State v. White , 2014 NV 56 ( 2014 )


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  •                                                                  ar
    130 Nev, Advance Opinion
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
    THE STATE OF NEVADA,                                   No. 62890
    Appellant,
    vs.
    FILED
    TROY RICHARD WHITE,                                              JUL 1 0 2014
    Respondent.
    EM. LINDEMAN
    ipE   orrun CLERK
    Appeal from a district court order granting defed ant's
    pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus, dismissing a burglary charge.
    Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Elizabeth Goff Gonzalez,
    Judge.
    Affirmed.
    Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B.
    Wolfson, District Attorney, Steven S. Owens and Jonathan E.
    VanBoskerck, Chief Deputy District Attorneys, and Ryan MacDonald and
    Michelle Sudano, Deputy District Attorneys, Clark County,
    for Appellant.
    Philip J. Kohn, Public Defender, and Scott L. Coffee and David Lopez-
    Negrete, Deputy Public Defenders, Clark County,
    for Respondent.
    BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.
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    OPINION
    By the Court, GIBBONS, C.J.:
    In this opinion, we address for the first time whether a person
    can burglarize his or her own home. We conclude that a person cannot
    commit burglary of a home when he or she has an absolute right to enter
    the home.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    Troy White and Echo Lucas were married and lived together
    with five children in a house owned by White. In early June 2012, after
    having marital issues, the couple separated. White offered to move out of
    their residence. The couple agreed that Lucas would live in the residence
    with the children during the week, and White would live there with the
    children over the weekend. White retained his house key to use on the
    weekends. In late June, Lucas' new boyfriend, Joseph Averman, moved
    into the residence to live there with Lucas.
    Averman testified that White would usually come to the
    residence between two and three o'clock in the afternoon on Fridays.
    White remained at the residence through the weekends, leaving on
    Sundays. During the weekends, Averman and Lucas would leave the
    residence and stay elsewhere until Sunday. Not surprisingly, White was
    unhappy that Lucas started dating Averman and began repeatedly
    harassing her with phone calls, voicemails, and text messages. He even
    threatened Averman, stating that "if you don't stay away, I'm going
    to ... kill you."
    On Friday July 27, 2012, around two o'clock in the morning,
    White began banging on Lucas' bedroom window. Lucas called him and
    told him to stop because the kids were asleep in the house. White
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    returned to the house later that day around noon, entered the house with
    his key, and asked to speak to Lucas. She told White that he was not
    supposed to be at the residence at that time and they could talk later.
    However, she eventually agreed to talk to him for five minutes. Lucas and
    White went into the spare bedroom to talk while Averman tended to one of
    the children across the hall in the master bedroom. Averman then heard
    Lucas say, "[White], no, please don't, and stop." Averman, aware of prior
    abuse between Lucas and White, went to the room and saw Lucas attempt
    to leave the room before being pulled back into the room. White then
    pushed Lucas against the wall and shot her in the stomach. White turned
    toward Averman and shot him once in the right arm and twice in the
    abdomen. White then told Averman that "I told you this was going to
    happen." White fled the scene in Lucas' vehicle. Averman eventually
    recovered from his injuries, but Lucas died as a result of her gunshot
    wound.
    The State filed a criminal complaint against White for (1)
    burglary while in possession of a firearm, (2) murder with use of a deadly
    weapon, (3) attempted murder with use of a deadly weapon, (4) carrying a
    concealed firearm, and (5) ten counts of child abuse, neglect, or
    endangerment. At the preliminary hearing, the justice court bound over
    White on all the charges and consolidated the child abuse charges.
    However, White argued that he could not be charged with burglary of his
    own residence. The justice court instructed the parties to file a petition
    with the district court in order to settle this issue.
    White then filed a pretrial petition for writ of habeas corpus
    arguing that a person cannot be charged with burglary of his or her own
    residence. The State filed a response arguing that Nevada's burglary
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    statute clearly and unambiguously allows a person to be charged with
    burglarizing his or her own home. The district court ultimately granted
    White's petition, dismissing the charge for burglary while in possession of
    firearm, and finding that (1) at common law one could not burglarize his
    or her own residence; and (2) one cannot legally burglarize his or her own
    residence "where there is no legal impediment such as a TPO, a
    restraining order of some sort . . . that would otherwise limit the ability of
    an owner to access their own property." The State now appeals.
    DISCUSSION
    A person cannot commit burglary of a home when he or she has an absolute
    right to enter the home
    We have not previously addressed whether a person can
    burglarize his or her own home. We review questions of law and statutory
    interpretation de novo. Sheriff, Clark Cnty. v. Burcham, 
    124 Nev. 1247
    ,
    1253, 
    198 P.3d 326
    , 329 (2008). "When interpreting a statute, legislative
    intent is the controlling factor."   State v. Lucero, 127 Nev. „ 
    249 P.3d 1226
    , 1228 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). To determine
    legislative intent of a statute, this court will first look at its plain
    language. 
    Id. "But when
    the statutory language lends itself to two or
    more reasonable interpretations, the statute is ambiguous, and [this court]
    may then look beyond the statute in determining legislative intent."       
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks omitted). When interpreting an ambiguous
    statute, "we look to the legislative history and construe the statute in a
    manner that is consistent with reason and public policy."                  
    Id. "Additionally, statutory
    construction should always avoid an absurd
    result." 
    Burcham, 124 Nev. at 1253
    , 198 P.3d at 329 (internal quotation
    marks omitted).
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    At common law, "burglary was generally defined as the
    breaking and entering of the dwelling of another in the nighttime with
    intent to commit a felony."       People v. Gauze, 
    542 P.2d 1365
    , 1366 (Cal.
    1975) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). However,
    Nevada's current burglary statute, NRS 205.060(1), states that "a person
    who, by day or night, enters any house, . . . or other building,. . . with the
    intent to commit grand or petit larceny, assault or battery on any person
    or any felony, . . . is guilty of burglary."
    We conclude that Nevada's burglary statute is subject to two
    reasonable interpretations: (1) the Legislature intended to revoke the
    common law rule that burglary requires entry into the building of another,
    or (2) the Legislature incorporated the common law requirement by failing
    to expressly include one's own home as a possible place of burglary.       See
    
    Gauze, 542 P.2d at 1366
    . 1 In order to resolve the two possible
    interpretations, we consider the purposes of common law burglary, the
    legislative intent of Nevada's burglary statute, and California's approach
    to whether one can burglarize his or her own home. 2
    'California's burglary statute is nearly identical to Nevada's, and
    that state's legislature has also similarly expanded the structures that can
    be burglarized and eliminated the breaking requirement. 
    Gauze, 542 P.2d at 1366
    . The California Supreme Court explained that the California
    Legislature's expansion of burglary could be interpreted in the same two
    ways. 
    Id. 2 Even
    though the State argues that the plain language of Nevada's
    burglary statute clearly allows a person to burglarize a house that he or
    she owns and has an absolute right to enter, we hold that this
    interpretation could create absurd results and would not promote the
    policy behind common law burglary and its modern codification, NRS
    205.060. See 
    Gauze, 542 P.2d at 1369
    (noting that a person could
    continued on next page . . .
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    The common law, "so far as it is not repugnant to or
    inconsistent with, the constitution or laws of the United States, or the
    laws of the territory of Nevada, shall be the rule of decision in all courts of
    this territory.... [and] should remain in force until repealed by the
    legislature."     Vansickle v. Haines,       
    7 Nev. 249
    , 285 (1872) (internal
    quotation marks omitted). Common law burglary was a crime against
    "habitation and occupancy" and "clearly sought to protect the right to
    peacefully enjoy one's own home free of invasion."         
    Gauze, 542 P.2d at 1366
    (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that "a person's home was
    truly his castle"). Further, the common law was clear that a person could
    not be convicted of burglary for entering his own home with the intent to
    commit a felony. 
    Id. "This rule
    applied not only to sole owners of homes,
    but also to joint occupants," thus "[t]he important factor was occupancy,
    rather than ownership." 
    Id. The Nevada
    Legislature has moved away from the common
    law definition of burglary in several respects. The current statute only
    requires an entry with the intent to commit certain enumerated offenses.
    State v. Adams, 
    94 Nev. 503
    , 505, 
    581 P.2d 868
    , 869 (1978). Breaking is
    no longer an essential element of burglary. 
    Id. Further, the
    entry does
    not need to be a forcible entry, nor does the burglary need to occur at
    night. Hernandez v. State, 
    118 Nev. 513
    , 531, 
    50 P.3d 1100
    , 1113 (2002);
    NRS 205.060(1). Also, consent to the entry is not a defense to burglary if
    . continued
    potentially commit burglary by walking into his house with the intent to
    forge a check, or with the intent to administer heroin to himself).
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    the person "acquired the entry with felonious intent." Barrett v. State, 
    105 Nev. 361
    , 364, 
    775 P.2d 1276
    , 1277 (1989). While these changes certainly
    expanded the common law definition of burglary, the common law notion
    that burglary law is designed to protect a possessory or occupancy right in
    property remains in effect.
    The basic policies underlying burglary statues also support the
    conclusion that a person cannot burglarize his or her own home when he
    or she has an absolute right to enter the home. Burglary statutes "are
    based primarily upon a recognition of the dangers to personal
    safety . . . that the intruder will harm the occupants in attempting to
    perpetrate the intended crime or to escape and the danger that the
    occupants will in anger or panic react violently to the invasion, thereby
    inviting more violence."      
    Gauze, 542 P.2d at 1368
    (internal quotation
    marks omitted). The laws are not intended necessarily to deter the
    trespass or the intended crimes, but "[are] aimed at the danger caused by
    the unauthorized entry itself." 
    Id. "The statute
    protects against intruders
    into indoor areas, not persons committing crimes in their own homes." 
    Id. at 1369
    (emphasis omitted).
    We agree with the analysis of the California Supreme Court in
    Gauze, which relied upon these policies to reach the conclusion that a
    person with an absolute right to enter a structure cannot commit burglary
    of that structure.   
    Id. at 1367.
    In Gauze, the defendant entered an
    apartment that he rented with two other roommates and shot one of his
    roommates. 
    Id. at 1365-66.
    The court concluded that the defendant did
    not commit burglary because he "invaded no possessory right of
    habitation." 
    Id. at 1367.
    He had an absolute right to enter the apartment
    and could not be refused admission to his apartment or ejected from the
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    apartment after entry. 3 
    Id. The court
    explained this conclusion by stating
    "Mn contrast to the usual burglary situation, no danger arises from the
    mere entry of a person into his own home, no matter what his intent
    is ... no emotional distress is suffered, no panic is engendered, and no
    violence necessarily erupts merely because he walks into his house."
    
    Gauze, 542 P.2d at 1368
    .
    Based on this analysis, we conclude that while the Legislature
    has expanded common law burglary in several respects, it has at least
    retained the notion that: (1) burglary law is designed to protect a
    possessory or occupancy right in property, and (2) one cannot burglarize
    his own home so long as he has an absolute right to enter the home. Thus,
    while ownership may be one factor to consider, the appropriate question is
    whether the alleged burglar has an absolute, unconditional right to enter
    the home.
    The district court did not err in granting White's pretrial petition for a writ
    of habeas corpus
    Applying our holding to the facts of this case, we now consider
    whether the district court erred by granting White's pretrial petition for a
    3 There  are common situations when a person does not have an
    absolute right to enter a structure. For example, a husband does not have
    a right to enter the house he owns with his wife if the wife obtained a
    district court order granting her possession of the house. People v. Smith,
    
    48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 378
    , 384 (Ct. App. 2006). Also, while customers have a
    limited right to enter a store for lawful purposes, persons who possess the
    intent to commit a felony therein are not entitled to enter. People v.
    Barry, 
    29 P. 1026
    , 1026-27 (Cal. 1892). Lastly, a landlord does not have
    an absolute right to enter a property he or she owns because the landlord
    conveys the right of possession to the tenant. State v. Machan, 
    322 P.3d 655
    , 659 (Utah 2013).
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    writ of habeas corpus. When reviewing a district court's grant of a pretrial
    petition for writ of habeas corpus, we must "determine whether all of the
    evidence received at the preliminary hearing ... establishes probable
    cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the accused
    committed it." Kinsey v. Sheriff Washoe Cnty., 
    87 Nev. 361
    , 363, 
    487 P.2d 340
    , 341 (1971). "The finding of probable cause may be based on slight,
    even marginal evidence," Sheriff Washoe Cnty. v. Hodes, 
    96 Nev. 184
    , 186,
    
    606 P.2d 178
    , 180 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted), and we will
    uphold the district court's determination of factual sufficiency absent
    substantial error. 
    Burcham, 124 Nev. at 1257
    , 198 P.3d at 332.
    Under the facts of this case, we conclude that the district court
    did not err in dismissing the charge against White for burglary while in
    possession of a firearm because he had an absolute right to enter the
    residence. Even though he orally agreed to stay elsewhere during the
    week, he still maintained an absolute right to enter the residence and did
    not forfeit any possessory right he had in it. Further, White could not be
    ejected or prevented from entering the residence, especially since he still
    retained his keys to the house and entered the house on a weekly basis to
    stay with his children on weekends. This conclusion supports the general
    burglary policy to protect against intruders, but not against persons
    committing crimes in their own homes, such as White. Thus, the State
    failed to provide slight or marginal evidence that White's entry into his
    residence invaded another's possessory right of habitation.
    CONCLUSION
    We conclude that the Legislature has not eliminated the
    common law notion that a person with an absolute unconditional right to
    enter a structure cannot burglarize that structure. As such, we conclude
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    that the district court did not err in granting White's petition for a writ of
    habeas corpus. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the district court. 4
    Gibbons
    We concur:
    dn' f1                       J.
    Pickering
    ,   J.
    Hardesty
    CAAA                          j.
    Parraguirre
    J.
    Douglas
    Cherry
    offilt=_                         J.
    Saitta
    4 We
    have considered the parties' remaining arguments and conclude
    they are without merit.
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