Glenn v. Barnhart , 124 F. App'x 828 ( 2005 )


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  •                                                         United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                February 17, 2005
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 04-50488
    Summary Calendar
    WILLIE GLENN,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    JO ANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. 1:03-CV-482-RP
    --------------------
    Before REAVLEY, JOLLY, and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Willie Glenn appeals the district court’s judgment for the
    Commissioner in his action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for
    review of the administrative law judge’s (ALJ) decision denying
    him disability benefits.    Glenn argues that the ALJ failed to
    correctly address whether he had impairments that imposed more
    than a slight limitation on his ability to perform work related
    activities for 12 consecutive months.    Glenn contends that the
    ALJ clearly erred in finding that he did not have a severe
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    impairment.   He argues that the ALJ should have gone beyond step
    two and should have addressed whether he could perform other
    gainful work activity.
    The proper standard for evaluating the ALJ’s decision is not
    that of clear error but of substantial evidence.    Ripley v.
    Chater, 
    67 F.3d 552
    , 555 (5th Cir. 1995).   The ALJ applied the
    proper legal standard of Stone v. Heckler, 
    752 F.2d 1099
    , 1101
    (5th Cir. 1985) in determining whether Glenn had a severe
    impairment, and the ALJ’s decision is also supported by
    substantial evidence.    The objective medical evidence in the
    record demonstrated that Glenn’s ability to perform basic work
    activities as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(a) and (b) were
    affected by his back impairment for a period of less than twelve
    months.   The medical evidence shows that although Glenn had a
    back impairment, he responded to the treatment and suffered few
    if any limitations that affected his ability to work within a
    year of his surgery.    Medical impairments that reasonably can be
    remedied or controlled by medication or treatment are not
    disabling.    Johnson v. Bowen, 
    864 F.2d 340
    , 347 (5th Cir. 1988);
    see also Fraga v. Bowen, 
    810 F.2d 1296
    , 1303-04 (5th Cir. 1987)
    (After back surgery, claimant did not have neurological or other
    signs of pain sufficiently severe or long-lasting to be disabling
    within the meaning of the Act.); Adams v. Bowen, 
    833 F.2d 509
    ,
    511-12 (5th Cir. 1987) (claimant responded to treatment of back
    condition, and symptoms were not present continuously for a 12
    month period).
    The ALJ’s adverse credibility assessment was based on proper
    considerations and is supported by substantial evidence.    The ALJ
    properly concluded that any “mild discomfort” which Glenn might
    have would not interfere with his ability to perform basic work
    activities and that he did not have a severe impairment that
    lasted for 12 consecutive months.   This finding is supported by
    substantial evidence from Glenn’s treating physicians, the
    examining and reviewing physicians, and Glenn’s own statements to
    his physician and physical therapist.
    Glenn argues that the ALJ improperly failed to give
    controlling weight to Dr. Bahm’s opinion that he was disabled.
    The ALJ explained his rejection of Dr. Bahm’s opinion by
    specifically pointing out that Dr. Bahm’s treatment notes
    contradicted his own opinion.   The ALJ’s conclusion that Dr.
    Bahm’s opinion that Glenn was permanently disabled should not be
    given controlling weight is supported by substantial evidence.
    Greenspan v. Shalala, 
    38 F.3d 232
    , 237 (5th Cir. 1994).
    Glenn contends that the ALJ may reject the opinion of the
    treating physician only if he performs a detailed analysis under
    the criteria set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).   The ALJ
    specifically considered these factors.   However, because there
    existed reliable medical evidence from an examining physician,
    Dr. Pieratt, controverting Dr. Bahm’s assessment, the ALJ was not
    obligated to perform the detailed analysis set forth in 20 C.F.R.
    § 404.1527(d)(2)-(6).   See Newton v. Apfel, 
    209 F.3d 448
    , 453
    (2000).
    Glenn also contends that remand is required because the ALJ
    did not seek additional clarification from the treating physician
    after concluding that the treating physician’s records were
    inconclusive or inadequate.   This requirement does not apply in
    this case.   First, the ALJ did not determine that the treating
    physician’s records were inconclusive or inadequate; he found
    that Dr. Bahm’s opinion was unsupported by objective clinical
    findings and contradicted by the evidence as a whole, including
    Dr. Bahm’s own treatment notes.   Further, Dr. Pieratt’s
    observations were based on his personal examination of Glenn.
    The ALJ did not err by not seeking additional evidence or
    clarification.   See 
    Newton, 209 F.3d at 453
    , 457-58.
    The ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence,
    and there was no misapplication of the law.   Therefore, the
    decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.