Com. v. Elliott, G. ( 2018 )

J-S25039-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
GEORGE G. ELLIOTT :
:
Appellant : No. 1769 WDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 12, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County
Criminal Division at No(s): C.R. No. 42-1977
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and OTT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED AUGUST 09, 2018
George G. Elliott appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed on
July 12, 2017, in the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County, after he was
resentenced, pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) and
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). In 1977, Elliott was
convicted by a jury of first degree murder1 and sentenced, in 1978, to life
without parole (LWOP). He was 17 years old at the time he committed the
crime. Following the issuance of the United States Supreme Court decisions
in Miller and Montgomery, the trial court resentenced Elliott on the murder
charge to a term of 50 years’ to life imprisonment.2 Elliott contends (1)
____________________________________________
1See 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502. Elliott was also convicted of arson at a separate
docket number.
2Elliott received credit for presentence incarceration of 40 years, 5 months,
and 11 days. See Order, 7/12/2017.
J-S25039-18
because Pennsylvania sentencing statutes for first and second degree murder
were invalidated by Miller, the only constitutional sentence available is that
of 10-to-20 years’ imprisonment for third degree murder at the time of the
offense, and (2) it is unconstitutional to impose a sentence of 50 years to life,
a de facto sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole
(LWOP), on a juvenile absent a finding that the juvenile is one of the rare and
uncommon juveniles who is permanently incorrigible, irreparably corrupt or
irretrievably depraved. Based upon the following, we affirm.
The background of this case is, as follows:
On June 16, 1977, a jury convicted [Elliott] of first-degree murder
and arson for crimes he committed when he was seventeen years
of age. On March 6, 1978, the trial court sentenced [Elliott] to life
imprisonment for the murder conviction and a five to ten year
concurrent sentence for the arson conviction. By per curiam order
entered June 20, 1979, this Court affirmed [Elliott’s] judgment of
sentence. Commonwealth v. Elliott, 417A.2d 780 (Pa. Super.
1979). On October 4, 1979, our Supreme Court denied [Elliott’s]
allocatur petition.
Commonwealth v. Elliott, 34 A.3d 235 (Pa. Super. 2011) (unpublished
memorandum) (affirming the denial of relief sought pursuant to the Post-
Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546). The United States
Supreme Court subsequently decided Miller in 2012, and Montgomery in
2016.
In Miller, supra, the Supreme Court of the United States held that
“mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of
their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual
-2-
J-S25039-18
punishments.’” Id., 567 U.S. at 465. Under Miller, only where a court finds
that the juvenile homicide defendant is permanently incorrigible, irreparably
corrupt, or irretrievably depraved is the court permitted to impose a LWOP
sentence upon the juvenile. Miller, at 471, 473, 479-480 (citations omitted).
Thereafter, in Montgomery, the United States Supreme Court held that the
Miller decision applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. Id. at 732-
737. Following Miller and Montgomery, our Supreme Court issued
Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017) (Batts II), which
addressed the procedural requirements for sentencing a juvenile homicide
defendant.
On June 28, 2016, based on Montgomery, Elliott obtained PCRA relief
in the form of resentencing. On July 12, 2017, the trial court resentenced
Elliott, as stated above. Elliott filed a timely post-sentence motion, which
was denied, and this appeal followed.3
Initially, we state our standard of review:
A juvenile offender who challenges a LWOP sentence raises issues
that involve mixed questions of fact and law. [Commonwealth
v. Batts, 163 A.3d] at 434-436. Because Montgomery makes
clear that a juvenile homicide offender may receive a LWOP
sentence only if he or she is found incapable of rehabilitation, such
a finding ipso facto implicates the trial court’s authority to impose
such a sentence. Id. at 434-435. This threshold legal inquiry
constitutes a pure question of law subject to de novo review. Id.
at 435. To the extent, however, the determination is based on
____________________________________________
3Elliott timely complied with the order of the trial court to file a statement of
errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
-3-
J-S25039-18
factual findings made by the trial court at the sentencing hearing,
those findings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See id. at
435-436.
Commonwealth v. Foust, 180 A.3d 416, 429 (Pa. Super. 2018).4
In his first issue, Elliott contends that because Miller invalidated the
first and second degree murder statutes for juveniles, the only available
constitutional statute was a sentence for third degree murder, which at the
time of the offense carried a penalty of 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment. Elliott,
however, concedes that “this argument, or those very similar, have been
summarily rejected by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth
v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017) … and this Honorable Court in
Commonwealth v. Foust, [180 A.3d 416 (Pa. Super. 2018)].” Elliott’s Brief
at 9. As Elliott is correct that our Courts have already addressed a claim such
as the one he presents herein, we need not discuss this issue further.
In his second issue, Elliott maintains “it [is] unconstitutional to impose
a sentence of [50] years to life, a de facto sentence to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole, on a juvenile absent a finding that the juvenile
is one of the rare and uncommon juveniles who is permanently incorrigible,
irreparably corrupt or irretrievably depraved.” Id.
____________________________________________
4 We note that presently, in Foust, a petition for allowance of appeal has been
filed and is pending at 126 WAL 2018 (Pa. 2018).
-4-
J-S25039-18
Elliott argues that in Foust, supra, this Court held that “a trial court
may not impose a term-of-years sentence, which constitutes a de facto LWOP
sentence, on a juvenile offender convicted of homicide unless it finds, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that he or she is incapable of rehabilitation.” Elliott’s Brief
at 9, citing Foust, 180 A.3d at 431. Elliott further asserts:
Given the age of the defendant and the life expectancy of long
term inmates, this sentence was, in effect, a life sentence without
a reasonable chance of parole.[5] As such, this 50 years to life
sentence was an abuse of discretion, excessive, unreasonable,
arbitrary and capricious even in light of Batts II.”[6]
Elliott’s Brief, id.
In Foust, the Court considered two consecutive 30 years-to-life
sentences, and determined that for purposes of Miller, the two sentences
must be examined separately. Id., 180 A.3d at 438. The Foust Court
____________________________________________
5 Elliott does not refer this Court to any data in the record regarding the life
expectancy of long term inmates. In any event, such evidence would not have
been useful. See Commonwealth v. Bebout, 186 A.3d 462, 469 (Pa. Super.
2018) (“[E]ven if Appellant had properly admitted into evidence the relevant
life expectancy statistics that he now raises in his brief, it is not evident how
helpful they would have been to the construction of a standard for what
constitutes a de facto LWOP sentence, or how such data dictates a result in
this case”).
6 In Batts II, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the decisions in
Montgomery and Miller and held “there is a presumption against the
imposition of a sentence of life without parole for a defendant convicted of
first-degree murder committed as a juvenile.” Batts II, 163 A.3d at 459. The
Batts Court also addressed the trial court’s discretionary sentencing
determination and sentencing procedure, instructing, inter alia, “section
1102.1 [18 Pa.C.S. § 1102.1] will help frame the exercise of judgment by the
court in imposing sentence ….” Id. at 458 (quotations omitted).
-5-
J-S25039-18
reasoned that a 150-year minimum sentence would clearly constitute a de
facto LWOP sentence, and concluded a sentence of 30 years to life
imprisonment clearly does not constitute a de facto LWOP sentence. Id. More
recently, in Commonwealth v. Bebout, 186 A.3d 462 (Pa. Super. 2018),7
this Court held that a sentence of 45 years-to-life is not a de facto LWOP
sentence. The Bebout Court opined:
Instantly, Appellant’s 45-life sentence falls between the “clearly”
constitutional and unconstitutional parameters suggested by the
Foust Court. We note, however, that the Foust Court’s choice of
a 150-year minimum sentence appears to be merely illustrative.
Undoubtedly, the Court intended to suggest a sentence that
clearly exceeded human life expectancy in absolute terms, rather
than average life expectancy, or the life expectancy of some
identifiable subset of the population. In that regard, the Foust
Court could just have easily listed 120-year or 100-year minimum
sentences as examples of what “clearly” constitutes a de facto
LWOP sentence, as the number of humans who could possibly
survive their minimum sentence would be virtually nil. The key
factor in considering the upper limit of what constitutes a
constitutional sentence, in this narrow context, appears to be
whether there is “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release
based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Graham [v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010)]. Implicit in this standard is the
notion it would not be meaningful to provide an opportunity for
release based solely on the most tenuous possibility of a
defendant’s surviving the minimum sentence imposed. To be
meaningful or, at least, potentially meaningful, it must at least
be plausible that one could survive until the minimum release
date with some consequential likelihood that a non-trivial amount
of time at liberty awaits. Thus, though it expressly declined to do
so, the Foust Court seemed to suggest some sort of meaningful-
opportunity-for-release standard by declaring that a 150-years-
to-life sentence constitutes a de facto LWOP sentence. If it had
any other standard in mind for making that determination, the
Foust Court’s analysis omitted it.
____________________________________________
7 On July 10, 2018, this Court denied Bebout’s application for reargument.
-6-
J-S25039-18
Instantly, Appellant was sentenced to 45-life, and he has already
been incarcerated for this crime since he was 15 years old.
Accordingly, Appellant will be eligible for parole when he is 60
years old. …
****
… Appellant’s sentence does not fall into the category of sentences
described in Foust; that is, his minimum sentence is not so long
that it is virtually certain that he could not survive it. Indeed, it is
at least plausible, and perhaps even likely, that Appellant could
live many years past his earliest possible release date.
Appellant argues that delaying parole until old age in these
circumstances (see footnote 3, supra), constitutes a
constitutional violation because, ostensibly, it would not provide
for a meaningful opportunity for release. See Appellant’s Brief at
26 (citing Bear Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, 334 P.3d 132
(Wyo. 2014), and State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41 (Iowa 2013)).
Neither Bear Cloud nor Null are controlling in this jurisdiction,
and we find their analyses unpersuasive at this time. Indeed, we
consider Appellant’s opportunity for release to be meaningful,
especially in light of the gravity of his crime, because he has the
potential to live for several decades outside of prison if paroled
at his minimum.
Thus, based on the record and arguments before us, we conclude
that Appellant has simply failed to meet his burden of
demonstrating that the lower court sentenced him to a de facto
LWOP sentence. There simply is no comparison between the
opportunity to be paroled at 60 years of age and 100+ years of
age. The difference is, quite literally, a lifetime. As such, we are
not convinced that Appellant’s sentence is the functional
equivalent of LWOP. Accordingly, Appellant’s first claim must fail.
Id. at *8-10, *13-14 (emphasis in original).
Here, Elliott was resentenced to 50 years’ to life imprisonment, and he
has already been incarcerated for 40-plus years. As Elliott was 60 years old
-7-
J-S25039-18
at the time of resentencing,8 he will be eligible for parole when he is
approximately 70 years old. While Elliott will be 10 years older than the
defendant in Bebout, who becomes eligible for parole at age 60, it is
important to note that the Bebout Court found the defendant in that case had
“the potential to live for several decades outside of prison if paroled at his
minimum.” Id. at *14 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). As such, we
conclude Elliott’s sentence is not a de facto life sentence since, as in Bebout,
Elliott has a meaningful possibility of parole. Therefore, we conclude no relief
is due on Elliott’s claim that the 50 years’ to life sentence constituted a de
facto life sentence.9
We next turn to review Elliott’s argument that the trial court abused its
discretion in imposing a sentence of 50 years’ to life imprisonment. In order
to obtain review of a challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing, an
____________________________________________
8 See Trial Court Opinion, at 5 (noting Elliott was born in April of 1957).
9 We recognize that on June 19, 2018, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
granted allowance of appeal from the Order of this Court in Commonwealth
v. Felder, 181 A.3d 1252 (Pa. Super. 2017) (unpublished memorandum), as
to the following issue:
Does not a sentence of 50 years to life imposed upon a juvenile
constitute a de facto life sentence requiring the sentencing court,
as mandated by this Court in Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d
410 (Pa. 2017) (“Batts II”), first find permanent incorrigibility,
irreparable corruption or irretrievable depravity beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Commonwealth v. Felder, 2018 Pa. LEXIS 3067 (June 19, 2018).
-8-
J-S25039-18
appellant must preserve it in a post-sentence motion, file a timely notice of
appeal, include in his brief a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement, and present a
substantial question for review. See Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d
162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010).
Elliott timely filed his appeal and preserved his claim in his post-
sentence motion. However, the Commonwealth objects to the form of Elliott’s
Rule 2119(f) statement. We disagree with the Commonwealth’s position.
Although Elliott’s Rule 2119(f) statement commingles challenges to the
legality and the discretionary aspects of sentencing, his statement does
provide reasons in support of allowance of appeal with respect to the
discretionary aspects of his sentence. See Elliott’s Brief at 5-8 (“Statement
of Reasons to Allow an Appeal to Challenge the Discretionary Aspects of a
Sentence”). We therefore conclude that Elliott substantially complied with
Rule 2119(f), and now turn to consider whether Elliott has presented a
substantial question.
“The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Prisk, 13 A.3d 526,
533 (Pa .Super. 2011). “A substantial question exists only when the appellant
advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were
either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or
(2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing
-9-
J-S25039-18
process.” Id. (internal citations omitted). In his Rule 2119(f) statement,
Elliott contends:
The sentencing court violated Section 9721(b) of the Sentencing
Code[10] by not carefully considering the relevant factor of Mr.
Elliott’s rehabilitative needs and balancing those with the
protection of the public and the gravity of the offense. Rather,
the sentencing court relied on the impact on the victim’s family
and the fact that Mr. Elliott was 17 years of age. … The sentencing
judge failed to consider any rehabilitative needs of [Elliott].
… For these reasons, the sentence imposed was excessive and an
abuse of discretion.
Elliott’s Brief at 7-8 (Rule 2119(f) statement). We find this claim does present
a substantial question that warrants review. See Commonwealth v.
Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 769-770 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc) (holding an
excessive sentence claim — in conjunction with an assertion that the court
failed to consider mitigating factors — raises a substantial question).
In reviewing a challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing,
the proper standard of review when considering whether to affirm
the sentencing court's determination is an abuse of discretion. …
[A]n abuse of discretion is more than a mere error of judgment;
thus, a sentencing court will not have abused its discretion unless
"the record discloses that the judgment exercised was manifestly
unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will."
… "An abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an
appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but
requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality,
____________________________________________
10 Section 9721(b) provides in relevant part: “[T]he court shall follow the
general principle that the sentence imposed should call for confinement that
is consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it
relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the
rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b).
- 10 -
J-S25039-18
prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly
erroneous."
Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 961 (Pa. 2007) (citations omitted).
Elliott contends he has proven he has been rehabilitated, and the trial
judge improperly used his age and his IQ as aggravating rather than
mitigating factors. In this regard, we note the trial court found Elliott was
“just about three and one half months short of being 18 years of age [at the
time of the murder, s]o I think that goes against you,” and had an above
average IQ. N.T., 7/12/2017, at 44. Elliott argues, “Under Miller and
Montgomery[,] it is clearly irrelevant that the Defendant was nearly 18 years
of age.” Elliott’s Brief at 11.
Here, the record reflects that, consistent with Batts II, the trial court
considered as guidance the factors enumerated in Section 1102.1(d).11, 12
____________________________________________
11 See Footnote 6, supra.
12 Section 1102.1(d) provides:
(d) Findings. — In determining whether to impose a sentence of
life without parole under subsection (a), the court shall consider
and make findings on the record regarding the following:
(1) The impact of the offense on each victim, including oral
and written victim impact statements made or submitted
by family members of the victim detailing the physical,
psychological and economic effects of the crime on the
victim and the victim’s family. A victim impact statement
may include comment on the sentence of the defendant.
(2) The impact of the offense on the community.
- 11 -
J-S25039-18
See Trial Court Opinion, 11/8/2017, at 6; N.T., 7/12/2017, at 38-47. It is the
trial court’s prerogative to weigh such sentencing factors as it believes
appropriate, and this Court may not “reweigh the reasons offered by the
sentencing court.” Walls, supra, 926 A.2d at 966.
Furthermore, where, as here, the trial court has the benefit of a pre-
sentence report, we presume that the court was aware of relevant information
regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along
____________________________________________
(3) The threat to the safety of the public or any individual
posed by the defendant.
(4) The nature and circumstances of the offense
committed by the defendant.
(5) The degree of the defendant’s culpability.
(6) Guidelines for sentencing and resentencing adopted by
the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing.
(7) Age-related characteristics of the defendant, including:
(i) Age.
(ii) Mental capacity.
(iii) Maturity.
(iv) The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the
defendant.
(v) The nature and extent of any prior delinquent or
criminal history, including the success or failure of any
previous attempts by the court to rehabilitate the
defendant.
(vi) Probation or institutional reports.
(vii) Other relevant factors.
18 Pa.C.S. § 1102.1(d).
- 12 -
J-S25039-18
with any mitigating factors. Commonwealth v. Seagraves, 103 A.3d 839,
842 (Pa. Super. 2014), citing Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 937
(Pa. Super. 2013). The trial court also had access to an extensive sentencing
memorandum provided by Elliott that detailed mitigating factors, including
rehabilitation.
Finally, the trial court explicitly recognized his obligation to “take into
account how children are different and how their differences counsel against
irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison,” and determined a 50-year
minimum sentence was appropriate. N.T., 7/12/2017, at 39. In so doing, the
court considered the Section 1102.1(d) factors, specifically: (1) the impact
on the victim, finding “that this greatly affected the family of the victim and it
has long lasting effects,” id. at 40, (2) the impact to the community, finding
that “for approximately two years it was unclear who had committed the
offenses,” id., (3) the threat of public safety, finding there was no threat to
anybody else at the time and Elliott would not be a threat if he were released
from prison — “[B]ased on … reports from the institution, [Elliott’s] chance of
recidivism is very, very little,” id. at 41, (4) the nature and circumstances of
the offense, finding Elliott entered the victim’s home to commit a robbery and
there was not “a lot of sophistication” as Elliott panicked and killed the victim,
and Elliott’s efforts to try to cover up the murder with a fire showed “a juvenile
mind” and an “immature effort,” id. at 42-43, (5) the degree of culpability,
finding there was no one else to blame except Elliott, (6) the guidelines for
- 13 -
J-S25039-18
sentencing, finding the trial court was allowed to set a minimum sentence
under the circumstances, (7) age, finding the fact Elliott was just three and
one-half months shy of 18 at the time of the incident weighed against him to
determine an appropriate minimum, (8) mental capacity, finding Elliott had
an above average IQ and “good mental capacity,” id. at 44, (9) maturity,
finding maturity was hard to judge, but Elliott was able to rise in the military
to the level of corporal prior to his arrest,13 (10) the degree of criminal
sophistication, finding Elliott’s crime was not “a particularly sophisticated
crime”, id. at 45, (11) prior criminal history, finding there was none, (12)
probation or institutional reports, finding the institutional reports over the 40-
plus years Elliott has been incarcerated described Elliott as “average or above
average with the exception of one misconduct,” id., and (13) other relevant
factors, finding remorse is not a relevant factor against Elliott. See id. at 41-
46.
The trial court also considered “family and home environment,” and
found Elliott’s home environment was “good” and “[t]here’s no indication …
there was anything bad in [Elliott’s] home that would have caused [him] to
go down the path [he] did with drinking and drugs and ultimately committing
the burglary and attempted theft that led to the murder[, and t]here was no
other pressure for [Elliott] to do this ….” Id. at 46-47. Accordingly, on this
____________________________________________
13 Elliott was not arrested until two years after the incident.
- 14 -
J-S25039-18
record, which reflects the trial court properly considered the all relevant
sentencing factors, including the factors listed in 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102.1(d) and
Section 9721(b), there is no basis upon which to disturb the trial court’s
decision.
Finally, Elliott contends “[t]he sentencing guidelines are unconstitutional
under the Constitutions of … the United States and the Commonwealth.”
Concise Statement, 12/7/2017. The entirety of this argument is one
sentence:
The sentencing guidelines are unconstitutional: (1) as they do not
meet Miller’s individualized sentencing requirements; (2) they do
not allow a Judge to give proper weight to rehabilitation; (3) they
focus on previous offenses rather than the Miller factors; and (4)
they do not focus on the possibility of rehabilitation.
Elliott’s Brief at 11.
We are unclear as to the nature of Elliott’s argument since he cites no
constitutional provisions and provides no analysis. Therefore, we simply point
out that the trial court properly followed the guidance of Section 1102.1 for
this pre-Miller defendant, as Batts II instructs, and that this Court has
rejected a post-Miller defendant’s federal constitutional challenge to Section
1102.1 based upon the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment. See Commonwealth v. Brooker, 103 A.3d 325, 338 (Pa.
Super. 2014) (quotations omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Lawrence,
99 A.3d 116 (Pa. Super. 2014).
- 15 -
J-S25039-18
To the extent that this claim is arguably a challenge to the discretionary
aspects of sentencing, specifically, the trial court’s failure to consider the
Miller factors, we find no merit in this argument since the trial court did, in
fact, consider those factors, including the possibility of rehabilitation.
With regard to the Miller factors, our Supreme Court explained:
[T]he Miller Court concluded that sentencing for juveniles must
be individualized. See id. at 474-78. This requires consideration
of the defendant’s age at the time of the offense, as well as “its
hallmark features,” including:
immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks
and consequences[;] ... the family and home environment
that surrounds him — and from which he cannot usually
extricate himself — no matter how brutal or
dysfunctional[;] ... the circumstances of the homicide
offense, including the extent of his participation in the
conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have
affected him[;] ... that he might have been charged and
convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies
associated with youth — for example, his inability to deal
with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea
agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys[;]
... [and] the possibility of rehabilitation ... when the
circumstances [(the youthfulness of the offender)] most
suggest it.
Id. at 477-78. See also id. at 476 (stating that in addition to age,
a court must also give consideration to a juvenile offender’s
“background and mental and emotional development ... in
assessing his culpability”) (quoting Eddings, 455 U.S. at 116).
Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410, 431-432 (Pa. 2017).
As discussed above, the trial court specifically considered Elliott’s
juvenile mind and immaturity, his family and home environment, the
circumstances of the murder, including the extent of his participation and peer
pressure, and the possibility of rehabilitation in light of positive institutional
- 16 -
J-S25039-18
reports. As such, the trial court took into account the Miller factors, and
weighed these factors as it was entitled to do.
In conclusion, we find the arguments presented by Elliott provide no
basis upon which to disturb the 50 years to life sentence imposed by the trial
court upon resentencing. Accordingly, we affirm.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/9/2018
- 17 -