Com. v. Neff, J. ( 2019 )


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  • J-S51037-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :         PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    JOSEPH J. NEFF,                            :
    :
    Appellant               :      No. 1839 MDA 2018
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 8, 2018
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0000776-2017
    BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., GANTMAN, P.J.E., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:                    FILED: NOVEMBER 5, 2019
    Joseph J. Neff (“Neff”) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed
    after a jury convicted him of approximately 350 counts of unlawful contact
    with a minor, 125 counts each of aggravated indecent assault and indecent
    assault, 100 counts of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child, 25
    counts of corruption of minors, and one count each of rape of a child and
    statutory sexual assault.1 We affirm.
    Between approximately 2009 to 2016, Neff perpetrated various sexual
    offenses against a minor female, E.B. (the “victim”), the sister of Neff’s
    estranged wife.      Neff began sexually assaulting the victim when she was
    approximately 8 years old. The assaults usually occurred while the victim was
    ____________________________________________
    1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6318(a)(1), 3125(a)(7) and (a)(8), 3126(a)(7) and
    (a)(8), 3123(b), 6301(a)(1), 3121(c), 3122.1.
    J-S51037-19
    in the care and custody of Neff and his wife. The crimes were reported to the
    State College Police Department in April 2017.                While Neff was being
    interviewed at the police department, he admitted that he had committed
    various sexual assaults against the victim. The police subsequently charged
    Neff with the above-mentioned offenses.
    The matter proceeded to a jury trial on November 30, 2017. Notably to
    this appeal, prior to opening statements, the trial court permitted the
    Commonwealth, over a defense objection, to publish to the jury three
    photographs      of   the   victim   (collectively,   the   “Photographs”).   These
    Photographs, which depicted the victim with family members and alone, were
    taken when the victim was approximately 10 and 11 years old.2 Neff’s counsel
    argued that the Photographs were irrelevant, inflammatory, and unduly
    prejudicial to Neff. The trial court permitted the Commonwealth to introduce
    the Photographs, with the understanding that they could not be published
    during its opening statement.
    In its case-in-chief, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of
    several witnesses, including the victim and Neff’s former romantic partner,
    Amanda Nisely (“Nisely”). Nisely testified, in relevant part, that (1) Neff had
    confessed to her (in a letter and in a subsequent statement) that he sexually
    ____________________________________________
    2 The Commonwealth sought to introduce the Photographs to demonstrate to
    the jury what the victim looked like when she was assaulted by Neff, as
    opposed to her appearance at trial, when she was 16 years old.
    -2-
    J-S51037-19
    assaulted the victim; and (2) Nisely believed Neff’s confession to be truthful.3
    In response to this testimony, Neff’s counsel moved for a mistrial, urging that
    Nisely’s prohibited testimony was inadmissible pursuant to a pretrial ruling on
    a defense Motion in limine.4 Although the trial court denied Neff’s Motion for
    a mistrial, it immediately gave the jury a curative instruction, which Neff’s
    counsel had requested. Neff testified on his own behalf and denied committing
    most of the charged crimes. At the close of trial, the jury found Neff guilty of
    the above-mentioned offenses.
    On May 8, 2018, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 28 to
    56 years in prison.       Neff timely filed a Post-sentence Motion, wherein he
    challenged the sufficiency and weight of the evidence supporting his
    convictions.     Following the trial court’s denial of this Motion on October 10,
    2018, Neff timely filed a Notice of Appeal. The trial court ordered Neff to file
    a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, and
    Neff timely complied. The court then issued a Rule 1925(a) Opinion.
    Neff presents the following issues for our review:
    1. Whether the lower court properly permitted the
    Commonwealth to introduce photographs of the alleged
    ____________________________________________
    3 Specifically, Nisely opined that Neff’s admissions to her “[were] not
    something fabricated[,]” i.e., because they had come from “Neff’s own
    mouth[.]” N.T., 11/30/18, at 191; see also 
    id. (wherein Nisely
    stated that
    she was glad that Neff was “an honest enough person to admit it[.]”). We will
    hereinafter refer to these statements as “Nisely’s prohibited testimony.”
    4 The court’s granting of the Motion in limine excluded at trial any opinion
    testimony on the matter of Neff’s credibility.
    -3-
    J-S51037-19
    victim and her family[,] which were not relevant to the
    issues at trial[?]
    2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial[,]
    when [Nisely] violated a Motion in limine Order and
    expressed an opinion on the guilt of [Neff?]
    Brief for Appellant at 5 (capitalization omitted).
    In his first issue, Neff argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law
    in permitting the Commonwealth, over his objection, to introduce the
    Photographs at trial,5 as they were irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. See 
    id. at 11-13.
        According to Neff, the Commonwealth sought to introduce the
    Photographs for the improper purpose of garnering sympathy from the jury.
    
    Id. at 12.
    Neff additionally emphasizes that the trial court did not give any
    jury   instruction     concerning      the     Photographs,   which,   he   asserts,
    “compound[ed] the prejudice[.]” 
    Id. at 13.
    This Court has stated the well-established standard of review for
    admission of evidence claims as follows: “[I]n reviewing a challenge to the
    admissibility of evidence, we will only reverse a ruling by the trial court upon
    a showing that it abused its discretion or committed an error of law. … To
    constitute reversible error, an evidentiary ruling must not only be erroneous,
    but also harmful or prejudicial to the complaining party.” Commonwealth
    v. Lopez, 
    57 A.3d 74
    , 81 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted).
    ____________________________________________
    5 The Commonwealth introduced the Photographs on two occasions: during
    the victim’s testimony and during the Commonwealth’s closing argument.
    -4-
    J-S51037-19
    In its Opinion, the trial court addressed this claim, and set forth the
    relevant law, as follows:
    In overruling [Neff’s] objection [to the admission of the
    Photographs], the [trial c]ourt accepted the Commonwealth’s
    argument that the [P]hotographs were not inflammatory, and that
    they were relevant to demonstrating the victim’s age at the time
    of the crimes.
    In determining whether a photograph is inflammatory, a
    court should determine whether the picture is “so gruesome it
    would tend to cloud the jury’s objective assessment of the guilt or
    innocence of the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Funk, 
    29 A.3d 28
    , 33 (Pa. Super. 2011). The [P]hotographs at issue in the case
    at bar were of the child victim and members of her family; there
    was nothing gruesome about them, and the [c]ourt [initially did]
    not believe there was any error in overruling the objection on this
    basis. Based on appellate cases decided since the time of trial,
    however, the [c]ourt believes [that] admission of the
    [P]hotographs[,] over [Neff’s] relevancy objection[,] was in error.
    Specifically, in Commonwealth v. Vucich, 
    194 A.3d 1103
    (Pa.
    Super. 2018), a case virtually on point with respect to this issue,
    the Pennsylvania Superior Court held [that] photographs of a child
    sex crime victim[,] from the timeframe in which the crimes were
    committed[,] were legally irrelevant and should not have been
    admitted into evidence. See 
    id. at 1106-11.
    In Vucich, the
    defendant was charged with various crimes arising from his sexual
    abuse of a child victim, including rape of a child, involuntary
    sexual deviate intercourse with a child, unlawful contact with a
    minor, corruption of minors, and indecent assault of a person less
    than thirteen. 
    Id. at 1106.
    Over objection of the defendant, the
    trial court admitted two photographs showing the child victim
    between the ages of nine and eleven. On appeal, the Superior
    Court agreed with the defendant that the victim’s appearance at
    the time of the crimes did not tend to demonstrate any material
    fact, so the photographs did not meet the threshold relevancy
    requirement. 
    Id. at 1107-09.
    Although the Vucich Court
    ultimately determined [that] admission of the photographs had
    been harmless error [(which we discuss infra in the instant
    appeal)], it also determined that it was error to admit them in the
    first instance. 
    Id. -5- J-S51037-19
    Based on the Vucich decision, th[e trial c]ourt [in the
    instant case] concludes that admission of the [] [P]hotographs of
    the child victim … was error, and that the [P]hotographs should
    have been excluded as irrelevant. However, as noted above,
    there was nothing inflammatory about the [P]hotographs, and the
    Commonwealth’s use of them at trial was limited to brief
    foundation testimony and publication to the jury. Under the
    circumstances of this case, the [trial c]ourt submits that the
    resulting prejudice to [Neff], if any, was de minimis, and the error
    [was] therefore harmless.
    Trial Court Opinion, 1/7/19, at 2-3 (citation to record omitted).      The trial
    court’s sound analysis is supported by the law and the record.
    As in Vucich, we conclude that the Photographs of the victim were
    irrelevant and therefore inadmissible, but that the error in their admission was
    harmless. “The harmless error doctrine, as adopted in Pennsylvania, reflects
    the reality that the accused is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect trial. …
    Harmless error exists[, in relevant part,] if the record demonstrates [that] …
    the error did not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was de minimis ….”
    Commonwealth v. Hairston, 
    84 A.3d 657
    , 671 (Pa. 2014) (citations and
    quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “[a]n error may be deemed harmless …
    where the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so
    overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so insignificant by
    comparison that the error could not have contributed to the verdict.”
    Commonwealth v. Moore, 
    937 A.2d 1062
    , 1073 (Pa. 2007).
    Like in Vucich, the Commonwealth in this case briefly showed the jury
    the Photographs on only two occasions.      Therefore, while the Photographs
    were irrelevant, see 
    Vucich, 194 A.3d at 1110-11
    , their use was limited, and
    -6-
    J-S51037-19
    they merely depicted the victim’s general appearance at the time of the
    assaults. Although the Photographs were inadmissible, we agree with the trial
    court that any prejudicial effect was de minimis and would not have affected
    the outcome of the trial. See 
    id. Moreover, we
    conclude that the trial court’s
    error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of Neff’s guilt, where
    Neff had confessed to the crimes on multiple occasions prior to trial, and the
    victim described the assaults, which occurred over many years, in detail. See
    
    Moore, supra
    . Accordingly, Neff’s first issue fails.
    In his second issue, Neff contends that the trial court abused its
    discretion in denying his Motion for a mistrial, where Nisely’s prohibited
    testimony deprived him of a fair jury trial. See Brief for Appellant at 13-14.
    Neff alleges that Nisely’s prohibited testimony violated the Motion in limine,
    and the trial court’s curative instruction to the jury on the matter was
    insufficient to cure the prejudice he suffered. 
    Id. at 14.
    Our standard of review in assessing the denial of a mistrial is as follows:
    The trial court is in the best position to assess the effect of an
    allegedly prejudicial statement on the jury, and as such, the grant
    or denial of a mistrial will not be overturned absent an abuse of
    discretion. A mistrial may be granted only where the incident
    upon which the motion is based is of such a nature that its
    unavoidable effect is to deprive the defendant of a fair trial by
    preventing the jury from weighing and rendering a true verdict.
    Likewise, a mistrial is not necessary where cautionary instructions
    are adequate to overcome any possible prejudice.
    -7-
    J-S51037-19
    Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
    107 A.3d 52
    , 53 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted);
    see also Commonwealth v. Judy, 
    978 A.2d 1015
    , 1019 (Pa. Super. 2009)
    (emphasizing that a mistrial is an extreme remedy).
    Our Supreme Court has explained that “whether the exposure of the
    jury to improper evidence can be cured by an instruction depends upon a
    consideration of all the circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Richardson,
    
    437 A.2d 1162
    , 1165 (Pa. 1981).                Two considerations are particularly
    important in determining potential prejudice to a defendant: (1) the nature
    of the reference; and (2) whether the testimony was intentionally elicited by
    the prosecutor.      Commonwealth v. Satzberg, 
    516 A.2d 758
    , 762 (Pa.
    Super. 1986).
    Here, the record reveals that Nisely’s prohibited testimony was not
    intentionally elicited. In fact, it occurred in response to an unrelated question
    asked by the prosecutor, which the prosecutor based on a specific remark that
    Nisely had made regarding Neff’s conduct in her prior police statement.6 See
    N.T., 11/30/17, at 192 (wherein the prosecutor explained to the court, “Judge,
    I didn’t illicit [sic] that comment. I asked [Nisely] how she was feeling …. It’s
    not what I was expecting to come out of her mouth. [Nisely] had written in
    her [police] statement that she felt physically ill.”).
    ____________________________________________
    6  Specifically, the prosecutor questioned Nisely, concerning the feeling that
    she had in response to hearing Neff’s confession, “[d]id it make you physically
    ill?” N.T., 11/30/17, at 190. Nisely then offered Nisely’s prohibited testimony.
    
    Id. at 191.
    -8-
    J-S51037-19
    Additionally, the trial court thoroughly and immediately instructed the
    jury that Nisely’s prohibited testimony should be disregarded, and that it was
    the sole purview of the jury to assess the credibility of witnesses. 
    Id. at 193-
    94. Neff is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one. 
    Hairston, supra
    . Under
    the circumstances, we conclude that any arguable prejudice to Neff
    attributable to Nisely’s prohibited testimony was effectively cured by the
    cautionary instruction to the jury. See 
    Johnson, supra
    . Therefore, the trial
    court did not abuse its discretion in denying Neff’s Motion for a mistrial, and
    his second issue entitles him to no relief.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 11/5/2019
    -9-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1839 MDA 2018

Filed Date: 11/5/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021