United States v. Dallas Williams , 526 F. App'x 312 ( 2013 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 12-4787
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    DALLAS WILLIAMS,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    Maryland, at Baltimore.    Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.
    (1:10-cr-00546-CCB-1)
    Submitted:   May 21, 2013                     Decided:   June 6, 2013
    Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, LaKeytria W. Felder,
    Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenbelt, Maryland, for
    Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Debra L.
    Dwyer, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland,
    for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Dallas Williams pled guilty, pursuant to a conditional
    plea agreement, to being a convicted felon in possession of a
    firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
    (2006).     The    district     court    sentenced     Williams      as    an    armed
    career criminal to the mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen
    years    prescribed   by   18   U.S.C.A.      §    924(e)    (West   Supp.      2012).
    Williams appeals the denial of his Motion for a Franks 1 Hearing
    and to Suppress Evidence. 2             In addition, Williams appeals his
    sentence, arguing that mandatory minimum sentences conflict with
    the mandate in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) to impose a sentence
    “sufficient but not greater than necessary.”                  We affirm.
    We    consider      first    Williams’         contention     that     the
    district court erred in denying his motion for a Franks hearing.
    Williams claims that the district court erred by denying his
    Franks suppression     motion      because        Baltimore    Police     Department
    Officer    Clemmie    O.     Anderson        III    made     deliberately        false
    statements in his affidavit supporting Williams’ arrest warrant
    and that these false statements were material to the probable
    cause determination.         The affidavit described the police pursuit
    1
    Franks v. Delaware, 
    438 U.S. 154
     (1978).
    2
    Under his plea agreement, Williams preserved his right to
    appeal the order denying his Franks suppression motion.
    2
    of a 2001 Acura through the streets of Baltimore.                           At one point
    during the chase, the Acura drove directly towards the police
    vehicle, and each of the officers in the cruiser identified the
    driver,     through        the      windshield,       as   Williams.            The    Acura
    eventually turned onto Schroeder Street in a school zone, and
    the officers followed.                 Anderson’s affidavit stated that the
    driver parked and escaped on foot and that the officers returned
    to the abandoned Acura where they found various papers bearing
    Williams’ name.
    Based       on   the     application,        the    state     of    Maryland
    charged Williams with several traffic and eluding charges, and
    an arrest warrant was issued.                  Williams was arrested on January
    24,   2010,    pursuant        to    the     arrest   warrant,     and    was     found    in
    possession of a firearm and ammunition.                          A federal grand jury
    subsequently charged Williams with possession of a firearm and
    ammunition     by     a    convicted       felon,     in   violation      of     18   U.S.C.
    § 922(g)(1).
    Williams moved for a Franks hearing and to suppress
    the tangible and derivative evidence, claiming that the arrest
    warrant was based on Anderson’s knowing and false statements.
    The district court conducted a motions hearing at which both
    officers, the principal of the elementary school, and Williams’
    probation      and    parole         agent    testified.          After     hearing       the
    testimony     and     the      parties’      arguments,     the     court      found   that
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    Williams     failed    to    make      the    necessary    showing     for   a   Franks
    hearing. 3    Accordingly, the district court denied the motion.
    The     purpose      of    a    Franks    hearing    is   to    determine
    whether,     but     for    the    inclusion      of     intentional    or   reckless
    misstatements by the affiant, an affidavit would not support a
    finding of probable cause. United States v. Clenney, 
    631 F.3d 658
    , 663 (4th Cir. 2011).               A defendant challenging the validity
    of a warrant is entitled to a hearing if he makes a preliminary
    showing      that:         “(1)     the      warrant     affidavit     contain[s]    a
    ‘deliberate        falsehood’          or    statement     made      with    ‘reckless
    disregard for the truth’ and (2) without the allegedly false
    statement, the warrant affidavit is not sufficient to support a
    finding of probable cause.”                  United States v. Fisher, 
    711 F.3d 460
    , 468 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56);
    Clenney, 631 F.3d at 663 (applying Franks to arrest warrants).
    Williams argues that he made this showing and that the
    district court erred in denying his motion for a Franks hearing.
    We review de novo the legal determinations underlying a district
    court’s denial of a Franks hearing, while its factual findings
    3
    The court remarked, “Of course, as a practical matter, we
    sort of just had a Franks hearing because [defense counsel]
    called witnesses and [the prosecutor] called witnesses. So I’m
    not sure how much further we could get with anything called a
    Franks hearing.” (Joint Appendix at 207).
    4
    are reviewed for clear error.               United States v. Allen, 
    631 F.3d 164
    , 171 (4th Cir. 2011).
    Williams     claims       that      Anderson      falsely       identified
    Williams as the driver of the Acura the police were pursuing
    because, “given the nature of the pursuit, the officers would
    not have had a clear view” inside the car.                     (Appellant’s Br. at
    23).    However, as the district court found, Williams presented
    no evidence that the driver would not have been visible through
    the windshield.        Furthermore, the district court found credible
    both officers’ testimony that they recognized Williams as he
    drove   towards       them,     and    we   defer    to    the   district      court’s
    credibility determination.              See United States v. Abu Ali, 
    528 F.3d 210
    , 232 (4th Cir. 2008) (according appellate deference to
    district     court’s      determinations           concerning        credibility    of
    witnesses during pretrial hearing on suppression motion).
    Moreover, we conclude that Williams otherwise failed
    to   show    by   a    preponderance        of    the     evidence    that    Anderson
    knowingly made false statements in his affidavit material to the
    probable     cause    determination.             Admittedly,     Anderson     declared
    that Williams drove into a school zone during school dismissal
    when,   in   fact,     school    had    already     been    dismissed.        However,
    evidence presented at the motions hearing showed that children
    were permitted in the school yard after dismissal and that there
    were no school zone signs with lights that would have alerted
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    the officer that dismissal had ended.                       Therefore, we conclude
    that the district court did not clearly err by finding that
    Anderson’s      statement    was     not    inaccurate.           Moreover,     even    if
    Anderson’s statement was deliberately untruthful, we agree with
    the district court that it was not material to a determination
    of probable cause to support the charges in the arrest warrant
    for numerous traffic violations and eluding police.
    We also agree with the district court that Anderson’s
    statement that Williams abandoned the car on Schroeder Street
    and fled is not facially false.                 The officers briefly lost sight
    of the car when it turned onto Schroeder Street.                             When they
    turned the corner, they saw the car was parked, and Williams was
    gone.    Although Williams argued that the affidavit was written
    as though Anderson witnessed Williams park the car and flee, the
    district court did not clearly err by interpreting the statement
    as reflecting the officer’s inference that Williams had parked
    the   vehicle     and    fled    rather      than     as    the    officer’s      actual
    eyewitness      account.        Furthermore,       assuming       arguendo    that     the
    discrepancies between the officers’ testimony regarding (1) the
    number   of     times    Anderson     had       previously     addressed        Williams
    individually,      (2)     whether    Anderson        had    previously       suspected
    Williams   of    drug    activity,     and      (3)   whether      the   door    to    the
    abandoned vehicle was open or closed demonstrated that Anderson
    6
    made false statements in his affidavit, these statements simply
    were not material to a finding of probable cause.
    We therefore conclude that the district court properly
    determined        that   Williams    failed      to   make   the    strong     showing
    necessary     to    warrant    a    Franks      hearing     and,   hence,     properly
    denied Williams’ Motion for a Franks Hearing and to Suppress
    Evidence.
    Turning to Williams’ challenge to his sentence, the
    Sentencing Reform Act, of which § 3553(a) is a part, dictates
    that   a   defendant      should    be   sentenced     in    accordance       with    its
    provisions to achieve the purposes of § 3553(a)(2) “[e]xcept as
    otherwise specifically provided.”                 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a) (2006).
    Courts     have    generally   held      that    statutorily       mandated    minimum
    sentences are “otherwise specifically provided” and thus do not
    conflict     with    §   3553(a)’s       “sufficient      but   not   greater        than
    necessary” clause.          United States v. Sutton, 
    625 F.3d 526
    , 529
    (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Kellum, 
    356 F.3d 285
    , 289 (3d
    Cir. 2004) (“[T]he [statutory] mandatory minimum sentences [the
    defendant] was exposed to . . . clearly fit within the ‘except
    as otherwise specifically provided’ exclusion of § 3551(a).”).
    “Courts have uniformly rejected the claim that § 3553(a)’s ‘no
    greater than necessary’ language authorizes a district court to
    sentence below the statutory minimum.”                 United States v. Cirilo-
    Muñoz, 
    582 F.3d 54
    , 55 (1st Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (collecting
    7
    cases); see also United States v. Franklin, 
    499 F.3d 578
    , 585
    (6th   Cir.     2007)    (“[Section]        3553(a)    factors     do     not    apply    to
    congressionally          mandated      sentences.”);           United       States        v.
    Roberson,      
    474 F.3d 432
    ,   436    (7th     Cir.   2007)       (acknowledging
    tension between § 3553(a) and statutorily mandated sentences,
    but holding that § 3553(a) is a “very general statute [that]
    cannot    be    understood      to    authorize       courts      to    sentence       below
    minimums       specifically      prescribed      by    Congress”).              In    United
    States v. Robinson, 
    404 F.3d 850
     (4th Cir. 2005), we held that,
    even after United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
     (2005), except
    in limited circumstances not present here, “a district court
    still may not depart below a statutory minimum.”                           404 F.3d at
    862.     Williams’ reliance on United States v. Raby, 
    575 F.3d 376
    (4th Cir. 2009), is misplaced, as that case provides no guidance
    on sentencing below a mandatory minimum.
    We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.                         We
    dispense       with     oral    argument      because       the    facts        and    legal
    contentions      are    adequately     presented       in    the       materials       before
    this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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