Ricky Earls v. State ( 1998 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
RICKY EARLS, )
) July 30, 1998
Appellant, ) C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9710-CR-00500
) (No. 2640 Below)
Cecil W. Crowson
VS. ) DAVIDSON COUNTY
Appellate Court Clerk
)
RICKY BELL, WARDEN, ) The Hon. Seth Norman
) (Dismissal of Habeas Corpus Petition)
Appellee. ) AFFIRMED PURSUANT TO RULE 20
ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion requesting that the
judgment in the above-styled cause be affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Tennessee Court of
Criminal Appeals Rules. Upon reviewing the record and the pleadings in this case, we find
that it is an appropriate matter for affirmance under Rule 20.
From the record, it appears that the petitioner pled guilty to several offenses
in Bedford County on November 10, 1994, and was sentenced to an effective sentence of
five years. The record also reflects that the petitioner was sentenced for a parole violation
at the same time. Thereafter, the judgments in Bedford County were set aside, and
eventually, the indictment for these charges was dismissed based on the grand jury
returning a superseding indictment. Subsequently, the petitioner appears to have pled
guilty to larceny and theft, receiving an effective sentence of three years. The petitioner
also pled guilty to burglary in Coffee County on May 8, 1996, and received a concurrent
three-year sentence. Although not in the record, there is a certified copy of an order
dismissing the case attached to the petitioner’s brief.
On October 9, 1997, the petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing that
time served and credits earned on his sentences that were set aside in Bedford County
should be applied to his more recent sentences from Coffee County. In denying relief, the
trial court held that after reviewing the Coffee County judgments at face value, the
sentences had not expired. Although the petitioner is currently released on parole, he
argues that parole constitutes a restraint.
It is a well-established principle of law that the remedy of habeas corpus is
limited in its nature and its scope. Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 161-162 (Tenn.1993);
Passarella v. State, 891 S.W.2d 619, 626 (Tenn. Crim. App.1994). In Tennessee, habeas
corpus relief is available only if "'it appears upon the face of the judgment or the record of
the proceedings upon which the judgment is rendered,' that a convicting court was without
jurisdiction or authority to sentence a defendant, or that a defendant's sentence of
imprisonment or other restraint has expired." Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164
(Tenn.1993) (citation omitted in original). In the present case, on the face of the
judgments, the petitioner’s sentence has not expired. Time served on other offenses,
regardless of whether those convictions have since been reversed, is not relevant. See,
e.g., Trigg v. State, 523 S.W.2d 375, 376 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975).
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the state’s motion to affirm the
judgment of the trial court under Rule 20, Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rules, is
granted, and the appeal is dismissed. It appearing that the petitioner is indigent, costs of
these proceedings are taxed to the state.
_____________________________
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
CONCUR:
_____________________________
JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
_____________________________
THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE