian Church v. Snyder, 
    2022 WL 4101153
    , at *4 (Pa.
    Super. filed September 8, 2022) (unpublished memorandum) (citations
    omitted).
    Thus, because the trial court’s distance requirement was not the
    narrowest means possible to achieve its goal, we vacated the trial court’s
    order and remanded the case a second time. In so doing, we emphasized that
    the trial court, in fashioning its injunction, was obliged to use the “narrowest
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    terms that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective” as framed by this Court
    and tailor its relief “as precisely as possible to the exact needs” of this case in
    a manner that imposes the least restraint on Snyder’s free speech, taking into
    consideration the physical realities of each Church property. 
    Id.
     at *4 (citing
    Turner Const. v. Plumbers Local 690, 
    130 A.3d 47
    , 69 (Pa. Super. 2015)).
    Accordingly, we gave the trial court the following instructions:
    On remand, as well as considering its finding that Snyder
    engaged in aggressive and agitated behavior that frightened and
    agitated Church members inside and outside of the Property, the
    trial court should, in setting the distance requirement set forth
    expressly why the particular distance restriction is the least
    necessary to protect Church property, permit the congregants’
    and Church employees access to the Church and to hold services
    without distraction, with the least possible impingement on
    Snyder’s constitutional right to convey his dissatisfaction with the
    Church and its leadership on public streets and sidewalks.
    Id. at *5.
    C.
    On September 20, 2022, the trial court entered a new order granting
    the Church’s emergency motion for injunctive relief and, like it did before,
    decreased its distance requirement, this time setting the distance requirement
    at 500 feet. As a result, the trial court’s order read in relevant part:
    1. Distributing, picketing, leafleting, harassing, intimidating,
    placing in fear, threatening, or otherwise communicating to
    Church members within [500 feet] of the church located at 1701
    Delancey Street, Philadelphia, PA 19103 [] on Sundays;
    2. Appearing within [500 feet] of all property owned and/or
    occupied by [the Church], in the immediate vicinity of [the
    Church] including: 1700 Spruce Street, 1701 Delancey Street,
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    315 S. 17th Street, 1710 Spruce Street, and 1716 Spruce Street,
    Philadelphia, PA 19103[.]
    Order, 9/20/22, at 1.
    The trial court then went on to make several factual findings in support
    of its distance requirement. First, the trial court found that Snyder engaged
    in “aggressive, threatening, and disruptive behavior” that was harassing to
    the Church’s congregants and employees.
    Next, the trial court found that a 500-foot restriction was “the least
    necessary to protect Church property and permit congregants as well as
    employees’ access to both the Church and its services.” Id. at 2. In support,
    the trial court gave this reasoning:
    According to reference.com operated by Ask Media Group, “a
    typical city block is from 310 to 323 feet in length.” As such, a
    [500 foot] restriction upon Snyder will permit Snyder to continue
    to exercise his constitutional right to free speech, while [at] the
    same time keep him sufficient distance away from Tenth
    Presbyterian Church property so as to prevent any egregious
    distraction, harassment or safety concerns by congregants,
    employees, or owners.
    Id. at 2 n.2.
    Relatedly, the trial court also found that
    [t]he evidence shows that even with [Snyder’s] protest being
    located outside the church and more than [20 feet] away,
    congregants could still hear [Snyder’s] loud verbal criticisms as
    well as his protests upon entering the church building and
    attending services. The evidence also demonstrates that all of the
    properties subject to this injunction are actively used by Church
    congregants or employees and are located in close proximity to
    the area of where Mr. Snyder has engaged in his disruptive and
    harassing conduct.
    -9-
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    Id. at 2-3 (footnotes with record citations omitted). Thus, in the trial court’s
    view, a 500-foot restriction was the least possible impingement on Snyder’s
    constitutional right to protest the Church and its leadership, while at the same
    time allowing Church congregants and employees access to the Church and
    “hold services without fear of harassment, distraction or safety concerns.” Id.
    at 3.
    Snyder timely appealed, and both he and the trial court complied with
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925. On appeal, Snyder raises a single issue for our review:
    Did the [trial court] commit an error of law and/or abuse its
    discretion by failing to narrowly tailor its injunction to address the
    alleged harms claimed by [the Church]?
    Snyder’s Brief at 4.2
    II.
    We again set forth the general principles guiding our analysis of this
    matter.     As this Court has explained, “[t]he purposes of a preliminary
    injunction are to preserve the status quo and prevent imminent and
    irreparable harm which might occur before the merits of the case can be heard
    ____________________________________________
    2 “Appellate courts review a trial court order granting or denying a preliminary
    injunction for an abuse of discretion.” Marcellus Shale Coal. v. Dep't of
    Envtl. Prot. of Commonwealth, 
    185 A.3d 985
    , 995 (Pa. 2018) (citation
    omitted). “Additionally, we do not inquire into the merits of the controversy,
    but only examine the record to determine if there were any apparently
    reasonable grounds for the action of the court below.” 
    Id.
     (citation and
    emphasis omitted). “Only if it is plain that no grounds exist to support the
    decree or that the rule of law relied upon was palpably erroneous or misapplied
    will we interfere with the decree.” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted).
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    and determined.” Constantakis v. Bryan Advisory Servs., LLC, 
    275 A.3d 998
    , 1016-17 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted). A petitioner seeking a
    preliminary injunction must establish each of the following prerequisites:
    1) that the injunction is necessary to prevent immediate and
    irreparable harm that cannot be adequately compensated by
    damages; 2) that greater injury would result from refusing an
    injunction than from granting it, and concomitantly, that issuance
    of an injunction will not substantially harm other interested parties
    in the proceedings; 3) that a preliminary injunction will properly
    restore the parties to their status as it existed immediately prior
    to the alleged wrongful conduct; 4) that the activity it seeks to
    restrain is actionable, that its right to relief is clear, and that the
    wrong is manifest, or, in other words, must show that it is likely
    to prevail on the merits; 5) that the injunction it seeks is
    reasonably suited to abate the offending activity; and 6) that a
    preliminary injunction will not adversely affect the public interest.
    Id. at 1022 (citations omitted).
    Additionally, “a preliminary injunction must be crafted so as to be no
    broader than is necessary for the petitioner’s interim protection.” Santoro
    v. Morse, 
    781 A.2d 1220
    , 1230 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citation omitted; emphasis
    added). The United States Supreme Court has also directed that “an order
    issued in the area of First Amendment rights must be couched in the narrowest
    terms     that   will   accomplish   the   pin-pointed   objective   permitted    by
    constitutional mandate and the essential needs of the public order.” Turner
    Const., supra at 69 (citing Carroll v. President and Commissioners of
    Princess Anne, 
    393 U.S. 175
    , 183, (1968)). Consequently, an injunction
    that restrains free speech “must be tailored as precisely as possible to the
    exact needs of the case.” 
    Id.
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    III.
    Snyder first argues that the trial court ignored this Court’s remand
    directive to consider the physical characteristics of the Church’s premises.
    Snyder contends that apart from its finding that congregants could hear him
    inside the church,3 the trial court gave no explanation for why any distance
    shorter than 500 feet would not be appropriate. Even if he was audible beyond
    20 feet from the church, Snyder asserts that the trial court failed to adequately
    explain why a 500-foot restriction was the least distance necessary to protect
    the Church’s congregants and employees.
    While it is not true that the trial court failed to explain its new distance
    requirement, we agree with Snyder that its explanation failed to answer our
    remand directive. As noted, we asked the trial court to set forth why its 1000-
    foot restriction was the least necessary distance “to protect Church property,
    permit the congregants’ and Church employees access to the Church and to
    hold services without distraction, with the least possible impingement on
    ____________________________________________
    3 Snyder contests with the trial court’s finding that he could be heard inside
    the Church, arguing that it misinterpreted the testimony of Ms. Elzey, who
    testified that she continued to hear Snyder as she entered the building. See
    N.T., 1/30/20, at 72. Snyder argues that this testimony establishes only that
    he could be heard while members entered the Church, not while they were
    inside. However, as the Church points out, Ms. Elzey also testified that Snyder
    was being loud enough that several other members already inside the Church
    told her that they also heard him. Id. at 72-73. Thus, the trial court’s finding
    that Church members could hear Snyder inside the Church rather than just
    entering is supported by the evidence.
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    Snyder's constitutional right to convey his dissatisfaction with the Church and
    its leadership on public streets and sidewalks.”
    On remand, the trial court, in setting its new distance requirement at
    500 feet, did not cite any record evidence or receive any new evidence.
    Instead, the trial court cited its own internet research that a “typical” city block
    is 310 to 323 feet in length, seemingly concluding that keeping Snyder around
    a block-and-a-half away from the Church was the only way to ensure that his
    protest does not deter congregants and employees of the Church from
    accessing its properties.
    The problem with this conclusion, however, is that it is not clear what
    evidence the trial court is relying on for its finding that 500 feet is appropriate
    under the facts of this case, taking into consideration the physical layout of
    the Church’s properties and the surrounding neighborhood. Like it failed to
    do before, there is no evidence that the trial court, in setting its distance
    requirement, weighed the physical characteristics of the Church’s property
    and then tailored its distance requirement so that Snyder could still
    meaningfully protest the Church and its leadership. In the absence of such
    evidence in this case, we are left to conclude that the trial court’s distance
    requirement of 500 feet—which would be well over the length of a football
    field—still puts Snyder’s protests well out of sight of the Church and, therefore,
    effectively extinguishes his constitutional right to protest. Thus, like we did
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    before, we are constrained to vacate the trial court’s order with respect to its
    500-foot distance requirement.
    Next, Snyder also faults the trial court for not specifically identifying all
    Church properties that would fall under its order. To recap, in its prior order,
    the trial court enjoined Snyder from “appearing within one thousand (1,000)
    feet of all property owned and/or occupied by Tenth Presbyterian Church,
    including but not necessarily: 1700 Spruce Street, 1701 Delancey Street,
    315 S. 17th Street, 1710 Spruce Street, and 1716 Spruce Street, Philadelphia,
    PA 19103.” Order, 11/10/21, at 1 (emphasis added). While acknowledging
    that the trial court listed specific properties, we observed that its restriction
    was not necessarily limited to those properties. See Tenth Presbyterian
    Church, 
    2022 WL 4101153
    , at *4. This language, we further noted, was “far
    from precise or narrow in scope, as it potentially captures unidentified
    locations that Snyder is unaware of.” 
    Id.
    On remand, though, the trial court did not attempt to limit its order to
    only those properties identified above.        Instead, the trial court enjoined
    Snyder from “[a]ppearing within [500 feet] of all property owned and/or
    occupied by [the Church], in the immediate vicinity of [the Church]
    including: 1700 Spruce Street, 1701 Delancey Street, 315 S. 17th Street,
    1710 Spruce Street, and 1716 Spruce Street, Philadelphia, PA 19103[.]”
    Order, 9/20/22, at 1 (emphasis added). Thus, the trial court added the phrase
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    “in the immediate vicinity” and removed the phrase “but not necessarily” and
    kept everything else the same.
    Again, we are constrained to agree with Snyder that the trial court’s
    revisions on remand did not address the concerns raised in our previous
    decision. As our Supreme Court has recognized, “it is widely accepted that
    general expressions such as ‘including,’ or ‘including but not limited to,’ that
    precede a specific list of included items are to be considered as words of
    enlargement and not limitation.” Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Cumberland Coal
    Res., LP, 
    102 A.3d 962
    , 976 (Pa. 2014).            Consequently, the trial court’s
    elimination of the phrase “but not necessarily” did not restrict the Church’s
    property to only those properties listed. Consequently, the trial court’s latest
    order still suffers from the same defect as its preceding one because it possibly
    still captures unidentified locations from which Snyder is enjoined from
    appearing within 500 feet.4
    Accordingly, we are forced to remand again and to hold a new hearing
    if it deems it necessary for the trial court to set forth expressly why its 500-
    foot distance requirement is the least necessary to protect the Church’s
    congregants and employees access to the Church and hold services without
    ____________________________________________
    4 Snyder also attempts to reassert his argument that the trial court erred in
    granting the Church’s motion and imposing an injunction enjoining him from
    appearing within a set distance of the Church and its property. However, as
    we have already affirmed those parts of the trial court’s order, we will not
    revisit them here where the sole issue is the distance requirement.
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    J-S04035-23
    distraction, while also being the least possible infringement on Snyder's
    constitutional right to protest the Church and its leadership in public. In doing
    so, it should list what conduct of Snyder is causing the harm and why that
    particular distance requirement is necessary to alleviate that harm.
    Additionally, in setting forth its distance requirement, the trial court should
    identify all properties that Snyder is enjoined from appearing.
    Order vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent with
    this Memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 3/01/2023
    - 16 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2580 EDA 2022

Judges: Pellegrini, J.

Filed Date: 3/1/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/1/2023