Com. v. Beatty, J. ( 2015 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JASON W. BEATTY
Appellant No. 429 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 22, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0016297-2013
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., JENKINS, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED OCTOBER 16, 2015
Following a bench trial, the trial court found Jason Beatty guilty of
driving under the influence of a high rate of alcohol1 and careless driving.2
The court sentenced Beatty to 90 days of intermediate punishment plus one
year of concurrent probation.3
In this direct appeal, Beatty raises two issues:
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(b) (driving while alcohol concentration in the individual’s
blood or breath is at least .10% but less than .16%).
2
75 Pa.C.S. § 3714.
3
The court did not impose further penalty on the other convictions. Beatty
filed a timely post-sentence motion challenging the weight of the evidence,
which the trial court denied, and a timely notice of appeal. Both Beatty and
the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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1. Whether the evidence was insufficient to sustain Beatty’s DUI
and careless driving convictions as the Commonwealth did not
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he drove the vehicle?
2. Were the verdicts of guilt against the weight of the evidence
because the trial court ignored overwhelming evidence that []
Beatty was not driving the car?
Brief of Appellant, at 5. We affirm.
Beatty first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Our standard of
review for such challenges is well-settled:
[W]hether[,] viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the
light most favorable to the [Commonwealth as the] verdict
winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to
find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In
applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence and
substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note
that the facts and circumstances established by the
Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence.
Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the
fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that
as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the
combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its
burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 716 (Pa.Super.2015).
The following evidence was adduced during trial: in the early morning
hours of May 29, 2013, Officer Eric Lakin, a 24 year veteran of the North
Versailles Township Police Department, responded to a report of an
automobile accident on Penn Avenue. N.T., 9/22/14, at 5-6. At the scene,
Officer Lakin observed that a Pontiac G6 had struck a pickup truck. Id. at 6,
9-10. A female, Amanda Delsignore, was present, and Officer Lakin
described her as “hysterical” and “frantic.” Id. at 6, 8. Beatty was lying on
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his back in a field across the street from the collision scene, lapsing in and
out of consciousness and “slightly combative”. Id. at 6-7, 18. When Officer
Lakin asked if he had been involved in an accident, Beatty denied being an
occupant of the vehicle. Id. at 7, 18. There was a laceration on the left
side of Beatty’s head near his eye, and blood from the laceration ran down
his face. Id. at 7. Officer Lakin detected a strong odor of alcohol on
Beatty’s breath. Id. at 8.
A paramedic crew arrived and immobilized Beatty. Id. Officer Lakin
spoke with Delsignore, who was upset and crying, and she stated that “she
was the passenger in the vehicle and [Beatty] was the driver, [and] that
they had been proceeding up Penn Avenue, having an argument” prior to the
accident. N.T., 9/22/14, at 9. Delsignore also told Officer Volker, who
arrived after Officer Lakin, that Beatty was the driver of the vehicle and she
was the passenger. Id. at 24-25, 26.
The Pontiac had struck the parked pickup truck head on. N.T.,
9/22/14, at 9. After the impact, the Pontiac spun around and ended up
parallel with and up against the pickup truck. Id. at 9, 15, 16. Officer Lakin
noted that the Pontiac’s driver’s side door contained blood smearing, and the
pickup truck had blood smearing on it as well. Id. at 9-10. Officer Lakin
testified that “the blood smear would be consistent with the driver of the
vehicle sustaining injury, as there [were] no other injuries to Delsignore that
were visible to me at the time.” Id. at 10. Delsignore “stated that she was
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not injured.” Id. at 13. Nor was Delsignore bleeding; the only source of
blood was from Beatty. Id. at 22. There was no damage to the passenger
side of the Pontiac. Id. at 15. The driver’s side window of the Pontiac “had
been shattered out” by the “secondary side impact” with the pickup truck.
Id. at 16. The blood smears on the inside of the driver’s side front door of
the Pontiac were just below where the window would have been had it not
shattered. Id. at 16, 22. The blood smears on the door of the pickup truck
were right next to the driver’s side of the Pontiac. Id. at 16, 22. Because
the driver’s side of the Pontiac was pinned against the pickup truck, nobody
could have exited the driver’s side of the Pontiac; the only way to exit was
the passenger side. Id. at 17, 22. Delsignore told Officer Lakin that she
had helped extricate Beatty from the vehicle.
Paramedics transported Beatty to the hospital, where a blood draw
revealed that his blood alcohol content was .110%. N.T., 9/22/14, at 12.
Delsignore testified that she went to the hospital after the accident,
and that her mother was also at the hospital, speaking with Officer Lakin on
the phone. N.T., 9/22/14, at 31, 36. Officer Lakin told Delsignore’s mother
that Delsignore had said at the accident scene that Beatty was driving the
car. Id. Delsignore’s mother relayed this information to Delsignore, and
Delsignore stated that she was the driver. Id. Delsignore insisted at trial
that she struck the pickup truck, and the impact threw Beatty from the
passenger seat to the driver’s side, where his head struck the driver’s side
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window. Id. at 28-29, 35. She claimed that neither she nor Beatty were
wearing seatbelts before the accident, and after the collision, she crawled
over Beatty and pulled him out of the car. Id. at 29, 33. Beatty is 6’1” or
6’2”, while Delsignore is only 5’6”. Id. at 33.
75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(b) provides:
An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical
control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient
amount of alcohol such that the alcohol concentration in the
individual’s blood or breath is at least 0.10% but less than
0.16% within two hours after the individual has driven, operated
or been in actual physical control of the movement of the
vehicle.
The term “operate”
necessitates evidence of actual, physical control of either the
machinery of the motor vehicle or the management of the
vehicle’s movement, but does not require evidence that the
vehicle was in motion. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 833 A.2d
260, 263 (Pa.Super.2003). Under Pennsylvania law, an
eyewitness is not required to establish one was driving,
operating, or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle, but,
rather, the Commonwealth may establish the same through
wholly circumstantial evidence. Id. ‘Our precedent indicates that
a combination of the following factors is required in determining
whether a person had ‘actual physical control’ of an automobile:
the motor running, the location of the vehicle, and additional
evidence showing that the defendant had driven the vehicle.’
Commonwealth v. Brotherson, 888 A.2d 901, 904
(Pa.Super.2005) (citing Commonwealth v. Woodruff, [] 668
A.2d 1158, 1161 ([Pa.Super.]1995)). In addition, when the
location of the vehicle supports an inference that it was driven,
this inference will serve as a key factor in a finding of actual
control; conversely, where the location of a vehicle supports an
inference that it was not driven, this Court has rejected the
inference of actual control. Brotherson, 888 A.2d at 905. In
Brotherson, we determined that “[t]he highly inappropriate
location of the car—on the basketball court of a gated children’s
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playground—created a strong inference that it was an already
intoxicated [a]ppellant who had driven the car to that spot.” Id.
Commonwealth v. Young, 904 A.2d 947, 954 (Pa.Super.2006).
Although Beatty does not dispute that his blood alcohol content was
over .10%, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he
was driving the Pontiac. Viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, the evidence was sufficient to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that Beatty drove the Pontiac. Delsignore admitted to two
police officers at the accident scene that Beatty was the driver and she was
the passenger, and the crash occurred because they were having an
argument. The physical evidence also proves that Beatty was the driver.
The blood smears on the vehicles were found only to the left of the driver’s
seat of the Pontiac -- specifically, on the door panel underneath the
shattered glass of the driver’s side window and on the pickup truck against
the Pontiac. Thus, the blood came from an injury to the driver. Only Beatty
lost any blood and showed any sign of injury. Delsignore, on the contrary,
was not bleeding and had no visible injury. The injury on the left side of
Beatty’s head correlated with the locations of the blood smears on the
driver’s side door and pickup truck. Delsignore’s testimony that she was the
driver is of no moment, because once again, we must view the evidence in
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the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. Therefore, Beatty’s
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is devoid of merit.4
In his next argument, Beatty contends that the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence. The law pertaining to weight of the evidence claims
is well-settled. The weight of the evidence is a matter exclusively for the
finder of fact, who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to
determine the credibility of the witnesses. Commonwealth v. Forbes, 867
A.2d 1268, 1273–74 (Pa.Super.2005). A new trial is not warranted because
of “a mere conflict in the testimony” and must have a stronger foundation
than a reassessment of the credibility of witnesses. Commonwealth v.
Bruce, 916 A.2d 657, 665 (Pa.Super.2007). Rather, the role of the trial
judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so
clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight
with all the facts is to deny justice. Id. On appeal, “our purview is
extremely limited and is confined to whether the trial court abused its
discretion in finding that the jury verdict did not shock its conscience. Thus,
appellate review of a weight claim consists of a review of the trial court’s
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4
In support of his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, Beatty cites
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 312 A.2d 430 (Pa.Super.1973), in which a
plurality of this Court held that the circumstantial evidence submitted by the
Commonwealth was not sufficient to sustain drunk driving conviction. As a
plurality opinion, Johnson is not binding precedent. See Commonwealth
v. Bethea, 828 A.2d 1066, 1073 (Pa.2003) (reasoning in plurality opinion
does not carry precedential weight).
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exercise of discretion, not a review of the underlying question of whether the
verdict is against the weight of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Knox,
50 A.3d 732, 738 (Pa.Super.2012). An appellate court may not reverse a
verdict unless it is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of
justice. Forbes, 867 A.2d at 1273–74.
The trial court acted within its discretion in finding that Beatty was the
driver of the Pontiac. The physical evidence summarized above refutes
Delsignore’s trial testimony that she drove the Pontiac. Moreover, the trial
court, as factfinder, was free to believe Officer Lakin’s testimony that
Delsignore admitted at the accident scene that Beatty was the driver.
For these reasons, we affirm Beatty’s judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/16/2015
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