Com. v. Taylor, S., Jr. ( 2019 )

J. A24035/18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
STEVEN ARTHUR TAYLOR, JR., : No. 460 MDA 2018
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, February 6, 2018,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County
Criminal Division at No. CP-21-CR-0000715-2017
BEFORE: OTT, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 08, 2019
Steven Arthur Taylor, Jr., appeals from the February 6, 2018 judgment
of sentence ordering him to pay the costs of prosecution, a $300 fine, and to
undergo six months’ supervised probation, imposed after he was found guilty
in a bench trial of driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled
substance – general impairment (“DUI”).1 After careful review, we affirm the
judgment of sentence.
The trial court summarized the relevant facts of this case as follows:
[O]n June 5, 2016, at around 2:05 a.m., Upper Allen
Township Police Officer Mark Sanguinito initiated a
traffic stop in Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania. The stop
was made as a result of Officer Sanguinito’s
observation of a black SUV drifting between the
street’s fog line and solid yellow line before turning
into the exit of a Burger King marked by a “Do Not
1 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1).
J. A24035/18
Enter” sign. Officer Sanguinito identified the vehicle’s
operator as [appellant], and testified that he observed
what he concluded to be an odor of alcohol emanating
from [appellant’s] breath, as well as glassy, bloodshot
eyes. After displaying what Officer Sanguinito
identified as clues of intoxication during the
Standardized Field Sobriety Tests, Officer Sanguinito
arrested and charged [appellant] with two counts of
DUI, as noted above. Officer Sanguinito’s testimony
at trial was aided by the officer’s dashboard Mobile
Video Recording (“MVR”).
On cross[-]examination, Officer Sanguinito admitted
that [appellant] only touched the painted lines on the
street and never fully changed lanes. He also
admitted that there may have been other
explanations for [appellant’s] glassy, bloodshot eyes
and that he had no trouble finding his identification
documents. No blood alcohol evidence was admitted
at trial.
Trial court opinion, 2/22/18 at 1-2.
As noted, appellant proceeded to a bench trial before the
Honorable Jessica E. Brewbaker on December 18, 2017. Following the bench
trial, Judge Brewbaker took this case under advisement to review
Officer Sanguinito’s dashboard MVR. On December 20, 2017, appellant was
found guilty of one count of DUI – general impairment, in violation of
75 Pa.C.S.A § 3802(a)(1).2 As noted, appellant was sentenced to pay the
costs of prosecution, a $300 fine, and to undergo six months’ supervised
probation on February 6, 2018. That same day, appellant filed a timely
post-sentence motion, arguing that the verdict was against the weight of the
2 Appellant was found not guilty of DUI in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 3802(a)(2) (driving with BAC of at least 0.08% but less than 0.10%).
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evidence and there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for DUI
– general impairment. (See “Post Sentence Motion,” 2/6/18 at 2-4.)3 On
February 22, 2018, the trial court filed an opinion and order denying
appellant’s post-sentence motion. This timely appeal followed on March 15,
2018.4
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether there was insufficient evidence to
support the trial court’s finding of guilt as to
DUI: General Impairment, because the
Commonwealth failed to present sufficient
evidence that [appellant] was incapable of
safely operating an automobile because of
alcohol consumption[?]
2. Whether the trial court’s verdict of guilt as to
DUI: General Impairment was against the
weight of the evidence where the officer was
unable to link any observations of impaired
driving to [appellant] and the Commonwealth’s
evidence did not establish that [appellant]’s
mental and physical faculties were impaired
such that he could not safely operate a motor
vehicle[?]
Appellant’s brief at 1.
Appellant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his
conviction for DUI under Section 3802(a)(1) “because the Commonwealth
3 Appellant’s post-sentence motion does not contain pagination; for the ease
of our discussion, we have assigned each page a corresponding number.
4 Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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failed to present sufficient evidence that [appellant] was incapable of safely
operating an automobile because of alcohol consumption.” (Id. at 25.)
Our standard of review in assessing a sufficiency of the evidence claim
is well settled.
We must determine whether the evidence admitted at
trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom,
when viewed in a light most favorable to the
Commonwealth as verdict winner, support the
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Where there
is sufficient evidence to enable the trier of fact to find
every element of the crime has been established
beyond a reasonable doubt, the sufficiency of the
evidence claim must fail.
The evidence established at trial need not preclude
every possibility of innocence and the fact-finder is
free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence
presented. It is not within the province of this Court
to re-weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment
for that of the fact-finder. The Commonwealth’s
burden may be met by wholly circumstantial evidence
and any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be
resolved by the fact[-]finder unless the evidence is so
weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no
probability of fact can be drawn from the combined
circumstances.
Commonwealth v. N.M.C., 172 A.3d 1146, 1149 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citations
omitted).
Section 3802 of the Crimes Code defines the offense of DUI – general
impairment, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) General impairment.--
(1) An individual may not drive, operate or be
in actual physical control of the movement
of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient
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amount of alcohol such that the individual
is rendered incapable of safely driving,
operating or being in actual physical
control of the movement of the vehicle.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
the verdict winner, we find that there was sufficient evidence to support the
trial court’s conclusion that appellant was incapable of safely operating his
vehicle due to his consumption of alcohol. This court has long recognized that
“a police officer who has perceived a defendant’s appearance and conduct is
competent to express an opinion, in a prosecution for [DUI,] as to the
defendant’s state of intoxication and ability to safely drive a vehicle.”
Commonwealth v. Butler, 856 A.2d 131, 137 (Pa.Super. 2004). Here, the
record demonstrates that in the early morning hours of June 5, 2016,
Officer Sanguinito observed appellant’s vehicle make a wide left-hand turn
from Gettysburg Pike onto Cumberland Parkway into the wrong traffic lane
generally utilized by vehicles exiting the Giant grocery store parking lot.
(Notes of testimony, 12/18/17 at 13.) As Officer Sanguinito proceeded to
follow appellant’s vehicle, he observed it drift between the roadway’s fog line
and solid yellow line before turning into the exit of a Burger King parking lot
marked by a “do not enter one way” sign. (Id. at 14-16.) Based on these
observations, Officer Sanguinito initiated a traffic stop of appellant’s vehicle.
(Id.)
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The record reflects that this incident was memorialized in a video taken
from an MVR in Officer Sanguinito’s marked patrol car; the MVR was
introduced at trial and viewed by the trial court. (Id. at 14.)
Officer Sanguinito testified that during the course of the traffic stop, he
observed that appellant exhibited multiple signs of intoxication, including
“glassy and bloodshot eyes” and “an odor of alcohol emanating from his
breath.” (Id. at 18-19.) The record further reflects that during
Officer Sanguinito’s administration of two standardized field sobriety tests
(“SFSTs”) to appellant, he observed appellant display multiple “clues” of
intoxication, including raising his arms for balance and “swaying side to side,
back and forth.” (Id. at 19-26.) Officer Sanguinito opined that following the
administration of the SFSTs, he believed appellant to be incapable of driving
safely:
A. [] At the conclusion of these tests, it was my
professional opinion that based on [appellant’s]
glassy, bloodshot eyes, the odor of alcohol on
his breath, and the clue that I observed [during
the SFST], that he was incapable of safe driving.
Q. Did you take [appellant’s] driving into
consideration as well?
A. And the driving, yes.
Id. at 24.
Based on the foregoing, we find that the Commonwealth established the
elements of impairment and inability to drive safely, and appellant’s
contention that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for
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DUI under Section 3802(a)(1) must fail. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Mobley, 14 A.3d 887, 890 (Pa.Super. 2011) (holding that the impaired ability
to drive safely was proven where the defendant failed field sobriety tests,
smelled of alcohol, and ran a stop sign with a police officer in plain view).
We now turn to appellant’s argument that the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence. Appellant avers that “the Commonwealth’s evidence
did not establish that [appellant]’s mental and physical faculties were impaired
such that he could not safely operate a motor vehicle.” (Appellant’s brief at
32.)
“An allegation that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is
addressed to the discretion of the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Galvin,
985 A.2d 783, 793 (Pa. 2009) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1051(2010).
[W]here the trial court has ruled on the weight claim
below, an appellate court’s role is not to consider the
underlying question of whether the verdict is against
the weight of the evidence. Rather, appellate review
is limited to whether the trial court palpably abused
its discretion in ruling on the weight claim.
Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 40 A.3d 1250, 1253 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation
omitted).
Our supreme court has long recognized that,
[b]ecause the trial judge has had the opportunity to
hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate
court will give the gravest consideration to the
findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when
reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict
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is against the weight of the evidence. One of the least
assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial
is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict was or
was not against the weight of the evidence and that a
new trial should be granted in the interest of justice.
This does not mean that the exercise of discretion by
the trial court in granting or denying a motion for a
new trial based on a challenge to the weight of the
evidence is unfettered. In describing the limits of a
trial court’s discretion, we have explained[,] [t]he
term “discretion” imports the exercise of judgment,
wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate
conclusion within the framework of the law, and is not
exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of
the judge. Discretion must be exercised on the
foundation of reason, as opposed to prejudice,
personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary actions.
Discretion is abused where the course pursued
represents not merely an error of judgment, but
where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or
where the law is not applied or where the record
shows that the action is a result of partiality,
prejudice, bias or ill-will.
Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013) (citations and
emphasis omitted).
Instantly, we discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court
in rejecting appellant’s weight claim. As noted, Officer Sanguinito testified at
great length that appellant demonstrated multiple signs of impairment
throughout both the traffic stop and two subsequent field sobriety tests,
rendering him incapable of safely driving or operating his vehicle. (See notes
of testimony, 12/18/17 at 11-28.) “[T]he trier of fact while passing upon the
credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to
believe all, part or none of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Andrulewicz,
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911 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa.Super. 2006) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 926
A.2d 972 (Pa. 2007). Here, Judge Brewbaker, sitting as fact-finder, concluded
that Officer Sanguinito’s credible testimony and the corroborating MVR
evidence presented at trial weighed in favor of the conclusion “that [appellant]
was guilty of DUI to a degree that he was incapable of safely driving[,]” and
elected not to believe appellant’s version of the events. (Trial court opinion,
2/22/18 at 3.) We are precluded from reweighing the evidence and
substituting our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Clay, 64 A.3d at 1055.
For all the forgoing reasons, we affirm the February 6, 2018 judgment
of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 05/08/2019
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