Com. v. Dekeyser, W. ( 2019 )


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  • J-S53042-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                            :
    :
    :
    WILLIAM DEKEYSER                           :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 3292 EDA 2018
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 14, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-51-CR-0003079-2017
    BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and NICHOLS, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                          FILED NOVEMBER 19, 2019
    Appellant William Dekeyser appeals from the judgment of sentence
    imposed following his jury trial convictions for persons not to possess firearms,
    carrying a firearm without a license, carrying firearms on public streets in
    Philadelphia, possessing instruments of crime, and simple assault.1 Appellant
    argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the jury to watch
    an     altered   version   of   the    Commonwealth’s    video   evidence   during
    deliberations. We affirm.
    The trial court opinion set forth the relevant facts of this appeal as
    follows:
    [Appellant] pointed a loaded gun at Jervine Oates on March 13,
    2017 at about 5:30 p.m., as both men stood less than two feet
    apart from each other at the corner of 16th Street and Nedro
    Avenue. Officers Timothy McGonigle and Judith Kinniry observed
    ____________________________________________
    1   18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6105, 6106, 6108, 907, and 2701, respectively.
    J-S53042-19
    [Appellant] pointing the gun as they travelled eastbound along
    Nedro Avenue in their marked police car. Both officers got out of
    the car, drew their weapons, announced that they were police,
    and told [Appellant] to drop the weapon. [Appellant] turned to
    look at the officers and then ran. Because [Appellant] was about
    fifty to sixty feet away from the officers, they got back into the
    car and drove to catch up to him, turning northbound on 16th
    Street, but ultimately lost sight of him after about ten seconds.
    After losing sight of [Appellant], the officers exited the car. Officer
    Kinniry noticed that people outside were pointing to where there
    was a gun on the ground, about fifteen to twenty feet away from
    where she initially saw [Appellant] pointing the gun at Mr. Oates.
    She stood by the gun to preserve the chain of custody, and
    radioed other officers for backup. Mr. Oates nervously stood
    nearby until [Appellant] was apprehended.
    Meanwhile, Officer McGonigle went into a store at the corner of
    16th and Nedro, where he knew that surveillance cameras were
    trained on that corner. By reviewing the surveillance video of
    three separate cameras, he could see [Appellant] point the gun,
    run, and enter the rear door of a property at 1602 Widener Place,
    which is at the next block north of Nedro. Officer Kinniry briefly
    asked another officer to stand by the gun, and then she entered
    the store to confirm that this was [Appellant’s] flight path. Officer
    McGonigle exited the store and told backup officers to try to
    surround the front and back entrances of 1602 Widener Place.
    Officer McGonigle then stood by the gun, as Officer Kinniry and
    another officer went to one entrance of 1602 Widener Place, and
    Officer John DeSanto and his partner went to the other entrance
    of 1602 Widener Place. The officers yelled into the property for
    [Appellant] to come out. [Appellant] told the officers that he did
    not have any guns, exited a back door or basement door of the
    property with his hands up, and was then arrested. Officer Kinniry
    testified that about ten minutes, at most, passed between the
    time that she recovered the gun and the time that [Appellant] was
    arrested.
    *    *    *
    DNA analysis of the gun recovered revealed that at least three
    individuals with distinct DNA profiles touched the gun. One of
    those individuals was [Appellant] and [Appellant] left most of the
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    DNA on the sample. There were no fingerprints recovered from
    the gun.
    Trial Ct. Op., 4/24/19, at 2-4 (record citations and footnotes omitted).
    On April 12, 2017, the Commonwealth filed a criminal information
    charging Appellant with multiple offenses related to his possession of the
    firearm and assault. Appellant proceeded to a jury trial on April 2, 2018. At
    trial, the Commonwealth played a recording of the surveillance videos for the
    jury.
    During the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, this evidence was
    presented in a split-screen format that compiled simultaneous
    footage from four separate surveillance cameras as a 2x2 grid.
    During deliberations, the jury asked to review this video evidence
    again. Outside of the jury’s presence, [the trial c]ourt directed
    the Commonwealth to play one video camera [angle] at a time,
    and to play only the clips from the three video cameras that
    allegedly depicted [Appellant].
    Id. at 7 (record citations and footnote omitted). By showing one camera angle
    at a time, the altered video appeared larger than the video shown during the
    Commonwealth’s case-in-chief. Id.
    Appellant objected to the trial court’s decision to alter the format of the
    video:
    [Appellant’s Counsel]: Your Honor, my basis of objection is that
    the video should be replayed in the same manner it was [played]
    for trial. [The prosecutor] could have―if he wanted to play this
    video [featuring one camera angle at a time] for the jury, he could
    have . . . done that during trial. However, . . . it didn’t happen
    that way. He played . . . the version that had three different
    videos playing at the same time. That’s the decision that the
    Commonwealth made. They can’t go back now and try to―
    THE COURT: It’s not a different video. It’s the same video.
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    *       *   *
    [Appellant’s Counsel]: But I’m saying they can’t . . . make
    highlights or alter the manner in which it was played for the jury.
    It’s counsel’s job and the Commonwealth’s job to present their
    evidence as clear as possible. I mean, when he presented
    evidence, he presented it in a manner that he chose to. You can’t
    look back and say I should have presented evidence differently.
    N.T. Trial, 4/4/18, at 10-11. The trial court overruled Appellant’s objection.
    Shortly thereafter, the jurors entered the courtroom and the trial court
    permitted them to watch the altered video. The trial court did not allow the
    jurors to leave the jury box, but it did permit the jurors to stand up within the
    box for a better view of the screen. After the jurors watched the altered video,
    they exited the courtroom and continued deliberations.
    Ultimately, the jury convicted Appellant of the aforementioned offenses.
    On September 14, 2018, the trial court sentenced Appellant to five to ten
    years’ imprisonment for persons not to possess firearms.         The trial court
    imposed no further penalties for the remaining convictions. Appellant timely
    filed a post-sentence motion on September 24, 2018, which the trial court
    denied on October 26, 2018.
    On November 13, 2018, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. The
    trial court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of
    errors complained of on appeal, which Appellant timely filed on November 20,
    2018.2 The trial court filed a responsive opinion, concluding that it did not
    abuse its discretion by allowing the jury to view the video evidence during
    ____________________________________________
    2Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement raised three issues. However, Appellant
    now presents only one of those issues for this Court’s review.
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    J-S53042-19
    deliberations. The trial court emphasized that “[w]hile the format of the video
    presented to the deliberating jury differed from the format of the same video
    played three times for the jury during trial, the enlarged single-[camera angle]
    format did not distort the exhibit to the extent that it could be characterized
    as ‘different’ evidence.” Trial Ct. Op. at 8 (emphasis in original). Moreover,
    the trial court determined that any error was harmless. See id. at 9-10.
    Appellant now raises one issue for our review:
    Did not the [trial] court abuse its discretion in permitting the jury
    to view a magnified version of a video clip during deliberations,
    where the video had not been magnified when it was shown during
    the trial and admitted into evidence?
    Appellant’s Brief at 3.
    Relying on Commonwealth v. Lilliock, 
    740 A.2d 237
     (Pa. Super.
    1999), Appellant argues that a deliberating jury may only review trial exhibits
    “in the same manner as [the exhibits] were presented during trial.” Id. at
    12.   In the instant case, Appellant contends that “the video shown to the
    deliberating jurors was shown in an altered and magnified format.” Id. at 11.
    Because of the altered format, Appellant asserts that video was fundamentally
    different from the video shown to the jury during the Commonwealth’s case-
    in-chief. Id. Further, Appellant insists that the trial “court’s conscious object
    was to have the jury review the evidence in a different manner from the
    manner in which the evidence was initially presented at trial.”       Id. at 12
    (emphasis in original). Under these circumstances, Appellant maintains that
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    “it was an abuse of discretion for the [trial] court to order the videos replayed
    for the jury in magnified form.” Id. at 16.
    Our review is informed by Pa.R.Crim.P. 646, which states:
    (A) Upon retiring, the jury may take with it such exhibits as
    the trial judge deems proper, except as provided in paragraph (C).
    *    *     *
    (C) During deliberations, the jury shall not be permitted to
    have:
    (1) a transcript of any trial testimony;
    (2) a copy of any written or otherwise recorded confession
    by the defendant;
    (3) a copy of the information or indictment; and
    (4) except as provided in paragraph (B), written jury
    instructions.
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 646(A), (C); see also Commonwealth v. Morton, 
    774 A.2d 750
    , 753 (Pa. Super. 2001) (holding the trial court did not violate the prior
    version of Rule 646 where, during deliberations, the jury was placed in the
    jury box, permitted to review a written confession briefly, not permitted to
    deliberate while in the jury box, and given a cautionary instruction).
    “Whether an exhibit should be allowed to go out with the jury during its
    deliberation     is   within   the   sound     discretion   of   the   trial   judge.”
    Commonwealth v. Barnett, 
    50 A.3d 176
    , 194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations
    omitted).
    We point out that the trial is the forum for finding truth. The jury’s
    deliberations represent the process by which the fact finders
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    establish what they believe to be true. For policy reasons, where
    materials inform a jury and aid it in the difficult task of
    determining facts, the jury should be permitted to study those
    materials during its deliberations.
    Commonwealth v. Strong, 
    836 A.2d 884
    , 886 (Pa. 2003) (citation and
    emphasis omitted).
    “The underlying reason for excluding certain items from the jury’s
    deliberations is to prevent placing undue emphasis or credibility on the
    material, and de-emphasizing or discrediting other items not in the room with
    the jury.” Barnett, 50 A.3d at 194 (citations omitted). “If there is a likelihood
    the importance of the evidence will be skewed, prejudice may be found; if not,
    there is no prejudice per se and the error is harmless.” Id. (citations omitted).
    “Under this doctrine, an error may be harmless where the properly admitted
    evidence of guilt is so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error is
    so insignificant by comparison that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that
    the error could not have contributed to the verdict.” Strong, 836 A.2d at 887
    (citation and quotation marks omitted).
    In Lilliock, “both parties used a [video] presenter, a video machine that
    enlarges a regular photograph on a video monitor, to assist them in presenting
    photographic evidence to the jury.”         Lilliock, 
    740 A.2d at 243
    .        During
    deliberations,   the   jury   did   not   have   access   to   a   video   presenter.
    Consequently, the trial court allowed the jury to use a magnifying glass to
    review the photographs during deliberations.
    On appeal, the appellant argued that the jury’s use of the magnifying
    glass violated a prior version of Rule 646. The Lilliock Court disagreed:
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    J-S53042-19
    The expert witnesses relied upon an examination of the
    photograph during their testimony, and the Commonwealth
    presented the evidence via the video presenter. The magnifying
    lens was used by the jury to view the photographs in the same
    manner as they were presented during trial. This procedure
    assisted the jury in its truth-determining process. Thus, we
    conclude that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in
    allowing the jury to utilize a magnifying lens during deliberations.
    
    Id.
     (emphasis added).
    Instantly, the Commonwealth presented a “split-screen format that
    compiled simultaneous footage from four separate surveillance cameras as a
    2x2 grid” during its case-in-chief. Trial Ct. Op. at 7. During deliberations,
    however, the trial court responded to the jury’s request to review this evidence
    by directing the Commonwealth to present video from one camera angle at a
    time.    
    Id.
       The trial court determined that it did not err in ordering the
    presentation of a different version of the video, because “the enlarged, single-
    [camera angle] format of the video played for the deliberating jury was the
    same evidence already played for the jury.” Id. at 6 (emphasis omitted).
    Although the trial court correctly noted that the deliberating jury viewed “the
    same evidence,” it was not presented “in the same manner” as the video
    played during the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief. See Lilliock, 
    740 A.2d at 243
    .
    Nevertheless, the Commonwealth’s properly admitted evidence was
    overwhelming. See Strong, 836 A.2d at 887. As the trial court noted:
    Officers McGonigle and Kinniry directly observed [Appellant] point
    a gun at someone and then flee after they announced their
    presence. Bystanders pointed Officer Kinniry to a firearm on the
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    J-S53042-19
    ground along [Appellant’s] flight path. There are no discernible
    issues with the chain of custody of that firearm, and the DNA on
    the firearm belongs primarily to [Appellant]. Officer McGonigle
    looked at nearby surveillance footage to determine [Appellant’s]
    flight pattern, leading to the discovery of [Appellant] inside of a
    nearby vacant building where there was only one item of
    clothing―the hoodie that the officers allegedly saw [Appellant]
    wearing as he fled from them. The surveillance footage merely
    corroborates the officers’ eyewitness testimony and aspects of
    their investigation. . . .
    Trial Ct. Op. at 10-11 (citations omitted).
    Additionally,    the    Commonwealth     entered       into   evidence    two
    photographs, which were “still shots” taken directly from the surveillance
    videos.   See N.T. Trial, 4/3/18, 38-39.        The photographs depicted an
    individual in a gray sweatshirt pointing a gun at another individual.           See
    Commonwealth’s        Exs.   22-23.   Unlike   the   video    played   during   the
    Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, the photographs each featured one image
    from a single camera angle. Id.
    In light of the Commonwealth’s overwhelming evidence, the prejudicial
    effect of allowing the deliberating jury to view the altered video was so
    insignificant by comparison that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that any
    error was harmless. See Strong, 836 A.2d at 887. Accordingly, we affirm
    the judgment of sentence.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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    J-S53042-19
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 11/19/19
    - 10 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 3292 EDA 2018

Filed Date: 11/19/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/19/2019