Com. v. Polster, G. ( 2018 )

J. S62042/18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
GLEN EDWARD POLSTER, : No. 335 EDA 2018
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, December 15, 2017
in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
Criminal Division at No. CP-09-SA-0000552-2017
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 20, 2018
Glen Edward Polster appeals pro se from the December 15, 2017
judgment of sentence imposing a $200 fine and the costs associated with his
prosecution after he was found guilty of the summary traffic offense of
driving while operating privilege is suspended or revoked.1 After careful
review, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history of
this case as follows:
On June 20, 2017, [a]ppellant was issued a citation
by Falls Township Police Officer Jeffrey Omlor for
Driving While Operating Privilege is Suspended or
Revoked, Non-DUI related, 75 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 1543(a).
On July 10, 2017, [a]ppellant entered a guilty plea to
the charge before the Honorable Jan Vislosky of
Magisterial District Court 07-1-10. On August 7,
1 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(a).
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2017, [a]ppellant filed a Notice of Appeal from his
summary conviction. A hearing originally scheduled
for October 20, 2017, was continued at [a]ppellant’s
request and subsequently rescheduled for
December 15, 2017.
On December 7, 2017, [a]ppellant filed a 36-page
[pro se] “Brief in Support of Notice for Dismissal for
Lack of Jurisdiction” along with a 4-page
“Respondent’s Special Appearance, Formal Notice of
Declination to Plead and Answer Form of Demur” and
a 4-page “Affidavit of Glen Edward Polster – Not
Engaged in Commerce or ‘Transportation’” in which
he apparently attempted to argue that he had a
constitutional right to operate a motor vehicle on
public roadways without a valid driver’s license.
Appellant, therefore, argues that the courts have no
jurisdiction to enforce any citations issued in
violation of his perceived constitutionally protected
rights.
After we rejected [a]ppellant’s argument at the
hearing de novo on December 15, 2017, and denied
his motion to dismiss, Officer Omlor testified that at
the time of the traffic stop, [a]ppellant was unable to
present a driver’s license, and informed the [o]fficer
“that he did not need one.” Officer Omlor ran a
check and discovered that [a]ppellant’s operating
privileges were currently suspended. He then
obtained a certified copy of [a]ppellant’s driving
record[,] which reflected that [a]ppellant “has been
under suspension for quite some time,” with his first
suspension effective on August 19, 2013, and the
most recent suspension effective as of July 18, 2017.
Appellant then testified that he was “here on special
appearance” and was “not agreeing to a plea or
anything,” and repeated his argument that the
“Transportation Code applies to commercial activity.”
At the conclusion of the hearing, we determined that
the Commonwealth had proven all of the elements
necessary for the charge of Driving While Operating
Privilege is Suspended or Revoked, 75 Pa.C.S.[A.]
§ 1543(a), denied [a]ppellant’s appeal from his
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summary conviction, and reinstated the sentence
imposed by the District Court.
Trial court opinion, 3/15/18 at 1-2 (citation to notes of testimony omitted).
This pro se appeal followed. On January 24, 2018, the trial court
ordered appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal, in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), within 21 days. Appellant
complied and the trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on March 15,
2018.2
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
A. Did the [trial court] error [sic] when he
rejected [a]ppellant[’]s motion and brief in
support of the motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction and failure to state a cause of
action for which relieve [sic] can be granted
and his other pleadings, for which the
[a]ppellant relied upon for his believes [sic]
and defense to the patently frivolous and
spurious charges(s) brought against him?
B. Did the [trial court] error [sic] when he ruled
over [a]ppellant[’]s objections to terms us [sic]
by the prosecutor from the “transportation”
code?
C. Did sufficient evidence support the trial court’s
finding, purportedly by clear and convincing
evidence, that the Prosecutor for the
2 The docket indicates that appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement was
time-stamped as filed on February 16, 2018, two days after the 21-day
deadline. However, this court accepted appellant’s pro se application to
amend, filed on September 21, 2018, which contains date-stamped copies of
U.S. Postal Service Certified Mail Form 3800 indicating that he timely filed
his Rule 1925(b) statement with both the Prothonotary and trial court on
February 14, 2018. U.S. Postal Service Certified Mail Form 3800 meets the
specifications of Pa.R.A.P. 121(e), relating to preservation of filing dates.
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Commonwealth/State proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that they had jurisdiction
over [a]ppellant and therefore classify
[a]ppellant as someone engaged in a
privileged/commercial activity (for monetary
gain/compensation/hire) which would have
require [sic] him to have a current valid
“driver [sic] license” issued by the
Pennsylvania Department of “Transportation”
and since [a]ppellant is being charge [sic] as a
criminal, did the Prosecutor prove willfulness?
Appellant’s brief at 9-10 (emphasis omitted). For the ease of our discussion,
we have elected to address appellant’s claims in a slightly different order
than presented in his appellate brief.
We begin by addressing appellant’s contention that the Commonwealth
failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for driving while
operating privilege is suspended or revoked. (Appellant’s brief at 42-51;
issue C.)
Our standard of review in assessing whether there was sufficient
evidence to sustain appellant’s conviction is well settled.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must
determine whether the evidence admitted at trial
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom,
viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth as verdict winner, is sufficient to
prove every element of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. As an appellate court, we may
not re-weigh the evidence and substitute our
judgment for that of the fact-finder. Any question of
doubt is for the fact-finder unless the evidence is so
weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
probability of fact can be drawn from the combined
circumstances.
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Commonwealth v. Thomas, 988 A.2d 669, 670 (Pa.Super. 2009)
(citations omitted), appeal denied, 4 A.3d 1054 (Pa. 2010).
Section 1543 of the Motor Vehicle Code, driving while operating
privilege is suspended or revoked, provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) Offense defined.--Except as provided in
subsection (b), any person who drives a motor
vehicle on any highway or trafficway of this
Commonwealth after the commencement of a
suspension, revocation or cancellation of the
operating privilege and before the operating
privilege has been restored is guilty of a
summary offense and shall, upon conviction,
be sentenced to pay a fine of $200.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(a).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, the verdict winner, we find that there was ample evidence
to sustain appellant’s conviction for driving while operating privilege is
suspended or revoked. The record establishes that on June 20, 2017,
Officer Jeffrey Omlor of the Falls Township Police Department conducted a
lawful traffic stop of a white 2003 Ford SUV being driven by appellant in
Falls Township, Buck County, Pennsylvania. (Notes of testimony, 12/15/17
at 18-19.) Officer Omlor testified that appellant did not provide him with a
driver’s license when requested to do so and informed him that, “I don’t
need one.” (Id. at 21.) Upon discovering that appellant’s driver’s license
was suspended, Officer Omlor issued appellant a traffic citation,
No. C4048599-2, for driving while operating privilege is suspended or
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revoked. (Id. at 22.) Appellant’s certified driving record, which was
admitted into evidence at the trial de novo, indicates that appellant’s
driving privileges were suspended on August 19, 2013, and his suspension
remained in effect on June 20, 2017, the date Officer Omlor stopped his
vehicle. (Id. at 23-24; see also “Certified Driver History,” 12/13/17;
Commonwealth exhibit C1.) Based on the foregoing, we find that appellant’s
claim that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for driving
while operating privilege is suspended or revoked must fail.
The crux of appellant’s remaining claims is that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to enforce the citation issued for his violation of the Motor
Vehicle Code because he was not engaged in commercial activity on the date
in question and possessed a constitutionally protected right to “travel free
and unencumbered” on public roadways without a valid driver’s license.
(Appellant’s brief at 24-41; issues A, B; see also notes of testimony,
12/15/17 at 10, 26-27.) This claim is meritless. “Subject matter jurisdiction
speaks to the competency of a court to hear and adjudicate the type of
controversy presented. Jurisdiction is purely a question of law; the appellate
standard of review is de novo and the scope of review is plenary.”
Commonwealth v. Elia, 83 A.3d 254, 265 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citations
omitted), appeal denied, 94 A.3d 1007 (Pa. 2014).
As discussed, the evidence clearly establishes that appellant operated
a vehicle in Bucks County while his license was suspended. It is well settled
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that a trial court, like the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County in the
instant matter, has jurisdiction over offenses which occur within “the
territorial boundaries of the judicial district in which it sits[.]”
Commonwealth v. Seiders, 11 A.3d 495, 497 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citation
omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Soder, 905 A.2d 502, 503
(Pa.Super. 2006) (finding the court of common pleas had jurisdiction over
charges stemming from violations of the Motor Vehicle Code). Moreover, we
note that our supreme court has long recognized that “[o]perating a motor
vehicle is a privilege, not a right . . . [t]o obtain the benefit of such a
privilege, a driver must abide by the laws of the Commonwealth relating to
the privilege.” Alexander v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Transp., 880 A.2d
552, 561 (Pa. 2005) (citations omitted). Accordingly, appellant’s jurisdiction
claims are meritless.
For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm appellant’s December 15, 2017
judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Appellant’s pro se application to
amend is granted.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/20/18
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