Com. v. Stroman, P. ( 2015 )


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  • J-S57006-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    PRESTON STROMAN
    Appellant                   No. 1842 EDA 2013
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 14, 2013
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0000561-2012
    BEFORE: MUNDY, J., OTT, J., and STABILE, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.:                             FILED OCTOBER 21, 2015
    Appellant, Preston Stroman, appeals from the May 14, 2013 judgment
    of sentence of one year’s probation imposed after being convicted by a jury
    of possession of a controlled substance and possession of marijuana.1 After
    careful review, we affirm.
    The trial court has summarized the relevant factual and procedural
    history as follows.
    On October 15, 2011, Officer Darnell Jessie
    (“Officer Jessie”) and his partner, Officer Millick,
    were on routine patrol in the area of 66th and
    Lebanon Streets, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Officer
    Jessie observed a red Ford Taurus, PA tag HHD 998,
    failing to signal while making a right turn, in violation
    of Motor Vehicle Code 334-B. Officer Jessie initiated
    ____________________________________________
    1
    35 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 780-113(a)(16), and 780-113(a)(30), respectively.
    J-S57006-15
    an investigative stop. The Ford was occupied by
    three individuals – a female driver, a female front-
    seat passenger and a male rear-seat passenger. At
    trial, Officer Jessie identified [Appellant] as the rear-
    seat passenger.
    As Officer Jessie was approaching the Ford, he
    observed [Appellant] quickly move his upper torso to
    the right and down toward the floor of the Ford. As
    Officer Jessie was asking the driver for her
    paperwork, he got a signal from Officer Millick.
    Officer Millick then came around to the driver’s side
    of the Ford and [Appellant] was removed from the
    Ford. At that time, Officer Jessie observed a clear
    plastic bag in the area where [Appellant] was sitting.
    The bag contained a brown handled cigar/cigarette
    and blue pills. Officer Jessie recognized these items
    as Marijuana and Xanax, respectively. The bag was
    located on the left rear floor of the Ford, next to
    [Appellant]’s right foot.
    [Appellant] was taken into custody for
    possession of a controlled substance.          When
    questioned about the items recovered from the Ford,
    [Appellant] stated that he had a prescription for the
    Xanax, but he was unable to produce one.
    [Appellant] also stated that the bag containing the
    drugs was his. The items recovered from the Ford
    were placed on a property receipt.         A seizure
    analysis corresponding to the property receipt
    revealed that item one tested positive for the
    presence of Marijuana and item two tested positive
    for the presence of Alprozolam, also known as
    Xanax.
    …
    On October 15, 2011, [Appellant] was arrested
    and charged with possession of a controlled
    substance [and possession of marijuana]. On May
    14, 2013, the matter proceeded to a trial.
    [Appellant] requested and was granted a waiver of a
    jury trial. Thereafter, the Commonwealth presented
    the testimony of Officer Jessie and the seizure
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    analysis relative to the items recovered from the
    Ford. [Appellant] presented the testimony of Ms.
    McCray and the 75-49 for the case. Based upon the
    testimony and the evidence presented, [on May 14,
    2013,] the [t]rial [c]ourt found [Appellant] guilty of
    the crime of possession [of a controlled substance
    and possession of marijuana] and sentenced
    [Appellant] to one year of reporting probation.[2]
    Trial Court Opinion, 3/20/15, at 1-3 (footnotes omitted).
    Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion.       On June 12, 2013,
    Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Thereafter, on June 27, 2013, the
    trial court ordered Appellant to file, within 30 days, a concise statement of
    errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
    Procedure 1925(b). It was not until July 29, 2014, that Appellant filed his
    Rule 1925(b) statement.3
    ____________________________________________
    2
    Appellant was sentenced to one year’s probation on the possession of a
    controlled substance charge, and no further penalty was imposed for the
    possession of marijuana charge. Sentencing Order, 5/14/13.
    3
    We note that, ordinarily, the failure to file a timely court-ordered 1925(b)
    statement results in a waiver of all issues on appeal.           See Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(b)(4)(vii); Commonwealth v. Hill, 
    16 A.3d 484
    , 494 (Pa. 2011)
    (explaining Rule 1925(b) is a bright-line rule). However, “[t]he complete
    failure to file the [Rule] 1925 concise statement is per se ineffectiveness
    because it is without reasonable basis designed to effectuate the client’s
    interest and waives all issues on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Thompson,
    
    39 A.3d 335
    , 339 (Pa. Super. 2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Burton,
    
    973 A.2d 428
    , 432 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc); see also generally
    Commonwealth v. Scott, 
    952 A.2d 1190
    , 1192 (Pa. Super. 2008). In such
    circumstances, Rule 1925(c)(3) directs us to remand for the filing of a Rule
    1925(b) statement nunc pro tunc and for the preparation of an opinion by
    the trial court. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(3). Instantly, however, Appellant’s July
    29, 2014 statement, although untimely filed, cures the defect that would be
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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    On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for our review.
    Whether the [trial] court erred in finding that the
    evidence was sufficient to convict … Appellant of
    simple possession of a controlled dangerous
    substance based upon the words of … Appellant
    alone, without other evidence independent of …
    Appellant’s words, in violation of the corpus delicti
    rule[?]
    Appellant’s Brief at 4.
    We begin by noting our well-settled standard of review. “In reviewing
    the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider whether the evidence presented
    at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in a light
    most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, support the
    jury’s verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Patterson,
    
    91 A.3d 55
    , 66 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted), cert. denied, Patterson v.
    Pennsylvania, 
    135 S. Ct. 1400
    (2015). “The Commonwealth can meet its
    burden by wholly circumstantial evidence and any doubt about the
    defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so
    weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be
    drawn from the combined circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Watley, 
    81 A.3d 108
    , 113 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    rectified by a remand pursuant to Rule 1925(c)(3). Further, the trial court
    did not file its Rule 1925(a) opinion until after the filing of the untimely Rule
    1925(b) statement. Therefore, the trial court had the opportunity to address
    Appellant’s issues on appeal. Accordingly, we are not precluded from
    reviewing Appellant’s sole issue he advances on appeal as it was included in
    his Rule 1925(b) statement.
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    citation omitted), appeal denied, 
    95 A.3d 277
    (Pa. 2014). As an appellate
    court, we must review “the entire record … and all evidence actually
    received[.]”     
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted).       “[T]he
    trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of
    the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.”
    Commonwealth v. Orie, 
    88 A.3d 983
    , 1014 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
    omitted), appeal denied, 
    99 A.3d 925
    (Pa. 2014).           “Because evidentiary
    sufficiency is a question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our
    scope of review is plenary.”      Commonwealth v. Diamond, 
    83 A.3d 119
    ,
    126 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted), cert. denied, Diamond v. Pennsylvania,
    
    135 S. Ct. 145
    (2014).
    Instantly, however, Appellant argues the evidence was insufficient
    because the Commonwealth violated the corpus delicti rule.              Appellant’s
    Brief at 12. Specifically, he argues that he “was only proven to have been
    merely present in the red Ford Taurus and was never shown to have
    possessed the bag containing [X]anax and marijuana by independent
    evidence, separate and apart from his stand alone admission.” 
    Id. at 13.
    The    corpus   delicti  rule   provides   that    the
    Commonwealth bears a burden of showing that the
    charged crime actually occurred before a confession
    or admission by the accused can be admitted as
    evidence. The corpus delecti [sic] is literally the
    body of the crime; it consists of proof that a loss or
    injury has occurred as a result of the criminal
    conduct of someone. The purpose of the corpus
    delicti rule is to guard against the hasty and
    unguarded character which is often attached to
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    confessions and admissions and the consequent
    danger of a conviction where no crime has in fact
    been committed.
    Commonwealth v. Otterson, 
    947 A.2d 1239
    , 1249 (Pa Super. 2008)
    (quotation marks and citations omitted).
    We dealt with a similar circumstance in Otterson, which we addressed
    as follows. “Initially, we point out that even though Appellant has framed
    his argument as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the corpus
    delicti rule applies to the admissibility of evidence.”    
    Id. at 1249
    (citation
    omitted). In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence,
    our standard of review is one of deference. Commonwealth v. Selenski,
    
    18 A.3d 1229
    , 1232 (Pa. Super. 2011), vacated in part on other grounds, 
    92 A.3d 766
    (Pa. 2014). Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence are
    within “the sound discretion of the trial court, and its discretion will not be
    reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.”      
    Id. (citation omitted).
       “An
    abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but is rather the
    overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is
    manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality,
    as shown by the evidence of record.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 
    884 A.2d 920
    , 924 (Pa. Super. 2005) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted),
    appeal denied, 
    928 A.2d 1289
    (Pa. 2007).         Furthermore, “if in reaching a
    conclusion the trial court over-rides [sic] or misapplies the law, discretion is
    then abused and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct the error.”
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    Commonwealth v. Weakley, 
    972 A.2d 1182
    , 1188 (Pa. Super. 2009)
    (citation omitted), appeal denied, 
    986 A.2d 150
    (Pa. 2009).
    We note, however, that Appellant has waived his corpus deliciti
    challenge for failure to preserve it below.    Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
    Procedure 302(a) provides that, “[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are
    waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”         The relevant
    testimony of Officer Jessie, elicited by the Commonwealth, is as follows.
    A.    There was a clear plastic bag right where
    [Appellant] was sitting. In that bag, it had a brown
    handle    cigar/cigarette,    which     I   immediately
    recognized as marijuana. Inside that was also blue
    pills. Once that was removed, looked on the pills
    and had a stamp of 3721, which in my previous
    experience was Xanax. So [Appellant] was taken
    into custody for a violation of controlled substance.
    Q. I’m going to ask you a question. You said that
    the bag was near [Appellant]. Where was it?
    A. It was in the left side of the vehicle where he was
    sitting as his right foot, so kind of like in the seat --
    well on the floor next to the right foot.
    Q. Okay. And was [Appellant] asked about the
    items in the bag?
    A. That’s correct.
    Q. What did he say?
    A. He had said that he had a prescription, but he
    could not produce one.
    Q. What did he say about the marijuana?
    A.   He didn’t say anything in reference to the
    marijuana.
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    N.T., 5/14/13, at 11-12. Accordingly, the record reveals that no objection
    was raised contemporaneously to the testimony at issue.            Therefore,
    Appellant has waived this issue on appeal.
    Based on the foregoing, we conclude Appellant has waived his
    challenge to the corpus delicti rule. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s
    May 14, 2013 judgment of sentence.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 10/21/2015
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