United States v. Farmer ( 1997 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    No. 95-7414
    DEE DEIDRE FARMER, a/k/a Douglas
    Farmer,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
    Joseph H. Young, Senior District Judge.
    (CR-86-158-Y, CA-94-3292-Y)
    Argued: April 9, 1997
    Decided: May 2, 1997
    Before HAMILTON and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and
    PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Reversed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: Henry Mark Stichel, PIPER & MARBURY, L.L.P., Bal-
    timore, Maryland, for Appellant. Jamie M. Bennett, Assistant United
    States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:
    Lynne A. Battaglia, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for
    Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    In 1986, Dee Deidre Farmer pled guilty to two charges of fraudu-
    lent use of credit cards. On November 28, 1994, Farmer filed this
    § 2255 motion in which she asserted that, at the time of her guilty
    pleas in 1986, she was suffering from AIDS-associated dementia as
    well as the effects of strong medication and, as a result, could not
    understand the legal consequences of her guilty pleas. See 
    28 U.S.C.A. § 2255
     (West Supp. 1997). She has filed two previous
    § 2255 motions in which she failed to mention this claim. However,
    Farmer maintains that only in late 1994 did she learn of the effects
    of her dementia and medication, because only then, after extensive lit-
    igation, were her medical records made available to her. See Farmer
    v. Brennan, 
    81 F.3d. 1444
    , 1448 (7th Cir. 1996), on remand from 
    511 U.S. 825
     (1994) (discussing Farmer's difficulty in obtaining discov-
    ery from Bureau of Prisons).
    In support of the present § 2255 motion, Farmer submitted affida-
    vits and medical reports from Drs. Bernard M. Branson and Alfred J.
    Saah, as well as her own sworn affidavit.
    In his affidavit, Dr. Branson declared that, after reviewing the
    report of a physician who had treated Farmer at the time of the guilty
    pleas in 1986, other medical information supplied by Farmer, and
    based on his own examination of Farmer during the period in ques-
    tion, he believed:
    [W]ithin a reasonable degree of medical certainty that on
    May 23, 1986, petitioner could not have entered a knowing
    and intelligent plea in any criminal proceeding, because of
    [her] health condition, and because of the medication that
    was being administered to the petitioner at the time.
    2
    Dr. Branson further observed that, according to Farmer's 1986 medi-
    cal report, Farmer had severe headaches, memory loss, lymphadeno-
    pathy (swelling of the lymph glands) and neurological abnormalities.
    These symptoms supported the conclusion of "possible AIDS demen-
    tia." Finally, Dr. Branson noted, "these findings were diagnostic of
    the encephalopathy (disease of the brain) associated with primary
    HIV infection. This condition was first described in the published
    medical literature in 1987, one year after [the 1986 medical] report."
    Dr. Saah submitted a similar report also concluding that Farmer
    could not have knowingly and intelligently entered into a plea agree-
    ment in 1986. Dr. Saah rested his conclusion both on the effects of
    the medication that Farmer was taking at the time of the pleas as well
    as the headaches and memory loss that Farmer experienced at that
    time.
    In her affidavit, Farmer explained that only after she received her
    medical records from the Federal Bureau of Prisons in 1994 did she
    realize that she might have grounds to vacate the guilty pleas:
    The cause for me not bringing the claims in my first two
    petitions was that I was not aware that the claims existed
    until I received the medical documentation in 1994. . . .
    [T]here was nothing in the medical literature[to support one
    diagnosis of her condition] at the time of the plea; thus, the
    medical records had to be re-evaluated by a professional
    before the additional diagnosis could have been made.
    The Government submitted no counter-affidavits or medical
    reports. Instead, the Government rested entirely on legal arguments.
    First, it asserted that Farmer's § 2255 motion constituted an abuse of
    the writ. The Government also maintained that the Rule 11 transcript
    proved that when Farmer pled guilty she clearly and unambiguously
    answered in the negative to questions regarding whether she was tak-
    ing drugs or under the care of a doctor during the six months prior
    to the pleas, and that her answers did not reflect the comments of a
    defendant suffering from dementia.
    The district court denied Farmer's § 2255 motion on the following
    rationale in a letter opinion:
    3
    Contrary to the petitioner's allegations, the [Rule 11] tran-
    script reveals that the defendant clearly understood the
    nature of the proceedings and answered the questions asked
    of her without any indication of duress or illness.
    The district court apparently failed to address Farmer's possible abuse
    of the writ or the probative value vel non of Farmer's affidavit. The
    court also failed to analyze -- or even mention-- the two indepen-
    dent opinions from reputable doctors supporting Farmer's claim that
    she was incompetent at the time of her guilty pleas.
    The doctors' affidavits, as well as the 1986 medical report, raise an
    issue which must be addressed as to Farmer's mental condition at the
    time of the pleas. These documents demonstrate that Farmer was
    being treated by a doctor at the time she pled guilty. They also pro-
    vide evidence that at the time of the pleas Farmer may have been suf-
    fering from the effects of her medical condition as well as from the
    medication she was taking. Dr. Branson stated that the diagnosis he
    would presently give to Farmer's symptoms at the time of the pleas,
    encephalopathy or "disease of the brain," was not recognized as a
    medical condition until 1987 -- a year after the pleas were entered.
    Both Dr. Branson and Dr. Saah unequivocally opined that, in view of
    Farmer's illness and strong medication, she could not have knowingly
    and intelligently pled guilty in 1986. Furthermore, Farmer's uncontro-
    verted affidavit requires some analysis before concluding that her fail-
    ure to pursue this claim earlier constitutes an abuse of the writ.
    From the record before us, we cannot determine why the district
    court failed to consider these independent opinions from qualified
    doctors in reaching its decision. A court need not issue a lengthy
    opinion addressing these claims. Nor must it hold an evidentiary hear-
    ing. Raines v. United States, 
    423 F.2d 526
    , 529-30 (4th Cir. 1970).
    However, the district court must provide some rationale for rejecting
    evidence of this sort. Alternatively, it may be, as the Government
    asserts, that Farmer has abused the writ. Even if Farmer had the diffi-
    culty she asserts in obtaining her medical files, it seems illogical to
    assume that in filing her first two § 2255 motions she completely for-
    got she was on drugs and not "in her right mind" at the time of her
    Rule 11 hearing. Since these are matters for the district court to
    4
    resolve, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent
    with this opinion.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 95-7414

Filed Date: 5/2/1997

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021