Boukassi, F. v. Wal-Mart Stores ( 2019 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
FATIMA BOUKASSI IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
WAL-MART STORES, INC. AND WAL- No. 3449 EDA 2018
MART STORE #2141
Appeal from the Order Entered November 8, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
No(s): 170301407
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED AUGUST 01, 2019
Appellant Fatima Boukassi appeals from the order granting the motion
for summary judgment filed by Appellees Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and Wal-Mart
Store #2141 and dismissing her premises liability action against Appellees.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in
favor of Appellees because the determination of constructive notice was a
question for the jury. We affirm.
We summarize the relevant background and procedural history as
follows. On May 2, 2016, Appellant slipped and fell at Wal-Mart Store #2141.
Appellees' Mot. Summ. J., 8/30/18, '11 2; Boukassi Dep., 9/14/17, at 10, 16-
17. Appellant testified that the store was busy when she arrived. Boukassi
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Dep. at 14. Appellant entered through the main entrance, walked straight to
the dairy section, picked up some lemonade, and turned around to exit. Id.
at 15. Walking back down the same aisle she had just come from, Appellant
slipped and fell on a spilled substance in the middle of the aisle. Id. at 15-
17. According to Appellant, the spill was about three inches in diameter, was
"liquid, yellowish, like oil maybe[,]" and had no dirt or streak marks in or
around it. Id. at 17-18.
Appellant was in the store for approximately two minutes before she
fell. Id. at 16-17. During that time, Appellant did not hear anyone say
anything about a spill on the floor. Id. at 16. Appellant did not look at the
floor or see anything on the floor before she fell. Id. at 17. Appellant testified
that she did not know where the spill came from. Id. at 18. After Appellant
fell, two nearby customers went and alerted two Wal-Mart associates, who
came to help Appellant. Id. at 23-24.
Appellant commenced this civil action by filing a complaint on March 15,
2017. On May 14, 2018, a panel of arbitrators found in favor of Appellees.
Appellant timely appealed the arbitrators' findings on May 24, 2018.
On August 30, 2018, Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment,
asserting that "[s]ince [Appellant] is unable to establish actual or constructive
notice and that [Appellees'] actions fell below the standard of reasonable case,
there is no genuine issue of material fact." Appellees' Mot. Summ. J. at ¶ 32.
Appellant filed a response alleging, in relevant part, that she was "a business
invitee . . . to be afforded the highest level of care," and "there are clear issues
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of fact which are only ripe for the finder of fact to determine . . . as to how
this accident occurred." Appellant's Resp. to Appellees' Mot. Summ. J.,
9/26/18, at 23, 22. The trial court granted Appellees' motion for summary
judgment on November 8, 2018.
On November 13, 2018, Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration
referencing, in part, Appellees' "Slip, Trip and Fall Guidelines." See Appellant
Mot. Reconsider., 11/13/18, at 1114. Appellant attached to her motion a copy
of the Guidelines, which stated that Wal-Mart employees were expected to
"[c]lean up spills, debris and slip and trip hazards immediately" and
"[c]omplete safety sweeps on a regular basis to help keep the salesfloor free
of slip and trip hazards and falling merchandise." Id. at Ex. C. The "Safety
Sweeps" section of the policy stated that employees should "[p]erform a visual
sweep of the area looking for potential hazards such as . . . spills . . . " and
"dust mop or broom sweep high traffic areas." Id. at Ex. C. The trial court
denied Appellant's motion for reconsideration on November 14, 2018.
On November 15, 2018, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal and
independently submitted a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The trial court
subsequently filed a responsive Rule 1925(a) opinion and concluded that
Appellant was not entitled to relief.
Appellant raises two questions for our review:
[1]. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in granting the
[Appellees]' motion for summary judgment where genuine issues
of material fact [exist]?
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[2]. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in determining the
[Appellees] were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of
law, by finding the [Appellees] did not receive proper notice of the
defect on their premises?
Appellant's Brief at 4.
We summarize Appellant's claims together as they are interrelated.
Appellant argues that in a slip and fall case, the plaintiff is not required to
prove the "precise manner in which the tortious condition developed." Id. at
14 (citing Finney v. G.C. Murphy Co., 178 A.2d 719, 721 (Pa. 1962)).
Appellant notes that circumstantial evidence may support a finding of
constructive notice. Id. Appellant indicates that factors for assessing
constructive notice may include "the number of persons using the premises;
the frequency of such use; the nature of the defect; its location on the
premises; its probable cause and the opportunity which the defendant had to
remedy the defect." Id. (citing Bremer v. W.W. Smith, Inc., 191 A. 395(Pa. Super. 1937)). Appellant contends a question of fact existed based on
her evidence showing that the spill originated at Appellees' store, occurred in
a busy section of the store, and caused Appellant to fall. Id. at 17. Appellant
asserts that "it is a question of fact for the jury to decide if a landowner knew,
or should have discovered the defect upon reasonable inspection." Id. at 13.
Appellant further argues that Appellees failed to exercise reasonable
care by deviating from their "Slip, Trip and Fall Guidelines." Id. at 15-16. In
support, Appellant analogizes the case at hand to Thakrar v. Wegman's
Food Mkt., 75 Pa. D&C 4th 437 (C.C.P. Northampton 2004). Appellant
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contends that Appellees clearly had a policy in place to perform regular sweeps
and inspections of the aisle where Appellant fell, but failed to do so, which
permitted the oil -like substance to remain on the floor. Id. at 16.
Lastly, Appellant contends that "equitable considerations should allow
plaintiff to recover in factual situations . . . [w]here a customer has sustained
injuries although neither the customer nor the store has [potentially] behaved
negligently." Id. at 15 (quoting Landis v. Giant Eagle, Inc., GD91-7779,
142 PLJ 263 (C.C.P. Allegheny 1994) (Strassburger, J.), aff'd, 655 A.2d 1052(Pa. Super. 1994) (unpublished mem.)).
The standards governing our review of a trial court's grant of summary
judgment are well settled.
Our standard of review of an order granting summary judgment
requires us to determine whether the trial court abused its
discretion or committed an error of law[,] and our scope of review
is plenary. We view the record in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine
issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party.
Only where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
it is clear that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law will summary judgment be entered.
* * *
. Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof on an
. .
issue, he may not merely rely on his pleadings or answers in order
to survive summary judgment. Further, failure of a nonmoving
party to adduce sufficient evidence on an issue essential to his
case and on which he bears the burden of proof establishes the
entitlement of the moving party to judgment as a matter of law.
Rodriguez v. Kravco Simon Co., 111 A.3d 1191, 1193 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(citation omitted); see also Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2. "A plaintiff cannot survive
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summary judgment when mere speculation would be required for the jury to
find in plaintiff's favor." Krauss v. Trane U.S. Inc., 104 A.3d 556, 568 (Pa.
Super. 2014) (citation omitted).
In a premises liability action alleging negligence, a plaintiff must prove
four elements to establish negligence by a defendant: (1) a duty or obligation
recognized by law; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between
the conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual damages. Toro v.
Fitness International LLC., 150 A.3d 968, 976-977 (Pa. Super. 2016)
(citation omitted).
Both parties agree that Appellant was a business invitee. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 defines the duties owed to an invitee as
follows:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused
to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover
the condition, and should realize that it involves an
unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the
danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the
danger.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (Am. Law Inst. 1965); see also Porro
v. Century III Assocs., 846 A.2d 1282, 1285 (Pa. Super. 2004).
This Court has explained that
the mere existence of a harmful condition in a public place of
business, or the mere happening of an accident due to such a
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condition is neither, in and of itself, evidence of a breach of the
proprietor's duty of care to his invitees, nor raises a presumption
of negligence. In order to recover damages in a slip and fall case
such as this, the invitee must present evidence which proves that
the store owner deviated in some way from his duty of reasonable
care under the existing circumstances. This evidence must show
that the proprietor knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care
should have known, of the existence of the harmful condition.
Section 343 also requires the invitee to prove either that the store
owner helped to create the harmful condition, or that it had actual
or constructive notice of the condition.
Rodriguez, 111 A.3d at 1193 (citation omitted).
The parties also agree that there was no evidence that Appellees helped
create or had actual notice of the harmful condition. See Appellant's Brief at
13; Appellees' Brief at 10. Therefore, the only issue is whether a genuine
issue of material fact exists as to whether or not Appellees had constructive
notice of the spill on their premises.
This Court has stated:
What will amount to constructive notice of a defective or
dangerous condition existing upon a defendant's premises,
necessarily varies under the circumstances of each case. Some of
the factors affecting the question, in addition to the time elapsing
between the origin of the defect and the accident, are the size and
physical condition of the premises, the nature of the business
conducted thereon, the number of persons using the premises and
the frequency of such use, the nature of the defect and its location
on the premises, its probable cause and the opportunity which
defendant, as a reasonably prudent person, had to remedy it.
Bremer 191 A. at 397 (citation omitted).
In Porro, this Court held that summary judgment was properly granted
when the plaintiff who slipped and fell on the defendant's premises failed to
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establish the duration of the spill's existence. Porro, 846 A.2d at 1286. This
Court explained that when
the evidence [indicates] that the transitory condition is traceable
to persons other than those for whom the owner is, strictly
speaking, ordinarily accountable, the jury may not consider the
owner's ultimate liability in the absence of other evidence which
tends to prove that . the condition existed for such a length of
. .
time that in the exercise of reasonable care the owner should have
known of it.
Id. (citation omitted).
In Toro, the plaintiff claimed that he slipped and fell on an unusual
buildup of soapy, cloudy water in the locker room of the defendant's fitness
center. Toro, 150 A.3d at 971. The defendant responded that the janitorial
staff regularly inspected and maintained the locker room and that there were
no reports that the floor of the locker room was wet before the accident. Id.
The defendant moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the defendant had constructive
notice of a buildup of water in the locker room. Id. at 977. However, since
the plaintiff could not establish how long the floor was wet prior to plaintiff's
fall, this Court found that the "[p]laintiff . . . failed to satisfy his burden of
proof as to his claims of negligence." Id. (citation omitted). This Court
explained that "there [was] no evidence that the floor was wet for such a
length of time that [d]efendant should have been aware of it, and could be
charged with constructive notice." Id. (citation omitted).
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The Toro Court also addressed the plaintiff's argument that 'the
condition could have existed for a long period of time' because the defendant
did not maintain accurate inspection of maintenance logs. Id. The Court
found that argument unconvincing as it was "based on mere speculation." Id.
(citing Krauss, 104 A.2d at 568). But see Rodriguez, 111 A.3d at 1196-97
(holding that an open issue of spoliation based on the absence of a
maintenance log for the date of the accident precluded entry of summary
judgment in favor of the defendant, where the plaintiff presented evidence
that maintenance contractors were responsible for sweeping and spot
mopping the floors on an hourly basis).
Here, as in Toro, the record in this case contained no evidence to
indicate the period of time that the spill existed. Appellant's deposition
testimony offered no indication of when the spill occurred. Appellant did not
hear anyone, including Appellees' employees, say anything about a spill on
the floor. Boukassi Dep. at 16. Appellant did not notice the spill herself when
she safely walked down the aisle the first time. Id. at 15. Appellant also
testified that when returning down the same aisle, the spill had no dirt or
streak marks in or around it. Id. at 18.
Therefore, we agree with the trial court that Appellant's evidence did
not raise a genuine issue of material fact. See Toro, 150 A.3d at 977. As
the trial court observed, Appellant could not rely on mere speculation that the
spill existed for a sufficient period to establish constructive notice. Trial Ct.
Op., 12/12/18, at 4.
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To the extent Appellant refers to Appellees' policy for cleaning up spills,
we initially note that Appellant's response to Appellees' motion for summary
judgment made no reference to the "Slip, Trip and Fall Guidelines." See
Appellant's Resp. to Appellees' Mot. Summ. J. Rather, Appellant first cited the
policy in its motion for reconsideration. See Appellant's Mot. Reconsider at
14. Appellant's failure to raise this evidence in its response may be construed
as waiver of her argument based on the policy. See Rabatin v. Allied Glove
Corp., 24 A.3d 388, 391 (Pa. Super. 2011) (noting that an issue that was
raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration could not be considered
by this Court on appeal).
In any event, Appellant's reference to the existence of the "Slip, Trip
and Fall Guidelines" does not raise an issue of fact that precluded the entry of
summary judgment in favor of Appellees. As stated above, the record lacked
any evidence to show how long the spill was in existence. Without further
circumstantial evidence to infer that Appellees' employees deviated from the
Guidelines, the mere existence of the spill did not establish a breach of
Appellees' standard of care. See Toro, 150 A.3d at 977-978; cf. Rodriguez,
111 A.3d at 1193; Thakrar, 75 Pa. D&C 4th at 442-43.
Lastly, we acknowledge Appellant's reference to the equitable and policy
considerations as stated by Judge Strassburger. See Appellant's Brief at 15
(quoting Landis); see also Rodriguez 111 A.3d at 1193 n.1 (indicating, in
a special concurrence, the author's decades -long "disagreement with
Pennsylvania law in this area"). We further acknowledge that reasonable
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minds may disagree as to the equity and policy implications of the theory that
as "[b]etween these two [potentially] innocent parties, fairness should require
the store to pay as a cost of operating its business." See Goodman v.
Chester Downs and Marina, LLC, 39 A.3d 371, 372 (Pa. Super. 2012) (per
curiam) (Strassburger, J. concurring). However, as we find no legal or factual
distinction between this case and Toro, we are constrained to conclude that
Appellant's equitable argument merits no relief consistent with the established
case law as applied to the circumstances of this case.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Jseph Seletyn,
D.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/1/19