Com. v. Salmond, Q. ( 2015 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
QUENTIN SALMOND,
Appellant No. 2247 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 28, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0009615-2012
BEFORE: BOWES, PANELLA, AND FITZGERALD, *JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED OCTOBER 30, 2015
Quentin Salmond appeals from the aggregate judgment of sentence of
twenty-five to fifty years incarceration imposed by the trial court after a jury
found him guilty of third-degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder.
We affirm.
The trial court delineated the salient facts as follows.
On April 12, 2008, at about 12:30 p.m., Joan Hill was
working at an insurance office located at 5637 Chew Avenue
when she saw a blue Lincoln town car park with the engine
running on Woodlawn Avenue. A man, later identified as
defendant Salmond, dressed in women’s Muslim clothing exited
the vehicle. Hill believed the man was going to rob Skyline
Restaurant, located around the corner, so she called 9-1-1 and
gave the license plate number of the vehicle.
At around noon that day, Kerron Denmark and Kenneth
Wiggins went to Skyline Restaurant and Wiggins ordered food.
Immediately after they left the restaurant with Wiggins carrying
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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his food, a man approached them asking for marijuana. As
Denmark and Wiggins were walking down the street someone
yelled “don’t f’ing move.” Denmark heard gunshots and ran
away.
On April 12, 2008, at 12:44 p.m., while on routine patrol,
Police Officer Christopher Mulderrig was flagged down by a man
on the street and told there had been a shooting about two
blocks away. When Officer Mulderrig arrived at 5643 Chew
Avenue, he observed a male, later identified as Wiggins, lying in
the street with a gunshot wound to the chest. Wiggins
subsequently died from this gunshot to his chest.
After the murder, Detective Thorsten Lucke recovered
surveillance video from Skyline Restaurant. The surveillance
video showed Wiggins and Kerron Denmark enter Skyline
Restaurant. While the men are inside the restaurant, a vehicle
drives by on Chew Avenue and turns left at the corner.
Defendant [Jamil] Banks and defendant Salmond, wearing
women’s Muslim clothing, emerge from the area where the car
had turned from Chew Avenue. The defendants walk towards
Skyline Restaurant. Defendant Salmond stops in an alley while
defendant Banks enters the restaurant. Defendant Banks buys a
bottle of soda, leaves the restaurant, and stands with defendant
Salmond in the alley, out of sight of the camera. After Wiggins
gets his food, he and Denmark leave the restaurant and walk
down the street. Defendant Banks follows closely behind Wiggins
and Denmark while defendant Salmond follows farther back. The
defendants confront Wiggins and Denmark and Wiggins falls to
the ground. Quickly thereafter everyone runs away.
Police Officer Joanne Gain of the Crime Scene Unit
recovered two .22 caliber fired cartridge casings, a Nike Air
Jordan sneaker, and a Mountain Dew bottle from the murder
scene. Officer Gain tested the Mountain Dew bottle for finger
prints and DNA. According to Police Officer John Cannon, an
expert in firearms identification, these two .22 caliber fired
cartridge casings were fired from the same unrecovered firearm.
The bullet recovered from the decedent[’]s body and the fired
cartridge casings were not fired from the same firearm.
On April 14, 2008, at about 9:00 p.m., an unlicensed blue
Lincoln town car was found on fire in the area of Tenth Street
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and Chew Avenue. Lieutenant Rodney Wright of the Philadelphia
Fire Department determined that the vehicle was burned
intentionally.
On April 15, 2008, Charles Hayward gave a statement to
police. Hayward explained that in February he had sold the blue
Lincoln town car that Hill had called in to 9-1-1 to Bernard
Salmond, defendant Salmond’s brother. According to Hayward,
about a week previously, Wiggins had robbed defendant
Salmond after they had been gambling.
On April 17, 2008, Richard Hack, a friend of Wiggins, gave
a statement to police. Hack explained that two days before the
murder, defendant Salmond, Wiggins, and himself were
gambling. Defendant Salmond and Wiggins argued about a
gambling debt and then Wiggins choked defendant Salmond and
took $1000 from him. For the next couple of nights, defendant
Salmond and his friends were in the area looking for Wiggins.
On January 13, 2010, Robert Bluefort told police that
about three weeks after the murder, defendant Salmond
confessed to him that he shot Wiggins. According to defendant
Salmond he had to shoot or be shot. Bernard Salmond told
Bluefort that the police had questioned Hayward because the car
that was used in the murder was in his name. Bluefort and
Bernard Salmond then discussed burning the vehicle. Bernard
Salmond stayed with Bluefort for about a month after the
murder.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/3/14, at 2-4.
The Commonwealth charged Appellant with homicide, conspiracy to
commit murder, person not to possess a firearm, carrying an unlicensed
firearm, carrying a firearm in public in Philadelphia, possession of an
instrument of crime (“PIC”), arson, and hindering apprehension. The latter
two charges were dismissed after a preliminary hearing. The court severed
Appellant’s trial from that of his brother, but Appellant proceeded to trial
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with co-defendant Banks. The jury found Appellant guilty of third-degree
murder and conspiracy. It acquitted him of carrying an unlicensed firearm
and PIC. The court sentenced Appellant on July 28, 2014, to twenty to forty
years incarceration for the third-degree murder count and a consecutive
term of five to ten years imprisonment for the conspiracy charge. This
timely appeal ensued. The trial court directed Appellant to file and serve a
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.
Appellant complied, and the trial court authored its Rule 1925(a) decision.
The matter is now ready for our review. Appellant presents three issues for
this Court’s consideration.
I. Did the trial court err by permitting the Commonwealth to
elicit irrelevant other crimes evidence not admissible
pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b) and
more prejudicial than probative under Pennsylvania Rule of
Evidence 404. . .and in violation of Appellant’s right to due
process guaranteed by the United States and Pennsylvania
Constitutions?
II. In this identification case, did the trial court err by denying
Appellant the right to elicit evidence of other suspects with
motives to murder decedent Wiggins?
III. Did the trial court err when it denied [sic] permitted the
Commonwealth Attorney to mischaracterize evidence in his
closing argument to the jury, such that it was unable to
fairly weight [sic] the evidence against Appellant?
Appellant’s brief at 5.
Appellant’s initial claim is that the trial court erred in allowing the
introduction of evidence that Appellant’s brother and Robert Bluefort burned
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the vehicle used in the killing. Appellant contradictorily claims both that he
was not involved in the arson and that the evidence was improper prior bad
acts evidence introduced to show his propensity to commit crime. It is
evident that Appellant’s actual claim hinges on the relevancy of the arson.
See Appellant’s brief at 14 (“[T]he prejudicial taint of this irrelevant
evidence against Appellant could not be overcome.”).
Although Appellant cites a litany of federal case law discussing prior
bad acts of the accused, he fails to account for the fact that the evidence
was neither his own alleged bad act nor introduced to show his criminal
propensity. Rule 404(b) prohibits evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or other
acts committed by that person to show the individual acted in accordance
with that same character in the underlying case. It does not speak to
evidence of bad acts committed by others. In the latter situation, such
evidence is generally not admissible because it is irrelevant.
The Commonwealth contends that the evidence was properly
introduced to rebut Appellant’s own cross-examination and position that
Robert Bluefort’s statements to police regarding the crime in question were
not credible. In addition, it highlights that Appellant did not level this
specific issue in his Rule 1925(b) statement and that the trial court therefore
did not address his claim raised on appeal. In this respect, Appellant alleged
in his Rule 1925(b) statement that, “The trial court erred in permitting the
Commonwealth to elicit direct or implied evidence of irrelevant and
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inadmissible other crimes evidence, including uncorroborated threats to
witnesses and their families, as evidence of prior bad acts not otherwise
admissible as an exception delineated in Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence
404(b).” Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal, at 1.
We agree with the Commonwealth that Appellant’s claim on appeal is
waived. It is evident that he did not contest the trial court’s allowance of
evidence of the arson in his 1925(b) statement. See id. In an attempt to
shoehorn his appellate issue into the claim advanced below, he has
attempted to assert that the arson evidence was evidence of a prior bad act.
Nonetheless, as noted, this evidence was not offered as evidence of his own
bad act.
Moreover, the evidence was relevant in this case because Appellant
attempted to discredit Mr. Bluefort’s earlier statements to police.
Specifically, defense counsel questioned Detective Nathan Williams, who had
interviewed Mr. Bluefort prior to trial. Before trial, Mr. Bluefort had set forth
that Appellant confessed to shooting the victim, but recanted this statement
at trial. In questioning Detective Williams, defense counsel asked if the
detective knew that Mr. Bluefort was a liar. The detective responded, “No.
His information was corroborated.” N.T., 3/10/14, at 227. Defense counsel
then highlighted Mr. Bluefort’s extensive criminal history, including
convictions for fraud and identity theft. Detective Williams acknowledged
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that he knew Mr. Bluefort was incarcerated at the time he questioned him,
but again reiterated, “the information he provided was corroborated prior to
my interview, prior to my contact with him.” Id.
Defense counsel continued, and initiated the discussion about the car
arson. She stated, “You say ‘corroborated.’ There was nothing about
Quentin Salmond mentioned with having to do with that car; is that right?”
Id. at 229. The detective stated that the link existed between Appellant and
his brother. The prosecutor on redirect then asked about the corroboration
and Detective Williams answered, “Mr. Bluefort actually confirmed
information that I had previously received. In December of 2009, I received
information that that Lincoln had been torched, and January 2010, when I
spoke to Mr. Bluefort, he was giving me great detail about the torching of
that Lincoln.” N.T., 3/11/14, at 12-13. Thus, the Commonwealth elicited
the information in direct response to defense counsel’s attempt to discredit
Mr. Bluefort. The Commonwealth was permitted to show that Mr. Bluefort
had provided other accurate information to demonstrate that Mr. Bluefort’s
statement regarding Appellant confessing was not false. Appellant’s initial
claim, aside from being waived, is without merit.
The second issue Appellant levels on appeal is that the trial court erred
in precluding him from introducing evidence that other suspects had a
motive to kill the victim. Although not contained in his Rule 1925(b)
statement below, almost the entirety of Appellant’s argument is premised on
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a due process position. In this respect, Appellant points out that a
defendant has a due process right to introduce evidence that the crime was
committed by another individual.
Appellant cites to fifteen separate pages of notes of testimony and a
trial exhibit in support of his claim, but does not specify in what manner the
trial court actually precluded him from introducing relevant evidence of other
individuals’ motives. The trial court, in its Rule 1925(b) opinion, noted that
Appellant “does not provide this Court with specifics as to what evidence was
precluded or how the defendant was limited.” Trial Court Opinion, 10/3/14,
at 8. It nonetheless speculated that Appellant was challenging its ruling on
questions asked of Detective Williams. The court maintained that it
permitted Appellant to question the detective about his investigation of other
suspects and other witnesses regarding individuals who had disputes with
the victim. However, it acknowledged sustaining objections based on
hearsay or where it found the evidence irrelevant.
The Commonwealth contends that Appellant’s claim is so vague and
undeveloped as to be waived. It highlights that Appellant was warned of
this deficiency by the trial court, but he failed to crystalize his position on
appeal. The Commonwealth adds that the trial court permitted defense
counsel to question two of the victim’s friends, Richard Hack and Kerron
Denmark, about other individuals who might have been angry with the
victim. Further, it avers that defense counsel questioned Detective Williams
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extensively about his investigation, including looking into additional
suspects.
Initially, we note that Appellant’s constitutional arguments are waived
because he did not raise them in his Rule 1925(b) statement.
Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306 (Pa. 1998). Additionally, we agree
that his claim below was vague and precluded the trial court from
meaningfully addressing the issue. Commonwealth v. Reeves, 907 A.2d 1
(Pa.Super. 2006). Indeed, the trial court only addressed a portion of the
transcripts that Appellant now alleges support his position. Therefore, his
position is waived on that ground as well. Moreover, Appellant’s brief,
though citing to pages of the trial transcript, fails to articulate what rulings
by the trial court that he is contesting. Since Appellant’s briefing is deficient
in this regard, his claim is waived. See Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918
A.2d 766 (Pa.Super. 2007).
Appellant’s final position is that the trial court erred in permitting the
prosecutor to argue during his closing statement that the burned Lincoln was
circumstantial evidence that Appellant was involved in the killing. Appellant
asserts that the trial court had given a specific jury instruction regarding the
arson evidence and that it informed the jury that the arson was admissible
to corroborate the police investigation but not as evidence of Appellant’s
participation in the homicide.
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The Commonwealth rejoins that the prosecutor did not argue that the
arson was evidence of Appellant’s guilt. Instead, it posits that the
prosecutor, in responding to defense counsel’s summation that Mr. Bluefort
lied about Appellant’s confession, reiterated Detective Williams’ investigation
and confirmed that Mr. Bluefort’s story regarding the burning of the car had
been corroborated. We find Appellant’s position disingenuous.
We have reviewed the notes of testimony cited by Appellant in support
of his claim that the prosecutor allegedly told the jury that the arson was
evidence of Appellant’s involvement in the murder. It does not support
Appellant’s argument. In discussing Mr. Bluefort’s statement to police, the
prosecutor stated,
The contents of the statement of which Detective Williams
of the Homicide Unit took, [Bluefort] was more suspect of
because a man in Bluefort’s postion will do anything to help
himself. So what did he do? He listened and he said, well, how
would you know about the burning of the car if it weren’t true, if
you didn’t hear it from the people’s mouths that actually did that
because he didn’t tell anybody about that. He just found out
that the car was torched a month before he took the statement
and Bluefort is running at the mouth about what? Them torching
the car.
N.T., 3/11/14, at 175.
Since the prosecutor did not contend that evidence of the arson
showed Appellant’s guilt, but instead was arguing that the arson confirmed a
portion of Mr. Bluefort’s statement to police, and therefore Mr. Bluefort was
not lying about Appellant’s confession, Appellant is entitled to no relief.
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/30/2015
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