Com. v. Johnson, S. , 125 A.3d 822 ( 2015 )

J-S59022-15
2015 Pa. Super. 221
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
STEFON JOHNSON, :
:
Appellant : No. 243 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 28, 2015,
Court of Common Pleas, Erie County,
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0001038-2014
and CP-25-CR-0002133-2014
BEFORE: BOWES, DONOHUE and FITZGERALD*, JJ.
OPINION BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED OCTOBER 20, 2015
Appellant, Stefon Johnson (“Johnson”), appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered on January 28, 2015 in the Court of Common Pleas, Erie
County. Upon review, we find no support for Johnson’s claim that the
sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence that is
manifestly excessive. We further conclude that the sentencing court
properly considered Johnson’s prior record score, as opposed to the number
of prior convictions in his criminal record, in determining that Johnson was a
repeat felony offender. We therefore affirm.
A brief summary of the relevant facts and procedural history is as
follows. Between March 9 and March 17, 2014, Johnson entered three
separate businesses with a small handgun and instructed the individuals
*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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therein to empty the contents of the cash registers. State police officers
arrested Johnson on March 18, 2014 and charged him with conspiracy,
robbery, receiving stolen property, firearms not to be carried without a
license, terroristic threats with intent to terrorize another, theft by unlawful
taking, persons not to possess a firearm, simple assault, recklessly
endangering another person, and possessing instruments of crime.1
On November 26, 2014, Johnson pled guilty to two counts of robbery,
and in exchange, the Commonwealth nolle prossed all other charges.
Johnson appeared for a sentencing hearing on January 28, 2015. During the
hearing, Johnson presented his mother, father, and grandmother as
character witnesses. They testified that Johnson was immature and made
mistakes, but that he could be rehabilitated. Johnson also testified,
apologizing for his actions. Defense counsel requested that the sentencing
court consider his young age, his rehabilitative potential, his juvenile record,
and the fact that he accepted responsibility for his actions when deciding
Johnson’s sentence. Defense counsel specifically requested that the
sentencing court “consider a concurrent, low-end standard range
sentence[.]” N.T., 1/28/15, at 19.
Defense counsel also contested the presentence investigation report
(“PSI Report”), which designated Johnson a repeat felony offender (“RFEL”)
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 903(c), 3701(a)(1)(ii), 3925(a), 6106(a)(1), 2706(a)(1),
3921(a), 6105(a)(1), 2701(a)(3), 2705, 907(b).
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pursuant to 204 Pa. Code § 303.4. Defense counsel asserted that a strict
statutory construction of section 303.4(a)(2) requires six or more
convictions or adjudications, not six or more points as reflected by the PSI
Report. Since Johnson did not have six or more prior convictions or
adjudications, defense counsel challenged the RFEL designation.
Following its review of section 303.4(a)(2), the sentencing court
rejected defense counsel’s argument, stating that a RFEL designation
requires six points, not convictions, based upon the defendant’s prior record
score. The sentencing court determined that Johnson was appropriately
designated a RFEL based on his prior record score of six for first- and
second-degree felonies and that the sentencing guidelines in the PSI Report
were calculated correctly. After considering the PSI Report, the statutorily
required factors set forth in the Sentencing Code, and the testimony offered
by Johnson and his witnesses, the sentencing court sentenced Johnson to
two concurrent terms of 102 to 204 months of incarceration and ordered him
to pay the costs of prosecution plus restitution in the amount of $793.
Johnson filed a motion for reconsideration on the same date as the
sentencing hearing, requesting that the sentencing court reconsider its
sentence and reduce the period of incarceration. Johnson alleged that he
was improperly designated as a RFEL and that the sentencing court should
have imposed a standard range guideline sentence rather than an
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aggravated range sentence. On January 29, 2015, the sentencing court
denied Johnson’s motion for reconsideration.
Johnson timely filed a notice of appeal on February 6, 2015 and a
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Rule
1925(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. On appeal,
Johnson raises the following two issues for our review, which we have
reordered for ease of disposition:
1. Whether [Johnson’s] sentence is manifestly
excessive, clearly unreasonable and inconsistent with
the objectives of the Sentencing Code?
2. Whether the [s]entencing [c]ourt erred in
sentencing [Johnson] with a prior record score of a
[RFEL] instead of with a prior record score of five
(5)[?]
Johnson’s Brief at 4.
In his first issue on appeal, Johnson challenges the discretionary
aspects of his sentence. Johnson’s Brief at 4. This Court has held, “[w]here
an appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of a sentence, there is no
automatic right to appeal and an appellant’s appeal should be considered a
petition for allowance of appeal.” Commonwealth v. Crork, 966 A.2d 585,
590 (Pa. Super. 2009).
Before we reach the merits of this [issue], we
must engage in a four part analysis to determine:
(1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether
Appellant preserved his issue; (3) whether
Appellant’s brief includes a concise statement of the
reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with
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respect to the discretionary aspects of sentence; and
(4) whether the concise statement raises a
substantial question that the sentence is appropriate
under the sentencing code.
Commonwealth v. Clarke, 70 A.3d 1281, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citing
Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 1250 (Pa. Super. 2006)).
In this case, Johnson filed a timely notice of appeal and preserved his
claim on appeal in a post-sentence motion as well as in his Rule 1925(b)
statement. Johnson also included a concise statement of reasons relied
upon for allowance of appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) in his brief. The
question remaining for our determination, therefore, is whether Johnson
raised a substantial question.
The determination of what constitutes a
substantial question must be evaluated on a case-
by-case basis. A substantial question exists “only
when the appellant advances a colorable argument
that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1)
inconsistent with a specific provision of the
Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental
norms which underlie the sentencing process.”
Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal
citations omitted).
In his Rule 2119(f) statement, Johnson argues that the sentencing
court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence “given the
mitigating factors of his case.” Johnson’s Brief at 9. In support of his claim,
Johnson relies on the testimony of his character witnesses that testified that
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he was immature and made mistakes, but that he had potential for
rehabilitation. Id.
“This Court has held that an excessive sentence claim—in conjunction
with an assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating factors—raises a
substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa.
Super. 2014) (citing Commonwealth v. Perry, 883 A.2d 599, 602 (Pa.
Super. 2005)).2 Thus, we will address the merits of Johnson’s claim.
Our standard of review for challenges to the discretionary aspects of
sentencing is as follows:
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound
discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence
will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest
abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse of
discretion is not shown merely by an error in
judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by
reference to the record, that the sentencing court
ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or
ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable
decision.
Commonwealth v. Disalvo, 70 A.3d 900, 903 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Glass, 50 A.3d 720, 727 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal
denied, 63 A.3d 774 (2013)).
2
This Court has offered “less than a model of clarity and consistency” in
determining whether this particular issue raises a substantial question. See
Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1272 n.8 (Pa. Super. 2013); see
also Commonwealth v. Seagraves, 103 A.3d 839, 841-42 (Pa. Super.
2014). Nevertheless, as the Dodge Court stated, “unless an en banc panel
of this Court or our Supreme Court overturns these decisions, we are bound
to follow them.” Dodge, 77 A.3d at 1273.
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Additionally, our review of the discretionary aspects
of a sentence is confined by the statutory mandates
of 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] §§ 9781(c) and (d). Subsection
9781(c) provides:
The appellate court shall vacate the sentence and
remand the case to the sentencing court with
instructions if it finds:
(1) the sentencing court purported to sentence
within the sentencing guidelines but applied the
guidelines erroneously;
(2) the sentencing court sentenced within the
sentencing guidelines but the case involves
circumstances where the application of the
guidelines would be clearly unreasonable; or
(3) the sentencing court sentenced outside the
sentencing guidelines and the sentence is
unreasonable.
In all other cases[,] the appellate court shall affirm
the sentence imposed by the sentencing court.
42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9781.
In reviewing the record, we consider:
(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense
and the history and characteristics of the
defendant.
(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to
observe the defendant, including any presentence
investigation.
(3) The findings upon which the sentence was
based.
(4) The guidelines promulgated by the
commission.
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42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9781(d).
Raven, 97 A.3d at 1253-54.
Johnson does not argue that the sentencing court applied the
guidelines erroneously or sentenced him outside the guidelines. Rather,
Johnson asserts that the sentence was excessive in light of mitigating factors
testified to at his sentencing hearing that the sentencing court failed to
consider. Johnson’s Brief at 9. Our review of the record reveals, however,
that the sentencing court had the benefit of a PSI Report when fashioning
Johnson’s sentence. “Where, as here, the trial court has the benefit of a
pre-sentence report, we presume that the court was aware of relevant
information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those
considerations along with any mitigating factors.” Commonwealth v.
Seagraves, 103 A.3d 839, 842 (Pa. Super. 2014).
Furthermore, the record reflects that the sentencing court considered
all mitigating factors prior to sentencing Johnson. At the sentencing
hearing, the sentencing court detailed the factors it considered, stating:
I’ve considered a number of things here. I’ve
considered the presentence report in its entirety and
I’m going to make it a part of the record in this case.
I’ve also considered the Pennsylvania Sentencing
Code and all its factors, the guidelines, the testimony
of the witnesses that have appeared in support of
the defendant, and the various statements made by
counsel and the defendant here today.
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N.T., 2/12/15, at 21. The sentencing court further stated that it considered
Johnson’s age, the seriousness of the offenses, and the fact that Johnson
had a significant juvenile record. Id. at 21-22.
Thus, after reviewing the record, we conclude that there is no evidence
of record to establish that the sentencing court “ignored or misapplied the
law, exercised its judgement for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill
will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.” Disalvo, 70 A.3d at
903. Nor is there any basis for us to conclude that the sentencing court’s
application of the guidelines in this case was clearly erroneous. See Raven;
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(2). As a result, we are unable to discern of any
abuse of discretion by the sentencing court. Johnson is not entitled to relief
on his first issue.
In his second issue on appeal, Johnson raises a question of statutory
construction of the sentencing guidelines under 204 Pa. Code § 303.4. This
is a question of law and “[t]hus, our standard of review is de novo and our
scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Wilson, 101 A.3d 1151,
1153 (Pa. Super. 2014) (italicization omitted) (citing Commonwealth v.
Spence, 91 A.3d 44, 46 (Pa. 2014)). “Consequently, we are not bound by
the lower court’s conclusions regarding the proper meaning of the applicable
provisions of this statute.” Commonwealth v. Devries, 112 A.3d 663, 670
(Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted).
The statute in question provides:
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(a) Prior Record Score categories. Determination of
the correct Prior Record Score category under this
section is based on the type and number of prior
convictions (§ 303.5) and prior juvenile adjudications
(§ 303.6). There are eight Prior Record Score
categories: Repeat Violent Offender (REVOC), Repeat
Felony 1 and Felony 2 Offender (RFEL), and point-
based categories of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
(1) Repeat Violent Offender Category (REVOC).
Offenders who have two or more previous
convictions or adjudications for four point offenses
(§ 303.7(a)(1) and § 303.15) and whose current
conviction carries an Offense Gravity Score of 9 or
higher shall be classified in the Repeat Violent
Offender Category.
(2) Repeat Felony 1 and Felony 2 Offender
Category (RFEL). Offenders who have previous
convictions or adjudications for Felony 1 and/or
Felony 2 offenses which total 6 or more in the
prior record, and who do not fall within the
Repeat Violent Offender Category, shall be
classified in the repeat Felony 1 and Felony 2
Offender Category.
(3) Point-based Categories (0-5). Offenders who
do not fall into the REVOC or RFEL categories
shall be classified in a Point-based Category. The
Prior Record Score shall be the sum of the points
accrued based on previous convictions or
adjudications, up to a maximum of five points.
204 Pa. Code § 303.4.
Johnson assails the sentencing court’s application of the guidelines
under section 303.4. Johnson’s Brief at 7-8. Johnson contends that the
language of subsection 303.4(a)(2) requires six prior convictions or
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adjudications, rather than six points, to designate an offender as a RFEL.3
Id. On that basis, Johnson asserts that he does not meet the requirements
of subsection 303.4(a)(2), and thus, the sentencing court improperly
designated him as a RFEL. Id. 4
In its order denying Johnson’s motion for reconsideration, the
sentencing court explained its rationale for classifying him as a RFEL,
stating, “Four points were ascribed to the burglary charge and two points for
the robbery charge, for a total of six. Therefore, the defendant met the
RFEL criteria.” Order, 1/29/15, at 1. The sentencing court further states in
its 1925(a) opinion that “[t]he defendant was a RFEL under the guidelines.
Prior record score is just that, a ‘score’ or ‘points,’ not prior ‘convictions.’
3
In Johnson’s post-sentence motion, he conceded that a representative of
the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing informed him that the
commission “interprets the statutes to mean points – not separate
convictions/adjudications as defense counsel argues[.]” See Johnson’s Post-
Sentence Motion, 1/28/15, at 2. Johnson, nevertheless asserted that the
commission’s “interpretation is at odds with a plain reading of the statute.”
Id. For the reasons set forth herein, we disagree.
4
Johnson also asserts that he should have been sentenced based on a prior
record score of five. Johnson’s Brief at 7. Johnson relies on 204 Pa. Code §
303.6 which states, “Only the most serious juvenile adjudication of each
prior disposition is counted in the Prior Record Score. No other prior juvenile
adjudication shall be counted in the Prior Record Score.” Id.; 204 Pa. Code
§ 303.6. Johnson, however, does not present any argument on how the
sentencing court erred in applying sections 303.4 and 303.6 to his prior
record score. Moreover, Johnson failed to present any evidence before the
sentencing court that the prior adjudications used in Johnson’s PSI Report
were part of the same prior disposition or were otherwise improperly
considered for prior record score purposes. Accordingly, this claim is
waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower court are
waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).
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The defendant’s [prior record score] was accurately calculated and
incorporated into the guidelines.” Sentencing Court Opinion, 2/13/15, at 1.
After conducting extensive research on this issue, we have not
uncovered any Pennsylvania legal authority addressing the question raised.
We must therefore undertake an interpretation of the statutory text to
ascertain whether section 303.4 requires six points or six convictions or
adjudications to designate an offender as a RFEL. In undertaking our review
of this issue, we are mindful that the Statutory Construction Act guides our
interpretation and provides that “[t]he object of all interpretation and
construction of statutes is to ascertain the effectuate the intention of the
General Assembly.” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a).
As we have often recognized, “[t]he General
Assembly’s intent is best expressed through the plain
language of the statute.” Commonwealth v.
Brown, [] 981 A.2d 893, 897 ([Pa.] 2009);
Commonwealth v. McCoy, [] 962 A.2d 1160, 1166
([Pa.] 2009). Therefore, when the terms of a statute
are clear and unambiguous, they will be given effect
consistent with their plain and common meaning. 1
Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b); Commonwealth v. Kelly, []
801 A.2d 551, 554 ([Pa.] 2002). This means
ascribing to the particular words and phrases the
definitions which they have acquired through their
common and approved usage. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1903. It
is only in instances where the words of a statute are
not explicit, or they are ambiguous, is there need to
resort to consideration of the factors in aid of
construction enumerated in 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(c).
McCoy, [] 962 A.2d at 1166; Commonwealth v.
Fithian, [] 961 A.2d 66, 74 ([Pa.] 2008); see also
1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b) (“When the words of a statute
are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it
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is not to be disregarded under the pretext of
pursuing its spirit.”).
Commonwealth v. Gerald, 47 A.3d 858, 859-60 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Hart, 28 A.3d 898, 908 (Pa. 2011)).
Our review of the statutory text of section 303.4(a)(2) reveals that it
instructs, in relevant part, that “[o]ffenders who have previous convictions
or adjudications for Felony 1 and/or Felony 2 offenses which total 6 or more
in the prior record” are deemed a RFEL. 204 Pa. Code § 303.4(a)(2). We
agree with Johnson that it is unclear from this language alone whether the
number six refers to prior convictions or prior record score points. Johnson’s
Brief at 7-8. As the statutory language is ambiguous in this regard, we must
ascertain the legislature’s intention. In so doing, the Statutory Construction
Act states that we may consider:
(1) The occasion and necessity for the statute.
(2) The circumstances under which it was enacted.
(3) The mischief to be remedied.
(4) The object to be attained.
(5) The former law, if any, including other statutes
upon the same or similar subjects.
(6) The consequences of a particular interpretation.
(7) The contemporaneous legislative history.
(8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of
such statute.
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1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(c).
Furthermore, the following presumptions may be used to determine
the legislature’s intention:
(1) That the General Assembly does not intend a
result that is absurd, impossible of execution or
unreasonable.
(2) That the General Assembly intends the entire
statute to be effective and certain.
(3) That the General Assembly does not intend to
violate the Constitution of the United States or of
this Commonwealth.
(4) That when a court of last resort has construed
the language used in a statute, the General
Assembly in subsequent statutes on the same
subject matter intends the same construction to be
placed upon such language.
(5) That the General Assembly intends to favor the
public interest as against any private interest.
1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1922.
This Court has further established that
[s]ections of statutes are not to be isolated from the
context in which they arise such that an individual
interpretation is accorded one section which does not
take into account the related sections of the same
statute. Statutes do not exist sentence by sentence.
Their sections and sentences comprise a composite
of their stated purpose.
Commonwealth v. Berryman, 649 A.2d 961, 956 (Pa. Super. 1994)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Lurie, 569 A.2d 329, 331 (Pa. 1990)). “An
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interpretation of the language of a statute must remain consistent
throughout the statute.” Id.
Viewing section 303.4 in the context of the Criminal Sentencing
Guidelines, we conclude that there is no support for Johnson’s assertion that
subsection 303.4(a)(2) requires six convictions or adjudications, and not six
points on his prior record score. Section 303.2 provides the procedure for
determining the guideline sentence. See 204 Pa. Code § 303.2. Pursuant
to section 303.2, the sentencing court must, in relevant part, “[d]etermine
the Prior Record Score as described in § 303.4--§ 303.8.” 204 Pa. Code §
303.2(a)(2). Section 303.7 of the Criminal Sentencing Guidelines, entitled,
“Prior Record Score--guideline points scoring[,]” establishes the points
allocated to each prior conviction and adjudication on a defendant’s criminal
record. 204 Pa. Code § 303.7(a). Under section 303.7, the prior record
score is determined by calculating the number of points for each conviction,
which range from one to four points. Id. Section 303.7 further cites to
section 303.15 of the Criminal Sentencing Guidelines, which provides a
“listing of offenses” with a corresponding number of prior record score
points allocated to each offense. See 204 Pa. Code § 303.15. Thus,
sections 303.7 and 303.15 indicate that a defendant’s prior record score is a
calculation of points, not convictions or adjudications.
Viewing section 303.4 in this context, we find it significant that the
language of subsection 303.4(a)(2) only provides that subsection
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303.4(a)(2) classifies as RFEL those offenders whose previous convictions or
adjudications “total 6 or more in the prior record[.]” See 204 Pa.Code
303.4(a)(2) (emphasis added). Subsection 303.4(a)(1), however,
specifically delineates that an offender falls within the Repeat Violent
Offender Category (“REVOC”) if he or she has “two or more previous
convictions or adjudications for four point offenses[.]” 204 Pa.Code
303.4(a)(1) (emphasis added). The differing language of the two
subsections belies Johnson’s contention that the legislature intended a RFEL
designation to be based upon the number of convictions, not points, in his
prior record. As this Court has held:
[W]here the legislature includes specific language in
one section of the statute and excludes it from
another, the language should not be implied where
excluded. Moreover, where a section of a statute
contains a given provision, the omission of such a
provision from a similar section is significant to show
a different legislative intent.
Commonwealth v. Kinney, 777 A.2d 492, 495 (Pa. Super. 2001) (quoting
Fonner v. Shandon, Inc., 724 A.2d 903, 907 (Pa. 1999) (citations and
emphasis omitted)).
We find further support for our conclusion in section 303.16(a), which
provides the Basic Sentencing Matrix. See 204 Pa.Code § 303.16(a). The
sentencing matrix in section 303.16(a) is based on the same prior record
score categories as those defined in section 303.4 and delineates a
sentencing recommendation for each category, increasing in severity with
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each subsequent category. See id. The categories are arranged beginning
with the point-based categories in ascending order from zero to five,
followed by the RFEL category, and ending with the REVOC. This lends
support for the interpretation that after the point-based categories of zero to
five points, the legislature intended to impose stricter punishments for those
offenders whose prior record scores carry more than five points on their
prior record scores. Thus, an offender with six or more points for first- and
second-degree felonies is designated as a RFEL and faces a more severe
sentencing recommendation. An offender that has two or more four point
offenses (totaling eight or more) and meets the required offense gravity
score, receives a designation in the REVOC and receives an even more
severe sentencing recommendation than those designated as a RFEL.
Johnson baldly states that “a strict interpretation of [section 303.4]
requires the [a]ppellant to have six (6) previous juvenile adjudications for
Felony 1 or 2 offenses.” Johnson’s Brief at 8. Although we agree that we
must strictly construe penal statutes,
courts are not required to give words of a criminal
statute their narrowest meaning or disregard evident
legislative intent.” Thus, we will not adopt the
strictest possible interpretation if doing so would
defeat the plain intent of the legislature. Again, we
must bear in mind that the legislature “does not
intend a result that is absurd, impossible of
execution, or unreasonable, and that the legislature
intends the entire statute to be effective and
certain.”
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Commonwealth v. Brown, 956 A.2d 992 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal
citations omitted).
If we endorsed Johnson’s interpretation of section 303.4, we would be
determining that the legislature intended to require a sentencing court to
designate an offender in the REVOC and point-based categories by
considering the total number of points in their prior record score, but when
designating an offender as a RFEL, ignore the number of points and focus
solely on the number of convictions. Johnson’s interpretation is
unreasonable, as the sentencing court would have to apply two separate
standards to determine the proper category. The sentencing courts would
be required to calculate the number of points for subsections (a)(1) and
(a)(3), but would be required to consider only the number of convictions or
adjudications without regard for points when considering subsection (a)(2).
As our legislature does not intend absurd or unreasonable results, we will
not employ an interpretation that would produce such a result.
Accordingly, we conclude that the sentencing court appropriately
determined that a RFEL designation under subsection 303.4(a)(2) is based
on a calculation of points in a defendant’s prior record score rather than the
number of convictions or adjudications in his criminal history. The
sentencing court therefore properly designated Johnson as a RFEL. Finding
no error in the sentencing court’s determination, we affirm the judgment of
sentence.
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Bowes, J. joins the Opinion.
Fitzgerald, J. concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/20/2015
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