Hettwer v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho , 118 Idaho 373 ( 1990 )

JOHNSON, Justice.

This case was styled as a bad faith insurance case.

Mr. Hettwer was injured when an automobile he was driving was involved in an accident with an automobile driven by Kara K. Hermstead. The Hettwers sued Kara and her parents, Richard and Marilyn Hermstead alleging that Kara Hermstead’s negligence was the cause of the accident. The Hettwers joined Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho (Farmers) as a defendant, alleging that (1) Farmers insured the Hermsteads under an automobile liability policy at the time of the accident, (2) the Hettwers had presented claims to Farmers for payment under the Hermsteads’ policy, and (3) Farmers had intentionally and tortiously denied or delayed payment on these claims.

Farmers moved for summary judgment dismissing the action against Farmers. After the motion for summary judgment was filed, the Hettwers moved to amend the complaint. In the proposed amended complaint the Hettwers alleged that Farmers was also their insurer under a contract of automobile insurance and that Farmers had denied and delayed payments on claims made under that contract.

The trial court granted the motion of Farmers for summary judgment, stating that a tort victim may not sue a tortfeasor’s insurer directly unless one of the factors enumerated in Bean v. Allstate Insurance Co., 285 Md. 572, 403 A.2d 793 (1979) exists. At the same time the trial court denied the motion to amend of the Hettwers, stating that misjoinder would occur if the amendment were allowed. The Hettwers appealed the summary judgment granting dismissal, but did not appeal the denial of the motion to amend. We affirm the dismissal of the claim against Farmers as the insurer of the Hermsteads.

The Hettwers assert that we should extend the principle we announced in White v. Unigard Mutual Insurance Co., 112 Idaho 94, 730 P.2d 1014 (1986), to this case. We conclude that this extension would be erroneous.

In White we held “that there exists a common law tort action, distinct from an action on the contract, for an insurer’s bad faith in settling the first party claims of its insured.” Id. at 100, 730 P.2d at 1020. Here we have a third-party claim by an injured party against the insurer of the party who was alleged to have been negligent in causing the injuries. The Hettwers argue that Rawlings v. Apodaca, 151 Ariz. 149, 726 P.2d 565 (1986), cited by this Court in White, supports the extension of White to the facts here. We disagree.

In Rawlings, the owners of a dairy farm who had sustained fire damage to their property sued their neighbors whom they alleged had started the fire. They also sued their insurance company under a homeowners policy, alleging breach of the obligation of good faith and fair dealing. The insurer paid the dairy farm owners the limits of their homeowners policy, but failed to furnish them with a copy of the investigation report concerning the cause of the fire and failed to advise them of the liability policy the insurer had issued to the neighbors. The Supreme Court of Arizona stated that the question presented was “whether an insurer violates the covenant of good faith and fair dealing when, for the purpose of protecting its own interests, it acts improperly to impede its insured’s recovery of the uninsured portion of the loss.” Id. 726 P.2d at 569. The action was a first-party claim by an insured against its own insurer for failure to act in good faith.

Here, the claim of the Hettwers against Farmers that was dismissed was the third-party claim, not a first-party claim. Therefore, neither White nor Rawlings is applicable. Whether the Hettwers have a valid first-party claim against Farmers is not presented to us in this appeal.

The Maryland Court of Appeals in the Bean case, cited by the trial court in its decision granting summary judgment, was a third-party action. There, the court said: “The narrow question presented in this case is whether one who has recovered a judgment in a personal injury suit stemming from an automobile accident may bring a direct action against his judgment debtor’s insurer for the amount that the judgment exceeds the policy limits.” 403 A.2d at 793-94. The court in Bean refused to allow a third-party claim against an insurer “in the absence of explicit authorization to that effect.” Id. at 796. This holding is consistent with our decisions on the question. Pocatello Indus. Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783, 791, 621 P.2d 399, 407 (1980); Downing v. Travelers Ins. Co., 107 Idaho 511, 514, 691 P.2d 375, 378 (1984). There is no basis for the Hettwers’ third-party action against Farmers.

We affirm the dismissal and find this appeal to be unreasonable and without foundation. We award costs and attorney fees to respondent.

BAKES, C.J., and BOYLE and McDEVITT, JJ., concur.