Alan Scott v. Fairton FCI , 379 F. App'x 155 ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                   NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 09-4171
    ___________
    ALAN N. SCOTT,
    Appellant
    v.
    FAIRTON FCI, Warden
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    D.C. Civil Action No. 09-cv-00929
    (Honorable Renée Marie Bumb)
    ____________________________________
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    May 6, 2010
    Before: SCIRICA, JORDAN and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges.
    (Filed:May 11, 2010)
    _________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    _________
    PER CURIAM.
    In March 2009, federal prisoner Alan Scott filed a pro se habeas petition in the
    District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Scott alleged that he had been denied
    admission into FCI-Fairton’s Residential Drug Abuse Program (“RDAP”) despite
    evidence that he had previously abused marijuana and heroin. Scott also claimed that he
    was eligible for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621, which provides that
    the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) may reduce, by as much as one year, the prison term of a
    nonviolent offender who successfully completes a residential substance abuse treatment
    program. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B).
    Shortly after Scott filed his petition, a back-and-forth ensued between the District
    Court and himself. On three separate occasions, the court entered a sua sponte order
    dismissing his petition and he subsequently submitted new filings amending his petition
    and/or challenging the court’s order. These developments occurred without the BOP’s
    participation in the case, for it appears that it had yet to be served.
    This case ultimately culminated in a sua sponte order entered by the District Court
    on September 14, 2009. The court, considering Scott’s then most recent round of filings,
    concluded that these new submissions, when compared to his earlier filings, “asserted a
    factually different scenario.” (Dist. Ct. Order of Sept. 14, 2009, at 3.) As such, the court
    closed the case, and directed the clerk to open a new habeas proceeding and docket
    Scott’s most recent round of filings in that new proceeding. The court further directed the
    clerk to serve all of Scott’s filings on the BOP, and ordered that the BOP answer those
    filings docketed in the new case. That new case currently remains pending before the
    2
    District Court. (See Dist. Ct. Civ. No. 1:09-cv-04710.) Scott now seeks review of the
    District Court’s September 14, 2009 order, as well as two of the earlier orders.1
    A district court order that does not resolve all of a petitioner’s claims in a given
    action is generally not immediately appealable unless the court certifies the order as a
    final judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). See Hill v. City of Scranton, 
    411 F.3d 118
    , 124 (3d Cir. 2005). In this case, neither the court’s September 14, 2009 order, nor
    any of its earlier orders, resolved all of his claims, for he still has claims pending before
    the court. That the District Court closed Scott’s original habeas proceeding and opened a
    new habeas proceeding to address those pending claims does not change this result.
    Although the court concluded in its September 14, 2009 order that Scott’s then most
    recent set of filings, when compared to his earlier filings, “asserted a factually different
    scenario,” we conclude that his legal claims did not change. Indeed, Scott’s efforts to
    obtain habeas relief had centered around, and continued to center around, his claims that
    he should have been admitted to RDAP, and that he is eligible for a § 3621 sentence
    reduction upon his completing that program. Accordingly, because the District Court did
    not certify any of the challenged orders pursuant to Rule 54(b), they are not appealable at
    1
    The District Court entered those two earlier orders on May 26, 2009, and July 17,
    2009, respectively. Scott does not challenge the District Court’s order entered on April
    24, 2009, which dismissed his habeas petition without prejudice because much of the
    petition was illegible.
    3
    this time.2 Those orders may be reviewed on appeal when the District Court has issued a
    final judgment in Scott’s pending proceeding.
    In light of the above, we will dismiss this appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
    Scott’s motion to expedite the appeal is denied as moot.
    2
    Although the collateral order doctrine allows appellate review of a “small class”
    of interlocutory orders, see Praxis Props., Inc. v. Colonial Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 
    947 F.2d 49
    ,
    54 (3d Cir. 1991), that doctrine does not apply here.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 09-4171

Citation Numbers: 379 F. App'x 155

Judges: Greenberg, Jordan, Per Curiam, Scirica

Filed Date: 5/11/2010

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/3/2023