Tyree Wallace v. Doe , 512 F. App'x 141 ( 2013 )

BLD-099 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-3926
___________
TYREE WALLACE,
Appellant
v.
JANE DOE, Medical Staff; BARBARA HOLLIBAUGH, Unit Manager;
MARY LOU SHOWALTER, Corrections Health Care Administrator;
DR. KLEMICK, Medical Director; SCOTT WALTERS, Unit Manager;
JAY JOHNSON, Counselor, JANE DOE, Plumbing Supervisor;
RAYMOND W. LAWLER, Superintendant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 1:10-cv-00948)
District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
January 25, 2013
Before: SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 31, 2013)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Tyree Wallace, an inmate currently incarcerated at SCI Huntingdon in
Huntingdon, Pennsylvania and proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denying his motion to alter
or amend judgment. Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will
summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See 3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
I.
Because we write primarily for the parties, we need only recite the facts necessary
for our discussion. On April 28, 2008, while housed in the EA Unit at SCI Huntingdon,
Wallace suffered a seizure, which he alleges rendered him unconscious for approximately
one hour and forty-five minutes. During that time, he was lying against an uncovered
radiator in his cell and suffered severe burns to his face, head, arm, and ear. According to
Wallace, he requested to be transferred to B Block and the Special Needs Unit a number
of times between 2004 and 2006 because of his seizure disorder. He was first diagnosed
in 2002 and was prescribed Dilantin, an anti-seizure medication. He continued to take
Dilantin from 2002 until the date of the radiator incident; however, he alleged that he had
gone four days without medication prior to his seizure. Wallace also asserted that after
the incident, doctors at Mercy Hospital switched his medication to Tegretol and that he
has not suffered a seizure since then.
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Wallace filed his civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in April
2010, alleging that Appellees violated his Eighth Amendment rights by providing
inadequate medical care and by demonstrating a failure to protect. On January 12, 2011,
the District Court dismissed Wallace’s complaint against Dr. Klemick in its entirety. On
June 17, 2011, the District Court granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment with
respect to Wallace’s inadequate medical care claim as to Jane Doe, Medical and
Showalter. Hollibaugh, Johnson, Walters, Lawler, and Jane Doe, Plumbing Supervisor
filed a motion for summary judgment on Wallace’s failure to protect claim on September
19, 2011, and Wallace filed his opposition on November 18, 2011. On June 13, 2012, the
District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees and dismissed Jane Doe,
Plumbing Supervisor, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) for Wallace’s failure to identify
and serve her. Wallace subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration of the District
Court’s judgment, which the District Court denied on September 13, 2012. Wallace then
timely filed this appeal.
II.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because Wallace’s timely
appeal from the denial of his motion for reconsideration “brings up the underlying
judgment for review,” we will review the District Court’s grants of summary judgment to
Appellees and dismissals of Klemick and Jane Doe, Plumbing Supervisor as well as its
denial of Wallace’s motion for reconsideration. LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr.
Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 225 n.6 (3d Cir. 2007); see also McAlister v. Sentry Ins. Co., 958
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F.2d 550, 552-53 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[A]n appeal from a denial of a Motion for
Reconsideration brings up the underlying judgment for review.”).
To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)). This Court affirms a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a
claim “only if, accepting all factual allegations as true and construing the complaint in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, we determine that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief
under any reasonable reading of the complaint.” McGovern v. City of Philadelphia, 554
F.3d 114, 115 (3d Cir. 2009). Furthermore, summary judgment is appropriate only when
the record “shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “The
moving party has the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact, and summary judgment is to be entered if the evidence is such that a
reasonable fact finder could find only for the moving party.” Watson v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 235 F.3d 851, 854 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986)).
We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s orders granting summary
judgment and Appellee Klemick’s motion to dismiss. See Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d
318, 322 (3d Cir. 2009); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). However,
we review the dismissal of a defendant on the basis of improper or failed service of
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process for abuse of discretion. See Umbenhauer v. Woog, 969 F.2d 25, 28 (3d Cir.
1992). We review a denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion, but
review a district court’s underlying legal determinations de novo and its factual
determinations for clear error. Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros,
176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999). We may summarily affirm on any basis supported by
the record. Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
III.
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), inmates must exhaust their
administrative remedies before filing a suit alleging specific acts of unconstitutional
conduct by prison officials. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). A prisoner must exhaust these
remedies “in the literal sense;” no further avenues in the prison’s grievance process
should be available. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 232 (3d Cir. 2004). Exhaustion must
be “‘proper exhaustion,’ meaning that the prisoner must comply with all the
administrative requirements and not merely wait until there are no administrative
remedies ‘available.’” Williams v. Beard, 482 F.3d 637, 639 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92-103 (2006)). “[I]t is the prison’s requirements, and
not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S.
199, 218 (2007).
The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections’ (“DOC”) grievance system requires
an inmate to first file a grievance with the facility grievance coordinator. See Pa. Dep’t
of Corr. Policy Statement, DC-ADM 804, Part IV.A.8. The inmate may appeal the
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coordinator’s decision to the facility manager, and then may file a final appeal to the
Secretary’s office. See id. at Part IV.C.1, 2 and Part IV.D.1. Here, the record reflects
that Wallace did not appeal the denial of his grievance alleging that he received
inadequate medical care for the burns he suffered to his face and that officials
inconsistently administrated his seizure medication. Furthermore, while Wallace argues
that he addressed his inadequate medical care claim against Klemick in a grievance filed
on May 7, 2008 and appealed on November 5, 2008, the record reflects that nowhere in
that grievance does he address that claim. Furthermore, Wallace never submitted a
grievance alleging that Jane Doe, Medical and Showalter provided inadequate medical
care. Therefore, the District Court properly dismissed Wallace’s complaint as to Klemick
and granted summary judgment to Appellees Jane Doe, Medical and Showalter on
Wallace’s inadequate medical care claim.
To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim for failure to protect, a plaintiff must
show that: (1) “he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious
harm;” and (2) prison officials operated with “deliberate indifference to [his] health or
safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); see also Hamilton v. Leavy, 117
F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 1997). A substantial risk of serious harm “may be established by
much less than proof of a reign of violence and terror,” but requires more than a single
incident or isolated incidents. See Riley v. Jeffes, 777 F.2d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 1985). To
determine whether officials operated with deliberate indifference, courts question
whether they consciously knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to the prisoner’s
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well being. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 840-44; Hamilton, 117 F.3d at 747. Not only must a
prison official be “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but the official “must also draw the inference.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
Here, Wallace asserts that both he and other inmates housed in the EA Unit
suffered radiator burns prior to his April 28, 2008 incident; however, the record contains
no evidence to support his assertions. Furthermore, Lawler, Walters, Johnson, and
Hollibaugh all declared that they had never heard of any inmate suffering burns from the
radiators prior to Wallace’s incident. Accordingly, Wallace cannot establish a substantial
risk of serious harm through a single incident. See Riley, 777 F.2d at 147. Given that the
record is devoid of any evidence that prison officials were aware of prior incidents
involving inmates being burned by the radiators, Wallace cannot establish that officials
could be aware of any facts from which they could draw an inference that the radiators in
the EA Unit posed a substantial risk of serious harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
Accordingly, the District Court properly granted summary judgment to Lawler, Walters,
Johnson, and Hollibaugh on Wallace’s Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim. 1
Finally, Wallace filed a motion for reconsideration of the District Court’s order
granting summary judgment to Appellees on his failure to protect claim. A motion for
reconsideration “must rely on one of three grounds: (1) an intervening change in
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controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) the need to correct clear error
of law or prevent manifest injustice.” Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir.
2010) (per curiam). Wallace did not identify any of these factors; instead, he merely
reiterated his previous argument and attempted to introduce new theories of liability, all
of which were available to him before he filed this motion. Accordingly, we discern no
abuse of discretion in the District Court’s denial of Wallace’s motion.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, no substantial question is presented and we will affirm
the judgment of the District Court. See 3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. Wallace’s
motion for the appointment of counsel is denied.
1
Because Wallace’s claim against Jane Doe, Plumbing Supervisor was meritless,
we need not determine whether the District Court abused its discretion in dismissing her
from the suit under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
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