Com. v. Rambert, E. ( 2016 )


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  • J-S44041-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                  :      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :            PENNSYLVANIA
    v.                              :
    :
    ERIC RAMBERT,                                 :
    :
    Appellant                  :            No. 2052 EDA 2015
    Appeal from the PCRA Order June 24, 2015
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
    Criminal Division, No(s): CP-51-CR-0625331-1983
    BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., STABILE and MUSMANNO, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:                                FILED JULY 08, 2016
    Eric Rambert (“Rambert”) appeals, pro se, from the Order dismissing
    his seventh Petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
    (“PCRA”). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
    On November 21, 1983, Rambert entered a negotiated guilty plea to
    rape,    involuntary    deviate   sexual   intercourse,   burglary,   robbery   and
    conspiracy.    On the same date, the trial court sentenced Rambert to an
    aggregate prison term of ten to twenty-five years in prison. Rambert did not
    file a direct appeal.
    Rambert filed six previous PCRA Petitions, all of which were dismissed.
    On July 29, 2010, Rambert filed the instant PCRA Petition.            Rambert filed
    numerous supplemental Petitions from March 2013 to May 2014.               On May
    21, 2015, the PCRA court entered a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 Notice of Intent to
    Dismiss. Thereafter, on June 24, 2015, the PCRA court dismissed Rambert’s
    J-S44041-16
    PCRA Petition as patently untimely, after which Rambert filed a timely Notice
    of Appeal.
    We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA
    in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA
    level. This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and
    the evidence of record. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s ruling
    if it is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error.
    This Court may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any grounds if
    the record supports it. Further, we grant great deference to the
    factual findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those
    findings unless they have no support in the record. However, we
    afford no such deference to its legal conclusions. Where the
    petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of review is de
    novo and our scope of review plenary.
    Commonwealth v. Ford, 
    44 A.3d 1190
    , 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations
    omitted).
    Initially, Rambert’s sentence, which imposed a maximum of twenty-
    five years, appears to have been completed. Thus, Rambert is ineligible for
    relief under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(1)(i).1
    However, even if Rambert was still serving a sentence, he would be
    ineligible for relief. Under the PCRA, a defendant must file any PCRA petition
    within one year of the date that the judgment becomes final.            See 42
    Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).     A judgment of sentence becomes final “at the
    conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme
    1
    According to the Commonwealth, Rambert is likely serving sentences for
    unrelated crimes, which he committed while in prison on or about January
    27, 1987. See Brief for the Commonwealth at 9 n.2.
    -2-
    J-S44041-16
    Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or the
    expiration of time for seeking review.” 
    Id. § 9545(b)(3).
    Here, Rambert’s judgment of sentence became final in December 1983
    when the time to seek review with this court expired. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a).
    Rambert had until December 1984 to file a timely PCRA petition. Therefore,
    Rambert’s July 2010 PCRA Petition is facially untimely.
    However, in the event that a petition is not filed within the one-year
    time frame, the PCRA provides three timeliness exceptions.           See 42
    Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii).   Any PCRA petition invoking one of these
    exceptions shall be filed within sixty days of the date the claim could have
    been presented. See 
    id. § 9545(b)(2).
    Rambert has not pled or proven any of the timeliness exceptions.
    While Rambert has raised ineffective assistance of counsel claims, such
    claims do not qualify as a timeliness exception.    See Commonwealth v.
    Yarris, 
    731 A.2d 583
    , 586 (Pa. Super. 1999) (stating that ineffective
    assistance of counsel claims do not invoke any of the timeliness exceptions).
    Based upon the foregoing, the PCRA court properly dismissed
    Rambert’s PCRA Petition.
    Order affirmed.
    -3-
    J-S44041-16
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 7/8/2016
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2052 EDA 2015

Filed Date: 7/8/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/9/2016