Com. v. Gelts, D. ( 2018 )


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  • J-S73031-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    DONALD E GELTS, JR.                        :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 693 WDA 2018
    Appeal from the Order Entered April 26, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-61-CR-0000290-2002
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and OLSON, J.
    JUDGMENT ORDER BY OLSON, J.:                        FILED NOVEMBER 30, 2018
    Appellant, Donald E Gelts, Jr., appeals pro se from the order entered on
    April 26, 2018. Although we quash this appeal, we instruct the PCRA court to
    comply with this judgment order.
    As our resolution of this appeal is based on the procedural posture of
    this case, we decline to set forth the factual background. On July 11, 2003,
    the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of 14 to 30 years’
    imprisonment after he pled guilty to statutory sexual assault1 and involuntary
    deviate sexual intercourse.2          After Appellant’s direct appeal rights were
    ____________________________________________
    1   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3122.1.
    2   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(a)(7).
    J-S73031-18
    reinstated nunc pro tunc, this Court affirmed. Commonwealth v. Gelts, 
    22 A.3d 1071
     (Pa. Super. 2010) (unpublished memorandum) (citation omitted).
    On December 29, 2010, Appellant filed his first3 pro se petition pursuant to
    the Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.          The
    PCRA court denied Appellant’s request for the appointment of counsel. 4 No
    action was taken on that petition for the next seven and one-half years.
    On April 6, 2018, Appellant filed a motion to amend that PCRA petition.
    On April 26, 2018, the PCRA court treated the filing as a second PCRA petition
    and purported to dismiss the petition. This appeal followed.
    Preliminarily, we must determine if we have jurisdiction over this appeal.
    Generally, we only have jurisdiction over appeals from final orders. Shearer
    v. Hafer, 
    177 A.3d 850
    , 855 (Pa. 2018) (citation omitted). An order denying
    a motion to amend a PCRA petition is not a final order.           See Pa.R.A.P.
    341(b)(1).     Hence, if Appellant’s filing were a motion to amend his PCRA
    petition, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. If, however, as the PCRA court
    ____________________________________________
    3   See Commonwealth v. Turner, 
    73 A.3d 1283
    , 1286 (Pa. Super. 2013).
    4In denying Appellant’s request for appointment of counsel to handle his post-
    conviction challenge, the PCRA court incorrectly stated that Appellant was
    being represented by his direct appellate counsel at the time. Appellate
    counsel, however, only had an obligation “to continue representation until the
    case [wa]s concluded[.]” Commonwealth v. White, 
    871 A.2d 1291
    , 1294
    (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). The case was concluded on December
    15, 2010, when the time for filing a petition for allowance of appeal expired.
    There is nothing in the certified record indicating that appellate counsel was
    appointed to represent Appellant in any post-conviction challenge. Hence,
    Appellant was not represented when he filed his PCRA petition.
    -2-
    J-S73031-18
    found, Appellant’s filing was a second PCRA petition, the April 26, 2018 order
    was a final order and we have jurisdiction over this appeal.
    We must look to the contents of a filing to determine its character and
    not merely the title a party ascribes thereto. Cf. Commonwealth v.
    Descardes, 
    136 A.3d 493
    , 503 (Pa. 2016) (court was required to consider
    filing a PCRA petition although titled a petition for writ of coram nobis). As
    noted above, Appellant’s December 29, 2010 PCRA petition was still pending
    when he filed the motion to amend. Appellant sought to add a claim to that
    PCRA petition in his filing. Hence, the PCRA court improperly treated the filing
    as Appellant’s second PCRA petition. The filing should have been treated as a
    motion to amend Appellant’s first PCRA petition. Hence, this appeal from the
    order denying the motion to amend is interlocutory and we lack jurisdiction
    over this appeal. Accordingly, we quash this appeal.
    Although we quash this appeal as interlocutory, we note that “it is
    undisputed that first time PCRA petitioners have a rule-based right to
    counsel.” Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 
    29 A.3d 1177
    , 1180 n.6 (Pa. Super.
    2011).     The PCRA court has denied Appellant that right for the past eight
    years. The PCRA court shall appoint counsel forthwith to litigate the pending
    PCRA petition.5
    Appeal quashed.
    ____________________________________________
    5   Counsel shall expeditiously file an amended petition or a no-merit letter.
    -3-
    J-S73031-18
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 11/30/2018
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 693 WDA 2018

Filed Date: 11/30/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/30/2018