Com. v. Havle, R. ( 2017 )


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  • J-S03017-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    ROBERT JAMES HAVLE, III
    Appellant                 No. 581 WDA 2016
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence dated March 24, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Bedford County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-05-CR-0000066-2015
    BEFORE: OLSON, J., SOLANO, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY SOLANO, J.:                                  FILED MAY 22, 2017
    Robert James Havle, III, Appellant, appeals from the portion of his
    judgment of sentence in which the trial court classified him as a sexually
    violent predator (“SVP”) under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification
    Act (“SORNA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10 to 9799.41. We affirm.
    When Appellant was 32 years old, he engaged in a sexual relationship
    with the victim in this case, who had just turned 13 or 14 years old at the
    time,1 and who is Appellant’s cousin. Appellant initiated and cultivated the
    relationship, which lasted for approximately two years. Appellant pressured
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1
    The confusion about the victim’s age stems from a discrepancy in what she
    told the police regarding her date of birth, the date of her first sexual
    encounter with Appellant, and the age she was on that date. See N.T.,
    3/24/16, at 59-69. The victim was either 12 or 13 years old during her first
    sexual encounter with Appellant, and had just turned either 13 or 14 years
    old when they first had intercourse.
    J-S03017-17
    the victim into performing various sexual acts, and told the victim not to tell
    anyone about the “relationship” because it would “break up the family,”
    result in criminal charges against Appellant, and cause Appellant to commit
    suicide. See Defendant’s Ex. 1 (Criminal Complaint); Commonwealth’s Ex. 2
    (Report of Herbert E. Hays).
    On July 9, 2015, Appellant, who was then 38 years old, pleaded guilty
    to five counts of statutory assault and five counts of aggravated indecent
    assault on a person less than 16 year of age.2 Pursuant to a plea agreement,
    Appellant was sentenced to four to eight years’ incarceration, to be followed
    by ten years’ probation.
    Because the offenses of which Appellant was convicted are classified
    as “sexually violent offenses” under SORNA, see 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.12,
    9799.14, the court was required to hold a hearing to determine whether he
    is an SVP. Id. § 9799.24(e). Therefore, on March 24, 2016, immediately
    prior to Appellant’s sentencing proceeding, the trial court held a separate
    hearing to determine whether Appellant had that status.3
    ____________________________________________
    2
    18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3122.1 and 3125(a)(8), respectively.
    3
    Under SORNA, the defendant’s status initially is assessed by the State
    Sexual Offenders Assessment Board. 42 Pa. C.S. § 9799.24(a). After that
    Board prepares a report and presents it to the Commonwealth, the court
    holds a hearing at which the Commonwealth must prove by clear and
    convincing evidence that the SVP designation is appropriate. See
    Commonwealth v. Feucht, 
    955 A.2d 377
    , 380 (Pa. Super. 2008)
    (description of process under earlier version of statute that still applies
    under current version).
    -2-
    J-S03017-17
    SORNA provides that a person may be designated an SVP because of
    “a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the individual
    likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses.” 42 Pa.C.S. §
    9799.12. A “mental abnormality” is defined as a “congenital or acquired
    condition of a person that affects the emotional or volitional capacity of the
    person in a manner that predisposes that person to the commission of
    criminal sexual acts to a degree that makes the person a menace to the
    health and safety of other persons.” Id. “Predatory” is defined as “[a]n act
    directed at a stranger or at a person with whom a relationship has been
    initiated, established, maintained or promoted, in whole or in part, in order
    to facilitate or support victimization.” Id. The court received expert evidence
    from each party on whether Appellant should be classified as an SVP, and it
    received reports by each expert into evidence.4
    To support a finding that Appellant is an SVP, the Commonwealth
    presented the testimony of Herbert Edwin Hays, a member of the State
    Sexual Offenders Assessment Board (“the Board”), who was admitted as an
    “expert in the treatment, management, and the assessment of sexual
    offenders.” N.T. at 10. Mr. Hays opined that Appellant has hebephilia, a
    ____________________________________________
    4
    Neither party objected to the classification of the other party’s witness as
    an expert. Appellant objected to the entry of the Commonwealth expert’s
    report into evidence on the ground that it was hearsay and cumulative. That
    objection was overruled. See N.T. at 30-31.
    -3-
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    sexual attraction to underage postpubescent individuals. Id. at 20-21, 24.5
    Mr. Hays explained that Appellant groomed and coerced the victim before
    engaging in a sexual relationship for several years, which the expert
    considered to be predatory behavior covering a significant time period. Id.
    at 12-15, 28.6 Mr. Hays stated that hebephilia is a lifetime condition; that
    statements by the victim indicated that Appellant’s condition overrode his
    control; and that because Appellant’s mental abnormality drove his sexual
    misconduct, it would be likely for Appellant to reoffend. Id. at 25-27.7
    ____________________________________________
    5
    The expert stated that while he opined that Appellant is a hebephiliac for
    purposes of the SVP statute, he was not rendering a “psychiatric or
    psychological . . . diagnosis.” N.T. at 24, 27-28.
    6
    Regarding the predatory nature of Appellant’s abnormality, the expert
    opined:
    When [Appellant] entered a shower with the victim and then
    gave her a sensual massage and also kissed her at the time he
    initiated a relationship with the victim in whole or in part in order
    to facilitate victimization. When he told her not to tell anyone
    about their sexual relationship and if she did tell he would go to
    jail and the family would “fall apart” he established, maintained
    and promoted the sexual relationship with the victim in order to
    facilitate continued victimization. There is sufficient evidence for
    predatory behavior.
    Commonwealth’s Ex. 2 at 7; see also N.T. at 28.
    7
    The report stated, “Considering the length of time and the persistence of
    the sexual acts in the Instant Offense there is sufficient evidence that future
    sexual offending is likely if given unsupervised access to young naïve
    impressionable teenage girls.” Commonwealth’s Ex. 2 at 6.
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    Appellant presented Dr. Timothy P. Foley, who was admitted as an
    expert in the same field as that of as Mr. Hays. N.T. at 70. Dr. Foley opined
    that Appellant did not meet the criteria for having a mental abnormality. Id.
    at 72. He stated that hebephilia is not an accepted medical diagnosis
    according to the Fifth Edition of the DIAGNOSTIC    AND   STATISTICAL MANUAL   OF
    MENTAL DISORDERS (“DSM-5”), 8 id. at 74-75, 81-82, and that Appellant’s
    sexual interest in a post-pubescent girl is “just fine,” id. at 79. Regarding
    the likelihood that Appellant would reoffend, Dr. Foley used an actuarial tool
    called the “Static-99R,”9 and found that Appellant “has a very low risk for
    future sexual misconduct.” Id. at 77. The expert reasoned that because
    Appellant has had sexual relationships with persons older than 18, there is
    ____________________________________________
    8
    We have described the DSM as a “categorical classification system that
    divides mental disorders into types based on criteria sets with defining
    features” and have cited experts’ opinions that the DSM is “an authoritative
    compilation of information about mental disorders and represents the best
    consensus of the psychiatric profession on how to diagnose mental
    disorders.” See Commonwealth v. Hollingshead, 
    111 A.3d 186
    , 186 n.4
    (Pa. Super.) (citation omitted, brackets in original), appeal denied, 
    125 A.3d 1199
     (Pa. 2015).
    9
    This is a classification system used to predict future recidivism. Dr. Foley
    defined the Static-99R as —
    a statistical method based on the records of about 30,000 sex
    offenders after release to the community. The items – there are
    ten [–] are generated statistically. It adheres to no theory. It’s
    just measuring behavior. It allows you . . . to class[ify] the
    person, put the person into a group of individuals with known
    behavior five to ten years after release [in]to the community.
    N.T. at 77.
    -5-
    J-S03017-17
    no evidence that it was “preferred or obligatory that he have sexual contact
    with a minor.” Id. at 79.
    At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ordered that Appellant
    be classified as an SVP and imposed sentence. In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)
    opinion, the trial court explained
    The Commonwealth’s witness, Herbert Hays, testified that,
    based upon Defendant’s mental abnormality and the
    circumstances of the case, it was his opinion that Defendant was
    likely to engage in future predatory offenses. We found Mr. Hays
    to be a credible witness and accepted his testimony. Upon an
    examination of Defendant’s mental abnormality, the length of
    Defendant’s predatory sexual behavior that occurred repeatedly
    over a number of years, the nature of Defendant’s relationship
    with the victim, and Defendant’s age at the time of expected
    parole, we concurred with Mr. Hay[s’] opinion.
    Trial Ct. Op., 7/27/16, at 3.
    Appellant filed no post-sentence motion, but he filed a timely appeal
    on April 22, 2016. Appellant raises the following issues:
    1. The Sentencing Court erred in determining that the
    Defendant, Richard Havle, III, was a Sexually Violent Predator
    by failing to take into account 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.12, 42
    Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24(a)(b).
    2. The Sentencing Court erred in determining by clear and
    convincing evidence that the Defendant meets the criteria of a
    Sexually Violent Predator.
    Appellant’s Brief at 3.10
    ____________________________________________
    10
    Appellant does not separate his brief into two sections (one in support of
    each issue), in contravention of Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). His failure to do so has
    no effect on our analysis, as the issues he presents overlap. We nevertheless
    remind counsel that they are required to comply with our rules of procedure
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    -6-
    J-S03017-17
    Both of Appellant’s issues pose a challenge to the sufficiency of the
    evidence supporting the trial court’s SVP determination. 11 Our standard of
    review is as follows:
    In order to affirm an SVP designation, we, as a reviewing court,
    must be able to conclude that the fact-finder found clear and
    convincing evidence that the individual is a[n SVP]. As with any
    sufficiency of the evidence claim, we view all evidence and
    reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to
    the Commonwealth. We will reverse a trial court's determination
    of SVP status only if the Commonwealth has not presented clear
    and convincing evidence that each element of the statute has
    been satisfied.
    Commonwealth v. Hollingshead, 
    111 A.3d 186
    , 189 (Pa. Super.)
    (brackets in original), appeal denied, 
    125 A.3d 1199
     (Pa. 2015).
    In challenging the trial court’s ruling, Appellant does not contest the
    conclusion by the Commonwealth’s expert, Mr. Hays, that Appellant is a
    hebephiliac and that this condition evidences a mental abnormality or
    disorder. See Appellant’s Brief at 6 (citing Hollingshead, 111 A.3d at 194).
    Rather, Appellant argues that the court should have separately found that
    Appellant is likely to engage in future predatory sexually violent offenses,
    and that the evidence presented on that issue was insufficient to permit such
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    and that an appeal is subject to dismissal if there is substantial
    noncompliance. Pa.R.A.P. 2101.
    11
    Appellant’s brief also casts his argument as a challenge to the weight of
    the evidence. That aspect of his argument has been waived by Appellant’s
    failure to raise that claim before the trial court. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a);
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 607; Commonwealth v. Schrader, 
    141 A.3d 558
    , 566 (Pa.
    Super. 2016) (holding challenge to the weight of the evidence regarding an
    SVP determination must be presented to the trial court in the first instance).
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    J-S03017-17
    a finding. 
    Id.
     According to Appellant, a hebephiliac condition in itself
    provides an insufficient basis upon which to conclude that a person is likely
    to engage in future predatory sexually violent behavior, particularly since
    hebephilia “is not recognized as a disorder in the DSM-5.” 
    Id.
     Appellant
    contends that the Commonwealth was required to present additional
    evidence of a future predatory likelihood, and he points to his own expert’s
    assessment of that question using the Static-99R tool, which led the expert
    to conclude that the possibility of such future conduct by Appellant is low.
    Id. at 6, 9. Appellant also criticizes the failure by Mr. Hays to evaluate the
    “Tanner Stages” of the victim when assessing Appellant’s condition. Id. at
    6.12
    A defendant does not need to be medically diagnosed with a
    psychological or psychiatric disorder to be classified as an SVP. A finding of a
    “mental abnormality” in accordance with the statutory definition is sufficient.
    See Commonwealth v. Dengler, 
    890 A.2d 372
    , 383 (Pa. 2005) (“[t]he
    statute does not require proof of a standard of diagnosis that is commonly
    found    and/or    accepted      in   a    mental    health    diagnostic    paradigm”).
    Furthermore, arguments that an expert’s testimony is unfounded or
    erroneous     affect   the   weight,      not   sufficiency,   of   the   evidence.   See
    Commonwealth v. Fuentes, 
    991 A.2d 935
    , 944 (Pa. Super.), appeal
    ____________________________________________
    12
    The Commonwealth’s expert explained that the “Tanner Stages” describe
    the extent to which a pubescent body is developing. N.T. at 47-48. The
    expert stated that this could be a tool used to diagnose hebephilia.
    -8-
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    denied, 
    12 A.3d 370
     (Pa. 2010); see also Commonwealth v. Feucht, 
    955 A.2d 377
    , 382 (Pa. Super.) (citations omitted), appeal denied, 
    963 A.2d 467
     (Pa. 2008) (“while a defendant is surely entitled to challenge [a report
    or opinion by a member of the Board] by contesting its credibility or
    reliability before the SVP court, such efforts affect the weight, not the
    sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s case”).13 Thus, when “the expert’s report
    and testimony support the trial court’s finding that [an appellant] was an
    SVP, there is no basis for granting sufficiency relief.” Fuentes, 
    991 A.2d at 944
     (quoting Commonwealth v. Meals, 
    912 A.2d 213
    , 223 (Pa. 2006));
    see also Hollingshead, 111 A.3d at 194 (holding it would not disturb trial
    court’s decision to credit Commonwealth’s expert witness over defense
    expert witness on a challenge to the sufficiency of an SVP determination
    based on a hebephilia diagnosis).
    Moreover, while the court must examine “the offender's propensity to
    re-offend, an opinion about which the Commonwealth's expert is required to
    opine . . . , the risk of re-offending is but one factor to be considered when
    making      an    assessment;       it    is   not   an   ‘independent   element.’”
    ____________________________________________
    13
    Although Dengler, Feuntes, and Feucht predate the current statutes
    governing assessment of a sexually violent predator, the current statutes do
    not materially differ from the previous statutes governing this determination.
    Accordingly, we may rely on caselaw predating the current statutes to the
    extent the versions are not inconsistent. Cf. Commonwealth v. Aikens,
    
    990 A.2d 1181
    , 1185 n.2 (Pa. Super.) (noting that this Court may rely on
    caselaw predating the enactment of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence to
    the extent the caselaw is consistent), appeal denied, 
    4 A.3d 157
     (Pa.
    2010).
    -9-
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    Commonwealth v. Stephens, 
    74 A.3d 1034
    , 1038–39 (Pa. Super. 2013);
    accord Hollingshead, 111 A.3d at 190 (citation omitted). It is improper for
    a court to base its decision solely upon an expert’s projection of recidivism.
    See id. (defense expert’s focus on risk of recidivism of hebephiliac was
    misplaced).
    Therefore, Appellant’s arguments that Mr. Hays’ testimony was
    unfounded or erroneous challenge the weight, not the sufficiency, of the
    evidence. Fuentes, 
    991 A.2d 944
    . 14 Indeed, regarding the absence of
    hebephilia from the DSM-5, we have previously held that “the debate
    surrounding hebephilia diagnoses, and their use in SVP proceedings, goes to
    the   weight     of   the   expert    witness’     testimony,”   not   its   sufficiency
    Hollingshead, 111 A.3d at 193. By the same token, because Appellant has
    cited no law making an examination of a victim’s “Tanner Stages” a required
    element of an SVP analysis, Appellant’s argument regarding the absence of
    such evidence also does not go to sufficiency. Appellant’s own expert
    ____________________________________________
    14
    We note the difference between challenges to the weight of the expert
    evidence regarding hebephilia, and an argument that the evidence regarding
    hebephilia is inadmissible or subject to a Frye hearing. See Dengler, 890
    A.2d at 377-83 (citing Frye v. United States, 
    293 F. 1013
     (D.C. Cir. 1923),
    which held that, in order to be admissible, the expert’s testimony must be
    based on evidence sufficiently established and accepted in the relevant
    scientific community); Hollingshead, 111 A.3d at 193 n.6. While Appellant
    did object at the hearing to the admission of Mr. Hays’ testimony regarding
    hebephilia, claiming that it is not recognized in the field, see N.T. at 19-21,
    Appellant did not ask the court to conduct a Frye hearing and does not
    specifically raise an admissibility issue on appeal.
    - 10 -
    J-S03017-17
    witness, Dr. Foley, conceded that a Static-99R test also is not required or
    necessary to make an SVP determination, see N.T. at 88 — a concession
    that clearly is correct in light of the fact that a risk of recidivism is only one
    of many factors to be considered by a court in making such a determination.
    Hollingshead, 111 A.3d at 194.
    Finally, Appellant claims that Mr. Hays’ testimony was insufficient
    because he failed to examine the fourteen factors listed in Section 9799.24
    of SORNA. Appellant’s Brief at 6, 8. Mr. Hays is a member of the SORNA
    Board that makes an initial assessment of a defendant’s SVP status prior to
    the determination by the court, and Section 9799.24(b) lists the following
    factors that a Board member is to consider when making that assessment:
    (1) Facts of the current offense, including:
    (i) Whether the offense involved multiple victims.
    (ii) Whether the individual exceeded the means necessary to
    achieve the offense.
    (iii) The nature of the sexual contact with the victim.
    (iv) Relationship of the individual to the victim.
    (v) Age of the victim.
    (vi) Whether the offense included a display of unusual cruelty
    by the individual during the commission of the crime.
    (vii) The mental capacity of the victim.
    (2) Prior offense history, including:
    (i) The individual’s prior criminal record.
    - 11 -
    J-S03017-17
    (ii) Whether the individual completed any prior sentences.
    (iii) Whether the individual participated in available programs
    for sexual offenders.
    (3) Characteristics of the individual, including:
    (i) Age.
    (ii) Use of illegal drugs.
    (iii) Any mental         illness,   mental     disability   or   mental
    abnormality.
    (iv) Behavioral characteristics         that     contribute      to   the
    individual’s conduct.
    (4) Factors that are supported in a sexual offender assessment
    field as criteria reasonably related to the risk of reoffense.
    42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.24(b). Appellant argues that a proper evaluation of the
    fourteen factors would lead to a conclusion that he is not an SVP. He notes
    that there was a single victim who was 13-15 years old and had no mental
    disabilities, there was a family relationship between the parties, there was
    no use of physical force by Appellant, and Appellant had no prior offenses.
    Id. at 9.15
    In Feucht, we stated the following with regard to the fourteen factors:
    . . . [T]here is no statutory requirement that all of them or
    any particular number of them be present or absent in order to
    support an SVP designation. The factors are not a checklist with
    each one weighing in some necessary fashion for or against SVP
    ____________________________________________
    15
    Appellant characterizes his crime as having fallen in love and having had a
    non-violent sexual relationship with a post-pubescent girl. Appellant claims
    that he made the complaining witness “feel special” and that “postpubescent
    . . . sexual interest in several cultures wouldn’t even be considered
    predatorial.” Appellant’s Brief at 6, 9.
    - 12 -
    J-S03017-17
    designation. Rather, the presence or absence of one or more
    factors might simply suggest the presence or absence of one or
    more particular types of mental abnormalities.
    Thus, while the Board is to examine all the factors listed
    . . ., the Commonwealth does not have to show that any certain
    factor is present or absent in a particular case. Rather, the
    question for the SVP court is whether the Commonwealth’s
    evidence, including the Board’s assessment, shows that the
    person convicted of a sexually violent offense has a mental
    abnormality or disorder making that person likely to engage in
    predatory sexually violent offenses.
    Feucht, 
    955 A.2d at 381
     (citations omitted). While the presence of certain
    factors indicate a mental abnormality, the absence of factors is not
    conclusive of the absence of a mental abnormality. 
    Id.
     In any event, the
    record shows that Mr. Hays did examine the fourteen factors before arriving
    at his opinion, upon which the court relied, that Appellant should be
    designated an SVP. See N.T. at 13-57; Commonwealth’s Ex. 2 at 4-6.
    Appellant’s argument based on Section 9799.24(b) therefore is without
    merit.
    We hold that there was clear and convincing evidence to establish
    Appellant’s SVP determination by the trial court, and Appellant’s arguments
    to the contrary regarding the sufficiency of the evidence are unavailing.
    Feucht, 
    955 A.2d at 382
    .
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    - 13 -
    J-S03017-17
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 5/22/2017
    - 14 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Com. v. Havle, R. No. 581 WDA 2016

Filed Date: 5/22/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/22/2017